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This study investigates accountability and external civilian oversight of policing reform in 
Northern Ireland, envisioned under the Patten Commission‟s programme of reforms in 1999. 
Emerging from the Patten Commission‟s report was a new architecture of accountability built 
around three institutions: the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI); the Northern Ireland 
Policing Board (NIPB); and the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI).  
 
Almost twenty years after the Patten Report was published, it is an opportune time to 
examine how these accountability arrangements may effect policing reform and whether 
there are clearly identifiable factors which enable or inhibit the efficacy of external civilian 
oversight. It is also timely to reflect upon the values, attitudes and beliefs held by those 
involved in external civilian oversight, and whether these attitudes can be differentiated 
across the actors and agencies involved in external civilian oversight in Northern Ireland.  
 
Employing both Q methodology and semi-structured interviews with elite actors (n=62) 
across the three institutions, this study has developed a re-conceptualisation of policing 
accountability from an ecological systems perspective. Through this a new framework of 
„triadic accountability‟ is proposed, comprising of three distinct and interdependent 
dimensions of situational (s); relational (r); and transformational accountability.  
 
Using this new framework, the study derives from findings what it calls the „Nine I‟s‟ of 
triadic accountability which include idiosyncrasies (s), independence (s), intelligence (s), 
information-sharing (r), individuals (r), incidents-handling (r), improvements (t), iterative 
nature (t), and internalisation(t). Furthermore, the values, attitudes and beliefs of elite actors 
were found to diverge into two distinct perspectives. Together with the „Nine I‟s‟ of triadic 
accountability, this illustrates how external civilian oversight of policing reform in Northern 
Ireland has been found to have a duality or mixed effect  - the “agathakakological” effect 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
“It ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more 
dangerous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the 
introduction of a new order of things. This is because the innovator has for enemies 
all those who have done well under the old conditions and not very active defenders 
in those who have done well under the new” (Machiavelli, 1513, p.9). 
1.1  Introduction 
 
Throughout Britain‟s colonial conquest of its island neighbour Ireland, “the old conditions” 
and “a new order of things” have been in perpetual contest. For most of the last one hundred 
years since the partition of Ireland, this contest has been viscerally and violently expressed. 
By the end of the twentieth century, negotiations between parties to the conflict led to a de-
escalation of violence and the promise of a new social and political dispensation. Organs of 
state associated with the old regime were earmarked in this process for reform, including 
what one eminent policing scholar described as “the state made flesh”: the police (Punch, 
2000, p.322). So important to the social and political transformation of society in  Northern 
Ireland was the agenda for policing reform, that an International Commission was established 
and chaired by Conservative MP Lord Chris Patten. Before finalising their report and 
package of proposed reforms (ICP, 1999), he and his fellow Commissioners undertook an 
unprecedented, extensive series of public consultation events. At the close of one such 
consultation event in County Down, Patten was challenged by an elderly woman who had 
been bereaved during the conflict: “It‟s all very well coming here and giving us all that stuff 
about generosity and that. You go home after this is over. We have to stay with our histories 
and experience all around us” (Patten, 2017, p.181).  
Two decades on, these histories and experiences of the past still impinge upon the Patten 
Commission‟s proposals for policing reform, including its new architecture for 
accountability. In Belfast‟s High Court on 21
st
 December 2017, relatives of those killed in the 
1994 Loughinisland massacre heard Justice McCloskey acknowledge their loss and dignity 
before publicly denouncing the Police Ombudsman‟s office and ruling the Loughinisland 
report (PONI, 2016) was unlawful. That judgment alone raises questions for oversight of 
policing and policing reform. Outside the court, advisors to retired police officers who won 
the case remarked aloud that while the Loughinisland families‟ grief was acknowledged, the 
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bereaved families of police officers killed had been ignored (researcher fieldnotes, 21
st
 
December, 2017). This perceived disparity is a curious anomaly. Since the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (PSNI) was formed in 2001, 16 officers have died in the line of duty, most 
in road traffic collisions (RTCs) (www.policememorial.org). During the conflict (1968 – 
1994), there were 300 officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) killed (Ryder, 2000). 
However, no police officer was killed in the Loughinisland massacre. Yet this case illustrates 
the complex, dynamic context in which policing oversight and policing reform exists. In 
January 2018, an application was made for Justice McCloskey to recuse himself on grounds 
of “unconscious bias”. Ultimately, the preliminary judgement was set aside and Justice 
McCloskey agreed that the case should be heard again before a different judge (BBC, 2018). 
 
Anomalies, inconsistencies and contradictions evoked by this case and others are not 
empirical artefacts or outliers. Nor are they embarrassing aberrations to be ignored by social 
scientific research. Rather, these idiosyncrasies constitute potentially significant data in 
themselves (Zeineddine & Pratto, 2017, p.26).Indeed, to be more than a managerial audit or 
evaluative review of accountability, external civilian oversight and policing reform in the  
Northern Ireland, the socio-legal and political environment within which these processes 
occur must be observed and understood. An ecological systems approach to development, 
change or reform (Pratto, 2016; Johnson, 2008) is one which offers to facilitate this objective. 
Within ecological systems theory (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; 1992; 1999; 2009) shared values, 
attitudes and beliefs are salient in facilitating change and development. The corollary to this 
is that the link between accountability, external civilian oversight and policing reform may be 
open to investigation through the values, attitudes and beliefs of elite actors involved in its 
exercise.  
Providing the anchor for this study is the Patten Commission‟s programme of reform which 
said that “a new beginning for democratic accountability is a key to the new beginning to 
policing” (ICP, 1999, p.28). Emerging from the Commission‟s report was a new architecture 
of accountability built around three institutions: the Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI); the Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB); and the Police Ombudsman for 
Northern Ireland (PONI). The NIPB and PONI are separate bodies with distinct remits jointly 
dubbed as the “Patten institutions” (Shearing, 2010, p.29). They were expected by the Patten 
Commission to have a co-operative and collaborative relationship for external civilian 
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oversight (ECO) of the PSNI. Yet, as the Patten Commission conceded at the time: 
“Accountability…is at least as much a matter of the culture and ethos of the service as it is of 
the institutional mechanisms” (ICP, 1999, p.22). Proceedings against PONI‟s Loughinisland 
report (PONI, 2016) tend to suggest accountability still excites opposition within the ecology 
of policing. How this „opposition‟ may affect policing oversight or reform lies at the heart of 
this study. 
1.2  What is accountability? 
 
The study of accountability in any subject area, as Dubnik (2014(b) argues, is not without its 
ontological challenges. This is because there are two distinct dimensions or forms of 
accountability: one is institutional; the other is relational (2014(b), p.650).  Going further, it is 
suggested that the future of scholarship on accountability should give increasing weight to the 
study of relational accountability because of Dubnik‟s view that „account-giving relationships 
and associated behaviours form the foundation of governance” (2014(b), p.651). This 
ontology finds favour with scholarship on policing accountability more specifically when it 
has been argued that “formal structures are less important than living procedures, an insight 
which is especially true for mechanisms of accountability located outside the institutions they 
are supposed to control” (Bayley, 1990, p.176).  Herein, prominent policing scholar Prof. 
David Bayley gives particular emphasis to the living procedures in the exercise of 
accountability through external oversight mechanisms, something which other research has 
given support (eg: Savage, 2013a, 2013b). In underscoring and elaborating upon the salience 
of the interactions between those engaged in the delivery of policing accountability to the 
study of the subject itself, Woods and Shearing (2013) citing Latour (1987, p.273) noted that: 
“the acting together is the cause of power…Governance is thus the consequence of an intense 
activity of enrolling, convincing and enlisting.”  
In this regard then, accountability is a “relational concept” connecting i) those who are 
accountable with those to whom they account; and ii) associating these and other parties 
through performance  of (shared) tasks (Bovens, Schillemans & Goodin, 2014, p.6).  Yet 
before a false dichotomy is conjured up between the study of institutional accountability and 
relational accountability, Dubnik (2014b) credits Bovens (2005) and Philips (2009) with 
building “a conceptual-theoretical bridge between these two ontologies” (Dubnik, 2014b, 
p.651). Whilst recognising the special significance ascribed by others to the “living 
procedures” of policing accountability (Bayley, 2008; Savage, 2013a, 2013b), this research 
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study seeks to further reinforce the intellectual scaffolding that has already been erected 
between the understanding of accountability in the institutional and the relational sense. 
Consequently, this research has intentionally adopted an explicitly interdisciplinary approach 
from an early stage in a decision which reflects the growing ambition and increasing call for 
scholarship to transcend traditional boundaries between disciplines. Additionally, an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of accountability also finds support within research on 
the subject (eg: Bovens et al, 2014; Dubnik, 2014b).  
 
1.3  Why accountability?  
 
Arguably, the passage of time since the publication of the Patten Report might be sufficient 
alone to justify a research study of this kind. However, there is also a wider policy need and 
broader public interest which further justifies research in this field. Such public interest has, 
undoubtedly, been influenced by recent global events. Some scholars contend that policing 
oversight in western societies is at “a critical juncture” (Porter & Prenzler, 2012, p.153).   
 
In 2014, widespread public protest and civil unrest broke out in North America after two 
defining incidents: firstly, the police shooting of Mr. Michael Brown in Ferguson and 
secondly, the death of Mr. Eric Garner in police custody (Walters, 2014). While these deaths 
spurred debate in the USA  and internationally about police accountability, previous 
academic research by social psychologists in the USA had already confirmed the salience of 
implicit bias in police use of force (Correll, Park & Judd, 2002; Correll, Hudson, Guillermo 
& Ma, 2014). International dismay about violent confrontation between police and citizens in 
the USA prompted Secretary General Ban Ki Moon of the United Nations to  exhort the US 
Administration to “do anything possible to respond to the demands of greater accountability” 
(UN, 2014, December 4). In response to public protests and calls for policy reform, the then 
US President Barak Obama established a Task Force on Policing Reform. The Task Force 
gathered evidence from many practitioners and scholars including those places where 
policing reform was regarded as having been successful, like Northern Ireland. Published in 
May 2015, that report concluded that some form of civilian oversight of policing is important 
“in order to strengthen trust with the community”. The Task Force report noted the dearth of 
empirical evidence on civilian oversight and called upon the US Department of Justice to 
expand its research programme to include civilian oversight and collate case studies of 
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existing civilian oversight (President‟s Task Force on 21
st
 Century Policing 2015, p.26 ) 
arguing that “Civilian oversight alone is not sufficient to gain legitimacy; without it, 
however, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the police to maintain the public‟s trust” 
(President‟s Task Force on 21
st
 Century Policing, 2015, p.26). 
Scholars have suggested that civilian oversight of policing in western societies is at “a critical 
juncture” (Porter & Prenzler, 2012, p.153). Recent research in Scotland has raised serious 
questions about the efficacy and independence of civilian oversight of policing (Malik, 2017). 
In Ireland, Professor Dermot Walsh cautioned that “the problems…associated with policing 
in this country cannot be satisfactorily addressed by ad hoc, piecemeal measures such as the 
establishment of a Police Authority” (Walsh, 2014). Referring to the Patten Commission as a 
blueprint, Walsh called upon the government in the Republic of Ireland to establish an 
inquiry “to be carried out by a Commission of experts”. Similarly, Conway (2014) advocated 
a new emphasis on human rights-based policing in the spirit of Patten. While these calls 
appear to go unheeded, two Ministers of Justice and two Garda Chief Commissioners have 
been forced to resign since 2014 amidst public controversies engulfing An Garda Siochána 
(McDonald, 2017, November 28). Eventually, a new Commission on the Future of Policing 
in Ireland was established in May 2017 by the Irish Government, chaired by a former 
member of the Patten Commission, Kathleen O‟Toole (O‟Toole, 2017, May 24). 
 
Policing oversight and policing reform appear to be inextricably linked, a finding which is 
especially important for the purpose of this study.  However, in this symbiotic relationship 
clarity of purpose appears to be dissipated by lack of definitional consensus about the 
construct of external civilian oversight itself. The absence of conceptual consensus or 
presence of confusion is underlined by the interchangeable language in the literature which 
refers to “citizen review” boards and panels (Claybo, 2012; Buren, 2007); “civilian review” 
(Sen, 2010); “civilian” “external” or “citizen oversight” (Prenzler, 2011, p.284). More 
recently, the concept of “external civilian oversight” has come into vogue (McDaniel, 2015). 
For instance, the concept of External Civilian Oversight (or ECO) is employed in research by 
Harris (2013) into the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo.  Walker (2001) defines civilian 
oversight as “a procedure for providing input into the police complaints process by people 
who are not sworn officers.” (Clarke (2009, p.2) expands on this to refer to “governmental 
institutions that empower individuals who are not sworn officers to influence how police 
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departments formulate policies” in addition to handling complaints. How best to describe or 
define the minimal requirements or best practice models for civilian oversight will be 
explored in greater detail in chapter 4. Yet, difficulties in prescribing optimal parameters for 
external civilian oversight reflect the conceptual challenges evident more widely in the 
history of the study of accountability. 
 
1.4  The roots of accountability 
 
Controversy about the misuse of force and power is not a phenomenon born in the 21
st
 
century. Dismayed by the moral degradation and political corruption rampant in 1
st
 century 
Rome, satirist Juvenal lamented: “Sed quis custodiet, ipsos custodes? Who will guard the 
guardians themselves?” (ICP,1999, p.7). This rhetorical lament has echoed throughout the 
last two millennia as an epigraph for accountability, and in particular, for policing 
accountability.  Whilst, the word accountability was not uttered by Juvenal, the practice of 
accounting from which it has emerged has modest heritage in the book-keeping of ancient 
civilisations in Mesopotamia, five thousand years ago (Bovens et al. 2014, p.3). Perhaps, this 
passage of time itself serves itself as a confounding factor for scholars attempting to define 
accountability as a concept. Building upon scholarship on conceptual political analysis by 
Sartori (1970), it is argued that the study of accountability has been afflicted and conflicted 
by „conceptual stretching‟ (Flinders, 2014, p.661). Perhaps, the readiness of researchers to 
retrofit accountability as a concept to institutional arrangements and individual behaviours 
and practices across disparate fields is in itself philosophically unsound. Either way, the 
greatest consensus in accountability studies appears to be that there is little consensus about 
the concept itself (Flinders, 2014). In fact, it appears that accountability is intrinsically and 
inherently conflicted. This contested quality may in fact be a quintessential part of the 
concept of accountability (Bovens et al. 2014, p.2). 
Notwithstanding manifest diffusion or confusion in the definition of the concept itself, there 
has been an inexorable surge in the use of the word accountability since the late 1960s 
(Dubnik, 2014a). This has led scholars to ascribe a special significance and status to 
accountability as a “golden concept” (Bovens, Hart and Schillemans, 2008) or a “cultural 
keyword” (Dubnik, 2014a, p.24).  This cultural cache has extended to dramatisations and 
fictional representations. In 2012, the cinematic production of “Skyfall” featuring a fictional 
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British intelligence officer called James Bond included a prickly exchange about “civilian 
oversight” between the head of MI5 and the chair of a parliamentary committee. Again in 
Gavin Hood‟s “Eye in the Sky” (2016) the remote and real-time dialogue of fictional 
characters involved in a chain of command regarding a possible drone strike, is pregnant with 
the emotion, politics and the legality of accountability. These are doors behind which the 
public can only see because of the artistic and fictional portrayals screened. Yet, they serve to 
illustrate and validate Dubnik‟s (2014a) ascription of “cultural keyword” status to 
accountability. 
How accountability in policing relates to real-life experience has been potently articulated in 
Britain and Ireland. Perhaps nowhere more so than in the aftermath of the inquests into the 
Hillsborough Disaster in 1989. One of those instrumental in the campaign by the families of 
those killed in the Hillsborough disaster is Professor Phil Scraton. He has written extensively 
on the events which led to the deaths of the 96 Liverpool football fans in Hillsborough in 
April 1989, and the institutional cover-up which ensued thereafter (Scraton, 2016). Interviews 
with families of those killed repeatedly referred to the need for accountability (Channel 4, 
2016, April 26). The use of the word accountability in this context seems to have distinctive 
connotations. Although not a feature of empirical research for this study, social media posts 
and political discourse after the Hillsborough inquest concluded in April 2016 revealed the 
prevalence of the word accountability. While an Independent Police Complaints Commission 
(IPCC) investigation into the Hillsborough disaster goes on, none of the former police 
officers under investigation will face misconduct proceedings because all of them have 
retired (Conn, 2017, January 13). However, three former senior police officers and a solicitor 
who represented them face criminal proceedings after the IPCC referred files to the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) (IPCC, 2017, June 27).  
In  Northern Ireland, reaction and commentary to publication of a report by the Police 
Ombudsman for Northern Ireland into the killing of 6 people in Loughinisland in 1994 appear 
to illustrate this same point. In June 2016, the Police Ombudsman published a new report into 
issues of complaint by the families of those killed in Loughisland (PONI, 2016, June 9). An 
earlier report in 2011 by a previous Police Ombudsman into the same case had been 
successfully challenged and overturned in court by the families. Whilst the detail of this will 
be examined later in this study, it is pertinent to note that the publication of the new 2016 
report by the Police Ombudsman into Loughinisland included an indictment of police 
wrongdoing and failings at the time of the killings. Among the findings by the Police 
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Ombudsman was that there was evidence of collusion by the police in relation to 
Loughinisland and criminal activities surrounding the event (PONI, 2016, June 9).  In 
discharging the duty under law to investigate complaints of police misconduct and 
wrongdoing, the report represented a very significant outcome in policing accountability in 
Northern Ireland. Having had their complaint upheld by the Police Ombudsman, the bereaved 
families and their legal representatives said after the Loughinisland report that they now 
sought accountability (BBC, 2016, June 9). In his own response to the report, the PSNI Chief 
Constable told the Northern Ireland Policing Board that he hoped the former police officers 
implicated in the Loughinisland report would be held accountable for their wrongdoing 
(PSNI, 2016, June 9). The fact that investigations completed as an act of holding the police to 
account, by a statutory authority for policing accountability, should result in demands for 
greater accountability, hints at the complexity of this concept, and of public expectation. The 
experience of the families bereaved by the Hillsborough disaster and the Loughinisland 
massacre point to the reality of humanity behind and within the statutory processes of 
policing accountability, while Appendix 1 illustrates a more detailed chronology of other 
critical incidents and key milestones in the accountability and external civilian oversight of 
policing in the Northern Ireland which have emerged during the course of this study.  
 
1.5  Accountability in Security Sector Reform 
 
Literature on the international application of policing accountability repeatedly situates this 
concept within field of Security Sector Reform (SSR).  The genesis of Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) can be traced to the late 1990s when it became aligned to the international 
development agenda of British foreign policy in post-conflict societies or fragile and 
vulnerable states (Frei, 2011; Hanggi, 2004; & Edmunds, 2007).  
Since that time, SSR has become a core policy objective of the United Nations (UN), 
European Union (EU) and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
(Anderlini & Conaway, 2004). Political and financial support for SSR has come from the 
United States Agency for International Development and the UK Department for 
International Development. Increasingly, SSR has been adopted by development donors 
including the World Bank, European Union and UN Development Programme. (Anderlini & 
Conaway, 2004). From the standpoint of development donors, SSR helps direct aid and 
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development assistance (Hanngi, 2004). SSR is also seen as a framework for the integration 
and co-ordination of international intervention in post-conflict societies, including the 
secondment or deployment of personnel from international (security) agencies. “Security 
Sector Reform is considered to be the process through which security sector actors adapt to 
the political and organisational demands of transformation” (Edmunds, 2007, p.27). 
Policing accountability, including specific provisions for external civilian oversight of the 
police, is a central element of SSR.  In fact, two normative elements common to all 
definitions of SSR are identified by Haangi (2004, p.5) namely: the creation of operationally 
effective, efficient and affordable security agencies within the state; and the formation of 
effective independent oversight bodies.  According to Timothy Edmunds, a leading scholar 
on the subject, a key objective of SSR is to create a “framework of democratic civilian 
control” for reformed security agencies (Edmunds, 2004, p.3-4). Similarly, political 
advocates of SSR within the United Nations Assembly repeatedly emphasise the indivisibility 
of accountability in security and policing for overall democratic reform and conflict 
transformation. For example, the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations said that 
through SSR a country “seeks to establish effective, accountable and representative security 
institutions in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound governance principles” 
(Rishchynski, 2011, October 12). 
In post-conflict societies, SSR is presented with very particular challenges (Edmunds 2007). 
In these circumstances, SSR is also expected to address the legacy of the past, to include 
those involved in conflict (both state and non-state forces) participating in a process of 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) (Hanggi, 2004). Literature also 
highlights the plurality of modern policing itself, even in societies in transition from conflict 
(eg: Singh, 2008). Frequently, security agencies and personnel are deployed from outside a 
state, within a post-conflict society, as part of SSR serving to further enumerate the potential 
plurality of policing in situ. Also common is the transition of some of those previously 
engaged in conflict to roles within new restructured and reformer security or policing 
structures. This signals complexities for accountability in the outworking of SSR.  
For example, since 1999, Kosovo has been an independent protectorate of the United 
Nations, although it has aspirations to independence. In the subsequent 17 years, security and 
policing in Kosovo has undergone a huge programme of reform, including the deployment of 
UN forces and establishment of new arrangements for policing accountability. On 27 June  
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2014,  2 men were convicted of the rape of a young girl as a war crime. This was 15 years 
after the UN mission in Kosovo began and was the first conviction for rape as a war crime, 
although  rape was widespread during the conflict in Kosovo (Gill, Geis, Kreiger, 
McCormack, Paulussen & Dorsey, 2015) This may underscore another concern raised in 
research for SSR that it fails to respond to the gender-related conflict issues (Anderlini & 
Conaway, 2004) and that it is conceptually ill-equipped to respond effectively to the legacy 
of past conflict (Caprini, 2006).  In 2006, an external civilian oversight body for policing in 
Kosovo was established. Research has indicated that the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK) 
has played a generally positive role in policing reform there though the research itself did not 
consider whether the PIK helped to ameliorate deficiencies outlined above in the 
development of SSR within the region (Harris, 2013). Elsewhere in the western Balkans, 
including Bosnia and Herzogovinia, Croatia, Albania, Georgia and Macedonia, research 
suggests that there have been serious problems with SSR, with too little progress on policing 
accountability, including external civilian oversight with claims that: “International actors 
during and after the conflict have identified police reform as a priority component of lasting 
conflict resolution in the western Balkans but the results are still not satisfactory” (Caprini, 
2006, p.16). 
Frei (2011) concurs that the lack of focus on governance and accountability is “the major 
failing of SSR in practice” (Frei, 2011, p.14). Yet there appears to be comfort with a 
paradigm which affords primacy to a counter-insurgency in policing reform in post-conflict 
societies, even at the expense of accountability (Frei, 2011; Claybo, 2011). Other research 
contends that the approach of the international community, especially the United States of 
America, to SSR in post-conflict societies has become “excessively coloured by terrorism-
related concerns” (Caprini, 2006, p.20) to the detriment of accountability.  
Over and over again, literature on SSR emphasises the social and political context as 
necessarily informing arrangements for policing accountability (eg. Caparini & Marenin, 
2004). Like modern policing, policing accountability “is to be found in a plurality of formats 
rather than in one single place” (Scott, 2012, p.139). Nevertheless, it is argued that “the same 
basic mechanisms for police accountability should apply”. (McDaniel, 2015, p.18). Perhaps 
more fundamentally, as prominent policing scholar Professor David Bayley (2008) has 
cogently explained, the normative principles of democratic policing are predicated upon 




1.6 Accountability in Northern Ireland 
 
In the transition from conflict to peace in Northern Ireland, huge importance was placed on 
SSR (Gormley-Heenan, 2008). Decades of conflict in Northern Ireland witnessed a society 
become heavily militarised with no effective accountability for policing (Moore & O‟ Rawe, 
2000), something explored in more depth in Chapter 2. With the advent of the peace process, 
negotiations between parties to the conflict sought to achieve a new dispensation. In the 
watershed accord, the Good Friday Agreement 1998, policing reform was given prominence:  
“The participants believe it essential that policing structures and arrangements are such that 
the police service is professional, effective and efficient; fair and impartial; free from partisan 
political control; accountable, both under the law and to the community it serves; 
representative of the society it polices, and operates within a coherent and co-operative 
criminal justice system, which conforms with human rights norms” (GFA, 1998, p.22). 
 
Furthermore, the Agreement ratified the terms of reference for an Independent Commission 
on Policing to be established to bring forward recommendations for reform of policing in  
Northern Ireland (Hillyard & Tomlinson, 2000). After extensive public consultation and 
engagement; verbal and written submissions; and sampling relevant academic literature on 
policing reform, the ICP published its report in September 1999 under its chairperson Lord 
Chris Patten, with whose name the report has become synonymous (Doyle, 2010). This made 
175 recommendations, including extensive proposals in relation to external civilian oversight 
(ECO) and policing accountability.  Two new statutory authorities, described as the “Patten 
institutions” (Shearing, 2010, p. 29) assumed primary responsibility for ensuring policing 
accountability. These were constituted as the Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB) and the 
Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI). There is widespread consensus about the 
importance of the NIPB and PONI in the accountability architecture of policing post-Patten. 
Since taking up office in May 2014 the current PSNI Chief Constable has added his support 
for police accountability (PSNI, 2014, December 10). Yet, 16 years after these „Patten 
institutions‟ were first established in the same epoch as the new Police Service of Northern 
Ireland, a complex and cluttered landscape of oversight and accountability has emerged.   
This led the first Chief Constable of the PSNI Sir Hugh Orde to have proclaimed on several 
occasions to be “…the most accountable police Chief in Europe” (cited in Markham & 
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Punch, 2007, p.301). In sympathy with this burden, policing scholar Peter Neyroud once 
described the landscape of policing accountability in Northern Ireland as something which 
resembled the London Underground (Neyroud, 2005).  While this portrayal of policing 
oversight will be discussed in detail later (Chapter 4), the study explored this idea by 
mapping out how policing oversight might look as a map (Figure 1). While not referring to 
Northern Ireland specifically, Koppells (2005) argues external oversight has now begun to 
overwhelm organisations. He pathologises the phenomenon as M.A.D.: Multiple 
Accountabilities Disorder (Koppells, 2005) arguing that the myriad of external bodies to 
which an agency may be accountable evokes confusion and dysfunction in the agency itself. 
 
Figure 1: Policing oversight mapped like the London Underground. 
 
Yet in the architecture of accountability envisaged by the Patten Commission (1999), the pre-
eminence of certain institutions was intended to be very clear. PONI and NIPB have emerged 
through, and as direct result of the process of policing reform, and specifically the Patten 
Commission. Originally, a collaborative interaction between PONI and NIPB was envisaged, 
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but previous research questioned whether this objective would be pursued (Moore & O Rawe, 
2000). Since the inception of the new accountability arrangements, academic research into 
PONI have been small in number and scale (eg: Prenzler, 2011; Savage, 2013b; Doherty, 
2013; Seneviratne, 2004). Equally, there have been limited examinations of the NIPB 
although research reports have been carried out on its behalf (Byrne, Topping and Martin 
2014) while both the NIPB and PONI are referenced in significant research by Lundy (2009; 
2011). Together with the PSNI, these two agencies continue to be at the centre of 
negotiations for implementation of further policing reform, most recently arising from the 
Stormont House Agreement (SHA, 2014). Furthermore, the importance and interdependence 
of the PONI, NIPB and PSNI in policing reform is illustrated by the fact that public survey 
data on public confidence in policing collected annually by the Department of Justice 
combines these three agencies together. That is why these agencies and senior officials in 
each of them provide the focus for this study on accountability and the exercise of external 
civilian oversight (ECO). 
 
1.7 Theoretical Orientation 
 
In his seminal work, “The Open Society and its enemies” (1945, vol.1&2), Sir Karl Popper 
offers a withering criticism of Wittgenstein‟s assumption of the hidden value of language and 
an excoriating critique of the historicism of Marx and Engels. Yet, these epistemological 
divergences do not denude institutions of social value and meaning, as Popper outlines: 
 “Human institutions such as the state are not rational, but we can decide to fight to make 
them more rational. We ourselves and our ordinary language are, on the whole, emotional 
rather than rational; but we can try to become a little more rational, and we can train 
ourselves to use our language as an instrument not of self-expression (as our more romantic 
educationalists would say) but of rational communication” (Popper, 1945 (1), p.482). 
Without adopting or abridging Popper‟s epistemology, his exposition of „critical rationalism‟ 
(1945(1), 1978) accommodates the irrationality of institutions and the emotionalism implicit 
within institutional processes. Inherent in this is the role of the individual as an agent of 
meaning and an actor within a group or institution.  Although held to be Popper‟s 
epistemological polar opposite, interpretivism and social constructivism also recognises the 
individual at the centre of studying social relations and social processes. Interpretivism seeks 
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to construe a situation from the standpoint of the actor, observing what is taken into account 
by the actor and how the actor interprets this account (Blumer-Mead, 1969, p.56). Whereas, 
social constructivism (Gergen, 1985) prizes the process of building or „constructing‟ 
knowledge in a shared activity with others, within a given social context and that the building 
blocks of this social construction are language. The importance of values, attitudes and 
beliefs within prevailing social circumstances is fundamental to scientific research (Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985. Cited in Reilly, 1997, p.37). Investigating the attitudes held by individuals has 
long been expounded as an effective pathway to exploring and understanding social relations 
and processes (Asch, 1952, p.577). The salience of values and attitudes shared by individuals 
within a group is a core concept common to many distinct and distinguished spheres of 
scholarship, including the theory of power and power relations (Dahl, 1957; Weber, 1978); 
the legitimacy of power (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012); and the effects of group norms and 
values upon individual attitudes and beliefs (Sherif, 1936; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Implicit in the aforementioned research, is the contention that the situational context in which 
social attitudes and behaviour occurs has a direct and significant effect. Social perception and 
cognition interact with the individual characteristics and social or situational context (Lewin, 
1935).  Social and situational context include history, culture and gender (Horowitz & 
Bordens, 1995). This construct of “situated cognition” credited to Vygotsky (1978) is 
explained as follows: “thought always occurs in a pragmatic problem setting including the 
cultural assumptions that are brought to the task” (Nisbett et.al., 2001, p.306). The salience of 
culture assumptions and situational context are fundamental to the epistemological and 
ontological underpinnings of this research. 
Whilst explaining the inherent falsifiability of scientific theory, Popper (1978) also underlines 
the interplay between research and socio-historical context:  “Knowledge cannot start from 
nothing – from a tabula rasa – nor yet from observation. The advance of knowledge consists, 
mainly, in the modification of earlier knowledge…. Neither observation nor reason are 
authorities. Intellectual intuition and imagination are most important, but they are not reliable 
: they may show us things very clearly, and yet they may mislead us. They are indispensable 
as the main sources of our theories; but most of our theories are false anyway. The most 
important function of observation and reasoning, and even of intuition and imagination, is to 
help us in the critical examination of those bold conjectures which are the means by which 
we probe into the unknown…The more we learn about the world, and the deeper our 
learning, the more conscious, specific, and articulate will be our knowledge of what we do 
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not know, our knowledge of our ignorance. For this indeed, is the main source of our 
ignorance – the fact that our knowledge can only be finite, while our ignorance must 
necessarily be infinite” (Popper, 1978, p.28). 
Still another challenge to all scientific research is the „law of contradiction‟ which holds that 
scientific theories should avoid contradiction at all costs (Popper, 1978). There has been a 
strong tradition in Western philosophy of attempting to integrate observed contradictions into 
social scientific research. Hegel was the first exponent of this philosophy of science although 
his ideas were further developed and popularised by the political philosophy of Mark and 
Engels. However, an alternative to the philosophical orientation towards the approach of 
scientific research to dialecticism exists within eastern philosophy (Choi & Nisbett, 1997; 
Nisbett et al, 2001). This philosophical position is one which does not subordinate 
contradiction to a system of rules or laws which according to western dialecticism integrate 
and reconcile, even on a temporary basis, the contradictions which may be manifest (from 
thesis to antithesis and ultimately synthesis). This alternative philosophy is one which not 
only acknowledges contradictions but expects their co-existence (Choi & Nisbett, 1997; 
Nisbett et al, 2001). This presents a compelling argument for re-considering or reformulating 
of western scientific orthodoxy which requires contradictions uncovered to be reconciled.  
These are prescient philosophical considerations for this study. A society emerging from 
conflict like the  Northern Ireland, in which aspects of State have been politically contested, 
is anticipated to experience continuing contradictions. The corollary to this is a theoretical 
and conceptual framework which accommodates co-varying and co-existing contradictions 
while helping to explain their association to one another. As Chapter 4 will go on to explore 
in detail, the framework adopted for this purpose derives from ecological systems theory 
(EST : Bronfenbrenner, 1979; 1992; 1999; 2009) with a critical realist epistemology and 
ontology. The intrinsic link between situational context and cultural assumptions is expected 
to be manifest in the exploration of attitudes. Before investigating the attitudes and beliefs of 
those elite actors involved in the exercise of external civilian oversight, the socio-historical 
context from which policing reform emerged invites attention. That will be the focus of 
Chapter 2.  
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1.8 Structure of Thesis 
 
Brief reference has already been made to subsequent chapters which elaborate and explore in 
greater detail several of the key concepts central to this study. To aid navigation of this study, 
the sequence and structure of chapters and main elements of each in turn are outlined below.  
As mentioned above, Chapter 2 explores the socio-historical and political context from which 
the agenda for policing reform in Northern Ireland has emerged. This chapter relies upon a 
review of relevant literature, supplemented by archival research, documentation and scoping 
interviews with elite actors who were involved in negotiations on policing reform and 
arrangements for accountability and external civilian oversight central to this study.  
Chapter 3 outlines the methodological challenges considered in embarking upon this study 
and explains how a method appropriate to this study was chosen and then operationalized. 
Techniques employed by the researcher to mitigate bias, increase the validity of findings and 
ensure the highest ethical standards were upheld throughout this study are also summarised.  
Chapter 4 further elaborates upon the theoretical and conceptual challenges of undertaking 
this research and provides an in-depth analysis explaining the researcher‟s adoption of an 
ecological systems perspective within a broader interdisciplinary research framework.  
Research findings are outlined in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 according to the postulated concept of 
triadic accountability. Accordingly, the presentation of these exploratory results are each in 
turn of the dimension of triadic accountability which the study considers. Chapter 5 looks at 
results for Situational Accountability (s); Chapter 6 summarises results for Relational 
Accountability (r); and Chapter 7 outlines results for Transformational Accountability (t).  
The final and principal section of results is Chapter 8. This tests the main hypotheses 
postulated in this study that participants hold distinctive beliefs, attitudes and values about 
accountability and its relationship to policing reform. The finding that two distinct social 
perspectives are held by participants in this study and that the differences largely accord with 
agency affiliation gives Chapter 8 increased significance. The implications of these findings 
for the wider study of accountability and external civilian oversight of policing reform are 
discussed in Chapter 9. Finally, the study concludes with Chapter 10 returning to the main 
research questions and hypotheses underpinning this study and areas for future research. 
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1.9 Research Question 
 
The primary research question which is drawn from this introductory overview of policing 
reform and accountability in Northern Ireland is: „In what way does accountability and 
external civilian oversight impact on policing and policing reform in Northern Ireland?‟   
In addressing this fundamental question, some secondary questions are also considered: 
firstly, what are the values, attitudes and beliefs held by those elite actors involved in external 
civilian oversight about accountability and its impact on policing?; secondly, how do these 
attitudes differentiate elite actors involved in external civilian oversight?; and finally, what 
are the factors which enable or inhibit the efficacy of external civilian oversight?  
Further, in seeking answers to these questions, this study also tests two hypotheses 
concerning participant‟s perspectives on accountability and external civilian oversight for 
policing reform (Chapter 8).  These hypotheses are: 
H1 - that at least two distinct social perspectives are held by participants in this study; 
H2 - that these social perspectives may be differentiated according to agency affiliation. 
 
1.10  Conclusion 
 
The overall purpose of this research study is to objectively and rigorously examine the 
architecture of accountability as envisaged by the Patten Commission through the NIPB, 
PONI and PSNI and to question and whether this accountability architecture helps or hinders 
policing reform. It does so through an exploratory reconceptualization of accountability to 
fully integrate levels of analysis inclusive of the local ecological system. This is 
conceptualised and articulated as form of „triadic accountability‟, encompassing three distinct 
strands: situational (s); relational (r); and transformational (t). Thereafter, the study tests two 
specific hypotheses about the attitudes, beliefs and values among elite actors towards 
accountability and external civilian oversight of policing reform. This is because these 
attitudes can provide an important insight into the effect and effectiveness of external civilian 
oversight as operationalised through the new architecture. In doing so, this study seeks to 
make a contribution to knowledge within the academy through the articulation of  the new 
concept of „triadic accountability‟ developed through the course of this research and to the 
practice of accountability in general, and specifically within the agencies in this study.  
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Policing in Ireland evolved within a specific political and socio-historical context. Colonial 
rule and political conflict informed and directed the development of policy and creation of 
policing institutions across the island as a whole. Other literature provides a comprehensive 
historical narrative of the evolution of policing in Ireland (Conway, 2013; Ryder, 2000; 
Farrell, 1976, 1983; Mulcahy, 2006). Building upon that, this chapter identifies episodes 
which serve to illuminate the socio-historical context within which policing reform, and in 
particular policing accountability, first became the focus of political negotiations. Efforts to 
negotiate new arrangements for policing accountability in Northern Ireland, particularly since 
the Good Friday Agreement, are especially germane to this study and invite more detailed 
attention. Yet, in order to discern the dynamics which propelled the process of policing 
reform, the socio-historical and political context for policing in Northern Ireland must be 
understood and discussed. This chapter discusses both this and the question of why 
accountability became interwoven with the contestation of policing. 
 
2.2 The British Model of Policing in Ireland (1920s – 1960s) 
Until the late 19
th
 century, both Belfast and Derry retained their own police forces and it was 
not until 1925 that the city of Dublin‟s own metropolitan police was dissolved (Campbell, 
1994, p.5). In fact, it was the 1920s before centralisation of policing in Ireland came about, 
and this was short-lived, coinciding as it did with the greatest political upheaval in the 
country and eventual partition (McGarry & O‟Leary, 2000, p.85).  
Before the partition of Ireland under the terms of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, the British 
government had already succumbed to pressure from James Craig‟s Ulster Unionist Party to 
establish an Ulster Special Constabulary.  The constitution of the Ulster Unionist Party made 
special provision for joint membership of the Orange Order. Therefore, it followed that the 
first Northern Ireland Executive, exclusively comprised of the Ulster Unionist Party, made 
provisions to lift the ban on recruits to the police force holding joint membership of the 
Orange Order, a ban which previously existed for RIC officers (Mc Garry & O‟ Leary, 2000, 
p.30-31). Perhaps more germane to the pathway for policing in the emergent six-county state, 
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recruitment to the Specials was overseen directly by the self-styled Commanding Officer of 
the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) Mr Wilfred Spender. He argued for the Specials to be 
recruited exclusively from the ranks of the UVF in what unionists clearly viewed as a process 
of “legitimizing their defence force” (Ryder, 2000, p.39). For others, the policing 
arrangements in the newly partitioned north-eastern counties of Ireland represented the 
“armed wing of unionism” (Farrell, 1983). Consequently, the inception of the politically 
contested state of Northern Ireland was mirrored in the contested legitimacy of the state‟s 
new police force: the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) (ICP, 1999). A Heads of Agreement 
between Michael Collins and leader of the new Stormont regime James Craig included plans 
to form a Committee in Belfast, comprising of Catholics and Protestants, to investigate 
complaints of intimidation and violence, including by the police. This was never 
implemented and the continuing violence in Belfast, including the infamous McMahon 
murders by the Brown Square gang comprised of police officers, drew stinging criticism in 
correspondence from Collins to Craig (Collins, 1922, April 27). 
  
2.2   Policing and Civil Rights (1968- 1971) 
 
Towards the late 1960s, policing had become inextricably intertwined with the escalation of 
conflict in Northern Ireland. One milestone in this era was the well-known 1968 Civil Rights 
march in Duke Street, Derry city. Prince (2012) says this “did not merely mark the shift from 
one era to another, it was vital to bringing about that shift” (2012, p.394). Importantly, 
research has drawn attention to the fact that the RUC‟s risk assessment of the march itself had 
concluded that “there would have been breaches of the peace” if the Civil Rights marchers, 
which were a non-violent protest movement, had been permitted to follow their proposed 
route (Prince, 2012).  After Stormont imposed a banning order on the march, the RUC 
mobilised water cannons and deployed double the normal number of police officers in a show 
of force (Prince, 2012). 
Three British MPs invited to observe the Civil Rights march drafted a report after the event 
(Kerr, Kerr & Ryan, 1968). The observers‟ written account records how police baton-charged 
the crowd of Civil Rights marchers on two consecutive occasions. Police used their batons 
“vigorously” and both batons and police water cannon were used “quite indiscriminately” 
against men, women and children, including local residents uninvolved in the Civil Rights 
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march. One of those injured was M.P. Gerry Fitt who was among those attending the Civil 
Rights march. The observers concluded: “The police used considerable violence in clearing 
the pavements and we stress that, in the main, we saw very little evidence of retaliation from 
any member of the crowd” (Kerr et al. 1968). However, Inspector William Meharg, the RUC 
officer in charge of the policing operation on the day, had a very different account of the 
march, one which absolved the police of any wrong-doing: 
“I was present in Duke Street from shortly after 4pm. From then and until the meeting 
concluded at about 4.40pm I did not see any policeman with a drawn baton. Apart 
from halting the procession in Duke Street, no action was taken by the police to break 
up the meeting or to disperse those in attendance… Fourteen police were injured – 
two are detained in hospital.. reference is made in to-day‟s „IRISH NEWS‟ that police 
outrageously attacked the vital parts of the male anatomy; that men were struck on the 
testicles with the baton. Inquiries at hospital indicate that no person attending there for 
treatment made any complaint of receiving an injury to such a part and no person was 
treated for such an injury" (Meharg, 1968a). 
A confidential report from Londonderry General Hospital of all those attending with injuries 
following the march on Duke Street was obtained by the RUC Inspector (Meharg, 1968b). 
There were 76 civilians treated in hospital, including 8 children under 14 years of age. Few of 
those attending hospital specifically identified police batons as the source of their injury. 
Nonetheless, the hospital records revealed that two-thirds of these were treated for 
lacerations, including two children. Most of those were wounds to their heads. Meharg sent 
the confidential hospital statistics to the Minister for Home Affairs in Stormont with a cover 
letter in which he wrote: “As you can see from the hospital report, this puts at nought the 
allegations of police brutality” (Meharg, 1968b).   
The completely contradictory accounts between the three British MPs (Kerr et al.1968) and 
the RUC Inspector (Meharg, 1968a, 1968b) were the subject of further comment by Anthony 
Peacocke, then the Inspector General of the RUC. In his report, Peacocke claimed that the 
number of RUC officers injured in Duke Street was double the number recorded in 
confidential hospital statistics taken by Meharg (Peacocke, 1968). Discounting the witness 
statement by the MPs, the Inspector General made no comment on specific allegations of 
police brutality, writing instead:  
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“I have… absolute confidence in the accuracy of the reports prepared by County 
Inspector Meharg…I am satisfied that he handled the situation in the best possible 
manner in the light of the circumstances prevailing” (Peacocke, 1968). 
The 1968 Civil Rights march marked a turning point in twentieth century Irish history 
(Prince, 2012), an argument promoted not just by academics but also by some political 
figures, such as Sinn Féin‟s Gerry Adams who remarked:  
“At the moment the RUC smashed their way into the crowd at Duke Street it was as if 
all the small things that had happened suddenly came together in a more coherent and 
ominous shape…There would be no turning back. What had started as a campaign for 
civil rights was developing into a struggle for national rights” (Adams, 1986, p.17). 
 
2.4  The Scarman Tribunal (1969) 
 
The Scarman Tribunal was established an inquiry in 1969 to look into these incidents of 
violence and disturbances in more detail. One such incident widely reputed to be the first 
killing of this stage of the conflict, was the death of Mr. Samuel Devenny (McKittrick, 
Kelters, Feeney & Thornton, 1999). On 19
th
 April 1969, a sit-down in Derry by Civil Rights 
protestors was dispersed by the RUC. In the disorder which ensued, several police raids were 
made into the predominantly nationalist Bogside area. By the end of the day 79 civilians had 
been injured. In one incident, RUC officers broke open the door of the home of the Devenny 
family. The occupants were violently assaulted by the RUC, among them Mr Samuel 
Devenny and several of his children. Two people, Mr Samuel Devenny and his neighbour had 
been beaten unconscious, each sustaining multiple head wounds from police batons. As RUC 
officers exited the family home, one of the older children leaned over his father to remove the 
broken teeth from his mouth as he continued to haemorrhage blood. Although hospitalised, 
Mr Devenny never recovered from the assault and passed away 3 months later on 17
th
 June 
1969 after multiple heart attacks (McKittrick, et al. 1999). 
Several months later, after being newly elected as a local MP, Ms Bernadette Devlin, who 
was also one of the leaders of Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, raised the 
circumstances of Mr Devenny‟s death in the House of Commons. Having noted that the 
inquest into Mr Devenny‟s death was unable to return anything other than an open verdict 
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because of the statute governing the coronial system, Ms Devlin went onto highlight that an 
internal inquiry by the RUC had called upon police officers present in Mr Devenny‟s house 
to come forward for an identification parade before the victim‟s family. No RUC officer 
presented himself for identification. A complaint was brought about the incident to the RUC 
on behalf of the Devenny family by their solicitor. By this time, the position of RUC 
Inspector General had been dissolved, and Anthony Peacocke was replaced by English 
policeman Sir Arthur Young as the first Chief Constable RUC (Ryder, 2000, p.116). Young 
requested a team from the London Metropolitan Police headed by Detective Chief 
Superintendent Kenneth Drury to examine the RUC‟s own investigation into Mr Devenny‟s 
death. While Drury‟s report confirmed the role of the RUC in the attack on Mr Devenny, he 
could not identify which of the 24 officers on duty that in Derry may have been involved. The 
report prompted Sir Arthur Young to publicly criticise a “conspiracy of silence” within his 
own force (PONI, 2001, October 4). Although the findings of the Drury review were 
submitted to Young, they were not disclosed to the Devenny family.  
Although the Ministry of Home Affairs in Northern Ireland admitted liability in a criminal 
injury claim brought by members of the Devenny family, no disciplinary action or criminal 
prosecution was ever brought against any of the RUC involved in the attack. More than three 
decades later, the case of the attack on Samuel Devenny was re-examined by the newly 
established Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland on foot of a complaint by 
the Devenny family. It was one of the first cases arising from the conflict to be examined by 
the new Police Ombudsman. Using special retrospective powers of investigation to examine 
matters which were „grave and exceptional‟ relating to the death of Mr Devenny, the Police 
Ombudsman found evidence to support some parts of the family‟s complaint of police 
misconduct and wrong-doing. However, the Police Ombudsman‟s report concluded that it 
would not be possible after the lengthy intervening time to pursue disciplinary action against 
the officers involved (PONI, 2001, October 4). 
Mr Devenny‟s death was not to be the last attributable to the police in this period. On 14
th
 
August 1969, the first child of the conflict was murdered. His name was Patrick Rooney and 
he was nine years old (McKittrick et al, 1999, p.34-36). The Scarman Tribunal later 
concluded: “the boy Patrick Rooney was killed in his father‟s flat…by a Browning machine 
gun fire from a Shorland police vehicle” (Scarman, 1972, p.162). Between the time of the 
police attack on Civil Rights demonstrators and others in Duke Street in October 1968 and 
the 15
th
 August 1969, there were 8 civilians who had died as a result of use of force by the 
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RUC and Ulster Special Constabulary. Five of these people were shot dead by the police. In 
October 1969, Victor Arbuckle became the first RUC officer murdered during the conflict. 
He was killed by loyalists in Belfast (Sutton, 1989). No member of the RUC or the Ulster 
Special Constabulary was brought before the courts or disciplined for any of these deaths. 
Rejecting the case that the RUC acted with partisanship or sectarianism during the period 
1969 to 1972, Lord Scarman believed that the RUC struggled manfully in a situation outside 
of their control. He concluded that their failings arose in the main from a shortage of officers 
and exhaustion rather than any significant mistakes. Nonetheless, Lord Scarman conceded 
that the Catholic community no longer believed the RUC was impartial. In Scarman‟s view, 
the RUC “came to treat as their enemies…those who persisted in displaying hostility and 
distrust towards them. Thus, there developed the fateful split between the Catholic 
community and the police” (Scarman, 1972, p.15). 
As events unfolded and the conflict intensified during the 1970s and 1980s, this fateful split 
became a limitless and impassable gorge. During a four year period of internment (1971-
1975), police officers, working alongside British Army troops deployed in 1970, used their 
powers of arrest twenty-times more often against nationalists and republicans than against 
unionists and loyalists. The European Court of Human Rights would later rule that the RUC 
used violence against many of those whom it detained (Ireland v UK [1978] 5310/71). The 
use of force, including lethal force, during joint RUC / British Army operations would be at 
the centre of controversy throughout the conflict and epitomised “how complex the interface 
between military and policing functions renders any debate about accountability” (O‟Rawe & 
Moore, 1997, p.150). However, it would be more than two decades later before these 
complexities and contradictions embedded into policing, with adverse consequences for 
accountability, would be uncovered in research about historic investigations (Lundy, 2011). 
 
2.5  The Cameron Commission (1969) 
 
In addition to the Scarman Tribunal, the Cameron Commission, appointed by the Stormont 
Executive, was established to provide another form of independent oversight of policing, 
though neither advanced an agenda for policing reform. It reported in 1969 on the public 
unrest which had followed in the months after the Civil Rights march the previous autumn in 
Duke Street (Cameron, 1969). Both the Commission and the Scarman Tribunal were time-
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bound and constrained in their remit. Neither had been empowered by its appointing authority 
to conduct effective investigations; to bring disciplinary action against police officers; or to 
make recommendations for reform of policing. More importantly, Mulcahy (2006) contends 
that reports by both Cameron and Scarman erroneously ascribed these fault-lines in policing 
to competing community perceptions rather than systematic abuse of police powers (2006, 
p.28-29). Even at this early stage, formal state analysis and narratives of the events as they 
unfolded studiously avoided what McGarry and O‟Leary identify as the precipitating impact 
of police partiality upon the emergence of political conflict (2000, p.31). 
Instead, proposals for reform of policing in Northern Ireland awaited the findings of a 
separate report by Lord Hunt, appointed by the British Prime Minister in 1969. When the 
Hunt Report (1970) was published, it received a broadly positive welcome from Civil Rights 
leaders and political leaders in the nationalist community whose own agenda for policing 
reform had been limited up to that point to the repeal of the Special Powers Act 
(O‟Dochartaigh, 2005). However, it has been argued that the Hunt Report was premised upon 
a false and untenable precept of recasting the RUC. Much of this hinged on Lord Hunt‟s 
implicit objective to transplant the English model of „policing by consent‟ to an Irish policing 
context defined by colonial rule and the conflict and contested polity (Mulcahy, 2006, p.30).  
 
2.6  The Hunt Report (1969) and Formation of the Police Authority (1970) 
 
The Hunt report argued that in order to repair relationships between the Catholic and 
nationalist community and the RUC, that the police force must eschew its role in security of 
the Northern Ireland state (Mulcahy, 2006, p.29). Lord Hunt‟s report made 47 
recommendations including: that the RUC should be disarmed; the B Specials should be 
disbanded but replaced by a new Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR); and, that there should be a 
new approach to police recruitment, with increased numbers of full-time officers and a new 
RUC reserve (Ryder, 2000, p115). Alongside this were proposals for a change in the image 
and tone of policing. A new blue uniform resembling the police in Britain was recommended 
by Hunt to replace the paramilitary khaki green colour of the RUC. Closer links to British 
police forces were to be encouraged, beginning with a new rank structure in the RUC to 
resemble their British counterparts. More emphasis on community engagement and 
accountability was also recommended by the Hunt report with a new police-community 
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relations unit, new internal procedures to receive complaints about the police, and the 
creation of a new civilian oversight body to be called the Police Authority (Ryder, 2000; 
McGarry & O‟Leary, 2000; Ó Dochartaigh, 2005; Mulcahy, 2006).  However, the Hunt 
Report was never fully implemented. Unionists and the RUC itself baulked at the idea that 
the uniform might change and were angry at the prospect that Orange Order membership 
might be grounds for refusing entry to the RUC (Ryder, 2000). Other recommendations by 
Hunt to disarm the RUC and end emergency laws were also never implemented (O‟Rawe & 
Moore, 1997, p.139).  
The newly established civilian oversight body, the Police Authority, had the power to appoint 
the Chief Constable of the RUC. However, this power to appoint was subject to veto by the 
Northern Ireland Office. In at least one instance, the recommendation for Chief Constable 
following interview by the Police Authority was vetoed by the Northern Ireland Office and 
resulted in an alternative appointee (Ryder, 2000, p.367). The Authority also had significant 
financial responsibilities. The budget for the RUC was secured and held by the Police 
Authority, and accounting officer duties resided with the chief executive of the Police 
Authority (Police (Northern Ireland) Act, 1970). It was responsible for the police estate and 
considered to be the employer of civilian staff working within the RUC, including the 
medical staff who attended police stations to examine detainees (Taylor, 1980, p.196).  This 
would later prove to be most important in relation to allegations of police misconduct, 
including torture of detainees (Taylor, 1980). In fact, the Police Authority also had the power 
to fire the Chief Constable (s.7, Police (NI) Act, 1970). During the three decades that it 
existed, this power was never exercised by the Police Authority. For most of its existence, 
minutes of Authority meetings were unavailable to the public and it conducted nearly all of 
its business in closed sessions (O‟Rawe & Moore, 1997, p.140). The Authority was under a 
legal duty to “keep itself informed as to the manner in which complaints of the public against 
members of the police force are dealt with” (s.12(1), Police (NI) Act, 1970). The Police 
Authority even had its own Complaints Committee and was empowered to establish a public 
Tribunal to investigate police wrong-doing (s.13(2), Police (NI) Act, 1970).  
Yet despite these powers and during more than three decades of existence, the Police 
Authority never garnered widespread support across the political spectrum in Northern 
Ireland. Throughout its existence, the Police Authority was strongly opposed by nationalist 
and republican political representatives. The SDLP argued that the Police Authority was 
inherently flawed and should be scrapped and replaced (Wright & Bryett, 2000, p.52-54). 
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Sinn Féin remained trenchantly opposed to both the RUC and the Police Authority and it was 
condemned as an „integral part of the „apparatus of repression” by the IRA (Ryder, 2000, 
p.336). A unionist Councillor and member of the Police Authority was abducted and 
murdered in December 1972 (Ryder 2000, p.125). Michael Murphy, a Catholic educationalist 
who sat on the Police Authority resigned in June 1986, after a public death threat was issued 
against members (Ryder, 2000, p.336). Civic society also withdrew support for the Police 
Authority with the umbrella organisation, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions refusing to 
participate (O‟Rawe & Moore, 1997, p.140). That said, opposition to the Police Authority 
was not restricted to the nationalist/republican community and civil society. It was also the 
subject of unionist political criticism with the DUP refusing to take seats on it (McGarry & O 
Leary, 2000). Even among the RUC, contempt for the Authority would surface. Police 
officers meeting to discuss the aftermath of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement were outspoken 
in their criticism of the Police Authority, although their views were recorded covertly (Ryder, 
2000, p.328). As for those who took up their seats on the Policing Authority, each of them 
was directly appointed by the Secretary of State, on advice from the Northern Ireland Office 
(Police (NI) Act, 1970) which had immediate implications for the independence of the 
Authority itself (Taylor, 1980 , p.46). In its first term of office, several of those appointed to 
the Authority were Justices of the Peace or were already recipients of honorary awards from 
the British Queen suggesting that “The Police Authority was an integral part of the 
Establishment” (Taylor, 1980, p.47). Additionally, it was not only the membership of the 
Police Authority which was unrepresentative of the demographic makeup of society in  
Northern Ireland. At its inception, most of the officials were drawn from the Stormont 
Ministry of Home Affairs (Weizter, 1995, p.67).  
 
2.7  Ulsterisation & the Diplock system (1976) 
 
However, it was in the exercise of accountability, or rather the failure to hold the police to 
account, that the Police Authority would come to draw fiercest criticism. As internment 
ended in December 1975, a significant shift occurred during 1976 in the direction of policing 
policy with a confidential paper “The Way Ahead” drafted by former Ministry of Defence 
official John Bourne (Taylor, 1980, p.43). This argued for the primacy of the police, a change 
referred to by senior figures in the British security establishment as „Ulsterisation‟ (Ryder, 
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2000; Coogan, 1995; Burke, 1987). In tandem, was swift implementation of 
recommendations by Lord Diplock, another English judge, which had the effect of 
significantly amending the Emergency Provisions Act 1973. Among the provisions were 
arrangements for one-judge, no-jury courts, commonly referred to as Diplock courts after 
their exponent (Coogan, 1995; Burke, 1987). Other significant amendments were made to 
extend the time police would be permitted to detain an arrested person without charge and the 
terms of section 6 under which a detainee may be interrogated by the RUC. Importantly, and 
to the concern of lawyers, the vagueness of s.6 did not explicitly preclude “the use or threat 
of physical violence” (Taylor, 1980, p.35). Alongside this, a new headquarters directive was 
issued by the then Chief Constable of the RUC Kenneth Newman. Marked „Secret‟  and 
referenced „SB 16/13‟, the directive was issued on 26
th
 July 1976 giving guidance and 
direction to all Divisional Commanders  which distinguished between the treatment by the 
RUC of those detainees to be interviewed from those to be interrogated (Taylor,1980, p.68). 
In other words, those regarded by the RUC as „terrorist suspects‟ could be interrogated 
without the same legal safeguards and constraints as might apply to ordinary detainees 
(Taylor, 1980, p.69). In tabling additional legislation, the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 
1974, British Home Secretary Roy Jenkins was forthright in describing to the House of 
Commons the government‟s intent: “These powers are draconian. In combination, they are 
unprecedented in peace-time. I believe they are fully justified to meet the clear and present 
danger” (HC Deb 1974-5, vol 882, col 35. 25 November 1974). 
Police violence against detainees previously witnessed in the early 1970s (Ireland v UK 
[1978] 5310/71) remerged within the new „Ulsterisation‟ paradigm. In fact, internees 
including „the Hooded Men‟  were effectively „guinea pigs‟ for police interrogation tactics 
within a new counter-insurgency framework (McGuffin, 1974). What happened in Palace 
Barracks in 1971 became “a blueprint for Castlereagh” (Taylor, 1980, p.21). This became a 
testing time for the Police Authority in its formative years. From 1976 onwards, allegations 
accumulated of the use of torture and physical violence against detained in police stations at 
Castlereagh, Omagh and Gough Barracks (Faul and Murray, 1978; Amnesty, 1978).  
In the case of Robert Barclay, the Court of Appeal quashed his conviction on grounds that 
“there was clear evidence that the accused had sustained serious injuries whilst in custody at 
Omagh RUC station”, making his conviction unsafe (Taylor, 1980, p.138). A complaint of 
police brutality by Mr Barclay led to charges being brought against the RUC detectives who 
interrogated him. That case came before Lord Justice Gibson (who had been one of the three 
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Appeal Court judges who threw out Mr Barclay‟s conviction). Lord Justice Gibson said he 
could not rule out the possibility that Mr Barclay‟s injuries were self-inflicted: “…there is not 
any reason why a man could not bang his ear, for instance, against a wall or damage his eye 
against some object in the cell” (Lord Justice Gibson, 1979, cited in Taylor, 1980, p.146). 
The perception that prisoners or people detained injured themselves in order to make 
vexatious or malicious complaints was one shared at the highest ranks of the RUC (Hermon, 
1997, p120). Lord Justice Gibson ruled that Mr Barclay was not an honest or reliable witness 
and acquitted the two RUC detectives on that basis. On 25 April 1987, Lord Justice Gibson 
and his wife were later murdered in an IRA bomb attack, an incident which itself was the 
subject of an inquiry (Cory, 2003, December 18). 
Apart from those disclosures which emerged before the courts, the Police Authority was also 
in receipt of detailed information from doctors who gave medical examinations to those in 
detention. However, information disclosed to officials of the Authority was not always passed 
onto members of the Authority (Taylor, 1980, p. 260-261). Rather than holding the police 
publicly to account, the secretary of the Authority and chair of the Authority‟s Complaints 
Committee Mr Ivor Canavan aimed instead “to dry up the problems at source” (Taylor, 1980, 
p196 & 279). The RUC repeatedly refused a request from members of the Police Authority‟s 
Complaints Committee to meet and be better informed by the internal RUC committee 
chaired by senior officer Jack Hermon, which was ostensibly monitoring complaints from 
detained persons. It was to this Hermon Committee, not the Police Authority, that the RUC 
Chief Constable at the time Kenneth Newman contended the doctors should send details of 
detainees‟ injuries (Taylor, 1980, p277).  Over the course of several years, a pattern emerged: 
increased scrutiny of treatment of detainees by police surgeons, the Police Authority or others 
(Amnesty, 1978; Faul and Murray, 1978) led to a temporary subsidence in complaints of 
brutality and switches made in RUC personnel conducting interrogations. However, the 
Hermon Committee did not recommend disciplinary action against those involved. 
 
2.8  The Bennett Report (1979) 
 
Two members of the Police Authority, Mr Jack Hassard and Mr Donal Murphy, repeatedly 
attempted to have the Police Authority exercise its power to insist on a report from the RUC 
Chief Constable or to invoke a Tribunal to investigate complaints of police brutality. Their 
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attempts to obtain information from the RUC in response to the doctors‟ concerns were 
repeatedly thwarted (Mulcahy, 2006, p.40). When the Police Authority eventually agreed to 
Hassard and Murphy‟s request to instigate a Tribunal into the injuries sustained by a Mr. 
James Rafferty whilst in RUC custody, the Tribunal eventually collapsed.  In March 1979, 
the secretary of the police surgeons, Dr. Irwin, gave a television interview in which he spoke 
of 150-160 cases over the previous three years where he had examined detainees whose 
injuries in RUC custody were most likely not self-inflicted (Taylor, 1980, p.319).  
Within days, a report was published by the Bennett Committee set up two years earlier by the 
British government to examine allegations of police brutality in custody (Ryder 2000, p.196). 
The Bennett Report (1979) was perceived by senior police officers as “a considerable but not 
total vindication of the RUC” (Hermon, 1997, p.119). Yet, it concluded that there had been 
police brutality (Ryder, 2000, p.197). It recommended that the RUC should be more 
forthcoming in disclosing any information which the Police Authority sought in the discharge 
of its duties (Bennett, 1979, p.129). It also exhorted the Police Authority to be more robust its 
existing powers to require reports and institute Tribunals (Taylor, 1980, p.326). By this time, 
Dr. Irwin had retired and both Jack Hassard and Donal Morgan resigned from the Police 
Authority. Although he had been serving on the Police Authority as a nominee of the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions, the trade union umbrella group refused to replace Mr Hassard and 
withheld support from that point onward for the Authority (Mulcahy, 2006, p.41). 
The institutionalised defects of the Police Authority extended beyond its duty to those who 
complained about police misconduct or wrongdoing and deficit in transparency. The 
Authority had no oversight, or apparent readiness to oversee, those aspects of policing which 
encroached upon security matters (O‟Rawe & Moore, 1997, p.140). This was exemplified in 
the tripartite relations between the RUC Chief Constable, Secretary of State and the Police 
Authority. Whilst ostensibly this constellation constituted tripartite arrangements at the heart 
of policing accountability pre-Good Friday Agreement, “the Police Authority (PANI) is 
clearly the „poor relation‟ in this accountability triangle” (O‟Rawe & Moore, 1997, p.143).  
Areas where this ineffective model of accountability became most apparent included the use 
of force in public order policing (O‟Rawe & Moore, 1997, p.141) or killings where the police 
had been directly or indirectly implicated (Stalker, 1988). With 17 fatalities during the 
conflict from plastic and rubber bullets by the RUC or British Army, the retention and 
deployment of these weapons by the police would always be controversial, not least among 
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the nationalist and republican among whom most fatalities and injuries had occurred from 
discharge of plastic bullets. Primary legislation necessitated that any resource, including 
weaponry, requisitioned by the RUC would first required approval from the Police Authority, 
as the purchasing body. Each RUC requisition would be itemised and submitted to one of the 
Authority‟s sub-committees. (Taylor, 1980,  p.47). In relation to plastic bullets, the Police 
Authority appeared aloof from and indifferent to concerns about repeated purchase of the 
weapons (O‟Rawe & Moore, 1997, p.141). CAJ found evidence about plastic bullets which 
raised concerns about the indiscriminate and “sectarian” use of the weapons with 5340 out of 
6000 plastic bullets discharged, used by the RUC against nationalists (O‟Rawe & Moore, 
1997, p.275-276).  After discussions it held with the RUC Chief Constable in December 1996 
about the events of the summer, the Police Authority said publicly that it had “accepted the 
Chief Constable‟s explanation about the deployment of PBRs (plastic baton rounds / plastic 
bullets) in July.” (PANI, 1997, p.15. Cited in O‟Rawe & Moore, 1997, p.275). 
 
2.9  The Stalker Affair (1983-1986) 
 
The Police Authority role in oversight was evidenced in its scrutiny of police use of lethal 
force or involvement in state killings. In 1984, John Stalker, then Deputy Chief Constable of 
Greater Manchester Police, was appointed by the British government to investigate 
widespread allegations of a „shoot-to-kill‟ policy by the RUC and British Army. In the 
jurisdiction of any other police force in Britain, his role in the investigation would have been 
supervised by the new Police Complaints Authority which had been formed in Britain 
(Stalker, 1988, p. 23). However, the Police Authority for Northern Ireland had no input into 
the remit of Mr Stalker or his appointment, revealing a lacuna in the policing oversight 
framework at that time. Despite the fact that the catalyst for the Stalker Inquiry was three 
incidents involving multiple fatalities where a „shoot-to-kill‟ policy by the RUC had been 
alleged, there appears to have been no contact or communication of any kind between the 
Police Authority and John Stalker (Stalker, 1988). Even when open court proceedings, prior 
to the Stalker Inquiry, heard RUC Constable John Robinson give evidence that his superiors 
ordered him to tell lies about the killings, the Police Authority appears to have been unmoved 
and inert (Stalker, 1988). This inertia contrasts with the perspective held by senior police 
officers who had already realised that “nobody would be satisfied with further RUC 
statements or internal investigations. Only an independent investigation would do” (Hermon, 
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1997, p.156). That was already underway under the stewardship of Mr Stalker who secured 
evidence to interview senior RUC officers as part of his inquiry into allegations of a „shoot-
to-kill‟. In March 1986, Mr Stalker shared copies of his interim report. His concluded that he 
may have to request the suspension and removal from duty of one or more officers and 
reasoned that he would have to discuss this with the Police Authority (Stalker, 1988, p.264). 
However, Stalker‟s contact with the Police Authority never occurred: “The risk of allowing 
me even to make such a request must have been too great, and I believe that in April 1986 a 
government decision was made to end my involvement in the inquiry. A decision of this 
importance would be unlikely to have been made at anything less than the highest levels” 
(Stalker, 1988, p.264).  
Even in the aftermath of the truncated involvement of Mr Stalker, the Police Authority did 
not appear to lift a finger in relation to the policy of shoot-to-kill.  This refusal to engage with 
policing actions which caused public concern was illustrated again in 1996 when David Cook 
and Chris Ryder were sacked from the Authority (O‟Rawe and Moore, 1997, p.145). As 
members of the Police Authority, Cook and Ryder had objected to the routine flying of the 
Union Jack over police stations and the requirement for police officers to swear an oath of 
allegiance to the Queen ( McGarry & O‟Leary, 2000, p.101). For expressing these views, 
Cook and Ryder were subject to a vote of no confidence and then sacked by NIO Minister Sir 
Patrick Mayhew serving to underline the lack of autonomy and independence of the Police 
Authority (McGarry & O‟Leary, 2000, p.101; O‟ Rawe and Moore, 1997, p.145). 
Some have described the ineffectiveness of the Police Authority as a symptom of threats 
against its members (Moran, 2008, p.103). However, most research concludes the Police 
Authority was an entity which utterly failed in the discharge of its duties (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 
40). Neighbourhood offshoots from the Police Authority referred to as Community Police 
Liaison Committees were equally ineffective, lacking transparency and failing to hold the 
police to account. Together these organs were criticised by some as window-dressing on the 
RUC and unrepresentative of the community in Northern Ireland, certainly in the minds of 
Catholics, nationalists and republicans (Weizter, 1995, p. 229-243). By the late 1990s, the 
reputation of the Police Authority had become so tarnished that establishing completely new 
accountability mechanisms was the only option (Wright & Bryett, 2000, p.120). In reality, 
policing in this heavily militarised society, buttressed by draconian emergency powers, had 
existed in  Northern Ireland since partition without any effective accountability (Moore & 




2.10  The Police Complaints System 
 
One of the damaging impacts of policing oversight was the handling of complaints against 
the RUC. As the evidence from Duke Street 1968 onwards made clear, complaints about the 
police had to be made to the police to be investigated by the police. Eventually, a new Police 
Complaints Board (PCB) was established in September 1977 with extremely limited powers 
to supervise the decision made by a senior RUC officer about the investigation of any 
complaint (Mulcahy, 2006, p.38). In the course of its ten year existence, the PCB only 
challenged 1% of outcomes of the RUC‟s internal investigations into its own conduct 
(Weizter, 1995, p.188). Many observers felt that the PCB was not effective in holding the 
police to account (Dickson, 2014). The PCB failed to stem the flow of complaints about 
police brutality against detainees and involvement in extra-judicial killings (Murray & Faul, 
1978). 
Under the Police (NI) Order 1987, the PCB was replaced by a new Independent Commission 
for Police Complaints comprising seven commissioners and 16 staff. Like its predecessor the 
PCB, the ICPC was external to the RUC. While RUC officers retained control of 
investigations into complaints against their fellow officers (Seneviratne, 2004), their 
investigation was supervised by a designated Commissioner of the ICPC. Upon completion 
of complaints investigations by the RUC, recommendations regarding discipline or referrals 
to the Director of Public Prosecutions remained a matter for the RUC Chief Constable to 
determine. The ICPC would be limited to providing a statement of satisfaction about the 
complaint investigation (Dickson, 2014). These changes did little to make policing more 
accountable, and perhaps that was the intention for as Mulcahy (2006) writes : “This abstract 
privileging of procedure over outcome,  a core element of the liberal legal tradition, was 
persistently used to discredit complainants” (2006, p.38). Nationalist politicians remained 
insistent that the system of police complaints was inadequate (Wright & Bryett, 2000, p.54).  
A case which brought to the fore, arguably as much as any other, failings in policing and 
policing accountability was the circumstances surrounding the murder of human rights 
lawyer Rosemary Nelson. Ms. Nelson had been the subject of death threats and harassment 
by some members of the RUC, something for which both the RUC Chief Constable and the 
NIO Minister for Security Adam Ingram denied all knowledge (Nelson Inquiry, 2011). 
46 
 
Nevertheless, the treatment of Ms. Nelson was put on the record with a specially appointed 
UN rapporteur Mr Param Cumaraswamy and was the subject of a complaint supervised by 
the ICPC. The supervising Commissioner Ms Geralyn McNally expressed dissatisfaction 
with the RUC‟s internal investigation into police intimidation of Ms Nelson. Ms McNally 
herself was later the subject of a death threat (Nelson Inquiry, 2011). Ms McNally‟s 
dissatisfaction with the RUC internal investigation was discussed by the Northern Ireland 
Office (NIO). NIO advice drew attention to “the need, or otherwise, to act on the cumulative 
total of material suggesting problems in the RUC handling of defence lawyers. The fact that 
the latest piece of material is from our “own” Independent Commission for Police 
Complaints cannot be discounted lightly” (Nelson Inquiry, 2011, p.225). In March 1999, Ms 
Nelson was murdered in an undercar booby-trap bomb. In the aftermath, particular criticism 
had been levelled at the role of the RUC Chief Constable Ronnie Flanagan in response to 
prolonged concerns about the campaign of intimidation and threats against Ms Nelson by 
some police officers. Both the chair of the Police Authority and the chair of the ICPC 
publicly defended the RUC Chief Constable. The ICPC was later scrapped following the 
report by Dr. Maurice Hayes which recognised the failure of policing accountability in 
Northern Ireland and proposed a new complaints system (Hayes, 1997). In his report, Dr. 
Hayes reflected upon the problems with police complaints systems in other societies : “…one 
of the lessons to emerge most strongly from foreign attempts to use civilian investigators is 
that…those systems which failed did so because of police opposition” (1997, p.11). His 
report paved the way for the establishment of a new independent, investigation and 
complaints system, enshrined in the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 as the Police 
Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. However, the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland did 
not commence operation until after the Patten Commission had reported (ICP, 1999). Dr. 
Hayes himself was appointed to the Patten Commission and further statutory provisions were 
made for PONI in subsequent legislation (Police (NI) Acts 2000 & 2003).  
Later, in remarks he had prepared to introduce a roundtable discussion as part of this study 
(2016, January 12), the late Dr. Maurice Hayes was adamant that it was not enough that the 
Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland was independent in law. He argued 
that the people within the office, most especially the Police Ombudsman, must be 
independent in mind and virtue. That is why he viewed the legal construction of „corporation 
sole‟ as an essential ingredient of PONI. The Police Ombudsman ought to be afforded the 
same protection as a senior judge and the person in this role needed to be someone “who can 
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look the police in the eye”. The Police Ombudsman should be focussed on matters of serious 
public concern and not encumbered with issues about the standard of service delivery, in the 
view of Dr Hayes. In this regard, he was also very clear that it was hugely detrimental for 
police officers to be permitted “to leave the field of accountability”. Dr. Hayes believed that 
retired police officers “should not have a right to refuse to co-operate with the Police 
Ombudsman in some instances as his view that the matter is under investigation relate to 
some of the most serious criminal acts were the lives of people had been lost” (Hayes, 2016, 
January 12). 
 
2.12  Prelude to Policing Reform 
 
As evident since the inception of the Northern Ireland state, the direction of policy on 
policing was inextricably linked with developments in politics. Before Dr. Maurice Hayes 
had been tasked with reviewing the system of police complaints, there were already detailed 
discussions behind the scenes about the need for negotiations to end the conflict (Mallie & 
McKittrick, 1996). Following the emergence of the Hume-Adams dialogue, referred to by 
Sinn Féin as the Irish Peace Initiative (Mallie & McKittrick, 1996, p.247) it had also been 
revealed that secret contact directly between the British government and Sinn Féin had been 
ongoing for many years (Mallie & McKittrick, 1996, p.232 - 255). Latterly, under the 
watchful eye of the Northern Ireland Office permanent under-secretary Sir John Chilcott and 
his officials Quentin Thomas and Jonathan Stephens, the Secretary of State Sir Patrick 
Mayhew had been exchanging secret messages with Sinn Féin (Mallie & McKittrick, 1996, 
p.235). After the British and Irish government had announced the Downing Street 
Declaration in December 1993, the IRA announced a ceasefire on 31
 
August 1994. Loyalist 
paramilitaries would subsequently announce an end to their armed actions as well. In the 
weeks which followed, NGOs strategized about forging an agenda to promote human rights 
in the months ahead. This led to a joint statement issued on International Human Rights day, 
10 December 1994, which stated: “Just as the conflict in NI has led to emergency laws and 
assaults on democratic rights and freedoms in all the jurisdictions on these islands, so the 
opportunity must now be taken to dismantle this apparatus of repression..” (CAJ, 2013, p.18). 
This step was followed up by an event in January 1995 under Chatham House rules between 
CAJ and other NGOs with senior police officers and officials from the Northern Ireland 
Office and Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, among others (CAJ, 2013, p.18).  
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When the Forum elections were held in 1996, discussions within the Forum during 1996 
included the subject of policing reform, a senior unionist negotiator said that participants 
could not reach any agreement about changes to the RUC (Interview with researcher, 2016). 
It has often been claimed that this impetus came from within the RUC itself (Ryder, 2000). 
Yet while the British Secretary of State‟s secret pre-ceasefire communications were ongoing, 
a consultation document was launched entitled “Policing in the Community: policing 
structures in Northern Ireland” (NIO, 1994). Sir Patrick Mayhew subsequently said that there 
were public “misunderstandings about the scope and intent of the currently planned reforms” 
(NIO, 1996). By May 1996, the Northern Ireland Office had drafted a white paper on 
“Foundations for Policing: proposals for policing structures in Northern Ireland” (NIO, 1996, 
Cmnd. 3249) pre-empting multi-party negotiations scheduled to commence on 10
th
 June 
1996. It also pre-empted the review by Dr. Maurice Hayes of the police complaints system, a 
review of emergency legislation in  Northern Ireland and a review of policing undertaken by 
the RUC following the ceasefires, all of which were due to be complete by summer 1996. In 
the foreword to the white paper, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland outlined 
overarching principles which should provide “the common ground” for future policing (NIO, 
1996, Cmnd. 3249). He said that the central thrust of the proposals in the white paper 
included “the need to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in policing, together with 
greater public accountability” (NIO, 1996, Cmnd. 3249). However, the white paper proposed 
that the Police Authority should be strengthened, though not dissolved and the NIO Minister 
underlined that policing reform would be an evolutionary process, contingent on the 
prevailing political and security environment. Nevertheless, the white paper was an indication 
of official recognition of systemic policing failures. Following the white paper, the final 
legislation was to be informed by impending negotiations (NIO, 1996, Cmnd. 3249). 
 
2.13 The Flanagan Review (1997) 
 
Meanwhile, claims that the RUC was intent on reforming itself frequently point to the 
Fundamental Review of Policing carried out by the RUC Chief Constable Ronnie Flanagan 
(Ryder, 2000). Until now, such claims had been difficult to validate since the Fundamental 
Review of Policing (aka. the Flanagan Review) had only been published in summary 
however this research project has since gained access to the full report. The Flanagan Review 
of the RUC states that “the continuing significant absence of terrorist violence during the 
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summer of 1995 gave an opportunity for a fundamental review of policing to take place” 
(para.2.1) under the direction of the RUC Chief Constable (para 2.2).  The review was led by 
the RUC itself, with five police officers and an official from the Police Authority carrying out 
most of the research. A steering group was made up of the RUC, Police Authority and 
Northern Ireland Office. The group was chaired by the RUC Deputy Chief Constable Ronnie 
Flanagan with Mr. Peter May and Mr. Alan Tipping consulting on behalf of the Northern 
Ireland Office.  The final report by Flanagan‟s review group was 224 pages long and 
contained 189 recommendations. The Flanagan Review covered 18 sub-headings : Service; 
Operational Structure; Management and Operational Support; Crime and Intelligence 
Support; Community Services Department; Senior Command & Other Departments; 
Resourcing responsibilities and structures; Financial Services; Technical Services; Personnel 
Services; Police Manpower; Civilian Staff; Information Systems; Administrative Procedures; 
Management meetings; Personnel Issues; and Organisational Style. Most of the 
recommendations related to internal restructuring of RUC systems and departments. The 
report also outlined three scenarios relating to the political and security environment which 
were considered by the Review Team. Implementation of the proposed changes was made 
contingent upon an assessment that there would be an enduring ceasefire and an end to the 
conflict.  
Senior PSNI officers have said that the Flanagan review team was replaced by a new Change 
Management Team to implement the Patten Report, with only two of the Flanagan review 
team kept on. The Flanagan review was no longer a focus for the police: “Our focus was on 
implementing Patten” (interview with researcher, 2016). However, on several occasions 
during this study, the Fundamental Review by the former Chief Constable of the RUC 
Ronnie Flanagan has been cited by some as the catalyst for policing reform. A senior unionist 
negotiator said that two-thirds of Patten was already underway thanks to Flanagan‟s 
Fundamental Review of the RUC (interview with researcher, 2016). One former RUC Special 
Branch officer has claimed: “There were few recommendations in Patten not already in the 
RUC‟s Fundamental Review” (Matchett, 2017, July 5). Having obtained full access to 
Flanagan‟s review of the RUC, those proposals were compared with the Patten Commission‟s 
report (ICP, 1999). The fact that both reports had different mandates and objectives has 
already been discussed. Yet, other stark contrasts emerge from the comparative analysis. By 
content analysis, recommendations by both reports were compared in terms of the specific 
focus of this study on accountability and external civilian oversight. Two chapters of the 
50 
 
Patten Report were devoted to accountability. There are no chapters on accountability in 
Flanagan‟s Fundamental Review. In the Patten Report, 38 of the 175 recommendations were 
about accountability. Of the 189 recommendations in Flanagan‟s Fundamental Review, not 
one was about accountability. The Patten Report has 128 numbered pages containing 108 
mentions of accountability or accountable and 97 mentions of human rights. Flanagan‟s 
Fundamental Review has 224 numbered pages containing 13 mentions of the word 
accountability or accountable. Several of these are references to reports by others which talk 
about accountability and there are no mentions of human rights in Flanagan‟s Fundamental 
Review. The final sentence of the last paragraph of content (p.196) does refer to “a sense of 
pride in the RUC along with a caring attitude and a respect for the rights of individuals”.  
In summary, the Flanagan review was very different from the Patten Report. Yet, the claim 
that the Flanagan review heralded policing reform continues to be promoted by some. This in 
itself reveals an interesting phenomenon in the ecological system within which policing 
accountability exists. For among those who publicly make this claim are, by their own 
admission, opponents of the Patten Commission‟s programme of reforms. This suggests a 
perceptual bias about the Flanagan Review which may be more than wishful thinking. 
 
2.15  Mandelson‟s Police (NI) Act 2000 and the Implementation of Patten 
 
The publication of the Patten Report in 1999 was met by some police and figures within 
political unionism with a vocal, often emotional rejection of the reforms proposed. The name 
of the RUC became a rallying point for this rejection. One interviewee involved in 
negotiations described how the Ulster Unionist leader travelled to Dublin with the RUC 
Widows Association. Together, they implored the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern not to “betray” the 
memory of RUC officers killed during the conflict by changing the name to the PSNI. Whilst 
sympathetic to those bereaved, the Irish Government was convinced that a name change was 
essential: “(David) Trimble told (Tony) Blair : “Hands off our police”. And Blair replied: 
“That‟s the problem: that‟s why we can‟t reverse reform” (interview with researcher, 2016). 
 
The Northern Ireland Office were more ambivalent. When first tabled, the Police (Northern 
Ireland) Bill 125, section 1(1) stated: “There shall be a body corporate to be known as the 
Northern Ireland Policing Board (in this Act referred to as the Board)”. The Bill also made 
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provision for establishing the “Royal Ulster Constabulary GC Foundation” for the purpose of 
marking the sacrifices and honouring the achievements of the RUC (s.63(1)). The Bill, which 
would become nicknamed after the Secretary of State Peter Mandelson who tabled it, also 
reflected the Northern Ireland Office‟s ontological position towards policing. Whereas the 
Patten Report referred more than one hundred times to a future new “police service”, the 
Mandelson Bill spoke only of the “police force”. This was recognised by nationalist 
negotiators: “There clearly was a fight back by the State or by the establishment to try and 
stunt the kind of change or control by the citizens of the police. In other words that the police 
would be genuinely a policing service, a public service, rather than a police force” (interview 
with researcher, 2016). 
 
While not disbanding the RUC, the Patten Report recommended under “Culture, Ethos & 
Symbols” that, “it should be named the Northern Ireland Police Service” (1999, p.99): 
“The problem is that the name of the RUC, and to some extent the badge and the uniform too, 
have become politicised – one community effectively claiming ownership of “our” police 
force and the other community taking the position that the name of the police is symbolic of a 
relationship between the police d unionism and the British state. The argument about symbols 
is not an argument about policing, but an argument about the constitution” (1999, p.99). 
However, during the passage of the Mandelson Bill, the British government gave way to 
unionist demands to such an extent that Professor Clifford Shearing wrote at the time: “The 
Patten Report (has) not been cherry picked – it has been gutted” (Shearing, 2000, November 
14). In particular, proposals in the Patten Report on the powers of PONI and NIPB were 
curtailed. For instance, the British Secretary of State told the House of Commons that he 
considered the Patten proposal that the NIPB could initiate reports and inquiries into any 
aspect of policing was “an extreme power, ranking it alongside the Board‟s ability to call on 
the Chief Constable to retire. The Government have therefore included safeguards on the 
exercise of the power… to protect the police from the risk of vexatious, repetitive or 
capricious behaviour by the Board in initiating inquiries and reports” (HC deb 06 June 2000, 
vol. 351 cc177-263, p.182) 
A senior Irish government negotiator said the push-back against reform was severe: “The 
British tried to dilute Patten. Didn‟t accept Patten. They felt it went too far. In the first 
instance, there were redrafts done with the Commissioners coming concerned to the (Irish) 
government to get input” (interview with researcher, 2016). Although aware of the magnitude 
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of what was at stake in the Peace Process and broader social and political transformation, a 
senior British negotiator confirmed his government‟s preoccupation with “handling political 
fallout, particularly on the unionist side” (interview with researcher 2015):  
“…what we ended up doing was a rather unseemly kind of juggling act where Peter 
(Mandelson) tried to get the unionists on board by offering unilateral changes on some of the 
symbolic issues which of course then made it very difficult for Sinn Fein on the other side 
who tried to start pulling the bedsheet back in their direction… In the end we ended up about 
right, more by accident than by design” (interview with researcher, 2015). 
Patten‟s proposal on the name of the new police service was targeted by unionists and the 
Secretary of State Peter Mandelson responded: “Finally, let me address the name of Northern 
Ireland‟s police, which in Patten‟s and the Government‟s view, is strongly linked to the new 
start that we want in policing. Many people in Northern Ireland – I mean largely, but not 
exclusively, Unionists – have never set their face against change, accept the case for reform 
allowing recruitment from all parts of the community, but equally are determined to protect 
the good name, the honour and the record of the RUC, and in particular, want it to be clear 
that the RUC is not being denigrated or disbanded. I believe that the final form of the Bill 
will achieve that…I believed that the sensible way forward was to provide in the Bill a legal 
description that incorporates the Royal Ulster Constabulary – effectively the title deeds, as I 
put it, of the new service – making it clear that disbandment is not taking place, while at the 
same time introducing a new name, the Police Service of Northern Ireland, which will be 
used for all working and operational purposes” (HC deb 06 June 2000, vol. 351 cc177-263, 
p.184) 
With the enactment of the Mandelson Bill as the Police (NI) Act 2000, a new section 1(1) 
was inserted as follows : “The body of constables known as the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
shall continue in being as the Police Service of Northern Ireland (incorporating the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary)”. Describing other studies into changing police culture, Chan (1997, 
p.54) states that “police bureaucracies are an embodiment of contradictions”. Mandelson‟s 
construct of inserting the RUC into the “title deeds” of the PSNI is not known to have any 
legal precedent or significance. Yet, this divergence from Patten‟s recommendation 
engendered a conflicted identity for the new police service from its inception. Moreover, it 
institutionalised an embodied contradiction. On its own, it may not have hindered progress. 
Yet this contradiction was embedded in the ecological system. Later, in legal action by retired 
53 
 
RUC officers against PONI‟s Loughinisland report (2016) submissions on their behalf before 
the court would invoke Mandelson‟s “title deeds” (researcher fieldnotes 1
st
 December 2017). 
Moreover, it is clear that the political emotions of policing reform, especially with respect to 
the name of the RUC, still reside in the ecological system surrounding the new beginning:  
“More emotional issues with this (policing reform) than any other issue (in 
negotiations). A really challenging issue to deal with. Many people I represent have 
had relatives in the RUC who were murdered. Any move to disband RUC would be a 
betrayal. A new dispensation on policing should be about transformation. Symbolism, 
name, badge – that was emotionally challenging… I see the result as being a marked 
increase in public confidence in policing across the community in NI…  I still 
struggle with issues such as the name.” (senior unionist negotiator, interview with 
researcher 2016). 
 
Within a four year period (2000-2004), four major pieces of primary legislation linked to 
reform of the policing and justice system in Northern Ireland were enacted in Westminster. In 
fact, in the course of two decades of negotiations up to the time of the Stormont House 
Agreement (SHA, 2014), the agenda for policing reform has routinely featured. This 
indicates the dynamic nature of the ecological system within which the PSNI, NIPB and 
PONI had already begun to operate. Yet, there were two further significant changes afoot. 
Both of these related to changes in British strategic security policy, not advancing reform. 
 
2.16  Primacy for MI5 in National Security (2004-2007) 
 
Negotiations to restore the power-sharing Assembly were convened at St. Andrews, in 
Scotland during October 2006. The resultant St Andrews Agreement included not only 
arrangements for the Northern Ireland Executive to be reappointed, it also led to two 
significant developments in the ecological system of policing accountability. Firstly, Sinn 
Féin convened a special Ard Fheis in spring 2007 to amend its constitution and approve the 
basis for its elected representatives to join others on the NIPB. After Assembly elections in 
2007, Sinn Féin made nominations like other political parties to sit on NIPB. 
 
Secondly, the British government brought to fruition its own plans to transfer primacy for 
National Security intelligence gathering in Northern Ireland from the PSNI to MI5 (BSyS). 
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This policy change outlined had been precipitated by a confidential report prepared by former 
NIO permanent under-secretary Sir John Chilcot and NIO official Christine Collins. The 
Chilcot report was commissioned in March 2002 after an office in Castlereagh police station 
was the target of a break-in (Reid, 2002, HC Deb 01 May 2002 vol.384 cc931-5). 
Unspecified information was removed from the Special Branch office in Castlereagh PSNI 
station. Whilst the Chilcot report has never been published, it has been cited as 
recommending the transfer of National Security intelligence from the PSNI to MI5. In July 
2003, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland at the time Mr Paul Murphy, MP, confirmed 
receipt of the report in a written statement to the House of Commons. He said that Sir John 
Chilcot made a number of recommendations regarding British National Security interests but 
“did not uncover any evidence” that government agencies carried out the Castlereagh break-
in (Irish Times, 2003, July 16). Fourteen years later, following a referral by the PSNI Chief 
Constable into claims the break-in was orchestrated to cover up the role of a British agent(s) 
in the IRA, PONI published findings of its own investigation (PONI, 2017, September 28). 
This reviewed PSNI intelligence about the incident but made no comment on whether the 
Castlereagh break-in was carried out to discredit Special Branch‟s primacy at the time in 
British National Security intelligence gathering. Nor was any comment made on claims the 
break-in had something to do with British agent(s) in the IRA. In many respects, this was an 
academic exercise. The policy change recommended by Sir John Chilcot to transfer British 
National Security intelligence gathering to MI5 had been under preparation from at least July 
2004 (Kearney, 2006, p.55). By 24 February 2005, former Secretary of State Paul Murphy, 
M.P. made a written statement to the House of Commons described the planned change as 
part of the “modernisation agenda of the Police Service of Northern Ireland”:  
“Such change will in no way diminish the role of the PSNI in intelligence gathering in 
areas other than national security….such a change will facilitate the devolution of 
justice and policing when a robust and workable basis for that is agreed… The powers 
and responsibilities of the Policing Board, the Police Ombudsman and the Police 
Oversight Commissioner to oversee policing are not affected by this change. We 
intend that the new arrangements together with any associated safeguards will be fully 
operational during 2007.” (Murphy, 2005, HoC written statement, Northern Ireland: 
National Security Intelligence Work, February 25).  
 
This plan was introduced to the ecological system of policing and policing oversight under 
the guise of Annex E to the St Andrews Agreement (2006). As part of the plan, a new facility 
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has been created for MI5 at Palace Barracks, near Holywood. During the last decade, 
unspecified numbers of PSNI officers have worked in the MI5 facility. Arguably, inclusion of 
this in talks at St. Andrews was a cosmetic exercise. Sir John Chilcot‟s report after the break-
in at Castlereagh police station had set in motion the strategic policy shift in transferring 
National Security intelligence gathering from PSNI to MI5. By October 2006 in St. Andrews, 
this plan was not up for negotiation, as one senior British government representative 
explained: “That wasn‟t a negotiation. We weren‟t negotiating that with anyone. Our security 
people told us what we needed and that was what we did” (interview with researcher, 2015). 
 
None of this was foreseen by the Patten Commission, although events which led to this 
strategic paradigm shift in the ecology of policing occurred quickly in the early stages of 
reform. Notably, the Patten Report‟s own recommendation that a Commissioner for Covert 
Policing should be appointed in Northern Ireland (1999, p.38) was never implemented. 
Instead, several independent reviewers have been appointed by the British government for 
reviewing different aspects of policing within the field of British National Security. There is 
no integration or co-ordination between these separate reviewers who each write their own 
report and receive limited logistical support from the NIO. Engagement between NIPB and 
these reviewers was infrequent, with the overall arrangements labelled “fragmentary” 
(researcher fieldnotes, November 2016). With the exercise of police powers by the PSNI in 
the interest of British National Security (BNS), the process through which citizens must go to 
make a complaint was described as “lugubrious” (researcher fieldnotes, November 2016).  
Despite the statement by the former Secretary of State (Murphy, 2005), it is still unclear how 
NIPB or PONI discharge their policing oversight duties when the PSNI is co-located with 
MI5 in relation to British National Security.  During 2010, the NIPB chairperson met with the 
Director of MI5 in Northern Ireland (NIPB, 2010, p.71). Later the same year two meetings 
were held between NIPB members and MI5, according to one participant in this study. Only 
oblique reference is made to this in NIPB records : “Annex E to the St Andrews Agreement 
states that the Security Service will participate in briefings to closed sessions of the Policing 
Board to provide appropriate intelligence background about national security related policing 
arrangements” (2011, p.73). Both the SDLP and Sinn Féin had taken seats on NIPB by then 
and were outspoken critics of MI5, revealing the contradiction this implanted in ECO. Recent 
submissions to the European Court of Human Rights describe oversight of British national 
security, including the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) as wholly inadequate to safeguard 
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human rights. An earlier report by CAJ (2012) reported that IPT has never upheld a single 
complaint. Giving MI5 primacy in British national security in Northern Ireland and tasking at 
least one third of PSNI resources to BNS-related activities has created a huge accountability 
void. CAJ warned that BNS had created a “grey area for the PSNI in limiting its 
accountability” (2015, p.31). Again this underlines how changes in British policy and 
agencies within the macro system, not directly involved in accountability, may have an 
(inhibiting or enabling) influence upon external civilian oversight. 
For some researchers, the fundamental contradiction underlying policing reform is one 
inherent to Security Sector Reform (SSR) elsewhere. SSR in post-conflict societies has 
become “excessively coloured by terrorism-related concerns”(Caparini, 2006, p.20) at the 
expense of governance, accountability and sustainable and balanced reform. Ellison & O 
Reilly (2008) argue that within the model of policing reform in Northern Ireland are “two 
distinct and potentially irreconcilable” components. One is the counter-insurgency policing 
which was part of the failed policing system of the past; and the other is the policing reform 
process, including accountability and external civilian oversight. “Counter-terrorism policing 
is often conducted within the supportive framework of a „state of exception‟ where judicial 
scrutiny, accountability mechanisms and independent oversight are inevitably diminished.” 
(Ellison & O Reilly, 2008, p.421).  Proponents of counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency 
policing (COIN) view the achievement of stability within a post-conflict society as a 
precursor to reform (Frei, 2011). Exponents of British National Security (BNS) see no need 
for this to be compromised this for the sake of policing reform and external civilian oversight 
in Northern Ireland, as one participant candidly stated during this study. Potentially, this 
resurrects a risk which the Patten Commission had sought to remedy when they warned of 
past problems: “…the Chief Constable has been responsible to the Police Authority for what 
might be called ordinary crime policing and directly to the Secretary of State for security-
related policing. Given the proverbial difficulty of serving two masters, it is not surprising if 
at times chief constables have tended to develop a more direct relationship with the one who 
appeared more influential…. These arrangements are not a basis for democratic 
accountability” (1999, p.23). Ten years after the transfer of National Security intelligence to 
MI5, how this impinges on the ecological system of policing accountability is still unknown. 
If the Stormont House Agreement (SHA) 2014 comes to be implemented, this will precipitate 
further change for NIPB, PONI and PSNI. Creation of a new Historical Investigations Unit 
(HIU) as envisaged will further alter the remit of each of the agencies with unclear 
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consequences for accountability and external civilian oversight. Yet it is clear that for some 
of those foremost in the political negotiations to reform policing, the risks associated with the 
HIU are better than the current state of play:  
“Where I have a difficulty – PONI involved in legacy cases has been problematic… I 
wish we had agreed HIU some time ago- to involve PONI in legacy cases was not a 
good thing. Chief Constable recognised that by establishing a HET….One deficit in 
reforms has been how we police the past. I wish we‟d reached agreement earlier. It 
held back the new policing dispensation. Policing gets caught in the middle of it. In 
terms of policing the past, we could have done better.” (senior unionist negotiator, 
interview with researcher, 2016). 
 
2.17  Bifurcated policing and National Crime Agency (NCA) (2013-2015) 
 
The ecology of policing accountability is responsive to factors beyond the local context 
which also deserves to be acknowledged in this study. The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR, 2001, May 4) held that the British government had breached the Article 2 rights in 
the murder of Gervaise McKerr and 13 others. The then First Minister David Trimble derided 
the ECtHR ruling as “astonishing and perverse”. In a public response, the Secretary of State 
at the time John Reid played down the judgment: “The criticisms are of procedures, the 
investigations, not the deaths themselves. We will want to study those criticisms carefully” 
(BBC, 2001, May 4).  
 
Sharing information and intelligence appears to go further under the rubric of the “war on 
terror”, leading to findings by the Council of Europe (2006) of British complicity with the 
USA in illegal abductions and renditions (HRW, 2006 ). Evidence of US agents in 
„intelligence-led policing‟ in Northern Ireland has also been confirmed in the case of the 
Omagh Bomb (eg: David Rupert).  Britain‟s strategic international intelligence interests and 
ongoing interactions with the US and others (“5 eyes” as one interviewee described it) 
illustrate the countervailing forces within the macrosystem. Disclosures by whistleblower 
Edward Snowden, a former US National Security Agency analyst appear to underscore this.  
A document disclosed online (Gallagher, 2016, June 7) reveals a Service Level Agreement in 
2011/2012 between the PSNI and the British Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), 
which hosted a “multi-agency Internet Data Unit (iDU)”. The SOCA-based host co-ordinated 
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an intensive online spying operation on behalf of the Home Office Communications 
Capabilities Directorate (CCD). The operation codenamed Milkwhite (Milkwhite Enrichment 
Services (MES)) provided an intelligence gathering hub involving the PSNI with other 
agencies including HMRC, MI5 and MI6. Forecasting future developments, the document 
states: “Implementing these new services is enabling the community to identify and 
overcome many of the operational, cultural and policy challenges associated with this 
transformation, GCHQ will continue to be forward leaning in supporting the CCD change 
agenda” (p.2).  
 
Under the Crime and Courts Act (2013) all of SOCA‟s responsibilities and powers 
transferred to the new National Crime Agency (NCA). The NCA was established with a 
Director General appointed by and solely accountable to the British Home Secretary. The 
legislation empowered the Home Secretary to give direction to the Director General of the 
NCA in the use of powers of constable afforded under the new law to NCA officers.  Scope 
to widen the powers of the NCA to counter-terrorism policing was also enshrined in the new 
Act as part of the re-engineering of policing in Britain. However, with the transfer of policing 
and justice powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly in 2010, the NCA could not operate in 
the devolved sphere without a Legislative Consent Motion (LCM) by the local Executive. 
What happened next illustrates the reversibility of policing reform and the risk that bifurcated 
policing (Reiner, 1992) may have a collateral adverse impact on accountability. 
 
The LCM was blocked by the main nationalist partners in power-sharing, Sinn Féin and the 
SDLP, who both insisted on safeguards on accountability of NCA. When no agreement was 
reached on the accountability for NCA, the LCM before the power-sharing Executive by the 
Minister for Justice was not adopted. Instead, on 29 January 2015, an Order In Council (S.I. 
2015 No.798) was tabled to extend the provisions of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 to 
Northern Ireland. This circumvented the “Sewel convention” which purports to give primacy 
to the local Assembly on matters which have been devolved. In May 2015, both NIPB and 
PONI announced that oversight of some aspects of the NCA had been given to them. The 
following spring 2016, NIPB publicised the first attendance of the Director General of the 
NCA at a meeting of NIPB. Underlining the dynamic effect of this bifurcation of policing the 
PSNI announced a new “co-located team” with NCA, Customs & Excise and HMRC 
(Fitzmaurice, 2017, September 23). Like interagency activity under „Milkwhite‟, it is unclear 
how ECO extends to this new co-located team. However, these developments further suggest 
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that the bifurcation of policing forecast by Reiner (1992) may also bifurcate policing 
oversight.  
These significant changes in the ecology of policing accountability are included within a 
chronology or key milestones or critical moments which occurred during this study 
(Appendix 1). Whilst this cannot be exhaustive, it is illustrative of the dynamic and complex 
ecology within which accountability and external civilian oversight exists and operates. 
 
2.2  Conclusion. 
 
This chapter explored the socio-historical context to understand what it might reveal about 
the conditions within which the new beginning to policing has emerged. It was within this 
ecology that the PSNI, PONI and NIPB were established and became operational. Transition 
from what Machiavelli described as the “old conditions” to “a new order of things” has been 
conjunctural, impacted upon by co-varying, co-existing and often contradictory factors and 
forces. It has been within a context of civil strife, political violence and thousands of murders 
since the inception of the Northern Ireland state. Dispute and debate about the scale and 
scope of policing reform has been followed by conflict and challenge over the quality of 
reforms implemented. Legislation to make provision for the new beginning to policing has 
been a further scene of struggle. The result of this has been that the new beginning to policing 
has within it embodied contradictions which institutionalise a dispute which the Patten 
Commission sought to resolve. Even as the foundations were laid for the new architecture of 
accountability, strategic policy change was still occurring around it with the transfer of 
primacy for British National Security intelligence gathering. During this study, further 
change has occurred with the National Crime Agency‟s extension into devolved sphere in 
Northern Ireland. Together, these developments would appear to support this study‟s 
reconceptualization of accountability and external civilian oversight as an ecological system. 
Furthermore, historical incidents outlined within this chapter still have contemporary salience 
within the ecological system of policing accountability and wider society in Northern Ireland. 
As this study ends, there is political debate about the anniversary half a century ago of the 
foundation of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and its march in Duke Street in 
Derry in 1968. New information has been uncovered about the torture of detainees in the 
60 
 
1970s which was not disclosed during Ireland v UK [1978]. This has led to a renewed 
application to the European Court of Human Rights, supported by the Irish Government. 
After a referral by the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) to the Director of Public 
Prosecution (DPP), a new investigation has begun into the murder of Martin Tighe, one of the 
killings linked with the shoot-to-kill policy investigated thirty years ago by John Stalker. Past 
events, summarised in this chapter, still telescope into the present day in Northern Ireland. 




Chapter 3:   Methodology 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the research methods employed and why these particular methods were 
chosen. The research design and procedures are described in detail. To maximise the 
ecological validity of research findings a mixed methods approach was adopted for this study. 
Securing and maintaining access to all three agencies at the centre of this study is reviewed 
alongside recruitment of the research sample. Procedures for collecting and analysing data 
are included and located within the wider scholarship which lends support to the chosen 
method. Detailed attention is given to the ethical issues identified in this study. Measures and 
techniques adopted by the researcher to mitigate bias and maintain ethical standards at all 
stages of the study are reviewed. Before detailing the methodology, the epistemological and 
ontological considerations which guided these choices are outlined. 
 
3.2  Epistemological and ontological considerations 
 
Research methodologies are inseparable from the epistemological and ontological approach 
of the researcher. Johnson & Duberley (2000) summarise three distinct paradigms by which 
social scientific inquiry may be categorised: positivist; hermeneutic; and critical realist.  
Bryman (2008) makes clear the divergence between positivist and hermeneutic paradigms is 
premised on dichotomous ontologies about the social world. Positivism posits an objectivist 
ontology, that our social world, including organisations and categories, exists independently 
of the individuals or actors within it. On the other hand, hermeneutics postulates a 
constructivist ontology, whereby social phenomena and categories are the product of and 
derive meaning and value from social interaction and social construction. This extends to the 
social construction of knowledge (Bryman, 2008, p.16-17).  As for critical realism, this 
incorporates naïve realism and critical realism (Bryman, 2008, p.12). Bryman (2008) 
contends that realism shares positivism‟s emphasis upon the observable world and on the 
adoption of rigorous data collection to the standard employed in the natural sciences. Where 
critical realism and positivism disagree is in the unobservable generative mechanisms 
engaged in the production of observable phenomena. Brannick & Coughlan (2007) further 
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elaborate the integral role of human cognition in the generation of social reality from a 
subjectivist ontology. Drawing upon the work of Johnson and Duberley (2000), they argued 
that critical realism is in fact more closely related to hermeneutics than positivist paradigms. 
As this chapter will proceed to explore, the epistemological and ontological assumptions 
underlying this research are inextricably and inevitably connected to choices by the 
researcher in relation to research procedures, methods of analysis, and the form of reflexivity 
entailed and involved in the research process (Brannick & Coughlan, 2007, p.62-63). 
In relation to the current study, literature reviewed overwhelmingly implicates individual 
actors and agency, interacting together, as the social process through which accountability is 
constructed (eg. Bovens et al., 2014). Consequently, a methodology which facilitates study of 
the processes by which accountability impacts upon policing reform must be capable of 
capturing the richness and complexity of the interaction. In particular, this study is interested 
in the discovery of shared values, attitudes and meanings held by social actors. It is also 
concerned with uncovering evidence of any impact on policing and policing reform which 
may be attributed to external civilian oversight by those involved in its exercise. Informed by 
this and by Brannick & Coughlan‟s (2007) succinct, comparative summary (Table 1), the 
epistemological and ontological underpinnings of this study favour a critical realist model as 
an appropriate paradigm for fieldwork.   
 
 Table 1: Research paradigms (Brannick & Coughlan, 2007,  p.63) 
Philosophical 
foundations 
Positivism Hermeneutic & post-
modernism 
Critical realism & 
action research 
Ontology Objectivist Subjectivist Objectivist 
Epistemology Objectivist Subjectivist Subjectivist 
Theory Generalisable Particular Particular 
Reflexivity Methodological Hyper Epistemic 
Role of researcher Distanced from data Close to data Close to data 
 
 
3.3  Research design 
 
This is an exploratory study using mixed methods. The use of a mixed methodology is a 
robust research design which offers the prospect of richer data and potentially more reliable 
results (Bryman, 2008). In the first instance, this included a desk-based review and interviews 
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with elite actors engaged in negotiations to develop an understanding of the situational 
context (Punch, 1986). The second stage involved fieldwork for a case study of the three 
agencies at the centre of accountability and external civilian oversight of policing reform in 
Northern Ireland. Using Q method, semi-structured interviews and observational field notes 
data was collected from the commencement of the study in autumn 2014 to completion in 
January 2018. However, an important temporal dimension to this was that the Northern 
Ireland Policing Board (NIPB) was due to be constituted in May 2016, following the 
elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly. This would change the makeup of the NIPB and 
within the following 12 months, the chair and vice-chair of the NIPB would also be re-
elected. Therefore, there was an imperative to undertake data collection following Ethical 
Approval as quickly as possible. Most fieldwork was conducted between September 2015 
and June 2016, although observational fieldwork continued in the background beyond this 
whilst preliminary data analysis commenced. 
Since this research procedure entails mixed methods, triangulation is used to help clarify and 
cross-check findings (Bryman, 2008, p. 275). In this study, available documentation (surveys; 
minutes; reports; records of proceedings) will provide valuable corroboration for the 
responses of participants in the Q sort and semi-structured interview. Furthermore, 
observational research was undertaken both formally and informally throughout the duration 
of this study. Formal observational research included monthly public meetings of the Policing 
Board between September 2015- September 2016 and select court proceedings throughout 
the whole study. This was augmented with informal observational research and in-situ 
research meetings which extended beyond September 2016 and participation in events, 
workshops and conferences. Access to official documentation, including previously 
unpublished documentation, will also be used in triangulation. Informed by the theoretical 
framework, Levels of Analysis (LoA) are employed to explore accountability at the level of: 
i) individual; ii) group; iii) institutional; and iv) inter-agency responses. Agency affiliation / 
job status, as well as gender, religion, nationality and socio-economic background may also 
be incorporated into these Levels of Analysis to help with interpretation of observations and 
findings. Furthermore, as stated previously, to contextualise the interpretation of findings at 
these Levels of Analysis, a chronology of significant milestones or episodes in policing 





3.4  Contextual interviews with elite actors. 
 
As outlined previously in this study, institutional design and operational delivery of policing 
accountability emerged and was influenced by ongoing political negotiations. Therefore, as a 
component part of the preliminary data collection and fieldwork for this study, semi-
structured interviews were arranged with a purposive sample of elite stakeholders (n=9). All 
of those interviewed played a significant part in the process of negotiations which led to the 
inception and continued to shadow the operation of the new beginning to policing in  
Northern Ireland. Although a small sample of interviewees (see Table 2) those who agreed to 
be interviewed encompassed a wide cross-section of actors who participated in negotiations 
from the British and Irish governments to the political parties in Northern Ireland.  
Other PhD studies, including sensitive research (McKeown, 1998) and research of a personal, 
intimate nature has revealed the utility of in-depth interviews with a purposive sample of 
„super-informants‟ (Reilly, 1997).  Semi-structured interviews have also been effectively 
employed with elite interviews in political office (Gormley-Heenan, 2008; Spencer, 2014).  
Taking account of these studies, the extensive literature on interviewing elites (eg. Dexter, 
2006) and review of literature on policing accountability, an interview schedule was devised 
in conjunction with supervisors (see Appendix 2). The focus of this was to learn from the 
viewpoint of the elite interviewees, the dynamics of negotiations on policing reform and how 
accountability came to be handled during talks.  
With the consent of participants, interviews were recorded digitally. All but two interviewees 
consented to this procedure. Two interviewees declined digital recording but consented to 
notes being taken during the interview, with the standard condition attaching to all interviews 
carried out that the participants would remain anonymous in this study. Upon completion, 
interviews were securely stored and later transcribed using Dragon Naturally Speaking 
software (v.13) for the purpose of general inductive analysis (Thomas, 2006).  In common 
with other interviews elite stakeholders involved in peace negotiations in Ireland (eg: 
Gormley-Heenan, 2008; Spencer, 2013), emergent findings from interviews were cross-
checked with available literature, including biographical accounts (eg. Powell, 2008), 
legislation, publications, news reports and grey literature, including the researcher‟s own 
archive of papers and correspondence regarding negotiations on policing reform. This phase 
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of fieldwork helps portray the socio-political and legal context which informed the design 
and impinged upon delivery of accountability. 
 
3.5  Q methodology. 
 
Drawing upon literature already reviewed, this study accepts the epistemological position that 
the researcher is an active agent and influence in this study. However, this study seeks to 
employ a methodology which gives primacy to the voice of the participants. In exploring and 
choosing an appropriate method, that is paramount. One method effective at facilitating this 
and which is compatible with the critical realist orientation of this study is Q method. 
The Q method has been found to be highly robust methodology (Van Exen & de Graf, 2005; 
O‟Connor, 2013) which enables subjective views and perception to undergo systematic 
analysis, whilst controlling for researcher bias (Shinebourne, 2009; Simons, 2013).  “Q‟s 
purpose is to reveal subjective structures, attitudes and perspectives from the standpoint of 
the person or persons being observed” (Brown, 1996, p.565). Unusually for methods which 
are compatible within a critical realist or an interpretivist paradigm, Q method entails 
numerical data and statistical analysis whereby participants self-classify (Woods, 2011). 
Intra-individual similarities and differences can be explored compared within and between 
organisations using the data collected during the Q sort is subject to factor analysis. What has 
been referred to as the „qualiquantilogical‟ character of Q method reflects the fact that it is a 
hybrid of qualitative and quantitative methods (Simons, 2013; Davoren, Cronin, Perry & 
O‟Connor, 2016). Moreover, the collection of responses through the use of the Q sort may be 
supplemented and augmented by semi-structured interview with participants (O‟Connor, 
2013).  In this respect, the method has been successfully employed in a diverse range of 
studies, particularly with a public policy implication. For instance, the method has been 
employed to examine leadership in education, (Woods, 2011), nursing (Simons, 2013) and 
business (McKevitt & Davies, 2015). Importantly, this method has been employed in 
research into sensitive subjects (O‟Connor, 2013). Significantly for the purpose of this study, 
it has also been employed successfully to research attitudes towards accountability in food 
health (Kraak, Swinburn, Lawrence & Harrison, 2014). Furthermore, Q methodology has 
previously been employed to explore the subjective perceptions of police officers towards 
gangs in Central America (Ratcliffe, Strang & Taylor, 2014).  
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Its utility and advantage to the current study as a method is that the Q methodology is a 
means of “capturing, comparing and contrasting individual perspectives on a specific 
question” (Woods, 2011, p.318). Van Exel & de Graaf (2005) maintain that it is this facility 
for Q methodology to record the operant expression of subjectivity which enables systematic 
analysis. In mobilising this operant response, it is posited (Cross, 2005) that this variability in 
subjective response has a protective quality against response bias. In this study, Q 
methodology has the added, potential value of orienting the participant(s) towards the Q sort, 
rather than towards the researcher. In this way, it is argued that this may permit a more 
humanistic, less directive approach, empowering the participant. 
That is not to obscure the researcher‟s role in Q methodology. In fact, statements (Q sort) are 
derived from the literature based on an intimate knowledge of the literature and subject area 
by the researcher (Simons, 2013). Statements may also be derived from publications, news 
reports and initial scoping interviews or preliminary observations in the field (O‟Connor, 
2013).  Statements might also be sourced from academic literature and journals (Kraak et al, 
2014). In Q methodology, this is described as the concourse (Van Exel & de Graaf, 2005) 
from which the Q sample may be generated. This Q sample (or Q set) is intended to reflect or 
represent the breadth of opinion about the subject of interest. Simons (2013) highlights 
variability in the volume of statements chosen for a Q sample from as few as 18 to as many 
as 140 (Simons, 2013, p.29). Van Exel & De Graaf (2005) suggest that a Q sample may have 
slightly more or less than 40-50 statements. However, the final number and content is the 
responsibility of the researcher to determine according to what is known from the concourse 
and prior research about the subject. As Kraak et al (2014, p.209) explain, once a Q study has 
defined the research question and generated a Q sample from the concourse, the next step is 
recruitment of participants. Selection of participants is very important since it hinges upon the 
role and position of the participant in relation to the subject under investigation. That is why 
recruitment of participants for Q methodology is by purposive. 
3.6  Research Sample (P set). 
 
Consistent with previous research employing Q methodology, purposive sampling was 
employed to recruit participants. The total sample for Q method interviews (n=62) was 
comprised of elite interviewees from each of the 3 specified agencies. An attempt was made 
to recruit numbers of participants from each of the agencies which would be broadly 
comparable (NIPB=23; PONI=15; PSNI=24). Whilst there was no aspiration towards a 
67 
 
sample of participants which would be statistically representative of the composition of each 
of the agencies, the recruitment of the sample reflects significant efforts to ensure a cross-
section of those who have been engaged in discharge of policing accountability since the 
inception of the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland and the Northern 
Ireland Policing Board 15 years ago (see Table 2).  When the overall statistical profile is 
segmented into the demographics for participants according to the agency to which they 
belong(ed) it is apparent that the sampling method has been successful in generating a cross-
section of opinion which is broadly reflective of the demography of each of the specified 
agencies and to a degree, of society as a whole. 
Table 2 – research sample (n=71) 
Agency Total 
(n) 
Current Former Male Female Cath. Prot. Unknown 
NIPB 23 18 5 12 11 13 9 1 
PONI 15 11 4 10 5 7 3 5 
PSNI 24 17 7 16 8 6 16 2 
Elite 
Actors 
9 - - - - - - - 
Total n=71 45 16 38 24 26 28 8 
 
As applications to University Ethics for this study reflect, all of those eligible for interview 
were required to have previously exercised or be currently exercising senior responsibilities 
in the discharge of external civilian oversight and interaction between the Police 
Ombudsman, Policing Board and the Police Service of Northern Ireland.  Recruitment of 
interviewees was primarily through the established liaison arranged by the researcher as part 
of the access strategy within each of the specified agencies. On occasion, where interviewees 
were already known to the researcher or where the prospective interviewee had already 
retired from the specific agency, the researcher made direct contact through available 
channels. Only one prospective participant declined to be interviewed, instead referring the 
researcher to his written remarks.  One other prospective participant agreed to be interviewed 
but despite repeated attempts and because of competing responsibilities, it became impossible 
to obtain this interview within the timeframe for fieldwork. All participating interviewees 
were asked to complete a preliminary questionnaire on general biographic information to 
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facilitate descriptive statistics of the P set as a whole (see Appendix 3). In accordance with 
Ethical Approval from the University, each participant received information about the study 
and consented for their Q sort and semi-structured interview to be recorded for the purposes 
of analysis in this study (see Appendix 4.). This also reflects the effortful task of purposive 
sampling in trying to ensure that there is a cross-section of opinion from participants of 
seniority, both serving and former, from within each of the 3 specified agencies. To reduce 
inhibitions arising from concern for career prospects, professional reputation or personal 
distress, all participants were afforded complete anonymity in this study. 
 
3.7  The Q set and Q sort. 
 
For this study, and consistent with available research on Q methodology a Q set of 59 
statements (see Appendix 5) was derived from the concourse on the subject of policing 
accountability and external civilian oversight in Northern Ireland. These were printed onto 
card, numbered randomly and laminated before use. At the start of each interview, a brief 
introduction of the procedure for the Q sort was provided and the participant was invited to 
sort the Q set of statements. Amidst the Q set were several statements which were 
deliberately counter-poised on the same theme in order to increase the reliability of the 
findings. For instance, statement 20 („After 15 years of external oversight there is now 
irrefutable evidence that it has driven policing reform‟) is counterpoised with statement 26 
(„there is no evidence that external oversight has had any impact on policing reform or 
improvements in the PSNI‟). In addition, reflecting the breadth of discourse (and opinion) on 
the subject of policing reform, terms such as „Northern Ireland‟ and „north of Ireland‟ are 
used interchangeably. 
For the purposes of this study, again informed by the available research on Q methodology, a 
sample sheet was designed to record interviewees responses (see Appendix 6). The quasi 
normal distribution used for recording participants‟ responses in the Q sort is flatter, in 
keeping with previous research (Van Exel & de Graaf, 2005) permitting a range of possible 
responses for choice by the participants. This is premised on the potential variability and 
strength of participants‟ responses expected by the researcher. In this study, the sorting 
pattern which participants were asked to follow ranged from very strongly agree (+4) to very 
strongly disagree (-4) similar to Kraak et. al. (2014). A prospective interview schedule 
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derived from the literature was agreed with research supervisors (see Appendix 7). Alongside 
the sample sheet on which interviewee responses to the Q sort were input, a digital recording 
device was used to record verbal responses for transcription. Each interview lasted between 
90 minutes to 2 hours, including semi-structured interview about the interviewee‟s Q sort. 
After Q sort interviews, data was securely stored data and transcription was undertaken with 
the use of Dragon Naturally Speaking (v.12) software into MS Word for subsequent inductive 
analysis (Thomas, 2006). Quantitative analysis of the Q sort by coding and inputting data for 
analysis using PQMethod statistical software (v.2.33, December 2012)  for analysis of data 
gathered through Q methodology (Schmolk, 2012). Participants‟ responses were analysed and 
interpreted based on the correlation matrix output and emergent analysis of factor loadings. 
Emergent quantitative data analysis guided the general inductive analysis of semi-structured 
interview transcripts. This primary data was supplemented by formal and informal 
observational research. In the case of formal observational research, digital or written 
recording was made in real-time, usually in situ. Online broadcast of NIPB public meetings 
facilitated occasional remote observational analysis and video recording. Informal 
observational analysis usually permitted brief contemporaneous written notes, and more 
detailed post-observation voice memos. News reports; publications; correspondence; 
minutes; court records; statistical surveys and grey literature including reports (by HMIC; CJI 
or others) produced about (any of) the 3 agencies, were also reviewed manually to ensure 
cross-checking of key emergent findings. 
 
3.8  Research access. 
 
Brannick & Coughlan (2007, p.68) highlight the precarious nature of negotiating access 
during research, especially inside organisations: “There may be a significant gap between the 
aspiration toward purity of research and the reality. How access is realized may depend on 
the type of research being undertaken and the way information is disseminated” (Brannick & 
Coughlan, 2007, p.68). This is consistent with the view of others that research access once 
secured, involves a process of continual negotiation during a study (Punch, 1986). Research 
into policing in Northern Ireland underlines that trust is a critical ingredient in securing 
access and once gained, requires continuous reinforcement (Brewer, 1990, p.584). 
Overcoming the suspicion inherent in all policing organisations of those from outside 
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depends upon the personality and skills of the researcher to allay suspicion (Brewer, 1990, p. 
585). Brewer highlights “tenacity, toughness and single-mindedness” as important qualities 
alongside “a certain balance and pragmatism” (Brewer, 1990, p.591).  Nevertheless, in 
societies experiencing or emerging from conflict, access is often regulated by and dependent 
upon the co-operation of gatekeepers. 
Gatekeepers may (unwittingly) have an influence upon research through the selection and 
approval of interviewees (Knox, 2001). This may especially be the case where organisational 
access is sought. Yet cognisance must also be taken of the professional, and possibly personal 
costs to the gatekeeper in levering co-operation for the researcher within the organisation.  In 
policing research in Northern Ireland, other researchers have highlighted difficulties in 
securing and sustaining access. Murphy (2008) highlights the hiatus in research activity 
which arose from the change in gatekeeper within the police. Topping (2009) was declined 
research access to the Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB). Access was eventually gained 
to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) but noted that the prevalence of multiple 
requests for research access to the PSNI heightened the risk of research fatigue and reduced 
co-operation (Topping, 2009). The potential instabilities and inconsistencies in the 
relationship between the researcher and the gatekeeper can have far-reaching implications for 
the success of any research study (Sanghera & Thapar-Bjorkert, 2008). However, formal 
gatekeepers within an organisation may not unlock access to all avenues of research. It has 
been argued within policing research that once the first gate is opened through approval from 
senior police officers, the second gate is consent of individual members of the police service. 
(Fox & Lundman, 1974 cited by Brewer 1990).   
The challenges highlighted by previous research and literature on research access and the role 
of gatekeepers are especially germane to this study. Access to three agencies involved in 
policing was sought simultaneously, conceivably multiplying the difficulties in gaining 
access. Moreover, this required three times the effort in sustaining research access once 
initially granted. On the other hand, the advantage may also be to the researcher that once 
agencies knew others were co-operating, they would be more willing to do likewise. 
Furthermore, the researcher sought access by going to the very top of each of the agencies to 
request access and co-operation. In the first instance scoping meetings were sought and 
obtained with the PSNI Chief Constable. Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland and the 
Chief Executive of the Northern Ireland Policing Board. This was followed up by an 
exchange of correspondence (see Appendix 8 ), formal approval from each of the agencies 
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and appointment of a designated Single Point of Contact (SPoC) for the duration of the 
research study.  An additional safeguard was in-built to the request for research access that a 
meeting would be convened with the chair of the University panel supervising the study, the 
researcher and the SPoCs for all three agencies together. This meeting was held in the course 
of the fieldwork at the University campus to provide a level of quality assurance on the 
research and to help facilitate the resolution of any issues concerning research access. At a 
later stage during fieldwork, research access to NIPB stalled. This followed departure from 
NIPB of two officials who had helped the researcher in the early stages (including the Chief 
Executive and the SPoC). Fortuitously, the access granted by NIPB had been arranged not 
only by the Chief Executive but also approved by the NIPB Performance Committee and full 
meeting of the NIPB. Following a further meeting with NIPB, involving the researcher and 
the University‟s chief investigator for the study (lead supervisor), access was reinstated.  
The strategy for gaining and maintaining research access was so successful that an 
amendment to original application for Ethical Approval was sought and obtained (April 
2016). This facilitated an increase in the number of interviews to be undertaken (to a 
maximum sample of 80). For the most part, access to documentation was also unfettered, 
within the constraints of the statutory responsibilities of the agencies.  
 
3.9  The ethics of fieldwork. 
 
The challenge for the researcher is how to remain detached and involved at the same time in 
the conduct of social scientific research. From the very outset, the motivation for this research 
has been grounded in and informed by the researcher‟s experience of the topic under 
investigation: policing accountability. Having previously provided advice at the highest level 
of public and political affairs on the agenda for policing reform, the specified agencies and 
some of the prospective participants in this study were already known to the researcher, and 
vice-versa. This presented an interesting dilemma for the researcher: how to distinguish his 
former role in the field from his current role in this academic study.  
Introducing Adler & Alder‟s (1987) exploration of membership roles in qualitative fieldwork, 
Peter Manning and his colleagues warn:  “There must be an almost hauntingly personal, 
deeply felt, emergent, and highly particularistic character for social research to count as 
authentic fieldwork” (Adler & Alder, 1987, p.5).  
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Punch (1986) has described the messy business which research methods entail and warned 
that convention and normative expectations often mitigate against the description of this in 
presenting methodologies. “To a certain extent, the fieldworker is no different to the 
policeman” argues Punch (1986, p.8) insofar as the “situational ethics of fieldwork are almost 
insuperable”. This underpins a broad spectrum of social science premised upon an expansive 
corpus of literature heavily influenced by sociological fieldwork (eg: Becker, 1963; Denzin, 
1970). This scholarship originated from what has been called the “Chicago School” of field 
research (Alder & Alder, 1987, p.11). Epistemologically, the “Chicago School” advocates an 
understanding of the social world of the participants in any study as the verstehen, 
encompassing the behaviours, attitudes, values and meaning assigned to their everyday 
affairs (Denzin, 1970). However, as with other social scientific inquiry, research paradigms 
involving insider/outsider roles may include: positivistic; hermeneutics; and action research 
(Brannick & Coughlan, 2007).  
Research where insider-outsider dynamics are salient has been undertaken in a diverse range 
of social settings, inter alia, including education (Mercer, 2007 ); business (McKevitt & 
Davies, 2015); and  action research (Herr & Anderson, 2014);  A further development upon 
insider-outsider research which Bartunek & Louis (1996) refer to as I/O research involving 
collaboration between insider(s) and outsider(s) (Bartunek & Louis, 1996). Brown (1996 
cited in Davies 2016) offers a typology of research in policing which is essentially a two-by-
two model of insider-outsider roles (see Table 3).  





Police Insider-insider Outsider-insider 
Civilian Insider-outsider Outsider-outsider 
 
Although Brown‟s (1996) typology is a helpful heuristic to distinguish researcher and agency 
designation, it does not convey the differential value or impact attributable to outsider 
research about the police (Bayley, 2015). Moreover, the nuance and complexity implicit in 
insider-outsider roles of the research process is more than formal affiliations based on 
whether the researcher is a police officer or not.   
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It is argued that researcher roles range from: complete observer; observer-as-participant; 
participant-as-observer; and complete participant (Alder & Alder, 1987). As opposed to the 
adoption of roles which are static, it may be that the researcher‟s role is contingent upon the 
extent to which s/he becomes embedded with those at the centre of the research. Alder & 
Alder (1987, p.13) outline stages in the relationship between the researcher and those 
researched where the researcher‟s role moves from a marginal (provisional) to an involved 
(categorical) status. The connectedness between researcher and those at the centre of the 
research may fluctuate from distant to close during a study (Nielson & Repstad, 1993). 
 
3.10  Insider - Outsider research 
 
In his own reflections on fieldwork, Punch (1986) offers an alternative typology of insider-
outsider roles in policing research (Table 4). Perhaps the greatest implication and the most 
subjective calculation for insider-outsider roles in research is the inter-personal boundary 
between researcher and those being researched. 





Overt Overt insider Overt outsider 
Covert Covert insider Covert outsider 
 
Punch (1986) deliberately refers to fieldwork as „infiltration‟, in order to convey the implicit 
moral and ethical dilemmas arising for the researcher. Whether it more closely mirrors the 
typology of Brown (1996) or Punch (1986), the ethical and moral dilemmas are myriad for 
those engaged in insider research. This is especially the case where a person is both 
researcher and employee within an organisation at the centre of their study (Adler & Alder, 
1987). Using covert ethnographic methods to study the police organisation of which he was a 
member left Young (1991) outcast amongst his colleagues. Brewer (1990; 1994) has also 
detailed at length the methodological challenges of ethnographic fieldwork in policing in 
Northern Ireland. Brewer (1994, p.242) also offers guidelines for good practice fieldwork in 
policing research more broadly. However, Punch (1986) highlights the obligation upon the 
researcher to consider in advance of research the ramifications for other researchers of what 
is done in the field. Punch‟s exhortation is to be careful not to spoil the field for others.  
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Furthermore, the social and emotional involvement of the researcher in the research, 
including the nature of his relationship with the subject, field, and participants in the study 
may in itself yield significant data (Punch, 1986). Potential data of this kind risks being 
“suppressed as „non-scientific‟ by the limitations of prevailing research methodologies” 
(Clarke, 1975, p.96, in Punch 1986). This is why consideration of the insider-outsider roles 
and attention to the social and emotional involvement of the researcher in the study with the 
field and participants becomes an important and ongoing facet of this methodology. In fact, 
Dwyer & Buckle (2009) posit that there is symbiotic interaction between the researcher and 
those being researched which is richer and far-reaching in qualitative methods: 
“We carry these individuals with us as we work with transcripts. The words, 
representing experiences, are clear and lasting. We cannot retreat to a distant 
„researcher‟ role. Just as our personhood affects the analysis, so, too, the analysis 
affects our personhood. Within this circle of impact is the space between” (Dwyer & 
Buckle, 2009, p.61). 
 
At the level of individual interaction in the field between researcher and participant(s), 
unwittingly altering (perceived) relationships from one of professional rapport to mutual 
friendship may irreversibly change the research study itself. This is commonly referred to as 
„going native‟, a term originally derived from anthropological research (Adler & Alder, 1987) 
although use of the term „native‟ may be construed as having unsavoury colonial 
connotations. In PhD research carried out in Northern Ireland, others (Reilly, 1997; 
McKeown, 1998) have also argued that this concept of „going native‟ is outdated and in any 
event, has limited explanatory value for the socialisation process in which the researcher is 
central for any social science research over a protracted or prolonged period (Reilly, 1997; 
McKeown, 1998). Yet the corollary to this may be especially germane to a PhD research 
study, where the socialisation of the researcher is over a three year cycle.  Referring to the 
challenges and risks of fieldwork in policing research, the observations of Maurice Punch 
(1986) tend to support this concern:  
“The investigator engages in a close relationship during a considerable period of time 
with those he or she observes. This is of vital significance, because the development 
of that relationship is subtly intertwined with both the outcome or the project and the 




The literature on insider-outsider research raises several vital challenges for the current study 
with implications for operationalizing this study and the commencement of fieldwork. 
Firstly, given our overlapping membership of social circles in society we are all insiders to 
some extent of the social world which is the focus of inquiry. When it comes specifically to 
research on policing in a society where the researcher has grown up and still lives, this is a 
relevant consideration and will be addressed hereafter in terms of positionality. This will also 
be considered later in this chapter with specific reference to the researcher.  
Secondly, the process of research may privilege the researcher with the intimacy of an insider 
while remaining an outsider. This brings with it the opportunity for research access but the 
responsibility to ensure boundaries.   
Thirdly, the concept of hidden or covert research not only raises ethical imponderables: it is 
not reconcilable with the existing network of contacts and prospective interviewees whom the 
researcher may be able to approach. Borrowing from Punch‟s (1986) typology, the researcher 
in this study assumes the role of the overt quasi-insider. This is intended to reflect the reality 
that the fact the researcher is known and has pre-existing professional relations with some of 
those at the centre of the research. However, the insider role in this context does not mean, 
nor does it require, affiliation or membership of any of the agencies. At the same time, it was 
important to distinguish the previous basis for contact from the parameters for contact 
between researcher and participants in this study.  
Fourthly, consistent with methodological role and personal values of the researcher in this 
study, an open and transparent approach to this study which is humanistic governed contact 
with participants. Fully disclosing the nature and scope of the research and exhibiting care 
and attention to the needs of participants who agree to be interviewed was essential.  
Finally, if the context for research is a fundamental part of correctly construing and 
configuring insider-outsider roles, then it is crucial to consider the conflict in Northern 
Ireland as a methodological challenge. The highly situational quality of policing research 
(Brewer, 1990, p.592) is inevitably modified by the fact that the violent conflict in Northern 
Ireland is finally past. Yet, many issues related to the conflict remain unresolved. These 
include statutory obligations which rest upon each of the agencies at the centre of this study 
(PSNI, PONI, NIPB). The implication of this for the current study is that a judicious 
approach was required to the form and nature of observational methods employed in order to 
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capture as much as possible of the interaction and operation of accountability without 
impeding or impinging upon the discharge of statutory duties or compromise the study. 
Undertaking this study as an overt quasi-insider and being aware of the situational ethics 
involved on-going effort by the researcher. One process which facilitated this was reflexivity. 
 
3.11  Reflexivity. 
 
Sensitivity to the cultural, social and political context in which a study is undertaken along 
with self-awareness of the values, bias and prior experience of the researcher is referred to in 
social science as reflexivity (Bryman, 2008, p.500).  As already outlined, the subject of 
policing is one which is politically and emotionally evocative for many people in Northern 
Ireland. Experiences of policing vary widely. The scale and speed of the reform process over 
the last 17 years means that many of those still involved in the field of policing are people 
whose experience predates the peace process. Growing up and living in Northern Ireland, 
policing is an experiential as well as an intellectual component in the life of the researcher. 
This extends to family members and the fact that relations between the community within 
which the researcher lives and the police have been fraught for many decades. For these 
reasons, reflexivity in research assumes great importance in this study.  
Realising and responding to the role of the researcher as an active agent in the study (Punch, 
1986, p.8) also helps to shape choice and use of research methods which are appropriate and 
rigorous. Reflexivity in research may take two forms: i) epistemic reflexivity; and ii) 
methodological reflexivity (Brannick & Coughlan, 2007). Reflexivity, informed by literature 
already discussed, has informed the choice of methods in this study. In particular, the choice 
of Q method is a calculated attempt to mitigate the potential for the researcher (through 
professional relations prior to commencing this study) to elicit a response bias among 
prospective participants during interviews and fieldwork for this study.  
If the context for research is a fundamental part of correctly construing and configuring 
insider-outsider roles, then it is crucial to consider the conflict in Northern Ireland as a 
methodological challenge. As Brewer (1990) outlines, policing in Northern Ireland is “an 
emotive topic in a sensitive environment and this sensitivity has implications for research” 
(Brewer, 1990, p.578). Sensitivity in fieldwork is not only what the researcher considers to be 
sensitive but also what the participants, the agencies within which they work and the 
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community at large consider to be sensitive (Feenan, 2002). This made reflexivity essential to 
this study.  
One example of this emerged during a scoping meeting in the early stages of this study. 
Discussing the researcher‟s move into academia and departure from a previous role in public 
affairs and politics, one participant expressed scepticism about how the three agencies would 
regard the researcher‟s change of career: “Do you think they believe you?” (researcher 
fieldnotes, 5
th 
December 2014).  This underlined to the researcher the need for participants to 
believe in the independence and trustworthiness of the researcher.  Conceivably, this question 
could legitimately be asked of any researcher: how can you be certain that those to be the 
subject of the research have confidence and trust in the person conducting the research? The 
corollary to this is even more profound: if the researcher commands little or no trust, how can 
the participants be expected to respond accurately and honestly? More fundamentally, if trust 
and confidence in the researcher is in doubt, how can access for the research study be 
successfully secured and sustained? 
Consistent with the researcher role informed by Punch (1986) of an overt quasi-insider, the 
disposition of the researcher has been to favour maximum transparency in on-going liaison 
with each of the agencies and interviewees. This is reflected in a remark made by a 
participant. Expressing satisfaction with the openness of the researcher on the background to 
the study and the procedures to be employed, the participant said: “Usually we‟re treated like 
mushrooms about research like this: kept in the dark”. Another elite stakeholder in policing 
accountability met by the researcher during scoping meetings for this study said: “You‟re a 
little more mature than I had been expecting for a PhD student”. This remark reveals how the 
appearance and assumed age of the researcher suggests the salience of underlying 
interpersonal dynamics in fieldwork which have nothing to do directly with the research 
study itself. These examples are shared from the reflexive journal kept by the researcher 
during this study to support the concept of fieldwork as dialogic. More importantly, they hint 
at the embedded norms of fieldwork interaction, including assumptions underlying 
researcher-participant interactions and power-relations. Again this became part of the on-
going reflexivity of the researcher. In the analytical stage of the research study, this 
reflexivity remains an important safeguard without imperilling hermeneutics. One technique 




Figure 2. Bracketing (adapted from Tufford & Newman, 2010, p.88) 
 
3.12  Bracketing, positionality & focussing. 
 
Originating from with phenomenological research paradigm, the researcher is required to 
“engage in the self-reflective process of „„bracketing‟‟, whereby they recognize and set aside 
(but do not abandon) their a priori knowledge and assumptions, with the analytic goal of 
attending to the participants‟ accounts with an open mind” (Stark, & Trinidad, 2007, p.1376). 
Emotions and cognitions, values, biases and pre-conceptions about the research subject may 
all be explored through bracketing which can entail compiling research memos; debriefing 
with an independent external to the research study; and journaling (Tufford & Newman, 
2010). For reasons of sensitivity and efficiency, and the ethics of maintaining confidentiality, 
journaling is the method of bracketing preferred in this research study. Bracketing helps “to 
mitigate the potential deleterious effects of unacknowledged preconceptions related to the 
research and thereby to increase the rigor of the project” (Tufford & Newman, 2010, p.81). 
This has the added safeguard for the researcher of off-setting adverse effects from interaction 
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with a topic which can cause emotional distress.  In the case of this researcher, two formative 
experiences of policing from around childhood occurred in or about the same time. These 
examples were shared and discussed during an academic paper presented by the researcher on 
emergent findings from this study (Kearney, 2016, October 8). 
At the age of 10, the researcher and his parents and family circle joined other families and 
people from within the wider community of south-west Antrim, where the researcher grew 
up. The purpose of the public gathering was to walk into the centre of Toome village, on the 
edge of the River Bann in county Antrim to meet with people from South Derry. The meeting 
was to hear public speakers and say prayers for  republican prisoners on the 1981 hunger 
strike in Long Kesh.  On the way into Toome village, the walkers found the road ahead 
blocked off by heavily armed RUC. A convoy of other RUC landrovers then followed up 
behind the walkers to cut off their retreat. The RUC officers in the landrovers opened fire 
indiscriminately with plastic bullets on the peaceful crowd, including the researcher and his 
family, by that stage scrambling into the adjacent chapel grounds. Several people were 
injured and some were arrested.  One evening, a year or two later, after attending the cinema 
in Magherafelt in south Derry with his parents, the researcher began coughing blood. The 
condition was discovered to be linked to surgery a fortnight earlier. Accompanied by his 
parents, he was rushed to hospital in Ballymena. The most direct route to the hospital 
required access to Magherafelt town centre, at that time sealed off overnight with security 
barriers because of the ongoing conflict. Driving up late at night in an unknown car to the 
security barriers policed by the RUC officers on high alert was a concern for the researcher‟s 
parents. However, the RUC agreed to open the security barrier to permit the car through and  
provided some tissue paper  for the bleeding still being experienced by the researcher. These 
contrasting experiences of the political and the personal exemplify this researcher‟s 
experience of the RUC was never black and white but multi-layered and complex. This also 
reflects something of the situational context in which most participants in this study grew up.  
From the standpoint of feminist scholarship, personal influences inevitably interact with the 
process of research and the researcher‟s experience of it. This is called positionality. 
Positionality is not limited to formal or professional roles but also entails significant lived 
experience. Recognition and attention to the positionality of the researcher in conjunction to 
the research subject is a vital element in the conduct of fieldwork and equally, in the 
interpretation of data and findings.  Fieldwork is politicised and dialogic in nature, constantly 
being inhibited or enabled by the interactions between the researcher and participant(s) and 
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underpinned by implicit power relations which are omnipresent. This is what makes 
reflexivity an important and ongoing activity in this study. As England (1994, p.83) states:  
“reflexivity is critical to the conduct of fieldwork: it induces self-discovery and can 
lead to insights and new hypotheses about the research questions. A more reflexive 
and flexible approach to fieldwork allows the researcher to be more open to any 
challenges to their theoretical position that fieldwork almost inevitably raises.. (and) 
must require careful consideration of the consequences of the interactions with those 
being investigated.”  
 
Reflexivity also helped guide the conduct of fieldwork and facilitate the identification of 
additional or supplementary questions which begin surface in what Schutt (2006) called 
„progressive focussing‟. These practices were mutually beneficial but also revealed 
something of the hidden power relations of the research process. For instance, whilst 
conducting fieldwork in the PSNI, the term „overview‟ was used often. As subsequent 
chapters on findings will discuss in more detail, „overview‟ was an actual computer system, 
not merely a description of the oversight process. When further enquiries were made about 
interaction between the agencies through „overview‟, this prompted internal discussion within 
the agencies about the research questions being sought. This was brought to the attention of 
the researcher during the course of fieldwork and merely served to underscore the active, 
dynamic effect of the researcher in the field. That is not to say that the fieldwork was 
measurably curtailed or controlled. However, it is naïve to think that a research question can 
be asked about an organisation / agency without any questions being asked within an 
organisation/agency about the research question(s). In this study, familiarisation with 
terminology used within and between the agencies was further aided, through cross-checking 
between agencies key issues. While this will be discussed further in later chapters, the 
example of „overview‟ underlines the iterative, interactive effect of reflexivity and focussing. 
 
3.13  Limitations & conclusions. 
 
The limitations of this methodology will be discussed in greater detail in the final chapters of 
this study, once results have been presented, analysed and interpreted. However, it should be 
noted that some researchers contend that mixed methods research are predicated on a false 
premise. Smith (1983, p.12-13) argues that quantitative and qualitative research methods 
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cannot be matched because they constitute irreconcilable views about the social world (cited 
in Bryman, 2008, p.453). Another limitation may be the non-randomised nature of purposive 
sampling in this study. Yet, both of these arguments are counteracted by Q method, which is 
the primary method in this study as already discussed. Perhaps, it is sufficient to acknowledge 
that the breadth and scale of this study, involving three separate agencies and 71 participants 
makes the collection, coding, analysis and interpretation of data a significant challenge. This 
is underscored by the time constraints which challenged this study. The sample of this study 
is, for the most part, comprised of people who are actively engaged in policing or policing 
oversight. With professional duties, each participant also had significant constraints on time. 
Moreover, fieldwork involving mixed methods demanded more time and energy from the 
researcher. This is the first time that Q method has been employed by the researcher and the 
first time it has been used as a research method to study accountability and external civilian 
oversight. Nevertheless, for reasons outlined herein, it is concluded Q method is 









As stated elsewhere, the triumvirate of agencies at the centre of policing accountability have 
never previously been the subject of empirical research. That invites some significant 
conceptual and theoretical challenges which this chapter will explore. Ultimately, this chapter 
will seek to provide a unifying conceptual framework to the subject under study.  
Accountability and external civilian oversight is understood in this study as a complex, 
conjunctural and dynamic system. An ecological systems perspective (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; 
1992; 1999; 2009) is viewed in this study as a paradigm which may facilitate research into 
the co-varying, co-existing and often contradictory factors active at different levels within 
accountability and external civilian oversight in Northern Ireland. On this premise, the 
exploratory conceptual framework proposed by this study is one of triadic accountability, 
comprising three distinct strands (situational (s); relational (r); & transformational (t)). This 
builds upon previous research to provide an integrative approach which accommodates an 
interdisciplinary and multi-level analysis of accountability in context.  The chapter begins 
with a summary of the central tenets of Bronfenbrenner‟s model, its application and some of 
its limitations. The chapter explores key definitional issues arising from the study of 
accountability, and in particular, external civilian oversight. Looking beyond the field of 
psychology from which Bronfenbrenner‟s work emerges, the study considers cognate 
research from other disciplines pertinent to this study which adds further value to the 
developing conceptual framework. Finally, an ecological systems approach to the study of 
policing accountability in Northern Ireland is proposed, adapting and applying 
Bronfenbrenner‟s ecological systems model (1979; 1992; 1999; 2009) to this study. 
 
4.2 Ecological systems theory (EST). 
 
Ecological systems theory (EST) has itself evolved over forty years of scholarship 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1979; 1992; 1999; 2009). The central tenets of this theory originate from 
the research of Bronfenbrenner‟s own tutor psychologist Kurt Lewin. Lewin‟s most 
influential proposition was that human behaviour was a function of the interaction of the 
person and environment (Lewin, 1935). Building on this, EST asserts that human 
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“development is a function of forces emanating from multiple settings and from the relations 
between these settings” (Bronfenbrenner 1999, p.15). In this model, Bronfenbrenner 
highlights two distinct propositions: i) proximal processes; and ii) dynamic influences. 
Proximal processes are seen as processes of enduring, complex and reciprocal interactions 
between a person and other people and objects or entities in the person‟s environment. 
Dynamic influences relate to the form, power, content and direction of this proximal process 
originate from changes in the characteristics of the person, the immediate and wider 
environment, and the socio-historical context in which the interaction occurs 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1999, p. 5). Taking Lewin‟s (1935) original concepts of behaviour, person 
and environment, ecological systems theory recasts these as PPCT, meaning “person-process-
context-time” (PPCT). This field-orientation views human development as mediated by the 
interaction of person - process –– context –time. Influence of the environment and individual 
agency are equally important from an ecological perspective (Lounsbury & Mitchell, 2008 
p.215) In this way, “the characteristics of the person are both a producer and a product of 
development” (1999, p.5).  Roles, norms and rules of the setting influence the interaction 
between person and environment and in this dynamic process, personal perceptions are 
salient in effecting and explaining individual behaviour (Lounsbury & Mitchell, 2008, p.215). 
Reconceptualising his own theory, Bronfenbrenner refers to the levels of analysis within EST 
as: Microsystem; Mesosystem; Exosystem; Macrosystem; (Bronfenbrenner, 2009.  See 
Figure 3).  The Chronosystem was later added to this model by the theorist to reflect the 
importance of time which interacts with all levels of the system from the chronological 
development of the individual person to the socio-historical development of the macrosystem.  
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Figure 3.  Bronfenbrenner‟s Ecological Systems Theory (EST).
 
In Bronfenbrenner‟s EST, these layers are nested together as: firstly the microsystem which 
involves daily and direct interaction between an individual with significant people or 
groupings in his/her life. Secondly, the mesosystem encompasses a set of interrelations, 
comprising relationships which exist between two or more microsystems. There are often 
cross-overs where relationships between work colleague or peer may also be a friend or 
partner). These linkages are the mesosystem (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p.25). Bronfenbrenner 
cited “the growth of mutual trust, positive orientation, goal consensus between settings and 
evolving balance of power” (1979, p.214) as enhancing development in the setting of the 
mesosystem. Thirdly, the exosystem is where linkages and processes occur between two or 
more systems at least one of which does not include the person directly. Yet in the exosystem 
events may occur which may indirectly effect the immediate setting in which the person 
exists (Bronfenbrenner, 1999). “There exist direct and indirect links to power settings through 
which participants in the original setting can influence allocation of resources and the making 
of decisions that are responsive to the needs of the developing person and the efforts of those 
who act on his behalf” (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p.256). Fourthly, the macrosystem refers to 
the prevailing cultural, economic and political environment. The shifting relationship of these 
layered or nested systems over time is reflected in the chronosystem which Bronfenbrenner 
added later to his theory. This chronosystem  is included to correspond with life changes at 









One limitation of Bronfenbrenner‟s EST may be too much emphasis upon the features of the 
physical setting within which an interaction occurs between two people (Neal & Neal, 2013). 
A further limitation is that a nested configuration of the systems within the environment may 
not clearly articulate the potential differential effect on individuals interacting with one 
another: “…systems are not necessarily nested within one another ...it is individuals‟ patterns 
of social interactions with other another that determine how systems relate to one another 
...each type of system to be precisely defined in terms of patterns of interaction” (Neal & 
Neal, 2013, p.6). 
 
Yet the rigour and utility of Bronfenbrenner‟s framework is widely acknowledged. Owing to 
his renown as a child psychologist most citations of his theory relate to research into child 
development.  In a search for Bronfenbrenner‟s 1979 ecological systems theory, Google 
Scholar (May, 2017) generated 32,500 hits. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this model has also been 
employed to research areas cognate to school-community partnerships (Leonard, 2011); 
college student culture (Renn & Arnold, 2003); and parenting (Belsky, 1984). Yet increasing 
recognition of the transferability of Bronfenbrenner‟s theory can be seen by the diversity and 
breadth of scholarship in which the ecological systems theory has been applied. This includes 
rebuilding a community in the aftermath of environmental disaster (Spokane, Mori & 
Martinez, 2013) and the study of accountability in education (Johnson, 2008). In policing 
research, EST has been employed to study police training (Litmanovitz, 2016), the dynamics 
of urban violence (Moncado, 2015) and the role of part-time police leaders in community 
policing (Minard, 2011).  Of particular note is the contention that Bronfenbrenner‟s EST is 
particularly well placed to articulate and investigate learning within “complex adaptive 
systems” (Purse, 2017; Johnson, 2008). Johnson contends that: “complex systems, i.e., 
systems that fit Bronfenbrenner‟s field theoretical model, balance precariously between stasis 
and entropy, and are constantly evolving and developing around this critical state.” (Johnson, 
2008, p.5). Using EST to the study accountability in an educational setting, Johnson (2008) 
discounted a linear association between accountability and improvements in school 
performance. That finding has particular resonance for the current study. Yet the intrinsic or 
idiosyncratic features of policing accountability in Northern Ireland invite closer examination 
before concluding whether or not ecological systems theory provides a valid theoretical 
framework for this study. 
86 
 
4.3  External Civilian Oversight 
 
Lack of scholarly consensus within research on policing accountability has led to many 
conceptual challenges. Most germane to this study is the definitional and conceptual debate 
among scholars about External Civilian Oversight (ECO). Prenzler expresses concern that 
“civilian oversight of police is characterised by frequent change and almost constant debate” 
(2011, p.286). This finding is supported by other research noting that: “As policing systems 
change, oversight, accountability, and control mechanisms need to change as well.” (Marenin 
& Caparini, 2004, p.19). Other Security Sector Reform (SSR) literature suggests that the 
evolution of policing oversight may be influenced by the objective or purpose which the 
oversight is intended to serve. In other words, the focus, function and effect of ECO may 
adapt or evolve according to changes in the environment and context within which it 
operates. 
 
One definitional challenge is the duality of the term model. This is applied to theoretical or 
conceptual paradigms of policing accountability (Reiner, 1993; Hays, 2013; McDaniel, 2015) 
whilst model is also used to define and distinguish institutional and operational forms of 
oversight. Citing Luna & Walker‟s (1997) study, Finn (2001, p.6) states that “There is no 
single model of (citizen oversight) and it is difficult to find two oversight agencies that are 
identical”. In offering a typology of four different civilian oversight mechanisms, Finn (2001) 
qualifies this by adding that most civilian oversight bodies are a hybrid of two or more of the 
four types distinguished. Furthermore, the oversight bodies included in Finn‟s typology 
related to oversight bodies which investigated complaints of police misconduct or 
wrongdoing (Finn, 2001). Goldsmith (1991) posits a typology of six „models‟ of civilian 
oversight. Borrowing from this, Clarke (2009) describes four types of civilian oversight 
bodies for policing in the United States of America: i) “civilian in-house”; ii) “civilian 
external supervisory”; iii) “civilian external investigatory”; iv) civilian auditor. Meanwhile, 
Kerstetter (1985) outlined 3 types of civilian oversight as: i) civilian review; ii) civilian input; 
and iii) civilian monitor. A review cited  by the Police Assessment Resource Centre (PARC, 
2005) on external police oversight bodies in the United States of America also lists 3 types: i) 
review and appellate; ii) investigative and quality assurance; iii) evaluative and performance-
based.   However, even here it is noted that all police oversight bodies in America “do not 
entirely fit into the three models described” (PARC, 2005, p.6). Prenzler (2011) identifies 
two primary models of external oversight:  1) a minimal review model (undertaking limited 
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responsibilities in relation to external audit and performance improvement recommendations 
on policies and procedures); and, 2) a „civilian control model‟ (with investigative and 
intrusive powers with regard to police corruption, including covert surveillance and powers 
of compulsion) (Prenzler, 2011, p.284). Prenzler suggests that the „civilian control model‟ is 
becoming more popular internationally (2011, p.285). Yet, on the global stage of policing 
accountability, there is significant variability in the remit, responsibilities and statutory 
powers of civilian oversight agencies (Porter & Prenzler, 2012, p.153). The concept of a 
„civilian control model‟ is invoked most frequently to describe police complaints systems 
(Prenzler, 2004) where there is a clear separation between the police being investigated and 
the civilian(s) investigating the complaint. Yet, language of „civilian control‟ to define and 
distinguish models of oversight remains problematic.  
 
Savage (2013a) has suggested that „civilianess‟ may be more meaningful than „civilian 
control‟ in explicating the value and effectiveness of civilian oversight. In Savage‟s 
comparative analysis of police complaints systems, it is suggested that the aspect of policing 
oversight where „civilianess‟ may be most important is in the profile or makeup of civilian 
investigators (Savage, 2013a, p.889). Recent research by Harkin (2015) suggests that public-
police engagement in Scotland can never truly be under the „civilian control‟ because the 
release of information to any public forum or oversight body is controlled by the police. This 
question of „control‟ remains at the crux of debate about policing accountability and extends 
to those in government who interact with civilian oversight bodies. Indeed, a Canadian study 
suggested that civilian oversight of policing in western societies is at “a critical juncture” 
(Porter & Prenzler, 2012, p.153).  Ironically, it is these same western societies and which are 
to the fore in expounding the virtues of Security Sector Reform (SSR) incorporating civilian 
oversight (Edwards, 2004). 
 
4.4  The asymmetric ecology of policing accountability in Britain & Ireland 
Walsh (2016) suggests that all police complaints systems in Ireland and Britain conform to a 
similar model.  However, the remit and rationale for policing oversight contrasts in different 
jurisdictions. These differences are all the more interesting because the history of policing 
across these islands which was premised on the ideas of Robert Peel. With devolution of 
policing and justice from Westminister in 2010, the asymmetry in policing accountability in 
Ireland and Britain has the potential to become ever more accentuated. As Gorringe & Rosie 
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(2010, p.71) outline: “Within post-devolution realpolitik Westminster may remain the 
supreme and sovereign body of the United Kingdom in a juristic sense but legitimacy in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, or at least a considerable portion of it, rests with the 
devolved institutions.” What makes the asymmetry in accountability and policing oversight 
more significant and potentially challenging is the continuing interdependence of police 
services in Britain and Ireland. Operational deployments from one jurisdiction to another 
under mutual aid have already occurred, for example in policing of the G8 summit in 
Northern Ireland. Specialist technical and human resources were deployed by the PSNI to 
assist with the London Olympics in 2012.  
More recently steps to tackle cyber-crime, international organised crime or counter violent 
extremism transcend jurisdictions. In the aftermath of the violent attacks on 11
th
 September 
2001 in America and bomb attacks in London on 7
th
 July 2005, the security agendas of the 
United States and Britain have been increasingly intertwined and mutually interdependent. 
The doctrine of „intelligence-led policing‟ has been a totem of this relationship (Baker & 
Phillpson, 2011). This has led to a strategic shift within the British security and intelligence 
complex, and one example of this may be creation of the National Crime Agency. As noted 
earlier, policing scholar Reiner (1992) foresaw increasing bifurcation of policing, with facets 
of policing operational at different tiers within the same environment. What Reiner (1992) 
did not foresee were the implications of bifurcated policing for collateral bifurcation of 
accountability. In an example previously mentioned, information disclosed by former US 
intelligence officer Edward Snowden and disseminated online suggests that the PSNI and 
several police services in Britain are partnered in an international project involving the 
exchange of bulk data collection by the US National Security Agency and British GCHQ 
which is anchored in Britain by the National Crime Agency (Gallagher, 2017, June 7). 
Disclosures like these from Edward Snowden prompted the ex-Chief Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police Sir Bernard Hogan Howe to caution that policing found itself in a “post-
Snowden” era where “There is work to be done to restore the public‟s trust that we are acting 
in their best interest” (Swaine, 2014, November 7). This signals that bifurcated policing poses 
new challenges to the effectiveness of accountability and oversight. It also underlines the 
constant evolution of the ecological system within which policing accountability operates. 
Asymmetry in accountability in Britain and Ireland is also evident in covert policing. The 
activities of covert police units tasked attached to the Metropolitan police are the subject of a 
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special inquiry led by Sir Christopher Pitchford. The units have since been disbanded and the 
Metropolitan police have publicly offered an “unreserved apology” several women who were 
duped into having sexual relationships by undercover officers (Hutcheon, 2016, June 5). 
When it emerged that the same units had been tasked with surveilling the family and 
supporters of murdered black teenager Stephen Lawrence, British Home Secretary at the time 
set up a judge-led inquiry under Sir Christopher Pitchford. While the Pitchford Inquiry is 
probing the activities of the disbanded police unit in England and Wales, reports of its 
activities in other jurisdictions are excluded. Therefore, while police officers retain powers 
across jurisdictions in Britain and Ireland, accountability does not automatically follow. 
Even when the deployment of police officers in Northern Ireland from outside is ostensibly in 
the public interest and to preserve independence of the investigation, arrangements for 
accountability remain unclear. This includes a high profile and hugely resourced investigation 
into the role of a British agent in the IRA headed by Bedfordshire Chief Constable John 
Boutcher and SIO Metropolitan Police Commander Keith Surtees. The investigators have has 
led to the arrest of a person reported by media to be a British agent code-named Stakeknife 
(McDonald and Cobain, 2018, January 30).  Personnel who have served or are serving in the 
PSNI, RUC, British Navy, British Army, British Air Force or British Security Services are 
not eligible to apply. Operation Kenova has an Independent Steering Group (comprising of 
five senior police officers and one civilian expert) and a Victims Focus Group, and its 
website states that anyone dissatisfied with officers and staff in Operation Kenova may 
complain directly to the investigation team, the IPCC, PONI or Professional Standards 
Department in Bedfordshire Police Force (www.opkenova.co.uk). However, it is unclear 
what statutory oversight existing civilian oversight bodies in Northern Ireland (PONI or 
NIPB) have of the conduct of Operation Kenova, especially given the personnel profile.  All 
of this emphasises the apparent mismatch between the portability and applicability of 
policing powers compared with policing oversight. It also shows dynamic ecology within 
which external civilian oversight operates. Away from specifics of such policing activities, 
the operational agility and resource sharing between police services in different jurisdictions 
in Britain and Ireland appears to far exceed the shared learning, personnel, practice or 
resources between those engaged in civilian oversight of policing. It is not the intention of 
this study to apportion responsibility for this differential but its implications for the agility 
and efficacy of civilian oversight is noteworthy.  
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Hindrances common to the effectiveness of all forms of policing oversight in Ireland and 
Britain are said to include: lack of independent personnel; continuing reliance on police 
investigation and police resources; lack of rigour in investigations; regulatory capture; police 
obstructionism; and shortage of resources (Walsh, 2016, p.52-55). While research carried out 
thus far compares police complaints systems between these jurisdictions (see for example 
Seneviratne, 2004; Porter & Prenzler, 2012; Savage, 2013a, 2013b), they do not examine the 
interaction between different forms of policing oversight within a single jurisdiction. The 
current study takes the position that the collaboration or interaction between agencies which 
occupy distinct but complementary roles is an important and apparently overlooked aspect of 
policing accountability. That mutually interdependent and collaborative approach to civilian 
oversight was the original vision articulated at the outset of the policing reform programme in 
Northern Ireland (ICP, 1999). This is one area where the current study may make a 
contribution to knowledge and existing scholarship on this subject of policing accountability.  
In summary, policing accountability in Britain and Ireland is asymmetric and informed by the 
idiosyncratic features of the political ecology within which it is situated. This includes recent 
developments within the macro-political context, such as the devolution of powers from 
Westminster; trans-jurisdictional and international security policies and tactics; rapid 
innovations in policing technology and surveillance; and the impending departure of Britain 
from the European Union. As bifurcated policing (Reiner, 1992) continues apace, the unseen 
implications of this for collateral bifurcation of accountability invites further attention. While 
research underlines the importance of civilians and non-police personnel in shaping 
accountable policing, to construe or conceptualise accountability as though civilians are 
entirely autonomous or in control of such arrangements is misleadingly reductionist. The 
political ecology is in constant interaction with accountability and policing oversight.  
4.5  Independence in accountability 
 
A theme widely referenced in literature on policing in Ireland and Britain is the „British 
model of policing‟ and therefore constitutes part of the macrosystem within which the subject 
of this study is analysed. As Reiner (1993) explains, this “British model of policing” is an 
orthodoxy or doctrine as much as an institutional design. A central tenet of this is the 
operational independence of the police (Reiner, 1993).  Lister and Rowe (2015, p.369) 
contend that this has become something of a “sacred cow” in policing. Yet the concept of 
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„operational independence‟ remains opaque. The Patten Commission (1999) helpfully 
distinguished between operational independence, and operational responsibility, preferring 
the latter. It also warned against the invocation of the concept of “operational independence” 
by a “recalcitrant Chief Constable” (1999, p.33): “In a democratic society, all public officials 
must be fully accountable to the institutions of that society…and a chief of police cannot be 
an exception. No public official can be said to be „independent‟” (1999, p.32). However, the 
concept of independence is said to be inherent and immutable in policing accountability.  
European Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarburg has insisted that an 
independent system for investigating police complaints is an indispensable prerequisite for 
the success of democratic accountable policing (Porter & Prenzler, 2012, p.153). This refrain 
underlined the paramount importance attached to independence as an arbiter of the 
effectiveness of the new complaints system in the north of Ireland (Hayes, 1997). 
 
Specifically in relation to external civilian oversight Porter and Prenzler (2012) place 
independence at its epicentre: “External oversight traditionally aims to provide independence 
to investigations of police conduct in order to increase police accountability and public 
confidence in police.” (2012, p.153). At the heart of this is a “paradox” for policing 
potentially more complex than the balance between external oversight and operational control 
correctly highlighted by Mawby & Wright (2005, p.2). If external civilian oversight requires 
independence to be effective in fostering public confidence in policing, the corollary is that it 
is in the interests of policing to safeguard and uphold the independence of civilian oversight. 
Instead, the ecological system within which accountability operates may harm independence. 
 
In a landscape review by the National Audit Office (2015) of inspectorates and oversight 
bodies in the public sector, the relationship between those government departments which 
sponsored and funded inspectorates or oversight bodies was considered to be too close and 
compromised the independence and effectiveness of the oversight function (NAO, 2015).  
Lewis (2000, p.20) warned that both police and government have individually, and in 
tandem, acted to hinder the independence of accountability. Evidence of this has already been 
uncovered in the public controversy which engulfed the Office of the Police Ombudsman 
whereby it was found that the independence of the Police Ombudsman‟s Office has been 
compromised (CAJ, 2011; CJINI, 2011). In fact, amongst the key findings from a trio of 
reports about the Office of the Police Ombudsman was the conclusion that a “significant 
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lowering of the independence” (CJINI, 2011, p.5) of the office had occurred, to the detriment 
of policing accountability in Northern Ireland.  
 
Some scholars have argued that this occurrence may be evidence of regulatory or agency 
capture theory (Savage, 2013b). Regulatory capture occurs when “the group being regulated 
subverts the impartiality and zealousness of the regulator” (Prenzler, 2000, p.662). It has been 
argued that this process of regulatory capture may or may not be premeditated. It may instead 
be a symptom of the comparative strength and resources of regulator to those being regulated 
as well as exchange or staff or evolution of “inappropriate links” between the two bodies 
(Prenzler, 2000). Some of these features were evident in the reports and reviews published 
about the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, triggered by the resignation 
of its Chief Executive in 2011 and subsequent public disclosures by him (CAJ, 2011). 
However, it was not only the relationship between PONI and the PSNI which was the source 
of concern and criticism. The role of the Department of Justice for Northern Ireland which 
sponsors PONI, and the non-devolved Northern Ireland Office was the subject of adverse 
commentary (CAJ, 2011; McCusker, 2011). This suggests that the theory of regulatory 
capture must go further than examining the dyadic relationship between oversight body and 
those overseen to include the context and environment within which oversight operates. 
Evidence from Northern Ireland shows decisions or actions of a sponsor Department or other 
aspects of the legislature or polity may intentionally or unwittingly impinge upon the 
functionality and efficacy of an oversight body. This contention finds some support in 
Savage‟s comparative analysis of PONI with its counterparts the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission (IPCC) and Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) 
(Savage, 2013b). That study found that the independence so fundamental to oversight of 
policing is “a site of interaction: a constant dialectic between the goals and aspirations of 
independent oversight and the contextual conditions within which it must operate” (Savage, 
2013b, p.109).  Whilst the role of the police is particularly salient in this interaction, Savage 
(2013b) also highlights the influence of other parties and institutions within the environment 
within which the regulatory governance must exist and operate (2013b, p.109). This 
conceptualisation of policing oversight is one which Savage describes as “relational” and 
through which the independence of policing oversight is “an ever-present challenge” (2013b, 
p.109). The representation of policing accountability as “relational” finds support within 
other literature on public accountability (eg: Bovens et al. 2014). Before going forward onto 
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explore these commonalities, it would seem that a potential limitation of regulatory capture 
theory must be considered. Applying this theory to problems with the independence of police 
complaints in the north of Ireland (CJI, 2011) may help to explain the compromising effect of 
relationships between the regulator and regulatee (Porter & Prenzler, 2012). However, this 
does not explain the influence or involvement of a third (or fourth) party, external to the 
accountability relationship, such as the influence of the Department of Justice (DoJ) or 
Northern Ireland Office (NIO) upon PONI (CAJ, 2011; McCusker, 2011). In other words, 
accounting for the multi-dimensional and dynamic interactions which may impinge upon the 
independence of external civilian oversight arguably invites something more than regulatory 
capture theory currently offers. Furthermore, if regulatory capture is based on a premise that 
it is the opposite of regulatory freedom, then it is open to challenge. What if a system of 
policing accountability has in-built design faults; contradictions within it which are present 
from the start? Borrowing Neyroud‟s (2005) London Underground metaphor, perhaps the 
system has unfinished train-tracks, signal failures, ghost stations and has gone without 
maintenance for too long. Worse still, some of those within an underground transport system 
work and move „in the dark‟. By this logic, is it not inevitable that policing accountability is 
often derailed? Whilst the London Underground metaphor may be stretched to many 
imaginative depictions of how policing accountability might work, the literature and findings 
reviewed in this chapter point to a quite different ontology to that linear grid of a rail 
network. Instead, what emerges supports the conceptualisation of accountability as a complex 
system. Yet a constant feature of the research reviewed is that effective accountability hinges 
on independence. 
The sections which follows seek to complete the journey to a conceptual framework which 
might transcend theoretical and disciplinary divides whilst retaining its ontological and 
empirical validity. To that end, attention will now be given to scholarship from a cross-
section of disciplines. From an extensive reading of literature across scholarly disciplines, 
issues of potential theoretical and conceptual significance for this study are highlighted. The 
summary which follows is derived from theories of justice, political science, sociology, 
institutional scholarship and psychology as they relate to public accountability. A recurrent 




4.6  An interdisciplinary overview of accountability 
 
As previously stated, it is the ambition of this study to attempt to bridge the disciplinary and 
theoretical divide which sometimes confronts research of this kind. That does not demean the 
insight which discipline-specific research may yield for understanding accountability.  Nor 
does this study leap onto an interdisciplinary bandwagon for fashionable acclaim. An earnest 
effort has been made to understand accountability from the standpoint of different disciplines. 
In doing this, the objective has been to contemplate the potential for an ecological systems 
perspective to accommodate contrasting disciplinary interests. Furthermore, this study has 
attempted to discern issues of common interest in research into accountability across 
disciplines. Emerging from this is an importance attached to values, attitudes and beliefs. To 
pinpoint a potential interface where interdisciplinary research might be possible, it is firstly 
necessary to review and summarise findings from different disciplines.  Therefore, theories of 
justice, political science, sociology, institutional scholarship and psychology are discussed.  
 
4.6.1 Justice theory 
 
This subsection begins with findings from three domains of scholarship in justice. Firstly, 
scholarship from the discipline of Transitional Justice (TJ) and the discipline of Restorative 
Justice (RJ) will be considered. Then, Procedural Justice (PJ) will be discussed insofar as it 
may relate to or help to illuminate conceptualisations of accountability. 
 
Transitional Justice (TJ) 
Accountability is often associated in TJ literature with redress and reparations for past wrong 
doing. In societies emerging from conflict, often referred to in TJ literature as post-conflict 
societies, there is debate about what accountability actually means in such contexts. Recently, 
a method of responding to this debate has been to draft guidelines for accountability. An 
example of this is the Belfast Guidelines for Accountability and Amnesty (Mallinder, 2014). 
Mirroring this process, principles of accountability have also been drafted in Kenya from a 
transitional justice perspective. Others in civil society like NGO Impunity, have attempted to 
compose guidelines which might be transferrable across jurisdictions emerging from conflict. 
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Transitional justice (TJ) processes and mechanisms can help a society to come to terms with 
a legacy of human rights abuses and may be connected to broader societal transformation 
such as security sector reform (Bell, 2008). In this way, the United Nation‟s Security Council 
(2004) commends the value of TJ in achieving accountability, alongside justice and 
reconciliation (S/2004/616).  On the other hand, there are contradictions within TJ, which 
yield “a multiplicity of rule of law dilemmas in a transitional society” (Sweeney, 2013, p.15). 
This study cannot accommodate the full extent of that debate. Yet it is important to 
acknowledge how accountability may be impinged upon by the tension between „ordinary 
justice‟ and „transitional justice‟ (Posner & Vermeule, 2004).   
Exploring this in the context of a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights about war 
criminals in Bosnia & Herzegovnia, Sweeney (2013) contends that there is inconsistency in 
the approach to TJ (2013, p.24) although the ECtHR has never referred to TJ in its rulings 
(2013, p.27). This has led Sweeney to postulate a form of “transitional relativism”, akin to the 
“cultural relativism” widely recognised within European human rights scholarship and 
practice (2013, p.2) whereby legal codes or standards are modulated in formal proceedings 
(Sweeney, 2013, p.25). If the standards, and even international codes are modulated by 
transitional relativism (Sweeney, 2005 & 2013) a corollary to this is the plasticity of 
accountability. 
In Northern Ireland, wrestling with the legacy of the conflict continues to prove a huge 
challenge and one in which accountability is frequently referenced. Although discussed 
elsewhere in this study, successive negotiations have thus far failed to generate a 
comprehensive consensus for „dealing with the past‟. Amidst political stalemate, academics 
and NGOs have again injected new ideas for breaking the logjam (McEvoy, 2017).  Yet, the 
failure to deal with the past continues to impinge on policing in the present. In July 2017, the 
High Court in Belfast ruled that the PSNI had breached Article 2 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights in proceedings brought by families bereaved by the Glenanne Gang, an 
amalgam of loyalist paramilitaries, British soldiers (UDR) and police officers (RUC). Mr. 
Justice Treacy found that the PSNI‟s decision to withhold a thematic review into collusion by 
the Glenanne Gang across multiple killings and the decision to transfer the case file internally 
to the PSNI‟s new Legacy Investigation Branch were “fundamentally inconsistent” with 
Article 2 of the ECHR [2017 / NIQB 92]. 
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Speaking about another high-profile case of the Hooded Men, Ann Hannah of NGO Freedom 
for Torture said: “Time and again we see the idea that you can rebuild after conflict and 
achieve some form of stability or you can have accountability…in reality of course, stability 
is fragile without some form of accountability. How can you expect survivors and their 
communities to trust state institutions like the police, the army, their politicians, if there‟s 
been no attempt at accountability?” (Griffin, 2017, July 25). This quote suggests a symbiotic 
relationship between accountability and transition from conflict not to mention trust in “State 
institutions” or state-building.  This signposts a broader debate, not only in TJ research but 
also within politics and public policy about whether accountability is complementary to or 
conflicted with transition and reconciliation. 
Representation of society in Northern Ireland as one which is in transition out of conflict 
renders makes TJ scholarship and concepts such as transitional relativism (Sweeney, 2013) 
potentially relevant to the understanding and exploration of accountability in this study. In 
that regard, the broader context of transition in the north of Ireland invites attention. Professor 
Christine Bell (2008, 2012) has offered a typology of the three patterns by which 
constitutional transition occurs in negotiated peace accords around the world. Common to 
these typologies is the concept of a “constitutional rupture” demarcating a departure from the 
old order to the new (Bell, 2008, 2012). Elsewhere, Bell has analysed the implementation of 
those peace accords or agreements which have been negotiated. In a guest lecture, Professor 
Christine Bell (2015, November 25) offered an excoriating critique of the failure to 
implement those aspects of the Good Friday Agreement which related to the human rights 
agenda, and in particular, a Bill of Rights. Problems outlined with full and faithful 
implementation of agreed reforms could be compared to the patterns of progress in relation to 
policing reform in the north of Ireland, outlined elsewhere in this study. The absence of a 
“constitutional rupture” in relation to the constitutional order in the north of Ireland 
corresponded with the struggle to fully implement policing reforms advocated by the Patten 
Report (1999). Equally interesting, and perhaps problematic, is the fact that there was no 
“organisational rupture” in policing. Instead, the British government inserted the name of the 
RUC into the “title deeds” of the PSNI and RUC officers, as previously mentioned. Officers 
and staff migrated into the PSNI, without any lustration of the kind envisaged in TJ 
(Sweeney, 2013). Also of note is the fact that some staff currently in the Northern Ireland 
Policing Board and Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland were previously 
employed in the oversight bodies which preceded them (Northern Ireland Police Authority or 
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Independent Commission for Police Complaints). If the socio-political ecology of policing 
accountability in the north of Ireland is to be accurately understood, the absence of any 
“constitutional rupture” in the transition of wider society may be relevant. Perhaps moreso 
given that some of those still involved in policing and policing accountability, including 
participants in this study, have service pre-dating Patten. 
Restorative Justice (RJ) 
Literature on restorative justice frequently emphasises the significance and salience of 
accountability in restorative processes. Yet, in contrast to the retributive orthodoxy of the 
criminal justice system, Restorative Justice (RJ) envisions accountability outside the 
courtroom through a reparative process (Consedine, 1995, p.1-7). Restorative justice (RJ) 
construes crime as wrongdoing or harm against another human being but attempts to facilitate 
healing for all of those involved through forgiveness (Zehr, 2014). RJ advocates “..postcrime 
reparation that focuses on healing the harm done, promoting accountability and personal 
responsibility, and encouraging the active participation of the victim, offender and other 
concerned parties” (Poulson, 2003, p.167). In a review of seven studies, Poulson (2003) 
examined responses of those who had participated in RJ processes with courtroom processes. 
In all studies, both victims and offenders were asked about whether the offender had been 
held accountable through the process. Results suggested RJ processes were reported to have 
held offenders more accountable than courtroom processes (Poulson, 2003, p.188-189).  
Accountability in RJ shifts the emphasis from the offender or perpetrator as a passive 
recipient of punishment to becoming actively engaged in making good their wrongdoing to 
the person aggrieved (Umbreit, 1995). In this way, “accountability in the restorative justice 
paradigm taps into the offender‟s strengths and competencies to compensate the victim for 
the material or emotional losses” (Umbreit, 1995, p.31). This is echoed by eminent RJ scholar 
John Braithwaite who contends that the criminal justice system and restorative justice, both 
offer different forms of accountability. Braithwaite (2006, p.49-51) expounds the virtue of 
integrating deliberative accountability and external accountability to the rule of law. 
Procedural Justice (PJ)  
Whereas TJ and RJ are each expansive disciplines in applied research and applied practice, 
Procedural Justice (PJ) is a theory (Tyler & Lind 1992; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). However, 
the belief that people can be rehabilitated is shared by both Procedural Justice and Restorative 
Justice which contend that “society and the legal system have a great deal to gain from 
focussing on the possibilities of rehabilitation and the restoration of people are law-abiding 
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members of society” (Tyler, 2006, p.323). PJ has become an increasingly important avenue 
for empirical research and experimentation in policing and criminal justice (Murphy, Tyler & 
Curtis, 2009; Mazzerole, Antrobus, Bennett & Tyler, 2013; Bradford & Quinton, 2014; 
Pickett & Ryon, 2017). How PJ relates to policing accountability is briefly considered. 
 
At the centre of Procedural Justice (PJ) scholarship is the study of legitimacy in policing and 
the criminal justice system (Tyler, 1990, 2011; Lind & Tyler, 1997). PJ postulates that public 
engagement with the police is significantly influenced by public perceptions of the legitimacy 
of the police (Tyler, 1990 & 2011). In turn, this legitimacy is contingent upon a belief in the 
fairness or „procedural justice‟ of the actions of the police (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p.514-
515). This is a process-based model of regulating police legitimacy (Tyler & Huo, 2002) 
which diverges from an outcome-based, instrumentalist depiction of police legitimacy 
derived from public opinion about police performance. By engendering respect and inclusion 
with a stronger social identity including shared group values and rules, PJ helps to increase 
legitimacy (Tyler, 2011). “Procedural justice involves high quality treatment and decision-
making (Tyler, 1990, 2011). It requires that decision-makers: 1) treat individuals with respect 
and dignity, and 2) make decisions fairly, with neutrality, and only after everyone has had an 
opportunity to voice their concerns” (Pickett & Ryon, 2017, p.13). When people experience 
PJ within an environment or setting in this way, they self-regulate their own behaviour in 
accordance with shared values and social rules (Tyler, 2006, p.309). PJ-driven policing 
strategies are designed to evoke legitimacy as an “internal motivation” among members of 
the public (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p.524) to shape their engagement and compliance with 
the police. This is postulated by Tyler (2006) and other PJ scholars as an alternative to 
conventional crime /social control. Like Bronfenbrenner‟s model, PJ theory is heavily 
premised upon the social psychology of theorists such as Kurt Lewin (1935) and Ed Deci 
(1975). Fundamentally, PJ esteems self-regulation above sanctions. Tyler (2006) has 
summarised three models of self-regulation (see Table 5). “In the long-run, the use of 
sanction-based approaches has the consequence of undermining the influence of social values 






Table 5: Self-regulatory motivations (adapted from Tyler 2006, p.321) 
Model Focus Motivation activated 
PJ models Legitimacy of authority Obligation 
RJ models Relationship to others Shame 
Moral development models Principles of right and wrong Guilt 
 
Sunshine & Tyler (2003) contend that a broad seam of scholarship now “makes clear that 
people‟s reactions to their personal experiences with the police are shaped by their 
evaluations of the fairness of the procedures the police use to exercise their authority” (2003, 
p.519). This finding is transferable to other circumstances, outside of the criminal justice 
system in which people may deal with hierarchical authorities (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Sunshine 
& Tyler, 2003; Pickett & Ryon, 2017)  
In a recent article, Pickett & Ryon (2017) make an interesting argument that police 
misconduct might be reduced if police perceived greater “procedurally just co-operation” 
from members of the public. For the current study, the suggestion that “procedurally just co-
operation” may moderate police misconduct raises interesting possibilities for accountability. 
However, significant differences exist between Pickett & Ryon‟s research and the current 
study. Principally, Pickett & Ryon‟s study examined public-police interactions. In this, 
hypothetical citizens were depicted as “youth on the street” (Pickett & Ryon, 2017, p.25). 
Furthermore, the citizens with whom police interact were legally subordinate to the police.  
Whereas, in the current study the interactions occur for the most part formally. The 
relationship between civilian oversight and the police is one at least of legal equivalence. 
Indeed, police officers are ascribed the role of legal subordinates. More widely, a potential 
limitation of PJ for the current study is that evidence of wrongdoing by the police is likely to 
be to the fore of arrangements for policing accountability. By design, external civilian 
oversight (ECO) in Northern Ireland is predominantly retroactive providing accountability 
ex-post facto. This is a very different context to that in which the effect of process-based 
regulation has been previously researched and the questionnaire-based methods employed 
(Tyler, 2011; Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Bradford & Quinton, 2014). Participants in the current 
study reflect upon personal experiences of policing accountability using the Q method. Data 
will be gathered in situ to enrich the ecological validity of the findings specific to Northern 
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Ireland. Whereas, PJ research in policing often entails use of an experimental and control 
condition, the real world research orientation of the current study does not allow for this.  
Nevertheless, the potential value of PJ theory for the current study is not entirely refuted. 
Experiences of participants in this study may reveal the procedural justice or fairness of past 
policing accountability processes. In turn, this may influence the perceived legitimacy of the 
police and /or policing accountability. In the current study it will be for participants to give 
voice and meaning to this, if they choose to do so, as analysis of results considered in later 
chapters may reveal. In particular, Pickett & Ryon‟s (2017) findings on procedurally-just co-
operation could potentially be translated to accountability and external civilian oversight. 
Conceivably, applying these principles to accountability and external civilian oversight may 
lead to increased co-operation by police with policing oversight and an improved perception 
of the legitimacy of rights-based policing reform.  
More fundamentally for the current study, the orientation of Procedural Justice theory is that 
accountability equates to a self-driven responsibility of a social group with whom the person 
share social ties and moral values (Tyler, 2006). By its very intrinsic, internal focus, the 
emphasis on external civilian oversight of policing seems incongruent with PJ. At the same 
time, recent research suggests external PJ may foster internal PJ (Van Craen, 2016a, 2016b) 
and that police officer “supervisor modelling” of PJ-based behaviours helps imbue this (Van 
Craen & Skogan, 2016).  PJ research has found that police officers‟ belief in the moral 
justification of enforcement of legal powers is positively correlated with their own perception 
of public co-operation (Bradford & Quinton, 2014). The beliefs of those who hold power in 
the legitimacy of their role is one of the central tenets of Weber‟s (1978) influential 
scholarship. The application of Weber‟s theory in criminal justice research will be further 
discussed in the subsection which follows on Political Theory. Overall, this review of PJ 
theory reaffirms the importance attached in this study to the attitudes, beliefs and experiences 
of senior officials involved in the exercise of policing accountability.  
Finally, the intersection in research between PJ and group or social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 
1976) is potentially significant for this study. In an offshoot of PJ research, the group 
engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2000) reports that PJ has a mediating effect on 
identification with a group or organisation (Tyler & Blader, 2000). It may also impinge upon 
motivation to act on behalf of the group (Blader & Tyler, 2009). Fairness of decision-making 
within a group and trust by an individual that one‟s own interests will be safeguarded by the 
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group are examples of the salience of PJ in group engagement (Blader & Tyler, 2009). 
Research on social identity (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Abrahams and Hogg, 1988) 
has shown how cognitive processes including heuristic judgements, perceptual bias and even 
animosity or discrimination are accentuated through group affiliation. Given that the current 
study is exploring the interaction of groups (agencies) engaged in policing accountability, the 
PJ-driven group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2000) and social identity research 
(Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Abrahams and Hogg, 1988) may yet be helpful in 
interpretation of results and formulation of conclusions. In the next subsection, attention will 
be given to political theory. 
4.6.2 Political theory 
  
Policing scholar Robert Reiner (1992) advocated a greater integration of the theory of 
political science into the study of policing: “The police are the domestic specialists in the 
exercise of legitimate force. Thus policing is at the heart of the functioning of the state, and 
central to an understanding of legal and political organisation. The character and style of 
policing, in particular the extent to which resort has to be made to legitimate force, will be 
affected by  most changes in  the social order” (Reiner, 1992, p.762). 
Whilst welcoming an increasing collaboration between policing research and political 
science, Reiner also noted preoccupation with immediate practical issues for the “police and 
police authorities” at the expense of a broader analysis within the “unfolding exigencies of a 
society” (1992, p.762). Concepts such as power and legitimacy are foundational in political 
science and are touchstone constructs in policing research. In this respect, few scholars have 
been more influential in theorising power and legitimacy than Max Weber (1978). The 
strengths and possible weaknesses of Weber‟s analysis of power and legitimacy could be 
debated at length but that would exceed the limits of this study. What is beyond dispute is the 
continuing influence of Weber‟s theoretical analysis to political science, and more 
specifically to policing research. Of particular value to the current study is the importance 
which Weber placed upon the attitudes, values and beliefs of power-holders. In his paradigm, 
the legitimacy of power was contingent upon those who held power believing their exercise 
of power had legitimacy. Weber (1978, p.946) further contends that this belief among power-
holders exists independently of those who may be subject to the exercise of power. Reiner 
(1992) reiterated the importance of this paradigm from political science for the future of 
policing research. Weber‟s (1978) emphasis on the significance of the attitudes, values and 
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beliefs of power-holders has special resonance with the focus of this study on elite actors in 
the three specified agencies at the centre of policing accountability in this society. For the 
current study, this would seem to complement the importance in Bronfenbrenner‟s ecological 
system theory of shared values and attitudes for learning and change. Notably, during the 
course of this study, the PSNI Chief Constable has articulated a strong connection between 
formal and informal accountability and the legitimacy of policing in the north of Ireland 
(Police Professional, May 2016). Furthermore, within this position piece importantly 
acknowledged that whilst “policing by consent” was integral to the Peelian philosophy of 
policing, it had been absent from policing in Northern Ireland for much of its history. This is 
a hugely significant observation from the most senior, serving officer in the PSNI. Yet, 
whether this viewpoint is universal or widely held among senior officials in policing or 
policing accountability is unknown at this stage.  
Although political theorists such as Weber elevate the importance of legitimacy in the 
exercise of power, this study does not ascribe a priori greater significance to the link between 
accountability and legitimacy than with human rights, confidence, or even effectiveness. All 
of these may be potentially important in accountability. However, the epistemological and 
ontological position of this study is to give privilege to participants‟ choices on what 
accountability means to them and how they see it impact. Still, this study is cognisant of 
ongoing debates in policing scholarship about legitimacy and the exercise of power (eg. 
Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012). It falls outside the limits of the current study to help reconcile the 
theoretical disputes apparent in political theory about criminal justice. Yet, it is noted that 
Bottoms & Tankebe (2012) also esteem shared values and beliefs in scholarly efforts to 
understand „power-holder legitimacy‟ in the exercise of criminal justice (2012, p.141-147). 
More importantly, in an expansive critique of literature on legitimacy they postulate a 
concept of legitimacy as a dialogic construct in a state of constant flux (2012, p.153). Their 
invaluable contribution also invites closer scholarly investigation of the relationships between 
power-holders and the attitudes and beliefs they espouse and exchange (2012, p.160). 
Bottoms & Tankebe‟s (2012) research agenda on legitimacy may be broadly compatible with 
the present study‟s conceptualisation of policing accountability as an entropic and complex 
ecological system. What makes Bronfenbrenner‟s ecological systems theory preferable to 
Bottoms & Tankebe dialogic concept is allowing for the duality of co-existing and 
countervailing or contradictory factors within the political ecology which may both enable 
and inhibit change and development (Bronfenbrenner,1999, p.16) including legitimacy. 
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An alternative theoretical construction to the Weberian tradition is that important interactions 
between social structure, power and individual agency are unseen. The production of norms, 
values and social forces reflect power relations deeply embedded in the political culture of 
society. Of particular interest in this school of thought is the Luke‟s third dimension of power 
(1974, 1986, 2005). From this perspective, Weber‟s emphasis on observable behaviours and 
performance outcomes precludes covert dynamics. Through the “institutionalisation of 
power” (Parsons cited in Lukes, 1974, p.31) the very makeup of the institutions may act to 
reproduce underlying power relations (Luke, 1974). By approaching the investigation of 
power as observable through interactions and behaviours of individuals, Weber‟s paradigm 
neglects “the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices 
of institutions” (Luke, 1974, p.26). One example of this which Lukes highlights is the control 
of information (Lukes, 1974, p.27) and the role of “indirect influence” which through action 
or inaction may “keep unacceptable issues out of politics thereby preventing the system from 
becoming anymore diverse than it is” (Lukes, 1974, p.39). However, rather than discount two 
other dimensions of power premised on Weberian theory, Lukes postulates a „hidden hand of 
power‟ (1974; 2005) where compliance is achieved through influence or manipulation of the 
beliefs or desires of others. In fact, Lukes contends that in his “three-dimensional view of 
power…what one may have here is a latent conflict, which consists in contradiction between 
the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude. These 
latter may not express or even be conscious of their interests” (1974, p.28).  
The present study contends that an ecological systems perspective of policing accountability 
can accommodate this third dimension of power. Of particular interest is Luke‟s attention to 
the control of information. An ecological systems approach permits levels of analysis, 
including the wider socio-political environment as well as the possible contradictions which 
may co-exist, even as„latent conflicts‟ as expressed by Lukes (1974).  
Another stream of scholarship which, like Lukes‟ critique, strives to synthesise institutional 
structure and individual agency is New Institutionalism (NI) (eg: Hall & Taylor, 1996). 
Within this broad area of scholarship are distinct strands of NI which go beyond the scope of 
this study to detail, one of which is feminist institutionalism (FI) (McKay, Kenny & 
Chappell, 2010). This research argues that institutions operate not just as constraints but also 
as strategic resources for actors through dynamic processes of daily contestation (Thelen, 
2003, p.213, in McKay et. al., 2010). NI scholarship accommodates the interplay between 
formal and informal rules and processes within an institution which may impinge on 
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individual actors; as well as the endogenous and exogenous constraints or dynamics which 
may impinge upon an institution (Hays & Taylor, 1996). Of particular note from within NI 
literature is Sociological Institutionalism (SI) which incorporates multi-level analysis and 
includes examination of shared values as well as symbolic, socialised and enculturated 
patterns of behaviour within institutions (Hays & Taylor, 1996). Like SI, Discursive (DI) or 
Constructivist Institutionalism (CI) also accommodates multiple levels of analysis, and 
explores how meaning is socially constructed within institutions. Attention to co-constitutive 
features of micro and macro level analysis afforded by SI and DI(CI) is one of the potential 
advantages of an ecological systems perspective, as previously stated. Nevertheless, the 
current study notes that there is a consensus across all strands of NI literature that 
“institutions are the „rules of the game‟ – the rules, norms and practices, that structure 
political, social and economic life” (Chappell & Waylen, 2013, p.599).   
Some scholars have argued that the field of NI research understate institutions‟ role in 
reflecting and reproducing power relations and inequalities within wider society (eg: Thelen, 
1999). Responding to this and expounding upon a Feminist Institutional strand within NI 
scholarship, “the key feminist insight is that structure and agency are gendered” (McKay et 
al, 2010, p.582-583). As such, institutional research must accommodate and integrate into 
analysis the gendering of roles and rules within institutions (McKay et al, 2010). Moreover, 
in a way which appears to converge with Lukes‟ (1974) radical view of power, the gendered 
approach to institutionalism highlights the “influence informal rules and practices have on 
institutional design and outcome” as “hidden aspects of political institutions” (Chappell & 
Waylen, 2013, p.599).  
Although not directly related to accountability and external civilian oversight, this sphere of 
scholarship on Institutionalism offers promise for the current study. Of particular note is the 
significance which CI attaches to the co-constitutive interactions between micro and macro 
levels of analysis and the importance within these interactions of symbolic and socialised 
patterns of behaviour. Additionally, Chappell & Waylen‟s research into the “hidden aspects 
of political institutions” (2013, p.599) holds potential for this study. This appears to be in 





4.6.3 Psychological theory 
 
Of course, as outlined earlier in this study, Bronfenbrenner‟s Ecological Systems Theory is 
derived from psychological theory. Moreover, other aspects of psychological theory have 
already been highlighted in preceding sections (eg. Lewin, 1935; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Yet, there has also been a significant contribution made by psychological theory to the study 
of accountability and its effects with Tetlock being foremost in this area of scholarship. 
 
Tetlock (1992) argues that despite claims for accountability as a “panacea for numerous 
ills…efforts to enhance performance by enhancing accountability often produce perverse 
effects” (Tetlock, 1992, p.333). Distinct strategies for coping with accountability are 
discernable at either an individual or institutional level. In positing a Social Contingency 
Theory of accountability, Tetlock argues: “Accountability is a critical rule and a norm 
enforcement mechanism – a social psychological link between individual decision makers on 
the one hand and social systems on the other” (1992, p.338).  Individual values, norms and 
beliefs about accountability interact with changes in decision-making situations as “a 
function of both the micro and macro context” (1992, p.338). Without direct reference to 
Bronfenbrenner‟s paradigm, Tetlock‟s levels of analysis at the micro and macro context in 
the study of accountability appears to complement and mirror the microsystem and 
exosystem in Ecological Systems Theory (EST). An advantage of Tetlock‟s Social 
Contingency theory is that provides a detailed matrix of varying circumstances and the 
predicted effect these may have upon the attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of those 
individuals engaged in accountability. Building upon extensive experimental research 
findings Social Contingency Theory portrays accountability as a complex interaction which is 
vulnerable to decision-making bias in circumstances which may be variable and open to 
manipulation. “It is not just a simple matter of accountability making things better. 
Accountability can exacerbate bias, attenuate bias, or have no effect – depending on the type 
of accountability and the type of bias under investigation.” (Tetlock, 1992, p.336). Social 
Contingency Theory (Tetlock, 1992) highlights three coping strategies people employ to 
manage accountability demands, alongside the situational and individual differences which 




Yet, one limitation of Social Contingency Theory may be its facility to capture factors 
beyond the immediate circumstances within which interpersonal engagement occurs. In his 
own way, Tetlock (1992) acknowledges this by comparing levels of analysis to the lens of a 
telescope: if research is focussed upon the macro level then specificity of value is not 
amenable to inspection at the micro level. Conversely, research which concentrates on micro 
level analysis struggles to encompass macro level issues of potential importance.  In contrast, 
the current study endeavours to transcend these levels of analysis to articulate and investigate 
policing accountability. This approach is supported by scholarship in developmental science 
which advances the ontology that knowledge is contingent. The challenge for research is to 
explore knowledge in context, and the relationship between knowledge and context, in the 
specific political and social circumstances at a given point in time (Lerner, Fisher & 
Weinberg, 2000, p.13). Recent research in political psychology lends further support for the 
potential of an ecological systems approach to provide this unifying framework. Building on 
„power basis theory‟ (Pratto, 2016), Zeineddine & Pratto (2017) present an ecological 
perspective of the exercise of power within a given socio-political context suggesting that: 
“There is no starting and stopping point for an ecology as a whole, but some ecosystems are 
more sustainable than others. All ecologies have most of their aspects mutually influencing 
their other aspects… In ecological thinking, the multiple causal processes that produce 
patterns of association are not problems in scientific validity, but a phenomenon worthy of 
understanding” (Zeineddine & Pratto, 2017, p.26).  
 
4.7  Rethinking accountability through a new conceptual framework 
 
Integrating conceptualisations of accountability has been a struggle, as other scholars have 
previously acknowledged (eg: Flinders, 2014).  As preceding sections in this chapter have 
outlined, this conceptual confusion applies to research of policing accountability. In Northern 
Ireland, this confusion is further compounded by the cluttered landscape of policing 
accountability. A proliferation of agencies, institutions and individuals within some specific 
oversight an aspect of policing appears to lend support to Koppells (2005) portrayal of 
Multiple Accountability Disorder. When related to policing in the north of Ireland, multiple 
layers and lines of accountability have been invoked to support the claim “that the PSNI is 
the most accountable police service in the world” (Orde, 2003). This particular statement 
which is omnipresent in policing literature and discourse in Northern Ireland may be 
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ambivalent in meaning. It might be interpreted as a boast, a complaint, or both. It could be 
part of an exercise in manufacturing consent for policing or legitimacy of the police. As a 
statement on its own, it will not be interrogated too closely at this stage since it will come to 
be explored through the views of participants. Yet, the web-like complexity of policing 
accountability to which the former PSNI Chief Constable Sir Hugh Orde has referred remains 
an important conceptual challenge for this study. Previous research has portrayed this as the 
“compartmentalisation” of security governance in Northern Ireland (Ellison & O Rawe, 
2010). Translating this critique to the current landscape of policing oversight would suggest 
the complexity is intentional (Ellison & O‟Rawe, 2010). More broadly, policing oversight in 
Northern Ireland could be argued to accord with Foucault‟s concept of “administrative 
grotesque” (Foucault, 2006, p.12). This concept was central to Foucault‟s critique of 19
th
 
century psychiatry as a legitimizing façade for courtroom proceedings. Conceivably, this 
representation of an “administrative grotesque” is consonant with the intentionally complex 
compartmentalisation of security governance (Ellison & O Rawe, 2010) and perhaps even 
multiple accountability disorder (Koppells, 2005). More recently, Tombs & Whyte (2017) 
have highlighted systemic bias in legal accountability in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower 
tragedy which affords impunity to individuals in positions of power. By this analysis, “the 
law reflects the deep structure of inequality in modern Britain that produces those tragedies” 
(Tombs & Whyte, 2017, July 5) such as Grenfell Tower and the Hillsborough disaster. In 
turn, these legal frameworks make the pursuit of accountability difficult to attain (Tomb & 
Whyte, 2017, July 5). Taken together, this research provokes a question for this study as to 
whether the complexity apparent in the map of accountability and policing oversight is 
chaotic by design. 
 
Of the studies mentioned, only the research by Ellison & O Rawe (2010) relates directly to 
the same context as the current research. Given limited scholarship about policing 
accountability in Northern Ireland, it would be unjustified to undertake this study assuming, a 
priori that the architecture of accountability is deliberately designed to be sub-optimal. 
Borrowing from Waldrop (1993, p.12), this study strives to find “order at the edge of chaos”. 
While still a conceptual challenge for this study, the apparent chaos or complexity of policing 
accountability in Northern Ireland may in itself reveal findings of significance to this study. 
That is why the study builds in stages from theoretical, to conceptual and predictive. 
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At the same time greater conceptual clarity on accountability is still required. This need was 
recognised by Bovens et al. (2014) who responded by dichotomising accountability into two 
dimensions a) “accountability as a virtue” and b) “accountability as a mechanism” (Bovens et 
al. 2014, p.7).  In the former, accountability “as a virtue” is represented as the dependent 
variable, emerging from the interaction of multiple individuals and factors (Bovens et al. 
2014, p.8). In the latter, accountability “as a mechanism” is the independent variable through 
which ex-post facto account-giving is obtained  (Bovens et al. 2014, p.9). This dichotomised 
representation of accountability by Bovens et al. (2014) is a helpful clarification. With credit 
to Bovens and his colleagues, this reflects their overview or de facto meta-analysis of 
research by other scholars. Yet, it does not accommodate the possibility that accountability 
could be both the independent and the dependent variable, interchangeably, within the same 
context. In fact, the position taken by this study is that value and effect of accountability is in 
both the (inter)action and the outcome. The effect and impact of accountability must be 
considered not only by the result obtained but also the process by which it is achieved and the 
situation of wider context within which all of this occurs.  
Building on the scholarship of others, it may be possible to discern what others describe as 
“latent paradigms” (Bronfenbrenner & Crouter, 1983, p.373-376). Comparing domains of 
public accountability (Bovens et al, 2014; Dubnik, 2014b) with research on external civilian 
oversight (Millar, 2002) and reforms envisioned in the Patten Report (1999), three strands to 
policing accountability are postulated within this study (situational (s); relational (r); and 
transformational (t)). These integrate the literature on accountability within the framework of 
an ecological systems perspective. Furthermore, in constructing a concourse for the Q set to 
put to interviewees in this study, each of these posited dimensions of accountability is 
reflected in statements (Q set), enabling findings to be related back to the existing literature. 
4.8  Institutional and Relational accountability 
 
In making the case for “accountability studies” as a new branch of scholarship, Dubnik 
(2014b, p.649-652) notes two different tendencies within existing research, with contrasting 
ontologies. The first tendency is to view and investigate the exercise of accountability 
institutionally and mechanistically. The second tendency is to explore the giving and 
demanding of accounts as relational accountability. Significantly, Dubnik (2014b) that these 
two dimensions of accountability are not mutually exclusive since “all institutionalised forms 
of accountability are comprised of structures and processes (ie. accountability mechanisms) 
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designed to establish and foster account giving relationships and associated behaviour” 
(2014b, p.650). The main difference between these two is that the study of relational 
accountability explores account-giving relationships as the level of analysis rather than 
institutional design. (2014b,  p.652). However, this does seem to leave the question of how 
institutional design may facilitate or inhibit relational accountability without an answer. In 
the current study, that is potentially important since the accountability arrangements 
introduced in Northern Ireland were intended to implement the Patten Report (1999). The 
corollary to this might be to question not only if this implementation was successful but also 
if the institutional architecture of accountability has facilitated ongoing policing reform. 
 
Notably, Bovens and Schilleman (2014, p.673 -682) argue for a new era of meaningful 
accountability. Citing experimental research findings (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) the most 
important effect of accountability is anticipation of future accountability by those being held 
to account  (Bovens & Schilleman, 2014). Extending this finding, stakeholders need to begin 
with clear expectations about standards of accountability and agreement about what these are 
intended to achieve. This clarity of purpose may be fostered through deliberative processes 
(Bovens & Schillemans, 2014, p.679-680). This is an important concept for the current study 
because forming and sharing ideas, beliefs and values has been found to be integral to change 
in Bronfenbrenner‟s model. Although Bovens & Schilleman (2014) do not explicitly discuss 
the link between accountability and reform, the claim that deliberative processes may be 
enhance the impact of accountability and facilitate change is of interest to the current study. 
In a review of external civilian oversight in policing, Millar (2002) summarises the 
institutional arrangements for policing accountability in different jurisdictions. Millar 
enumerates factors which may help and hinder the effectiveness of civilian oversight as: 
political support; police co-operation; activist support; resources; management and 







Table 6 : Criteria for evaluating External Civilian Oversight (adapted from Millar, 2002) 
Criteria for success Evaluation Strategies 
Integrity: whether the complaints process is 
fair, thorough and objective. This includes 
fairness to both complainants and police 
officers. It relates to whether decision-
making is objective in evaluation of facts and 
statements. 
Audits of complaints files; audits of training 
and recruitment of investigators; review of 
management and supervision of 
investigators; assessment of staffing levels 
for investigations; surveys of public 
awareness of complaints processes. 
Legitimacy : describes how the complaints 
processes are perceived, notably by the 
public, complainants and the police. The idea 
of legitimacy can be extended to broader 
areas of public policy. 
Satisfaction surveys of complainants and 
police officers; surveys of public confidence; 
interviews with complainants, police officers 
and the public. 
Learning : the extent to which the 
complaints process provides meaningful 
feedback which contributes to the 
improvement of the process and the police 
department generally. This criterion can be 
extended to organisational responses to other 
issues besides complaints. 
Policy reviews; interviews with police 
officials; analysis of data on police activity; 
observations of police practice; examining 
uptake of recommendations for reform. 
 
Drawing upon the scholarship of others (Perez, 1994; Walker, 2001), it is argued that the 
three key criteria for measuring or evaluating the success of external civilian oversight of 
policing are: integrity; legitimacy; and learning. Methods for measuring each of these are 
outlined in Table 6. 
“Accountability is probably best achieved when these processes work together and 
reinforce one another. It is therefore important not to view civilian oversight as 
providing all the answers to the problem of producing an accountable police service, 
but as an important element” (Millar, 2002, p.22). 
The proposition that external civilian oversight of policing is optimised from the overlapping 
and interaction of three criteria (Millar, 2002) is one which is compatible with and 
complementary to the ecological systems approach of this study. From an ecological 
perspective, this study attempts to reformulate these criteria on civilian oversight of policing 
(Millar, 2002) to align with the broader literature on public accountability (Dubnik, 2014b; 





Table 7. Three dimensions of triadic accountability (s; r; t) 
Dubnik 2014b Millar, 2002 Current study : Triadic 
Accountability 
Institutional accountability  Integrity (resources) Situational (S)  
Chrono & Macrosystem 
Relational accountability Integrity (processes) & 
Legitimacy 
Relational (R) 
Exo & Mesosystem 
Meaningful accountability 
(Bovens & Schilleman, 
2014) 
Learning Transformational (T) 
Meso & Microsystem 
 
This study proposes a realignment of criteria for evaluating external civilian oversight 
(Millar, 2002) and constructs in public accountability (Dubnik, 2014b; Bovens & Schilleman, 
2014) along dimensions of triadic accountability. In this way, development of the concourse 
of statements derived from literature for the Q set may reflect all of the dimensions within the 
ecological system. It is hoped that this will enable a more comprehensive exploration of 
triadic accountability. It may also aid the effort to iteratively relate and interpret results from 
the Q sort by participants to existing scholarship in this field. Given the difficulties discussed 
in conceptual definitions which pervade scholarship on accountability, including policing 
accountability, the proposed reformulation potentially offers an integrative framework. It is 
compatible with existing research and inclusive of all levels of analysis entailed in an 
ecological systems perspective of policing accountability. It is beyond the limits of the 
current study to examine whether this conceptual framework of triadic accountability has 
sufficient validity to enable comparative analysis of policing accountability between 
jurisdictions and contexts. For now, the putative dimensions of triadic accountability are 
outlined, defined and explained within the ecological systems approach that this study adopts. 
 
4.9  Situational accountability (S) 
 
The preceding discussion has already highlighted the extent to which existing literature gives 
attention to Institutional accountability, especially legislative design and mechanisms. Of the 
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three criteria derived from evaluations of external civilian oversight of policing, only part of 
one of these (Integrity – staffing and resources) appears to coalesce with institutional 
accountability. Yet, even here little allowance is made for the fact that the institutional 
design, including staffing and resources, is often out of the hands of those inside policing 
oversight bodies. From an ecological systems perspective, the institutional design of 
accountability might be considered to include both the legislative framework, and the 
physical environment within which accountability operates. Whilst assuming that legal 
powers, staffing and resources are more important than the physical location or office 
environment, all may be relevant. In addition, as the preceding discussion about the dynamic 
nature of the macro political environment would suggest, there are other occurrences which 
may impinge upon institutional accountability. The current study posits a Situational 
dimension of accountability, compatible with and inclusive of both Institutional 
accountability and the wider socio-political context. From an ecological systems perspective 
this ensures the Exo-system, Macro-system (and Chrono-system) are reflected in 
development of the Q set statements on Situational accountability for interviewees. 
 
4.10  Relational accountability 
 
As already discussed, account-giving occurs within a relationship. The quality of that 
relationship and the processes which support it has an influence upon accountability. Criteria 
for evaluating effectiveness of external civilian oversight include integrity (perceived 
fairness) and legitimacy.  Some literature previously reviewed (eg: Procedural Justice) might 
suggest that perceived fairness and legitimacy of relationships are inseparable. Given 
evidence in support of this, the current study aligns these to Relational accountability as 
outlined in broader scholarship already discussed.  Elsewhere, the dynamic process of 
accountability has already been described as “relational” (Savage, 2013b). From an 
ecological systems perspective, the roles played by people may constitute an important 
dynamic feature in the environment: “roles are not merely normative features of the 
environment, but also present powerful environmental levels for affecting developmental 
change” (Bronfenbrenner, 1999, p.13).   For the purpose of the current study, Relational 
accountability is intended to encompass relations both at an interpersonal and inter-
organisational level. This incorporates relations between oversight bodies. From an 
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ecological systems perspective this is inclusive of analysis at a level of Micro, Meso and 
Exosystem. 
 
4.11  Transformational accountability 
 
As evident in literature previously reviewed, for reform to occur learning, change and 
improvement are required. For these processes to occur, sharing information alone is not 
sufficient. Beliefs, attitudes and values also have to be shared. This is a central tenet of 
Bronfenbrenner‟s ecological systems theory of development. In a school context, depictions 
of learning as a function of a linear association between accountability and academic 
achievement have been strongly refuted (Johnson, 2008).  “The idea of a school as a complex 
system in which developmental processes and outcomes emerge from a complex interaction 
among systemic layers is consistent with what seems to be intuitively known by many 
educators – that the rate of academic achievement is not a simple monotonic function that 
increases toward absolute proficiency” (Johnson, 2008, p.6). Similarly, this study postulates 
an association between accountability and learning or reform in policing as a complex 
system, rather than a „closed system‟. That there is an interaction between three separate 
public authorities (NIPB; PONI; & PSNI) in the exercise of policing accountability lends 
more support to this conceptualisation of a complex system.  Whilst Bovens and Schilleman 
(2014) elude to learning and “meaningful accountability”, Millar (2002) makes direct 
reference to “meaningful feedback” as a catalyst for learning. The corollary to this is that 
accountability could exist and be exercised with no guarantee of learning or reform. If and 
how accountability has helped to transform policing is an important question which policy-
makers have asked (eg. USDoJ, 2015). In an attempt to explore this, statements will be 
selected for the Q set which reflect the learning processes in the exercise of external civilian 
oversight. These are intended to reflect learning and reform along a dimension of 
Transformational Accountability. Of interest in this study is evidence of the transformational 
effect of accountability at an individual, interpersonal and/ or inter-agency level. From an 





4.12  Conclusion: Ecological System of Policing Accountability (ESPA) 
 
The current study integrates conceptual findings from literature on public accountability and 
external civilian oversight of policing with ecological systems theory to adopt an 
overarching, integrative framework. In this the conceptual and theoretical framework is 
adapted to the visually reflect the three postulated dimensions of accountability: Situational 
(S); Relational (R); and Transformational (T) (see Figure 4). As the earlier table outlined, 
Situational, Relational and Transformational accountability correspond primarily with 
different tiers within the ecological system. Yet, Ecological Systems Theory does not argue 
that each level of analysis with the ecological system is hermetically sealed from the 
adjoining level of analysis. Therefore, Situational (s), Relational (r) and Transformational (t) 
analyses may transcend the level of analysis in which they predominate. Figure 4 reflects this 
and the dynamism and fluidity of ongoing interactions within and between the different levels 
within the ecological system (no special value is assigned to the position or number of s, r & t 
in this figure). In this way, dimensions of accountability are interactive and co-active and 
form part of an ecology of accountability which is a dynamic, conjunctural, complex system. 
 

























In this study, the microsystem is assumed to be an individual member official or officer 
within one of the three specified agencies (NIPB, PONI or PSNI) and that individual‟s daily 
interaction with significant others. The roles played by people may constitute an important 
dynamic feature in the environment: “roles are not merely normative features of the 
environment, but also present powerful environmental levels for affecting developmental 
change” (Bronfenbrenner, 1999, p.13).  
A mesosystem comprises relationships which exist between two or more microsystems. 
There are often cross-overs where relationships between work colleague or peer may also be 
a friend or partner. These linkages are the mesosystem (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p.25). 
Bronfenbrenner cited “the growth of mutual trust, positive orientation, goal consensus 
between settings and evolving balance of power” (1979, p.214) as facilitating development 
potential in the setting of the mesosystem. In this study then, the mesosystem could be intra-
agency or interagency. 
As previously stated, the exosystem is where linkages and processes occur between two or 
more systems at least one of which does not include the person directly but in which events 
may occur which may indirectly effect the immediate setting in which the person exists 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1999).  
“there exist direct and indirect links to power settings through which participants in 
the original setting can influence allocation of resources and the making of decisions 
that are responsive to the needs of the developing person and the efforts of those who 
act on his behalf” (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p.256) 
In the current study, the exosystem may represent interactions between the three specific 
agencies with each other and with the wider criminal justice family and statutory framework 
for policing accountability. The macrosystem refers to the prevailing cultural, economic and 
political environment. In this study, this is posited to include government (sponsor) 
departments, other security  / policing agencies,  other aspect of the criminal justice system 
(courts; PPS; Coroner) other oversight bodies, and political debate (eg: party political 
positions and ongoing negotiations). Finally, the chronosystem is the temporal framework 
within which relationships exist in a shifting context over time. In this study this may include 
the history of conflict and the background to policing and accountability in Ireland and 
particularly Northern Ireland. 
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Bronfenbrenner (citing Wachs, 1979) highlights the co-existence of competing and 
countervailing forces in the environment which may on the one hand enhance the power of 
proximal processes and on the other, suppress and undermine them (Bronfenbrenner, 1999, 
p.16).  To explore how these forces might interact within the ecological system of policing 





This illustrates the endeavour by this study to reconceptualise policing accountability from an 
ecological systems perspective. In doing so, this study presents an alternative to the London 
Underground (Neyroud, 2005) analogy of policing oversight in Northern Ireland.  This study 
presents this illustration as a visual representation which is linked to a new conceptualisation 
of triadic accountability. As illustrated, this study places the “Patten Institutions” at the 
epicentre of this ecological system, whilst cognisant of external dynamics and factors which 
may impinge. It is an attempt to find “order on the edge of chaos” (Waldrop, 1993, p.12) 
within a theoretical framework which may crystallise important linkages within the 
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Figure 5. An ecological system of policing accountability in Northern Ireland 
©Ciarán J. Kearney 2018 
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Chapter 5:  Policing & Situational Accountability „s‟ 
 
5.1  Introduction to situational accountability „s‟ 
 
Much research on accountability in public policy has concentrated upon the institutional 
arrangements (Bovens et al, 2014; Dubnik, 2014b). Having extensively reviewed research in 
this study, there appears to be no consensus about the optimal institutional design for 
maximum accountability (Walker, 2001; Finn, 2001; Kerstetter, 1985; Clarke, 2009; 
Prenzler, 2011). In all of this research, the importance of the independence of accountability 
mechanisms appears to be common. Independence certainly featured prominently in the 
proposals which led to the new architecture of accountability in Northern Ireland (Hayes, 
1997).  Independence has also been highlighted more recently in the local context of 
accountability where it was embroiled in public controversy and crisis because of what was 
later found to be a “lowering of independence” in PONI (CJINI, 2011). Research has also 
argued that civilianess (Savage, 2013a) is an essential condition to the design of effective 
institutions for policing accountability.  
Whilst this study accepts other research findings on the salience of civilianness, it also clear 
that this is not enough on its own and that accountability is multi-factorial (Bayley, 1990). 
The civilian component in the institutional design of accountability is but one element within 
the ecological system. Moreover, policing research is very situationally dependent (eg. 
Brewer, 1990). That context-sensitivity also informs the institutional arrangements for 
accountability. In Northern Ireland, one crucial context-specific feature was the failure of 
systems and structures of accountability for policing over many decades (Moore & O‟Rawe, 
2000). Equally important was the scale of violent conflict and the effect that had on society 
(McKittrick et. al., 1999) and on the police (Ryder, 2000). Furthermore, the wholesale 
programme of policing reform under the aegis of the Patten Commission (ICP, 1999) was a 
key component of SSR and ingredient of the nascent peace process (Gormley-Heenan, 2008).  
Policing scholarship underscores the salience of idiosyncratic aspects of the context within 
which accountability and policing reform emerges as interacting with the institutional design. 
“Institutional reforms of the same sort do not have the same effect everywhere” (Bayley, 
1990, p.176).  Therefore, it is not sufficient to consider the legislative and policy parameters 
alone in order to examine the efficacy of the arrangements for accountability. The socio-
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historical context from which accountability emerges informs the institutional design of and 
influences its operation. Scholars repeatedly underline the importance of the features of 
situational context for the social interaction (eg. Lewin, 1935; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This 
entails more than the institutional design of accountability.  
As explained in a previous chapter (4), that is why this study suggests a strand of situational 
accountability (s) comprising the institutional design together with the socio-legal and 
historical context surrounding the institutions. This includes the passage of time 
(chronosystem); the political and policy environment, including the legislative duties and 
remit of the institutions of accountability (macrosystem); and decisions or factors outside the 
institutions which may impinge inside the physical setting, staffing and resourcing available 
to enable the institutions to function (exosystem). 
This study posits situational accountability (s) as a composite construct compatible with these 
levels of analysis within the ecological system of policing accountability. To explore this 
dimension of triadic accountability, participants‟ responses by agency affiliation are 
reviewed. The main findings for situational accountability (s) are summarised in Table 8. 
This approach parallels the use of Q method by Ratcliffe et al. (2014) in research into police 
attitudes towards criminality. After coding data in Excel ratings for each item (mean and 
standard deviation) were generated to explore patterns of response by agency affiliation. The 
Q items which received the most positive and the most negative mean score within situational 
accountability were highlighted. By cross-referencing the Q items reporting highest / lowest 
mean scores with those participants who gave strongest ratings on these items, interviews of 
those participants could be explored by general inductive analysis. Findings are related back 














AGENCY PONI PSNI NIPB 
Q. no. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
4 3.733 1.624 4.083 1.552 2.652 1.228 
5 5.466 1.302 6.541 1.473 6.608 1.373 
6 7.733 1.791 6.833 1.761 6.608 1.644 
7 3.333 1.112 3.541 1.641 3.956 1.147 
17 5.2 1.897 3.25 1.674 4.478 1.238 
18 5.133 2.199 4 1.744 4.565 1.618 
19 5.6 1.897 3.25 1.259 5.304 2.141 
21 6.133 2.065 6.708 2.235 6.956 1.845 
22 5.733 1.579 4.416 1.282 5.304 2.119 
24 5.4 1.352 4.333 1.094 4.869 1.179 
25 6.866 1.060 6.916 1.717 7.130 1.324 
30 4.866 0.743 6.875 1.153 4.173 2.059 
31 4.933 1.486 4.791 1.793 5.304 1.329 
32 5.4 2.472 5.708 1.082 4.739 1.136 
33 7 0.925 7.458 1.250 7.896 1.328 
34 4.466 1.355 5 1.841 6 2.195 
36 7.333 1.290 7.291 1.082 6.304 1.222 
37 6.4 1.882 4.708 1.601 5.521 1.274 
41 5.866 2.199 6.041 1.921 6.260 1.321 
42 7.333 1.838 6.541 1.641 6.347 1.640 
44 4.733 1.334 5.791 1.318 4.347 2.207 
45 6 1 5.791 1.718 5.956 1.691 
52 8.4 0.736 7.875 1.190 8.347 0.831 
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Table 9 - Q (23 items) on „S‟ (Situational accountability) 
4. There is no need for the Policing Board to have scrutiny over or accountability for matters in 
the sphere of national security or covert policing.  
5. The devolution of powers on policing and justice has led to tangible improvements in policing 
accountability 
6. The most effective model of policing oversight is one which is under civilian control 
7. The Police Ombudsman‟s access to all aspects of policing, including national security and 
covert policing is completely unfettered 
17. All those aspects of policing which the in the past gave cause for concern are now subject to 
effective accountability through the Police Ombudsman and / or the Policing Board. 
18. The existence of the arrangements for external civilian oversight ought to be sufficient to 
build public confidence in policing. 
19. All public agencies have to adapt to current funding constraints and external oversight of 
policing should be treated in exactly the same way. 
21. More of what is presently done by external oversight could be transferred to internal police 
accountability mechanisms. (reverse scored). 
22. The external oversight bodies are not ready for the creation of the Historical Investigations 
Unit. (reverse scored). 
24. External oversight bodies are not yet effectively aligned to recent changes in the delivery of 
policing. (reverse scored). 
25. A separate Policing Board and Office of the Police Ombudsman may have been justified at 
the start of the policing reform process but now resource constraints mean 2 separate 
oversight bodies is a luxury. (reverse scored). 
30. The Northern Ireland Policing Board‟s powers and responsibilities need to be increased to 
make it effective. (reverse scored). 
31. The emphasis on external oversight sometimes has the effect of inhibiting internal regulation 
within the PSNI.(reverse scored) 
32. The office of the Police Ombudsman has all of the power and responsibilities it needs to fulfil 
its mandate. 
33. A new beginning to policing accountability has been the key to a new beginning to policing 
34. Democratically accountable policing is only possible because elected representatives are 
involved in the Policing Board. 
36. External civilian oversight bodies should limit their remit to those issues of concern 
presented by members of the public.(reverse scored) 
37. Policing accountability in Northern Ireland is the „Rolls Royce model‟ of external oversight. 
41. Ultimately, the PSNI is accountable to the courts and that takes precedence over the external 
oversight bodies.(reverse scored). 
42. External oversight bodies should have scrutiny over only those aspects of policing which 
concern everyday crime and community safety. (reverse scored). 
44. The Department of Justice has too much influence over the affairs of the external oversight 
bodies. (reverse scored). 
45. What has evolved through negotiation and legislation for policing accountability in Northern 
Ireland is faithful to the Patten Report in 1999. 
52. There was nothing wrong with the arrangements for policing accountability which we had in 





5.2  Idiosyncratic. 
A strong and potent aspect of situational accountability which has been highlighted 
repeatedly in the literature is the context for accountability.  As an aspect of situational 
accountability, this has idiosyncratic features which are situation-specific. Northern Ireland 
has undergone an unprecedented and hugely expensive programme of policing reform.  
At the outset, it is notable that the item in situational accountability to which participants in 
all agencies responded most strongly was Q.52: “There was nothing wrong with the 
arrangements for policing accountability which we had in the past before the 1999 Patten 
report”. To help mitigate any response bias in the Q sample, Q.52 was reverse scored. Given 
that the maximum rating for any Item is 9, there is noticeably high rating in each of the three 
agencies, with an impressive degree of consistency across the sample in relation  to this Item, 
underlined by the low Standard deviation in each instance (PONI = 8.4 / SD= 0.72; PSNI 
=7.87 / SD=1.19; NIPB = 8.34/ SD= 0.83). Across the sample as a whole, there is an 
overwhelming consensus that there were very serious failings in policing accountability in the 
past. Many of the respondents were emphatic in criticising the absence of effective 
accountability in the past, before the Patten Report and policing reform in the Northern 
Ireland. For instance, in discussing Q.52 one respondent distinguished the practices of the 
present External Civilian Oversight bodies from their predecessors: 
“The whole process of how, that existed pre-1999, was not transparent. It didn‟t 
inspire public confidence and it was very - I know we‟re bureaucratic - but it was 
even more bureaucratic. My understanding of what would have happened there was 
that if a complainant made an allegation of assault, and say they‟d been charged with 
disorderly behaviour, or something along those lines, that the criminal proceedings 
would be stayed until such times as the complaint investigation was done. And if the 
police gathered more evidence they would use that against the complainant in court. 
So, I don‟t see how that is imbuing true accountability as to where we‟re going. 
Whereas, we stand outside, we have those powers, I think that just gives it that bit 
more transparency. I mean, we have disclosure rules. People are not getting 
information that could necessarily be used against the complainant” (PONI 
interviewee, 2016). 
By this perspective, it was not only the case that systems of accountability were ineffective 
but that they were actively subverted. This corresponds with the discussion earlier in this 
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thesis about the role of the Police Authority or the Independent Commission on Police 
Complaints. Previous complaints procedures were open to misuse and exploitation to the 
detriment of complainants. In fact, the risk of charges being brought by the police against 
people who made complaints against the police was a phenomenon commented upon by 
human rights observers. Furthermore, the arrangements which existed for handling police 
complaints was viewed as being unrepresentative and without independent rigour : 
“It‟s clearly wrong. The policing accountability before then (Patten Report), there 
wasn‟t cross-community support for it. It was felt that it was the police investigating 
the police, even with the ICPC.” (PONI interviewee, 2016) 
This reference to cross-community support is widely recognised as one dynamic in the 
political conflict in Northern Ireland. The fact that one section of the community, with 
political allegiance to Britain, also felt closer to the police and to the state in Northern Ireland 
is a matter of record which was also noted by the Patten Report (ICP, 1999) as being part of 
the policing problem. That makes it all the more notable that this sample which includes 
individuals from a unionist background, found agreement for the view that a watershed in 
policing accountability was crossed with the Patten Report: 
“Even as a unionist growing up in a loyalist area I think that it would be very difficult 
to agree with that (Q.52). I mean effectively, it‟s well documented, that one of the 
main problems integral to the troubles was the concern around policing. So, it was, 
you know, there was effectively no accountability mechanism. I think it‟s well 
recognised that the RUC were a stand-alone law onto themselves. I don‟t know if it‟s 
entirely fair, or that they deserved all the criticism that they received locally and 
internationally. But certainly there was a broad recognition that there had to be some 
form of reform and accountability” (NIPB interviewee, 2016). 
 
The importance of policing reform to the overall peace process was so great that it was taken 
out of party politics and entrusted to the Patten Commission. It concluded that “a new 
beginning to democratic accountability is a key to the new beginning to policing (ICP, 1999). 
This statement corresponds to Q.33 which was one of the statements in situational 
accountability enjoying strongest agreement from participants in both PSNI (7.45; SD.=1.25) 
and NIPB (7.896 / SD.=  1.32). Interviewees in PONI (7.0/ S.D.= 0.9) also gave strong and 
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very consistent support to this statement, despite not being amongst the top three item ratings 
from within this agency. This is another significant finding in this exploratory research of 
situational accountability. It illustrates the consensus among participants across the three 
agencies that new accountability arrangements were a necessary step change. 
 “I‟m very proud of the organisation (RUC) I originally joined, and all of that. But for 
me personally, I also know that they weren‟t a perfect organisation. Neither is the one 
I left (PSNI). Like most big organisations. But, the bottom line is, pre-Patten, I‟d have 
been middle management level, you know. The notion of policing accountability was 
not, certainly in terms of middle management down, it was not part of your language 
or your thinking, in any demonstrable way that I can really remember” (PSNI 
interviewee, 2016) 
This insight exemplifies the scale of change which was heralded by the Patten Commission. 
It corresponds with the socio-historical context outlined earlier in this thesis. Moreover, it is 
also an indication that the institutional change had to connect to organisational culture.  As 
the Patten Commission itself recognised: “Accountability should run through the bloodstream 
of the whole body of a police service and it is at least as much a matter of the culture and 
ethos of the service as it is of the institutional mechanisms” (ICP, 1999, p.22). How cultural 
change and accountability relate to one another is something which Chan (1997) and Bayley 
(1990) have both researched. This will be explored in the discussion (chapter 9). For now, it 
is sufficient to note that it was former RUC officers transferring into the PSNI, with no 
experience of effective external accountability, who were being challenged to accept the new 
dispensation.  This helps to illustrate how the strands of triadic accountability are 
interdependent and connect to one another. The transfer of RUC officers into the PSNI was 
an aspect of situational accountability (chrono-system and macro-system) which may have an 
effect in one way or another upon relational accountability (exosystem & mesosystem).   
“Police officers were killed. Colleagues were killed. And sometimes some of the poor 
behaviour they got up to as well. Policing was very different in many, many ways. 
And it was like the advancements in policing, good, bad or indifferent that the 
mainland had made and other parts of the globe had made, someone had switched the 
lights off here. That‟s how I‟d describe it: someone had switched the lights off! „We 
ain‟t developing anything because we‟ve got enough on our hands‟ ” (PONI 
interviewee, 2016).   
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Seventeen years after the Patten Commission published its report, the scale of the challenge 
for policing reform might be too easily minimised or set aside. Yet, as this interviewee 
outlines accountability in Northern Ireland had been seriously deficient. In large measure, this 
reflects the idiosyncratic nature of the situational-context at that time. However, it is clear 
from the findings of this study that these idiosyncratic features did not evaporate with the 
inception of new accountability arrangements.  That included a continuing threat of violence 
and a failure by the political parties and two governments to agree mechanisms to 
comprehensively address the legacy of the conflict. Into this environment emerged the new 
beginning to policing and situational accountability inherited these idiosyncracies: 
“Our continual frustration is that the Patten construct was not about a backward 
looking police service. The Patten construct was about a forward looking police 
service, admittedly in an enabling environment. And you could argue about whether 
the environment is as enabling as Patten had envisaged it was going to be. But you 
know, we‟re having to build all these structures about the Past, and all, you know we 
spent, if you did an analysis of the questions (from NIPB) so much of it relates to a 
period which predates the construct of the PSNI. So I don‟t think that‟s an effective 
way of accountability. I think it‟s an ineffective mechanism where none else exists to 
try and get some answers about the Past. And in doing so, you make the policing less 
effective, reduce legitimacy, and make the Board less effective” (PSNI interviewee, 
2016). 
This highlights the interplay between the environment, the socio-historical context and 
accountability. The suggestion that the exercise of accountability in this context may “reduce 
legitimacy” of policing is something which will be explored in more detail later (Chapter 9). 
Once again the influence of the past on present policing including accountability is evident 
and raises concerns among participants about the adverse impact of this on effectiveness. 
 
5.3  Intelligence and National Security 
 
A necessary and important component of the new arrangements for accountability has been 
the statutory framework, including the remit, responsibilities and powers of the agencies. 
Interestingly, participants in this study all expressed some concern about constraints or limits 
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on the new agencies. This was reflected in responses from participants across all three 
agencies. Greatest consensus centred on Q.4 “There is no need for the Policing Board to have 
scrutiny or accountability for matters in the sphere of national security and covert policing”.  
Participants in all three agencies most strongly disagreed with this (PONI=3.73 / SD.=1.62; 
PSNI=4.08 / SD.=1.55; NIPB=2.65 / SD.1.22). The consensus across all agencies on Q.4 
concerning accountability over national security and covert policing in Northern Ireland is 
especially significant. Significant strategic change has occurred in this area of British 
National Security since the Patten Commission was published. As outlined earlier (Chapter 
2), transfer of national security intelligence from PSNI to MI5 since 2007. This unseen world 
where policing interfaces with intelligence has been the subject of serious criticism in the past 
in Northern Ireland (eg. Cory, 2004; De Silva, 2012). The activities of state agents continue 
to impinge on policing and on the role of accountability bodies. One contemporary 
illustration of this is the case of self-confessed loyalist paramilitary and police informant 
Gary Haggarty illustrates. On 29
th
 January 2018,  Haggarty was sentenced to 6 and ½ years 
for his role in five murders and over 200 other criminal offences to which he had pleaded 
guilty (Morris, 2018, January 30, pg.4-6). Justice Coghlin reduced Haggarty‟s 35 year 
sentence to reflect his role as an Assisting Offender under the Serious and Organised Crime 
and Police Act (SOCPA, 2005). Some of the offences for which Haggarty was convicted 
post-dated the Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the Patten Commission (1999). His role as 
a state agent and involvement in criminality only emerged following PONI‟s Operation 
Ballast investigation into the activities of a loyalist crime gang in north Belfast and its 
connections with the police and British intelligence. Such competing State interests and 
obligations have conflicted with the public interest in Northern Ireland, as Lord John Stevens 
told the House of Commons (HC 893, 3 May 2011): 
“There was the RUC, MI5 and the (British) army doing different things. When you 
talk about intelligence, of the 210 people we arrested, only three were not agents. 
Some of them were agents for all four of those particular organisations, fighting 
against each other, doing things and making a large sum of money, which was all 
against the public interest and creating mayhem in Northern Ireland. Any system that 
is created in relation to this country (UK) and Northern Ireland has to have a proper 
controlling mechanism. It has to have a mechanism where someone is accountable for 
what the actions are and that has to be transparent, especially in the new processes” 
(Lord Stevens, HC 893, 3 May 2011). 
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Lord Stevens depiction of the myriad of competing interests in the past reflects what new 
accountability arrangements had to come to terms with: “you know the sharing of intelligence 
was pretty much a mess” (PONI interviewee, 2016). Following the post-Patten policy change 
to transfer national security intelligence gathering from PSNI to MI5, participants in this 
study remained concerned about the accountability gap. Significantly, the Patten Commission 
proposal for a Commissioner for Covert Law Enforcement has never been implemented (ICP, 
1999, p.38). Furthermore, there appears to be a divergence from the Patten Commission‟s 
framework that “the Chief Constable remains fully accountable for the involvement of the 
police in matters involving national security, even though his or her main accountability in 
such matters is to the Secretary of State” rather than NIPB (ICP, 1999, p.33). 
“What we don‟t have is you know the (PONI) Ballast and the (PONI) Stafford stuff. 
So we would be concerned that MI5 and the oversight commissioner that reports to 
the Westminster committee… (it) has never upheld a complaint about the police…. 
We wouldn‟t have any confidence and that‟s something we think is outstanding” 
(NIPB interviewee, 2016) 
This is also a concern for participants in this study with a background in the PSNI. The 
degree to which this policy shift impinges on policing and policing accountability is 
disguised by the invisible nature of this subject. One PSNI interviewee said that “around 40% 
of our NI specific business isn‟t even measured, never mind being held to account in a kind 
of robust way” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). Intelligence gathering under the rubric of National 
Security should be governed in the same way as good policing and effective accountability: 
“Policing is on a continuum, this doesn‟t exist divorced from what we should be 
doing even though sometimes it does, and again, that‟s where I think you end up 
sometimes with very perverse outcomes and things go wrong … It‟s not something 
that we shouldn‟t be taken that broad human rights approach towards. So, I think it‟s 
not helpful to make that separate or special in the accountability regime as well.” 
(PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
This accountability gap applies not only to NIPB oversight of how PSNI resources are used 
in matters relating to British national security, it also impacts PONI investigations. A Judicial 
Review taken by the Police Ombudsman against the PSNI Chief Constable in 2014 brought 
into sharp relief the persisting problem. This Judicial Review was brought by the Police 
Ombudsman in order to recover more than 60 pieces of information relating to several 
127 
 
ongoing inquiries which the PSNI Chief Constable had declined to disclose. Given the 
reported sensitivity of the issues raised in the papers, these were not available at the time of 
this research. However, the proceedings and the decision to lodge them were the subject of 
comment by several interviewees within PONI: 
“If the Police Ombudsman has to take them to court and, over a blockage, therefore 
there have been those blockages. …My understanding was that on occasions they 
(PONI investigators) would be challenged as to why did they need that information 
and on the basis of their answer they would or they wouldn‟t be given the 
information. ……..I coined the phrase for Michael that you can‟t do investigation by 
negotiation. It‟s not for the holder of the information to decide whether an investigator 
needs it. It‟s for the investigator” (PONI interviewee, 2016).   
As outlined in the chronology of key milestones and critical incidents during the period of 
this study (Appendix 1), the new PSNI Chief Constable agreed a resolution with PONI. That 
is why the response of participants from a PSNI background in this study after that resolution 
had been reached is all the more interesting. One statements with which PSNI participants 
(3.541; SD.=1.641) most strongly disagreed was Q.7: “The Police Ombudsman‟s access to all 
aspects of policing , including national security and covert policing is completely unfettered”. 
Some PSNI interviewees reasoned that fettering access to PONI access is justified, pointing 
to alternative Westminster oversight already highlighted by an interviewee from NIPB. Other 
PSNI interviewees harboured their concerns about the effect on police culture of secrecy: 
“I struggle with this security and covert policing…..and I really struggle with this 
kind of concept there is stuff going on that people don‟t need to know about. It‟s the 
stuff going on here that people most need to know about. And that‟s a mind-set 
change for us organisationally… And  I think it‟s wrong. I think it‟s perverse. I think 
it leads to very perverse outcomes” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
This same problem was recognised by participants with a background in PONI. The presence 
of fetters on the scope and free exercise of PONI powers and the realisation that there is an 
accountability gap which overlaps with policing in Northern Ireland is a critical concern: 
“..the skeleton in the cupboard or the elephant in the room really is around secret 
intelligence. You know: „Well, that‟s secret. That‟s a national security issue‟…I think 
there should be a mechanism, and there‟s not one at the moment as I understand it, 
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where there is a process where the Ombudsman does have access as well to national 
security information ” (PONI interviewee, 2016).  
What makes this all the more challenging is the suggestion that the NIPB continues to be 
responsible funding aspects of policing through the PSNI budget which it cannot scrutinise. 
One NIPB participant expressed concern about this and the fact that scrutiny of spending on 
this aspect of policing was constrained by the existing legislative and policy framework: “..it 
was always the case in terms of national security…. that MI5 can run agents in the north. It 
was actually , I was actually  discovered at a private meeting of the Board that the budget to 
pay agents comes through the police, even for MI5….I could never get that amount” (NIPB 
interviewee, 2016). 
This appears to be completely at odds with the Patten Commission‟s framework whereby the 
“the Chief Constable remains fully accountable for the involvement of the police in matters 
involving national security..”(ICP, 1999, p.33). What accentuates this contradiction is the fact 
that the PSNI has received substantial additional funding for policing activities under the 
rubric of national security directly from the British Government. While the Patten 
Commission envisaged a lead role for external civilian oversight bodies in financial 
accountability (ICP, 1999) the current statutory framework appears to negate this.  This 
problem extends to other aspects of financial accountability. For example, NIPB was asked 
by PSNI to pay police legal costs of £393k incurred in unsuccessfully defending its policing 
operation during illegal loyalist flags protests in 2014 (DB v PSNI Chief Constable [2014] 
NIQB 55). Yet, previous NIPB minutes do not indicate any input into the impugned decisions 
by the PSNI nor did court proceedings indicate that NIPB had any liability. This raises 
questions about the current statutory framework or the way that statute is being interpreted 
which lie outside the limits of this study to definitively answer. Even participants with a 
background in NIPB disagreed that powers of the NIPB needed to be increased to be 
effective. Other participants felt NIPB could make improved use of existing powers: 
“I think the greatest weakness that the Board has is its inability to come together 
collectively in the interests of everybody and things break down consistently around 
partisan lines. I‟m not saying extra powers and responsibilities wouldn‟t make it more 
effective but I don‟t think it needs more of those to be effective. It could be more 
effective without more power.” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
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One illustration is the fact in 16 years the NIPB has never exercised its powers to call the 
PSNI Chief Constable i) to report and ii) instigate an inquiry under s.59&s.60 of the Police 
(NI) Act 2000. These accountability powers were recommended by the Patten Commission: 
“The Board should have the power to request another agency to conduct an inquiry and 
should have the capacity to do so itself. It is also essential that all members of the police 
service should be required to cooperate with that inquiry. Without such an obligation, the 
Board would be dependent on reports from the Chief Constable with no effective follow-up 
capacity. It would therefore be powerless against a recalcitrant Chief Constable unless it was 
prepared to call for his or her retirement. To be truly effective an institution needs to have 
more than just one extreme power which by its nature it difficult to use” (ICP, 1999, p.33). 
Differences in the past have existed between members of NIPB about the use of powers of 
report and inquiry. Yet, during this study, NIPB came closer than ever to using these powers.  
Following meetings in February and March 2015, the chairperson of NIPB‟s Performance 
Committee said members were seriously concerned about the damage being caused to 
confidence in policing and the Coronial process. (www.nipolicingboard.org). This led to a 
resolution by the NIPB to trigger s.59 & s.60 of the Police (NI) Act 2000. The NIPB‟s 
independent Human Rights adviser  along with an independent NIPB member were tasked 
with drafting the letter to the PSNI Chief Constable to set the process in motion, as required 
under the legislative provisions. However, that letter was never sent to the PSNI.   
Instead, a correspondence log from NIPB indicates a letter was sent on 29
th
 June 2015 to the 
Minister of Justice requesting his support to commission an inspection by HMIC of the 
PSNI‟s arrangements for legacy inquests. On 9
th
 July 2015, the Minister for Justice responded 
to decline the NIPB request to commission an inspection of the PSNI on grounds of funding 
cuts. NIPB held a meeting with the Minister for Justice (30
th
 July 2015) to express concern at 
the decision by his decision to refuse its request for an inspection. At the time it was said:   
“The Board unanimously agreed to ask the Justice Minister to have HMIC do an 
inspection. And they‟re (DoJ) using the issue of money and resources as not being 
available... The police are still saying PEEL is the most important thing to them. Now 
the Minister has come up with some sort of half-way house…  I‟m talking about DoJ, 
what the terms of reference or the parameters for such a review or inspection would 
be. So we would have some concerns… some concerns about the remit… we‟ve not 
taken no for an answer from the Justice Minister.” (NIPB interviewee, 2015). 
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Over a period of several months from March 2015, the consensus among NIPB members to 
invoke s.59 & s.60, and then to commission an inquiry by HMIC into PSNI handling of 
disclosure, eventually broke down. Instead, the Minister of Justice tasked the Criminal Justice 
Inspectorate to inspect the PSNI‟s disclosure arrangements. Published in December 2016, the 
inspection concluded that PSNI processes were “complex, convoluted and contributing to 
delay” but the PSNI was fulfilling its statutory duty to disclose material to the Coroner 
(CJINI, 2016).  This episode reaffirms how the distinctive conflict-related socio-historical 
context in Northern Ireland imposes itself in present-day accountability. It also shows how 
the autonomy of oversight can be hindered. 
 
5.4  Independence. 
 
“I don‟t think as a society we had fully understood that we were holding major 
policing issues up to the light. …And I think that was a problem… I suspect, that may 
have been a view, that there was a silent „mostly‟ in front of the word accountability, 
or in front of the word „independent‟, that it was „mostly independent‟” (PONI 
interviewee, 2016) 
This quote illustrates quite strongly how societal expectation and situational factors interacted 
in accountability. Interestingly, the response of participants suggests those with a background 
in PONI (4.73/ SD. 1.33) and in NIPB (4.34 / SD.=2.20) were concerned about Q.44: “The 
Department of Justice has too much influence over the affairs of the external civilian 
oversight bodies”.  This has implications for the independence of the accountability 
arrangements. Furthermore, given literature reviewed elsewhere (Chapter 4), the integral 
nature of independence to the effectiveness of external civilian oversight is well understood.  
Previously, research has revealed how the independence of PONI has been compromised to 
the extent that the Office itself was engulfed in controversy and the former Police 
Ombudsman obliged to resign (CAJ, 2011; McCusker, 2011; CJINI, 2011). Academic 
research has also underlined the criticality of independence in policing oversight 
(Senevaritne, 2004; Mawby & Wright, 2005; Porter & Prenzler, 2012). This makes it all the 
more significant that participants from both of the external civilian oversight bodies are 
concerned with the DoJ having too much influence over their affairs. One interviewee 
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succinctly explained: “They (DoJ) hold the purse-strings” (NIPB interviewee, 2015). This 
corresponds with the dilemma articulated by the National Audit Office landscape review of 
inspectorates and oversight bodies (NAO, 2015) where sponsor departments have conflicted 
interests which impinge on the independence of those public bodies they fund. On the other 
hand, the fact that there is vigilance among participants in NIPB and PONI about the 
relationship with DoJ may be considered a healthy safeguard of independence. As with other 
findings, this will be the subject to further analysis in the discussion (Chapter 9). 
This study shares the view that independence is a “site of interaction: a constant dialectic” 
(Savage, 2013b, p.109). For the purpose of this study, it is examined through situational 
accountability. That is because matters preordained in legislation or policy such as criteria of 
those appointed to lead in external civilian oversight may influence independence. For 
example, under the provisions of the Police (NI) Act 2000, nine independent members of 
NIPB are appointed by the DoJ. The terms of their appointment was later modified by the 
DoJ to give it discretion to decide the length of tenure an NIPB independent member serves. 
Their remuneration also comes from DoJ. Another situational feature of external civilian 
oversight in Northern Ireland is the fact that the Police Ombudsman must be a civilian, 
uninvolved with the police in Northern Ireland (Hayes, 1997). That appointment is defined in 
statute as „corporation sole‟ meaning that the Police Ombudsman is the Office (Police (NI) 
Act 1998). Again the significance of this was highlighted by several participants: 
“Let me talk about the civilian control and civilian oversight. I believe that while it‟s 
terribly important to have technical knowledge of policing and have a policing 
mindset and understanding in making a judgement call on a specific; and the policing 
perspective must be fed into that decision making. Ultimately, it must be a non-
policing decision, a non-policing person making that decision” (PONI interviewee, 
2016). 
Perhaps of the distinctive remit of PONI, greater importance was attached to “civilianess” 
(Savage, 2013a, p.889) by PONI participants (7.79 / SD. 1.79). This was further articulated 
by one participant who referred to PONI‟s investigative report into the „Good Samaritan 
bombing‟ (PONI, 2013). This probed the circumstances surrounding an IRA bomb in Derry 
in August 1988 which killed three people. The PONI report found that the RUC had prior 
information about the incident (PONI, 2013). 
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“It had to be for a civilian to call that… it was just such an emotive issue. So it‟s 
about not only independence, it‟s about the optics of independence. And there was the 
incident where to me it was most stark”. (PONI interviewee, 2016) 
 
5.5  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has elaborated on the proposed strand of situational accountability and 
summarised exploratory findings from this study. These findings could be explored in greater 
depth and the validity of situational accountability could be further tested. For now, these 
findings suggest three main features of situational accountability worthy of restating. Firstly, 
the idiosyncratic nature of the context in which accountability emerges has a significant 
influence on the specification and legislation for institutional reform. This context-sensitivity 
cannot be more strongly underlined. Secondly, the institutional powers and remit of the 
accountability arrangements may be affected by subsequent and/or parallel policy or 
legislative developments. In this study, the role of intelligence and its relationship to policing 
and accountability stands out as an area which requires attention. Participants perceive an 
accountability gap where policing interfaces with British National Security (BNS). Thirdly, 
the independence of the arrangements for accountability may be enabled or inhibited by the 
institutional design. In this study, encroachment by DoJ was a concern for ECO bodies. All of 




Chapter 6:  Policing and Relational Accountability „r‟ 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter will explore „relational accountability‟ as the second of the three prospective 
sub-domains on accountability in this research. In the preceding chapter some of the 
situational or institutional determinants and components of accountability were explored. 
Some of the existing research on accountability chooses to discriminate between either, the 
institutional dimension or the relational dimension of accountability (eg. Dubnik, 2014b, 
p.649-652). As explained previously, this research takes the position that a thorough 
understanding of the impact of external civilian oversight on policing reform in Northern 
Ireland entails much more than the institutional arrangements. It must consider the 
operational dynamics of accountability as mediated by the social (power) relations within this 
institutional framework (Bovens et al. 2014, p.3). For the purposes of this research, relational 
accountability is that domain or sphere which concerns the dynamic interactions between the 
actors involved in the exercise of external civilian oversight. As the findings in this chapter 
will come to illuminate, relational accountability is perhaps best examined through an 
interdisciplinary research (IDR) framework. Yet, within that framework, relational 
accountability may derive greatest clarity from the literature on social psychology. In that 
scholarship, the function and effect of inter-group dynamics has received extensive attention 
(eg: Tajfel & Turner, 1976; Abrahms & Hogg, 1988). While, there may be also evidence for 
the salience of bias and stereotypes (Bandura, 1986) and the influence of individuals upon the 
quality of relational accountability. Of the most promising literature in helping to explain the 
relational dimension to accountability is the pioneering research by Tetlock (eg: Tetlock, 
1992). Bovens et al. (2014, p.4) notes the pre-eminence in this social psychological 
scholarship of the relational facet of accountability. Whether such (quasi)experimental 
approaches adequately capture the potential complexity of accountability in the field is 
something which existing research does not yet exhaustively investigate. Nevertheless, the 
value of Tetlock‟s social contingency theories for understanding the operation and exercise of 
accountability is widely accepted (eg: Bovens et al. 2014). Other research examining 
Principal-Agents theory (eg. Gailmard, 2014) offers less assistance in exploring the 
triumvirate of agencies in external civilian oversight in Northern Ireland. By exploring the 
expectations, experiences and effects of interactions from and upon those actively involved in 
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the processes of external civilian oversight, this study hopes to add to existing research on 
relational accountability.  
As previously noted, existing scholarship from sociology, political science and public 
administration adds value to, rather than diminishes the theoretical framework within which 
to explore and understand relational accountability. Whilst Lipsky‟s (1980) study of „street-
level bureaucrats‟ was ground-breaking in itself, Dubnik (2014b, p.651) notes that this has 
also been reconceptualised more recently in terms of relational accountability by Hupe & Hill 
(2007).  Indeed, there is an ever-increasing interest in the field of accountability in this 
relational dimension (Dubnik, 2014b). This study seeks to further that effort. Apart from the 
dichotomous approach to the study of institutional and relational accountability already 
eschewed, existing research conceptualises the relational strand as one which is altered by the 
bureaucratisation of accountability: “Once a relationship becomes structured formalised, and/ 
or mechanised, the social dynamic that underpins account-giving relations and behaviours is 
altered” (Dubnik, 2014b, p.650). 
Where the current research attempts to go further is in exploring if these relations and 
behaviours are altered and effected in an on-going way, and what factors might be most 
salient in this respect. Miller‟s (2002) criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of civilian 
oversight, acknowledges the importance of the perceptions of the police in relation to the 
processes employed. Alongside police experience of accountability, the current study 
includes the perceptions and experiences of those actively engaged in policing oversight. If 
relational accountability is an important aspect of the operation of external civilian oversight, 
it is hoped to add new insight to this by exploring the perceptions and experiences of those 
involved in it from different sides. This research posits that the relational “milieu of account-
giving and account-demanding” (Flinders, 2014, p.667) is a critical ingredient in assessing 




6.2  Summary of findings on relational accountability „r‟ 
 
All results under this prospective domain of „relational accountability‟ are summarised in 
Table 10. These are explored in more detail to consider their possible significance and to aid 
progressive focussing of the qualitative data garnered in this research. In examining these Q 
statements on relational accountability (see Table 11), ratings for each item (mean and 
standard deviation) were generated in Excel to explore patterns of response by agency 
affiliation. Q items which received highest/ lowest mean scores within relational 
accountability were highlighted. Interviews of those participants who gave strongest ratings 
on these items were explored by general inductive analysis. Findings were then related back 
to the Patten Commission‟s (1999) proposals and other research. 
Table 10.  Responses to Q statements on „r‟ Relational Accountability by Agency 
AGENCY PONI PSNI NIPB 
Q no. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
1 5.466 1.125 4.5 2.043 5.913 1.564 
2 2.733 1.667 3.375 1.134 2.826 1.230 
3 5.533 1.245 5.5 1.587 5.826 1.370 
10 3.8 1.740 4.125 1.918 4.521 1.343 
16 3.2 1.698 3.791 1.284 3.173 1.497 
27 3.733 1.032 3.583 1.767 4.391 1.559 
29 5 0.845 4.375 1.279 4.869 1.423 
35 6.866 0.516 5.333 1.434 6.478 1.309 
38 6.4 1.183 6.291 1.756 6.130 1.324 
39 5.066 1.032 5.125 2.576 5.869 1.686 
40 4.6 2.261 4.25 1.621 4.478 1.879 
48 3.333 1.588 3.958 1.517 3.608 1.698 
49 6.666 1.759 4.625 1.663 5.434 2.085 
50 3.733 2.086 3.291 1.366 4.521 1.274 
51 6.4 1.764 5.25 1.293 5.782 1.677 
54 6.4 1.454 4.958 1.756 5 1.705 
56 7 1.772 5.25 1.939 6.956 1.429 
57 3.133 1.355 3.666 1.239 2.521 1.238 
58 2.733 1.099 5.25 1.326 5.086 1.378 





Table 11.  Q statements (q=20) on „r‟ (relational accountability) 
1. The process of interaction between the PSNI and the external civilian oversight bodies is too 
adversarial. (reverse scored) 
2. The PSNI has dealt fairly and speedily with all requests for disclosure of information from the 
external oversight bodies. 
3. Sometimes it seems as though the external civilian oversight bodies are used by those who 
deliberately want to damage policing.(reverse scored) 
10. PSNI is justified in its concern that information disclosed to the external civilian oversight 
bodies may not be treated with the necessary sensitivity / confidentiality (reverse scored) 
16. There are still some areas where the external oversight bodies struggle to gain full co-
operation from police and officers and staff. (reverse scored) 
27. Party politics has too great an influence on the Northern Ireland Policing Board. (reverse 
scored) 
29. Sometimes the activities in which external oversight engage are like a morality drama or a 
piece of theatre.(reverse scored) 
35. The institutions for policing oversight which have evolved are not like a monster which has to 
be fed. (reverse scored) 
38. It’s as though the PSNI is being pulled up by its roots every time the policing oversight bodies 
grab an issue of concern.(reverse scored) 
39. As a result of external oversight we now have leaders in policing chasing numbers and targets 
which are completely counterproductive. (reverse scored). 
40. Over the years the Office of the Police Ombudsman has shown consistency in handling of 
complaints against the police. 
48. The independence of the external oversight bodies has never been challenged or undermined 
by the PSNI. 
49. External oversight bodies have already played a positive role in dealing with the legacy of the 
past policing. 
50. It is unfair of external oversight bodies to judge past policing practices and procedures by 
current policing practices and procedures.(reverse scored) 
51. It seems as though there is little understanding and sympathy on the part of external oversight 
bodies of how policing works in the local context. (reverse scored) 
54. The external oversight bodies do not engender confidence among the officers and staff of the 
PSNI.(reverse scored). 
56. Everything that is in the public interest  - not the police interest – should be disclosed to the 
external oversight bodies. 
57. The PSNI has always demonstrated complete transparency to the external oversight bodies. 
58. There are clear and necessary limits to what the PSNI should disclose to the external civilian 
oversight bodies. 






6.3   Information-sharing and disclosure 
 
The most positive rating on this sub-set of statements for relational accountability was Q.56: 
“Everything that is in the public interest – not the police interest – should be disclosed to the 
oversight bodies”. This Q statement received the strongest levels of agreement from 
interviewees from both PONI (7 / SD. =1.772) and NIPB (6.956; SD.=1.429)  although the 
standard deviation (Std.Dev. =1) tends to suggest an amount of variability in response within 
each agency. Nevertheless, one of the reasons this Q.56 assumes significance in findings is 
not only because of the strong level of recorded agreement during the Q sort among 
participants from PONI and NIPB, but also because the statement is derived from the Patten 
Report (1999) itself. Consistent with Q methodology, no direct attribution was made or 
identified to participants for this Q statement, in order to help mitigate any response bias. In 
fact, the issue of what should and should not be disclosed to the PONI and NIPB by the 
police was the subject of lengthy consideration by the Patten Commission, as reflected in 
their report under the chapter entitled “Accountability II : a new beginning” (ICP, 1999, p.28- 
39)  in a section on transparency (para.6.38) : 
“We further recommend that the police service itself should take steps to improve its 
transparency. There are many ways in which this should be done. Police codes of 
practice should be publicly available; this does not mean, for example, that all details 
of police operational techniques should be released – they clearly should not – but the 
principles, and legal and ethical guidelines governing all aspects of police work 
should be, including such covert aspects as surveillance and the handling of 
informants (cf the ACPO Codes of Practice on these matters referred to in Chapter 4). 
The presumption should be that everything should be available for public scrutiny 
unless it is in the public interest – not the police interest – to hold it back. It follows 
that there should be readily available and clearly drafted notes on matters which the 
public are likely to be interested to see. It was our experience during the period of our 
review that briefing notes and statistics on a range of issues of interest to us – and 
therefore probably to others – were not readily available.” (1999, p.36). 
It is notable that although the Patten Commission was mandated by the Good Friday 
Agreement, and had the endorsement of both governments in Dublin and London to fulfil its 
terms of reference, “briefing notes and statistics on a range of issues of interest to us… were 
not readily available” (1990, p.36). This serves to underscore the challenge in relation to 
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information exchange and what the Patten Report describes as transparency in relations 
between the police and those with oversight for the police. Even in the course of this 
research, it is noted that many of what the PSNI now describes as Service Procedures are not 
publicly released. Some of those which have in the past initially been released, such as the 
PSNI‟s Service Procedure for the handling of assisting offenders under the Serious and 
Organised Crime and Policing Act (2005), have subsequently been withdrawn from public 
circulation. Moreover, Service Procedures and Memoranda of Understanding relating to the 
interaction with other agencies involved in covert policing and agent handling, such as the 
British Security Service have never been made public. To what extent this may compromise 
effective accountability will be explored and assessed in greater detail in the course of these 
findings and ultimately, concluding chapters. Yet, it is very clear the premium which the 
Patten Commission placed on transparency in information-sharing as an ingredient in both 
accountability and more broadly, the culture and ethos of policing in Northern Ireland: 
“accountability to the law is vital but accountability is a much wider concept than that. It 
raises questions both of structure – the institutional relationship between the police and 
government both at central and local levels – and the style and purpose of policing. It 
involves partnerships – “constructive and inclusive partnerships with the community at all 
levels”, in the words of the Agreement. And it involves transparency – the police being open 
and informative about their work and amenable to scrutiny.” (1999, p.10) 
“Transparency is accountability in the “explanatory and cooperative” sense…. People need to 
know and understand what their police are doing and why. This is important if the police are 
to command public confidence and active cooperation. Secretive policing arrangements run 
counter not only to the principles of a democratic society but also to the achievement of fully 
effective policing. The past arrangements have not held the police adequately accountable in 
the “explanatory and cooperative” sense”. (1999, p.24-25) 
“There needs to be a culture of openness and transparency in a police service as a whole, in 
which police officers as a matter of instinct disseminate information about their work. The 
prevailing instinct at present, however, is defensive, reactive and cautious in response to 
questions, as we experienced ourselves in relation to some of our own inquiries” (1990, p.28). 
“Transparency is not a discrete issue but part and parcel of a more accountable, more 
community-based and more rights-based approach to policing” (1999, p.36). 
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“We have recommended community accountability mechanisms at local and central levels, 
and a policy of complete transparency about police work except when the public interest 
would be damaged” (1999, p.98). 
Several statements in this strand of relational accountability which evoke the strongest 
response from participants in all agencies orbit around transparency in sharing information by 
the PSNI with the ECO bodies. Significantly, participants in all agencies strongly disagreed 
with Q.2: “The PSNI has dealt fairly and speedily with all requests for disclosure of 
information from the external oversight bodies” (PONI= 2.733 / SD.=1.667; PSNI=3.375 / 
SD.=1.134; NIPB=2.826 / SD.=1.230). Similarly, participants in all three agencies strongly 
disagreed with Q.57: “The PSNI has always demonstrated complete transparency to the 
external oversight bodies” (PONI=3.133 / SD.=1.355; PSNI=3.666 / SD.=1.239; NIPB=2.521 
/ SD.=1.238). Given the seniority of those involved in this study, the pattern of consensus on 
these statements is a strong challenge to the spirit and intent of the Patten Commission, as 
already outlined. Strangely, it is also inconsistent with the agreement in support of Q.56 
which was discussed at the outset of this section. Admittedly, in the case of Q.56 support 
from PSNI participants was not as formidable as that of participants from PONI and NIPB. 
Taken together, these findings suggest continuing difficulties with information-sharing. As a 
dominant theme of relational accountability, this is the main focus of this chapter. The 
implications of this for the effectiveness of accountability are very clear: 
“The disclosable stuff, this one still causes, I think, a lot of fear for those who would 
have information disclosed or disclosable… but it‟s absolutely imperative that the 
person who is charged with assessing the validity of decisions made, sees everything. 
That doesn‟t mean that they themselves will onwards disclose everything that they 
have seen” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
This also helps to illustrate the interplay between situational and relational strands of triadic 
accountability.  Information-sharing is moderated and impacted upon by other factors. One of 
those is a situational constraint of British national security, previously described by a 
participant (chapter 5) as “the skeleton in the cupboard or the elephant in the room”.  At the 
heart of this, appears to be an important finding for the purposes of this research: control. The 
granting of access to information from the police to those working in external civilian 
oversight is seen as reflecting balance of control. One PONI participant said the process of 
obtaining information from the PSNI in the past “was like pulling teeth”: 
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“Once you start attaching caveats and conditions to disclosure of information and 
what type of complaints get passed and so forth, you are handing back control to the 
police. And it‟s not to say, of course, that the present police regime wouldn‟t be 
entirely conscientious in that respect. But nevertheless, the keys to the kingdom, as it 
were, are handed back once you start letting the police making those judgements for 
themselves” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
So for PONI, information-sharing or disclosure constitutes the “keys to the kingdom” for 
accountability. Although it has different powers and functions from PONI, the NIPB appears 
to have experienced similar difficulties in relation to requests for information from the PSNI: 
“And we‟ve seen that happening: police decide what goes out there and what doesn‟t 
go out there. And to me, that has been used in Northern Ireland, used and abused and 
exploited, this idea of National Security, whatever that means. I don‟t think anybody 
has really asked the question: what does that mean? And the public have been fobbed 
off, the Board have been fobbed off with National Security. And you cannot have a 
situation where the police are determining what is in their interest to disclose, and that 
has happened repeatedly with the police” (NIPB interviewee, 2016) 
Over the years, there have been well-documented difficulties in NIPB obtaining information 
from the PSNI. One example is the Historical Enquiries Team.  When the NIPB monthly 
meeting convened in private on 2
nd
 October 2008, NIPB members were informed of receipt 
of a draft report by Professor Lundy,  “Can the past be policed? Lessons from the Historical 
Enquiries Team (HET) in Northern Ireland” (Lundy, 2009). The PSNI had approved access 
for Professor Lundy to study the HET. The research findings raised serious implications for 
the lack of independence of the HET by employing former RUC officers.  With its oversight 
of the PSNI and the policing budget, the report had implications for NIPB. The Human 
Rights and Professional Standards Committee was delegated to meet with the PSNI Chief 
Constable to discuss Professor Lundy‟s (unpublished) report (12
th
 November 2008). From 
November 2008 to October 2012, Professor Lundy‟s research on the HET was the subject of 
meetings or correspondence between NIPB and PSNI on at least twenty occasions (NIPB, 
2012, Record no. 217802). When NIPB first asked the PSNI to respond to Professor Lundy‟s 
report in November 2008, it was not until 30th March 2009 that the PSNI replied, enclosing a 
current situation report prepared by the HET brushing off the concerns raised by Professor 
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Lundy. The PSNI approach to Professor Lundy‟s findings was later criticised by HMIC 
(June, 2013).  
After the NIPB was reconstituted in May 2011, the Human Rights and Professional Standards 
Committee began enquiring again about the HET.  At a meeting on 13 October 2011, the 
PSNI briefed a meeting of the HRPS Committee that no specific steps had been taken to 
address Dr Lundy‟s concerns (NIPB, 2012, Record no. 217802). At that stage, NIPB received 
a second report by Professor Lundy (2011) on processes and procedures involving Royal 
Military Police cases under the ambit of the HET. After meeting Professor Lundy on 8
th
 
March 2012, the Committee wrote to the PSNI. A rapid response was received which refuted 
the status and legal standing of Professor Lundy‟s report (NIPB, 2012, Record no. 217802). 
A fortnight later, NIPB members met with senior PSNI officers to discuss unresolved 
concerns arising from Professor Lundy‟s consecutive reports (2009, 2011). Then, at NIPB‟s 
next monthly meeting (NIPB, 2012, April 5) further questions were tabled by NIPB members 
about Professor Lundy‟s reports. The PSNI Chief Constable indicated that he was 
considering inviting HMIC to undertake an independent review of the HET. The scope and 
remit of the inspection was the subject of further correspondence between NIPB and PSNI. 
Eventually, HMIC commenced an inspection of the PSNI‟s HET in November 2012 and its 
report the following year vindicated Professor Lundy‟s research findings, (HMIC, 2013). It 
took four years, two research reports and an independent inspection by HMIC before the 
PSNI finally agreed to remove the leadership of the HET. It was not until a new PSNI Chief 
Constable was appointed that the HET was finally closed.  
It is beyond the limits of the current study to examine in depth interactions between the NIPB 
and PSNI about the HET. From the inception of the HET in 2005 until 2014 when it was 
closed by the PSNI CC, NIPB had oversight of the HET. Yet, the NIPB itself did not invite 
Professor Lundy to meet to discuss her first report until 2 June 2010. Even with PSNI‟s 
reluctance to share information or take decisive action, NIPB‟s response to Professor Lundy‟s 
research appeared dilatory, despite the legal and ethical implications raised within it: 
“I think in some ways the shock around that (HET) was that we already had a Policing 
Board for 9 or 10 years, apparently overseeing this, and yet the access to what was 
going in there wasn‟t provided, or wasn‟t looked for, or wasn‟t given back. And it was 
only when there was some sort of outside, another outside body, oversight with 
different powers, they found something out. And even then, you wonder did they 
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really get to the bottom of things. So every time you bring in outside bodies like 
HMIC or external auditors, to some extent the Board also runs the risk of them being 
exposed as it being on their watch.” (NIPB interviewee, 2016). 
This raises a further dynamic in the realm of information sharing and disclosure. Vested or 
reputational interests in inquiries by ECO bodies may impair efficacy. Accountability for the 
impugned actions of the HET required intensive and sustained effort. Ultimately, it was the 
catalyst for change was prompted by two independent interventions: academic research by 
Professor Lundy (2009; 2011) and the inspection by the HMIC (2013). Even from this 
summary, the example of the HET reveals the compromise to relational accountability 
between the NIPB and PSNI over time. Documentary evidence available about the HET 
corresponds with the views of participants in this study that there was a lack of speed, 
fairness and transparency in the PSNI response to information sharing with NIPB.  
“The PSNI have just refused to give us information. They have refused to give us 
information about legacy issues. They have refused to give us information about 
employment issues, and agency staff. We fought battles over issues which should 
have been just management issues. Not just issues which could be classed as political 
issues which might be about legacy and disclosure, and compliance with 
Ombudsman‟s recommendations and all that kind of stuff. From the level of just 
hiding their mistakes to the level of people making political judgements about what 
could be disclosed, that hasn‟t happened in practice” (NIPB interviewee, 2016). 
It is a measure of the strain on this relational accountability that a senior interviewee says the 
Policing Board has “fought battles” with the police to obtain information. Perhaps, even more 
revealing is the suggestion that these vigorous disputes have related to areas of business 
unconnected with the political conflict and the questions surrounding legacy investigations. 
Moreover, PSNI decisions to refuse to disclose information with NIPB may belie a myriad of 
different police interests. Some of these will be further explored in the sections which follow. 
Certainly, it is interesting that while PSNI participants strongly agree that there approach to 
disclosure has been lacking in speed, fairness and transparency, their agreement was much 
more tempered in relation to Q.56 “Everything that is in the public interest – not the police 
interest – should be disclosed to the external oversight bodies” (PSNI=5.25 / SD.1.939). 
Given that Q.56 corresponds with the Patten Commission, it is welcome that there is 
agreement among PSNI participants, even if it is weaker than PONI and NIPB: 
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“This one about public interest and police interest. I don‟t necessarily think they 
should be separated. You know we‟re public servants. We‟re part of a democratic 
society otherwise what‟s the point. So, I can‟t divorce the two concepts. I don‟t feel 
that there‟s anything that we‟re involved in as an organisation which, within reason, 
and when I say within reason I mean if it‟s going to speak to significant article 2 
issues for individuals or, all of which can be managed. So, I don‟t think there is 
anything that we are doing as an organisation that shouldn‟t be disclosable. It would 
trouble me if I thought there was.” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
 
6.4   Individuals 
 
Responses on statements around the theme information-sharing (Q.56, Q.2., Q.57 & Q.58) 
also revealed insight into why this aspect of relational accountability is so strained. Again, 
consistent with the overall framework of triadic accountability as an ecological system, these 
responses reflect an interaction between situational and relational accountability. As 
highlighted earlier, the transition from RUC to PSNI was one of people as well as policing 
processes. As already noted, this led to a scenario where the new policing dispensation was 
populated by officers and staff unfamiliar with external accountability: 
“There was severe hostility to this office, I think at all levels within the RUC as it was 
when we first started. It quickly became the PSNI. And I think that (hostility) 
continued for a number of years. And gradually it just became pockets of, small 
pockets within the police, not to say that‟s been completely eradicated now, because 
I‟m quite confident that it hasn‟t. But I think you‟re now talking about largely a 
regime, at senior management level, not entirely, but largely a management regime 
which is in the same place as this office” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
As this participant explains, the relationships between policing oversight and the police have 
improved over the years. This will be explored further in the chapters which follow (7 & 9). 
Yet, implicit in this interview extract is the insight that a change over time within the PSNI. 
This includes a change in the composition of the PSNI, as a result of the Patten Commission. 
It has also involved a change in those “at senior management level” in the PSNI. Meanwhile, 
participants across all agencies shared the view that “There are still some areas where the 
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external oversight bodies struggle to gain full co-operation from police officers and staff” 
(Q.16). This sentiment was strongest among NIPB participants (3.173; SD.=1.497) 
This emphasis on the importance of individuals within the agencies involved in 
accountability was often expressed by participants in this study. At times, the difference 
which individuals make to accountability was reluctantly acknowledged: 
“I mean, accountability means accountability. It‟s a serious thing. The public need to 
be reassured that it‟s not down to individuals because they can change. But I do think 
though, the truth of it is, individuals do change. And the amount of accountability you 
can either demand or get will to some extent come down to the individuals on the 
Board, at any one time, and their makeup and how they‟re doing their job and also to 
George and his top team. You know, there‟s a couple in the Top team that you would 
have time for in terms of them trying really hard, and then you have others, who are 
the art of smiling away at you but have no intention of doing the Board‟s bidding, but 
it‟s the show” (NIPB interviewee, 2016). 
In exploring stages of transition or organisational change, Maurer (1996, p.14) outlines 
different methods employed by individuals to resist reform or change in the status quo. One 
of these is malicious compliance, where an individual signals receptivity to change or 
compliance but subsequently interferes, delays or reneges. Malicious compliance is a concept 
which has previously been investigated in societies in transition, such as South Africa. In that 
context, where policing reform is an important part of societal transition, malicious 
compliance has been highlighted by scholars (Bruce, 2011). Highlighting the need for 
carefully designing performance measures for policing, Bruce (2011 p.2) warns the “inherent 
risk of indicators is that they have unintended consequences such as „promoting inappropriate 
behaviour or malicious compliance‟. This has been illustrated in South Africa with evidence 
of performance management related targets and systems contributing to a pattern of non-
recording of cases reported at police stations”. In consecutive years (2009 & 2010) the 
Auditor General has expressed concerns about the quality of compliance with regulatory 
requirements by the South African Police Service (SAPS) (Bruce, 2011, p.6). These findings 
were 15-16 years after the end of apartheid and beginning of democratic transition in South 
Africa. Interestingly, this timeframe reflects the trajectory of policing reform in Northern 
Ireland.  In exploring relational accountability, some of these findings suggest malicious 
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compliance in response to information-sharing and disclosure with ECO bodies. This does 
not necessarily mean that the individuals involved are offensive in their conduct: 
 “One of the problems I have with the police is that, in the nicest possible way, if they 
choose to, they can run rings around the Board. They‟re very adept at talking at length 
but not saying very much. I don‟t want to be cynical about them because I do admire 
them but they‟ve an awful lot to say. Senior policemen could talk for Ireland, but you 
sometimes come out of a session thinking „what did we learn?‟ ” (NIPB interviewee, 
2016). 
This extract highlights the difficulty experience by some of those involved in external civilian 
oversight. A risk to relational accountability is not synonymous with a risk to relationships. 
Interactions between the ECO bodies and PSNI can be cordial and courteous without being 
effective in holding the police to account, as the Patten Commission envisaged. Indeed, 
vision of a “recalcitrant Chief Constable” conjured up in the Patten Commission‟s view the 
need for the NIPB to have powers of report and inquiry, as outlined in the previous chapter. 
While those powers have never been used, some NIPB participants portray exchanges with 
past leadership of the PSNI which are problematic for relational accountability: 
“As a member of the Policing Board (NIPB), we were constantly undermined and 
challenged by the PSNI, sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly. They just 
sabotaged stuff….They never said „No‟. they just did „No‟. And again, that has to be 
in the context of the personalities, some weak leadership. I do think I would have 
some confidence in George Hamilton. He‟s probably the straightest of what we‟ve 
seen, whether he can override some of the characters that he‟s depending on. Some of 
the past Chief Constables have been to varying degrees obstructive and hostile. I don‟t 
see that in George but time will tell” (NIPB interviewee, 2016). 
Sabotage is another, more pernicious dimension to Maurer‟s (1996) analysis of resistance to 
change within organisations. Whether there are differences between experience of „malicious 
compliance‟ or „sabotage‟ in the behaviours reported by participants is outside the scope of 
this study to probe. However, differences in personal perceptions are interesting. So too is the 
emphasis given to the personal attributes of senior officials in the PSNI. It is notable here that 
a change in leadership can result in a change in approach, influenced by the new appointee. If 
this is salient in PSNI‟s approach to accountability, perhaps it also applies to ECO bodies. 
Yet, there is an inherent risk in this dependence on individuals at the expense of safeguards 
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and statutory powers. There was a debate within NIPB on this about British government 
proposals to introduce the National Crime Agency (NCA) in 2014. In response to the plea for 
NIPB to trust the leadership of the NCA, some members insisted that was insufficient:  
“I said: „That may be the case and nobody is questioning that. But we have to have 
systems and processes in place. We cannot ever depend on whether an individual 
happens on this occasion to be coming with a value base that is honourable‟ (NIPB 
interviewee, 2016). 
The findings about the influence of individuals in accountability have a particular resonance. 
Changes in leadership of PONI and PSNI have both occurred during the last five years. These 
changes in leadership have coincided with evidence of some changes in the approach to 
information-sharing. In some ways, this debate about the importance of individuals or the 
importance of systems appears contradictory. Yet this is precisely why this study has 
favoured the framework an ecological systems perspective because of the perpetual and 
stochastic or conjunctural interaction between individual (s), systems and other factors. 
Another permutation of this is the effect of a leadership crisis in ECO bodies. The most 
prominent illustration of this was in PONI and preceded the commencement of this study: 
“if you go back to the time of Sam Pollock and all the people that were involved 
there. And all of those relationships between the PSNI and the Ombudsman‟s Office. 
And the guy that was in charge, Al Hutchinson. I think Al Hutchinson rolled over.... I 
think that Michael Maguire has been a breath of fresh air” (NIPB interviewee, 2016). 
Three individuals in PONI are mentioned here: Sam Pollock, the former Chief Executive of 
PONI who blew the whistle on the controversy which “led to a lowering of the 
independence” of PONI. The Police Ombudsman at the time of that controversy Al 
Hutchinson, who had a background in the former Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Finally, 
Dr Michael Maguire, the current Police Ombudsman who replaced Mr Hutchinson. Those 
within the PSNI referred to as having relationships with PONI were not identified here. The 
implication is that relationships during that period between individuals in the PSNI and PONI 
contributed, by design or by default, to a crisis in accountability. Overall, the theme which 
emerges and which has been highlighted by others is that individuals can make an important 




6.5   Incident Handling 
 
Another factor which may impact on information –sharing is the issue at the centre of the 
request. Attention has already been given previously (Chapter 5) to how intelligence and 
British National Security may hamper the autonomy and efficacy of accountability. A factor 
which also intervenes in information-sharing is the legacy of the conflict. This has also been 
highlighted elsewhere in this study as a recurrent factor in the ecological system of policing 
accountability in Northern Ireland. Again, this illustrates how strands of triadic accountability 
can interact and the impact of these upon external civilian oversight, as one participant said: 
“It goes back to one of the original points I made. I think there are some dreadful 
things that perhaps went wrong and the Government just aren‟t prepared to take it on 
board. That‟s the bottom line” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
On the need to disclose or share information about conflict-related or legacy cases, the 
response of some PSNI participants appears to differ to others within this study. For instance, 
one of the statements with which PSNI participants feel most strongly is Q.50: “It is unfair of 
external civilian oversight bodies to judge past policing practices and procedures by current 
policing practices and procedures” (reverse scored. PSNI=3.291 / SD.=1.366). Furthermore, 
the views of PSNI participants reflected concerns about redirecting resources from present 
day policing to dealing with the past, in a climate of reducing budgets for policing. 
“We don‟t deal with request for information or disclosure speedily. It‟s not one of the 
things that‟s high on our list of priorities, and sometimes that‟s quite rightly the case” 
(PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
During this course of this study, the judiciary have directly expressed dissatisfaction with the 
quality and pace of disclosure by the PSNI. In July 2017, Justice Stephens criticised the 
approach of the PSNI: “Years have passed without compliance…there is no evidence of any 
attempt by the defendant (PSNI) to comply with its initial obligation under the rules to serve 
a list of documents or to comply with all the order made by the Master over many years” 
(Stephens J., 2017, July 21. Flynn V PSNI ). In the case of Barnard V PSNI, Justice Treacy 
issued a significant ruling on 28 July 2017 in which he specified a deadline by which time he 
expected the PSNI to comply with the court‟s requirement for disclosure information sought 
in relation to the Glenanne Gang killings [2017] NIQB 82. When no remedy had been 
provided to the court by November 2017, Justice Treacy then issued an Order of Mandamus 
148 
 
on the PSNI (Morris, 2017, December 8). In response to this and a letter published from those 
bereaved by the Glenanne Gang, the PSNI Chief Constable George Hamilton issued an open 
letter (PSNI, 2017, December 15). Mr. Hamilton stated that he would be appealing Justice 
Treacy‟s judgment. He also expressed concern about the resource pressure of legacy 
disclosures and lamented the failure to progress with mechanisms envisaged under the 
Stormont House Agreement (SHA, 2014) for dealing with the past: “While these cases relate 
to so-called „legacy‟ incidents, I am concerned by their potential implications for delivery of 
effective, operationally independent and accountable policing in the present” (PSNI, 2017, 
December 15). Yet even as this study concludes there is no firm evidence that the political 
agreement sought by the PSNI Chief Constable is about to be delivered. In the meantime, 
PSNI participants in this study find themselves dissatisfied that external civilian oversight 
bodies continue to judge past policing by present standards (Q.50). One PSNI participant said 
that the issue of the legacy of the conflict and dealing with the past impacts on the ecological 
system within which policing and policing accountability operates: 
“I think it‟s difficult for families of police officers as well… I do think it‟s back to 
that kind of concept that the Chief talks about all the time in terms of the past really 
being our critical incident of today” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
The fact that this participant signals that this transcends the PSNI as an organisation to effect 
the families of police officers tends to support this study‟s concept of triadic accountability as 
an ecological system within which factors within each strand of the system interact. The 
linkage made between police families and police officers, and the interaction between the 
past and the “critical incident of today”, illustrate this proposition.  For some police officers 
in this study, 30-40% of time on service each week was devoted to pending disclosures. 
There was some sympathy with the position of the PSNI by participants from both PONI 
(3.733 / SD.=2.086) and NIPB (4.521 / SD.=1.274). Nevertheless, PONI participants strongly 
agreed with Q.49: External civilian oversight bodies have already played a positive role in 
dealing with the legacy of the past”. Participants from NIPB also agreed with this (5.434 / 
SD.=2.085) while PSNI mildly disagreed (4.625 / SD.=1.663). However, even here there is 
an acknowledgement of the complexity of the past for external civilian oversight bodies: 
“I think the (Police) Ombudsman has been pretty successful in dealing with some of 
the issues with the legacy of the past. But the only thing I would say about that is the 
legacy of the past means different things to different people. What I mean by that, 
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victims want different things, they have different expectations…. You almost come to 
a negotiated contract with the individual. What is that individual or those individuals 
particularly looking for? Do you just want closure? What is it you don‟t understand? 
And I think there‟s a lot of still needs to be done around that” (PONI interviewee, 
2016). 
 
6.6  Conclusion 
 
The picture which emerges very strongly from this summary of findings is critical for 
proposed dimension of relational accountability. Given the challenge function of 
accountability through external civilian oversight of policing, an adversarial dimension to this 
might have been expected. Although this study‟s proposition of triadic accountability is 
exploratory, the notion of accountability as relational finds strong support across the literature 
(eg. Bayley, 1990; Bovens et al. 2014; Dubnik, 2014b; Savage, 2013a, 2013b; Woods & 
Shearing, 2013). This literature has previously been discussed (Chapter 2 & 4). What these 
findings add is the suggestion that relational accountability (r) exists within an ecological 
system wherein the composite strands (s, r & t) interact and impact upon one another.  
Firstly, the conclusion which emerges most strongly in relational accountability arises from 
problems perceived by participants in all agencies with information sharing. In particular, 
there was an acceptance among all participants that PSNI‟s approach to sharing information 
with ECO bodies has not been speedy, fair or transparent. Problems with information sharing 
or disclosure by police to external civilian oversight have been highlighted in recent times 
(Harkin, 2015). In this study, some differences in response emerged about whether the PSNI 
is justified in withholding information or placing limits on disclosure. Participants with a 
background in ECO bodies generally did not accept such limits, concerned that the “keys to 
the kingdom” would be in the control of the police. 
Secondly, an interesting aspect of the findings was participants‟ perceptions of the salience of 
individuals in the effectiveness of accountability. The importance of the individual was 
illustrated in relation to information sharing when there were changes in both the leadership 
of PONI and of the PSNI.  A third and final conclusion is how certain issues or incidents 
modulate information-sharing. Nowhere is this more conspicuous in the local ecological 
system than with so-called legacy cases or conflict-related disclosures. This was underpinned 
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by the insight that the PSNI portrays dealing with the past as “the critical incident of today”. 
Whether other critical incidents unrelated to the past conflict have the same impact upon 
information sharing would be worthy of further investigation. For the purpose of this study, 
the emphasis given to certain cases or themes was determined by participants and presumably 
influenced by the conditions and context which prevailed during the course of fieldwork and 
interviews. There may even be an argument that the tension in relational accountability 
between the three agencies in this study is a healthy sign. Yet, the extent of discord is 
surprising and the negative connotations of this for relational accountability are 








Chapter 7:  Policing and Transformational Accountability „t‟ 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter summarises participants‟ views about the third and final strand in triadic 
accountability. Transformational accountability (t) is suggested as a development on the 
existing literature which argues for the importance of learning in accountability (Bovens, 
2007; Bovens & Schilleman, 2014; Millar, 2002). Transformational accountability (t) is a 
composite of the strand of meaningful accountability (Bovens & Schilleman, 2014) and 
learning (Millar, 2002). It has been argued by Bovens & Schilleman (2014, p.679-680) that 
involving stakeholders in deliberative processes of accountability helps to clarify and agree 
expectations and achieve shared standards. However, this notion of meaningful accountability 
is not translated directly to reform or improvement more generally, or in relation to policing. 
Moreover, Millar (2002) has highlighted the importance of learning as a criterion to evaluate 
the effectiveness of external civilian oversight. Learning in that context was defined as policy 
improvement or change in the police as a result of policing oversight (Millar, 2002).  
Elsewhere, this study outlined (Chapter 4) transformational accountability is the third strand 
of an ecological systems approach to policing accountability in Northern Ireland. 
Transformational accountability is an attempt to suggest a composite of meaningful 
accountability (Bovens & Schilleman, 2014) and learning (Millar, 2002) which is in harmony 
with the reform agenda of the Patten Commission.  In doing so, the response of participants is 
explored and related back to relevant aspects of the original report by the Patten Commission. 
Some policing research post-Patten has highlighted issues of public confidence, legitimacy 
and trust (Topping et al. 2014) while other research reveals adverse effects from some forms 
of policing (CAJ, 2015; Lundy, 2009 & 2011).  As discussed earlier, (Chapter 1 & 4) the 
paucity of evidence in support of external civilian oversight does not negate a widely held 
assumption that it can only be positive for policing and reform (President's Task Force on 
21st Century Policing, 2015) In fact, accountable policing was viewed as an essential part of 
the transformation of policing in Northern Ireland, which in turn was central to the peace 
process. Therefore, this study argued that there is an important public policy interest in 
knowing if accountability and external civilian oversight is having the desired effect of 
enabling and enhancing policing reform. 
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Within the ecological system of policing accountability proposed by this study, 
transformational accountability (t) corresponds with the Micro and Meso-systems. As a 
result, it is explored at an individual, interpersonal and/ or inter-agency level. As 
acknowledged earlier, the strands of triadic accountability interact and affect one another. 
Transformational accountability (t) may be facilitated or inhibited by factors which impact 
within the other dimensions of relational (r) or situational (s). As Johnson (2008) found, the 
association between accountability and performance was non-linear, reflecting the co-
existence of co-varying and contradictory factors within the ecological system. Nonetheless,  
evidence from participants‟ responses to statements for transformational accountability (t) 
may indicate evidence of change and / or of the factor which help or hinder change. 
 
Table 12.  Responses to Q statements on „t‟ transformational accountability by agency. 
 
7.2  Findings 
 
In common with preceding findings (r & s) this putative transformational dimension of triadic 
accountability is explored through participants‟ responses by agency affiliation. The same 
procedure has been followed with coding data in Excel ratings for each item (mean and 
standard deviation) to explore patterns of response by agency affiliation.  A similar structure 
to the presentation of findings also follows. The summary of results based on participants 
AGENCY PONI PSNI NIPB 
Q no. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
8 6.4 1.992 7.291 1.232 6.913 1.164 
9 5.4 1.055 5.541 2.126 5.869 1.765 
11 4.666 1.799 4.458 1.382 5.869 1.516 
12 7.333 1.234 7.875 1.623 7.521 1.441 
13 5.133 0.990 4.166 1.606 4.478 1.343 
14 7.133 1.407 6.958 1.267 6.130 1.740 
15 4.8 0.414 3.458 1.641 5 1.477 
20 7.133 1.245 5.458 1.587 6.826 1.434 
23 7.133 1.407 5.208 1.955 5.652 1.492 
26 7.4 1.298 7.75 1.390 7.565 1.408 
28 7.266 1.980 7.708 1.197 7.434 1.014 
43 6.466 1.302 7.041 1.334 7.434 1.056 
46 6.4 1.681 5.791 1.444 5.739 1.593 
47 7 1.253 7.5 1.503 7.695 0.748 
53 6.8 1.264 5.25 2.231 8.043 1.041 
54 6.4 1.454 4.958 1.756 5 1.705 
55 5.066 1.397 4.875 1.940 5.217 1.830 
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response by agency affiliation are in Table 12. The Q statements associated with this putative 
dimension of transformational accountability (t) are shared in Table 13.  
By cross-referencing those Q items highest/lowest mean scores within transformational 
accountability with the interviews of those participants who responded most strongly, 
interviews were subject to inductive analysis to yield greater insight into the results. Findings 
are related back to the Patten Commission‟s (1999) proposals and other relevant research. 
The main emergent themes are then summarised and conclusions offered for incorporation 
into final chapters. 
Table 13.  Q statements (q=17) on „t‟  (transformational accountability) 
8.   Without effective external civilian oversight there can be no public confidence in policing 
9. It is helpful that the Policing Board is consulted but ultimately all decisions on policing 
are for the PSNI. 
11. It is useful that the Office of the Police Ombudsman can make suggestions for policy and 
practice reform but ultimately all decisions on policing are for the PSNI. 
12. Without accountability policing in any democratic society is bereft of legitimacy. 
13. Since the inception of the Policing Board and the Police Ombudsman, there has been 
effective collaboration in achieving accountability. 
14. As a result of external oversight, accountability is now ingrained within the culture of 
policing in the north of Ireland. 
15. The Policing Board has been very successful in engendering public confidence in 
policing. 
20. After 15 years of external oversight there is now irrefutable evidence that it has driven 
policing reform. 
23. The office of the Police Ombudsman has been very successful in engendering   public  
      confidence in policing. 
26. There is no evidence that external oversight has had any impact on policing reform or     
      improvements in the PSNI. 
28. Without external oversight it would not be possible to have accountable policing 
43. Monitoring human rights compliance is now an integral and vital component part of the      
      external civilian oversight bodies. 
46. The PSNI is the most accountable police service in the world 
47. Without the external oversight bodies it would be difficult if not impossible for policing    
      to have legitimacy. 
53. If it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsman and the Policing Board the human  
      rights agenda on policing would not be so far advanced. 
54. The external oversight bodies do not engender confidence among the officers and the  
      staff of the PSNI. 
55. When decisions on policing have to be made, the external oversight bodies should not  
      interfere with the police decision-making process. 
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7.3  Improvement 
 
Significantly, participants from all three agencies strongly agree with Q.28: “Without 
external oversight it would not be possible to have accountable policing” (PONI=7.266 / 
SD.=1.98; PSNI=7.708 / SD.=1.197; NIPB=7.434/ SD.=1.014). Both the Good Friday 
Agreement (1998) and the Patten Commission‟s report (1999) set the objective of securing, 
inter alia, accountable policing. Therefore, it is a positive indication of progress that elite 
actors within all three agencies responded strongly in agreement with Q.28.  As a measure of 
transformational accountability at the level of strategic change, this appears encouraging. 
“I think now that the office is 15 years old, there is a much more, it‟s kind of, the idea 
that you have to be accountable for your decisions, it‟s pervasive. It‟s there. Every 
new recruit understands it. It think there is, it is much more accepted as something 
that actually even should be there as opposed to something to be feared, which is 
perhaps where things were when the institutions were first being set up” (PONI 
interviewee, 2015). 
Along the same theme of improvement in policing, participants from all three agencies 
strongly disagreed with Q.26: “There is no evidence that external civilian oversight has had 
any impact on policing reform or improvements in the PSNI” (reverse scored) (PONI=7.4 / 
SD.=1.298; PSNI=7.75 / SD.=1.390; NIPB=7.565 / SD.=1.408). The strength of response to 
Q.26 was reflected in the comments of participants who were adamant that ECO has had a 
direct and positive impact upon policing reform or improvements in the PSNI : 
“I think (ECO) it‟s probably been at the core of policing reform and improvements. 
That‟s not to big us up. I think there‟s been a lot of people in the PSNI who have been 
at the core of policing reform and improvements. But I think we have helped push 
them in that direction as well. I think it took both: people in there who saw the future, 
who looked at the past and went, „We don‟t want to be there anymore‟” (PONI 
interviewee, 2016). 
This extract portrays external civilian oversight (ECO) as a catalyst or accelerant for policing 
reform which enabled those within the PSNI who wanted reform. Within the PSNI, that view 
is shared as reflected of the benefit for transformational accountability of ECO: 
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“Well there‟s plenty of evidence. You look at levels of complaints. You look at levels 
of police use of force. You look at levels of shootings. You look at levels of 
accountability. You know, none of that, if there hadn‟t been reform of policing, none 
of that would have been there. So I think there‟s a bundle of evidence that it‟s had a 
huge impact upon policing, external oversight, huge. And you look at the amount of 
recommendations. Thousands of recommendations from external oversight bodies, 
that we actually monitor on its own computer programme called „overview‟” (PSNI 
interviewee, 2016). 
It is notable from this comment that there is an association being made between 
accountability and the use of force of firearms by the police. The Patten Commission had 
recommended that the PSNI should be routinely unarmed (ICP, 1999). Even though the PSNI 
remains heavily armed, the use of firearms is extremely infrequent. The reference to the 
monitoring of recommendations through „overview‟ will be returned to later in this chapter. 
However, when asked to offer evidence to support the assertion that ECO had led to policing 
reform or improvements, many interviewees in this study struggled to cite specific examples.  
Instead, several interviewees referred to an association with confidence in policing. One 
interviewee described this in sequential or cyclical terms: 
“Where an external civilian oversight body is successful it feeds into improvements in 
policing and those are seen. When police are held to account and there‟s improvement 
in policing, the public confidence increases in policing” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
The question of confidence in policing is one which was mentioned briefly earlier in this 
thesis. It was noted that the measure of confidence in policing collected in public survey by 
DoJ is a composite measure of seven different measures about the three agencies at the centre 
of this study, PONI, PSNI & PONI. Most of the questions that are used to measure 
confidence in the police were developed many years ago (Campbell, 2017, January 19). It is 
not within the limits of this study to probe the association between public survey data on 
confidence in policing and the occurrence of improvement in policing or the police. 
Nonetheless, interviewees tended to refer to general indicators that policing oversight has had 
a positive effect on improvement in policing. Another such example was the reference to the 
fact that other societies visit Northern Ireland to learn about policing reform: 
“People are still coming from across the world to look at our reform process, flaws as 
well as the positive points. But look at the way we do things. And why we do them. 
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So again, whilst not captured possibly in terms of academic research up until now, I 
think there‟s unquestionably evidence that external oversight…oversight works. 
Accountability works. It definitely does. It can be a pain in the neck but it works” 
(PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
In some way, this extract exemplifies the broadly held belief, across all three agencies that 
policing reform including accountability and oversight has facilitated transformational 
change. Implicit in this is the recognition that the peace process in Northern Ireland, of which 
policing reform has been a key component, is held in positive regard internationally.  
Interestingly, there was greater variability among participants in relation to Q.20: “After 15 
years of external oversight there is now irrefutable evidence that it has driven policing 
reform” (PONI=7.133 / SD.=1.407; PSNI=5.458 / SD.=1.587; NIPB=6.826 / SD.=1.434). 
Whereas, participants with a background in the PONI and NIPB were strongly in agreement 
with Q.20, participants with a background in the PSNI were less committed to this claim. To 
some extent this mean score for agency affiliation disguised differences among the PSNI. 
“I don‟t believe that there is any evidence that external oversight has driven policing 
reform. I think we‟ve driven a lot of it. However, I do accept that without it we might 
not have been able to get so far. You know it‟s a bit of a strange thing. I don‟t think 
the evidence is there that you can point to and say the role of the Policing Board or the 
role of the Ombudsman was to build confidence in policing and to move it on, but yet 
you know instinctively that if it wasn‟t there, we wouldn‟t be where we‟re at” (PSNI 
interviewee, 2016). 
This perspective was shared by other participants in the PSNI who said: “it‟s unfair to accept 
that it wouldn‟t have happened anyway” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). In these remarks, there is 
a hint of resentment at the notion that external civilian oversight enjoys credit for the reform 
and improvement of policing. Other participants with a background in policing oversight 
insisted that reform would not have been possible without external civilian oversight: 
“I believe that the restructuring of the PSNI , the disappearance of special branch and 
we now have C3 for example, has a lot to do with police accountability over the last 
decade” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
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Interestingly, this interviewee had a background in PONI which has invested much time in 
investigations into aspects of policing undertaken by Special Branch (eg. PONI, 2016). These 
differences between participants will be further explored later (Chapter 8 & 9). 
It often proved difficult to obtain evidence of reform or improvements in documentary form 
to support the views of interviewees. An interviewee with a background in NIPB also 
highlighted trends in police use of force. In particular, the NIPB had put a focus on 
developing a strategy in conjunction with the PSNI to reduce the incidence of complaints by 
members of the public to the PONI about police aggression and incivility in 2012/2013. This 
„Control Strategy‟ was adopted by the PSNI and monitored by the NIPB over a period of two 
years. The „Control Strategy‟ was later cited in the 2015 annual report by the NIPB‟s Human 
Rights Adviser as an exemplar of good practice which could be replicated in other areas of 
oversight (NIPB, 2015). Unfortunately, the Control Strategy is protectively marked and 
therefore not publicly available for scrutiny. Yet, it is known from research fieldwork for this 
study that the Control Strategy entailed very little more than a tiered and co-ordinated 
approach to monitoring the conduct of local PSNI officers, with special attention to those 
districts where complaints of this type had rocketed. 
In PONI it was learned that the effect of external oversight evolved and often changed 
direction during an investigation. PONI investigations will look for three things: a) 
misconduct; b) criminality; c) improvements. Patterns within complaints may be clustered 
and recommendations for improvement unrelated to the original complaint may emerge. This 
reflects what was envisioned by the Patten Commission (ICP, 1999). PONI stream 
recommendations which emerge from investigations into several categories: a) Strategic; b) 
Operational; c) Minor Areas for Improvement. One participant highlighted improvements in 
police use of force, an issue in the past surrounded by controversy in Northern Ireland:  
“There‟s a multitude (of recommendations for reform). In fact, this year (2016) I think 
we put out almost 60 recommendations that have been accepted and implemented by 
the police service ranging from very minor changes to forms right up to how the 
police deal with high risk missing people. They (PSNI) recently accepted changes to 
training in firearms” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
This is illustrative of the interactive and interdependent dimensions of the ecological system 
of policing accountability. Issues or incidents arising require interaction between the agencies 
involved, as indicated in the preceding chapter on relational accountability (Chapter 6). From 
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this recommendations for policing reform and improvement sometimes emerge unexpectedly 
from complaints or investigations. This has the potential to be transformational (t) through 
improvements, but requires integrative action by the agencies. 
 
7.4  Iterative and integrative 
 
In the new architecture of accountability, a dynamic and collaborative to policing reform was 
envisaged between PONI, PSNI and NIPB (ICP, 1999, p.38). The need for an integrative 
approach to policing reform seems self-evident given the scale of change proposed. The 
Patten Commission made 175 recommendations and 38 of these related to accountability 
(ICP, 1999). However, as highlighted already in this chapter by several participants, there 
have been many other reforms and improvements recommended since the new policing 
dispensation commenced. One participant mentioned “Thousands of recommendations from 
external oversight bodies, that we actually monitor on its own computer programme called 
„overview‟” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
During fieldwork it was discovered that the policing oversight bodies and police service have 
developed computerised databases for inputting and collating policy recommendations. The 
PONI system is called „In-Site‟ whilst the PSNI system is called „Overview‟ whilst the NIPB 
have „Overview‟ access through an on-site computer which is linked to the PSNI‟s intranet 
system. PONI has access to the PSNI intranet service (policenet) through a stand-alone 
computer station in its own library. NIPB does not have on-site access to the PONI system.  
“It‟s not police-net. We have our own internal one… Our policy recommendations 
also go through the quality assurance group who will look at it and go „oh well, this 
one‟s already there, this one‟s been addressed.‟ But that in itself is interesting, 
because if we‟re saying „Listen you‟ve done this wrong but by the way we told you a 
year ago you were doing it wrong. You really need to do it right if you haven‟t 
addressed it. Or if the manner in which you have addressed that isn‟t effective, you 
need to look at it again‟. But yes, we do have a way of looking at our policy 
recommendations. But that‟s internal ” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
These computerised databases both came on-stream within the PSNI and PONI around the 
same time, in 2007/08. However, there is a complete separation between PONI‟s „In-site‟ and 
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PSNI‟s „Overview‟ meaning no facility for remotely cross-referencing between systems. In 
2014, senior officials from the PONI, PSNI and NIPB began between under an ad hoc „Policy 
Evaluation Group‟ (PEG) to exchange views about recommendations made for improvement 
in policy and practice. At first this PEG met every six months, but during the course of 
fieldwork it was stated that this had been reduced to once a year.  
During a research meeting with NIPB officials in May 2016, it was learned that up to that 
time NIPB had never accessed the PSNI „Overview‟ system for tracking policy changes and 
did not routinely revert to it to monitor implementation of recommendations from PONI 
amongst others. When this finding was cross-validated during a research meeting that same 
month with the PSNI it led to the Chief Constable highlighting the availability to the NIPB of 
the „Overview‟ system at the next public meeting of the Policing Board in June 2016. In 
addition, as highlighted in an earlier chapter in relation to reflexivity, queries raised during 
research about the existence of the two (separate) computerised systems of „Overview‟ and 
„In-Site‟ prompted exchanges between interviewees and /or officials within organisations. 
Yet these computer-based systems are not iterative and reflect a kind of separation between 
all three agencies. This is difficult to reconcile with the integrative, collaborative and 
dynamic approach the Patten Commission envisioned towards policing reform. Rather it 
seems that computerisation has led to a bureaucratisation of accountability: 
“You know they‟ve ended up with a matrix of recommendations from various bodies 
which they‟re desperately trying to implement and that‟s almost consuming their time 
in terms of organisational improvement and making things better. And that‟s almost 
become the raison d‟etre for organisational improvement and the way they go about it. 
…they are responding to external influences and there are so many of them, that 
squeezes their organisational capacity then” (NIPB interviewee, 2016). 
This participant with a background in NIPB offered this insight from outside the PSNI. This 
suggests that the PSNI are buffeted by a battery of recommendations from “external 
influences” and this is having an adverse or intended internal effect. It also implies that the 
systems being employed by the PSNI does not triage or prioritise recommendations according 
to the source from which they originate. During fieldwork, PSNI agreed to share screenshots 
of the interfaces used on „Overview‟ (PSNI, 2016, May 19). Within these is a drop-down bar 
which lists all agencies from which recommendations had been made (up to May 2016). 
There are more than forty agencies or individuals listed including PONI, NIPB, HMIC and 
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Patten. Also among those included is the former RUC Chief Constable Ronnie Flanagan, 
whose Fundamental Review preceded the Patten Commission. Some of the inclusions do not 
have any perceived role in external civilian oversight of policing. There are other notable 
omissions such as Committee for the Administration of Justice (CAJ) which has published 
reports and made suggestions for policing reform (PSNI, 2016, May 19). When queried 
during research meetings, it was suggested that the list had not been refreshed over the years. 
As recommendations were made by external agencies these were added to Overview.  
“what can happen is you‟ve got so many people clamouring to want to influence the 
way an organisation is setting itself that it doesn‟t give them the space to sit down and 
set their own strategic direction….it starts to really blur the boundaries and what 
we‟re trying to achieve and why we‟re trying to achieve it... I have seen a lot of 
instances of that where we have to be seen to do something to satisfy the oversight 
body but it‟s not necessarily the right thing for us to be doing because it causes 
disproportionate amount of effort; or resources to do it; or whatever” (PSNI 
interviewee, 2016). 
While this comment is not specific to the external civilian oversight bodies in study, this is an 
important perspective on the internal effect of external oversight on the PSNI. This is 
suggestive of the type of organisational dysfunction which Koppells (2005) has studied. 
Others scholars such as Bayley (1990) also caution about the adverse and unintended effects 
of external oversight. These findings will be further discussed in the conclusion (Chapter 10). 
The iterative quality of transformational accountability to positively affect policing reform 
was reflected in another example described. Recruitment and training of investigators within 
PONI includes how to use Valentines, a software package for legal research. When a trainee 
investigator came to encounter a PSNI inspector, the learning gained was shared: 
“a great experience recently where a trainee… challenged a chief inspector in an 
interview. The chief inspector said „well you‟re wrong in the law‟.  And the 
investigator went and looked up it up online (for legal research). My trainee went and 
looked it up, I….. showed him. He went back and told the chief inspector „This is how 
you should have looked it up‟ and he said „I‟m sorry. You‟re right‟. He said „we‟ll 
have to look into getting that resource that you (PONI) have‟. But it‟s arming people 
with the right tools” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
161 
 
Therefore, bureaucratisation of oversight and accountability need not necessarily lead to 
reform and learning. In fact, learning and improvements within organisations may be stifled 
and potentially compromised by intrusive oversight (Bovens & Schillemans, 2014, p.676). 
However, an iterative, integrative approach to collaboration seems to hold promise. Another 
unexpected but unrelated example of oversight having a potentially delirious effect is what 
PONI participants referred to as the „Police Ombudsman brush-off‟. This is a by-product of 
the provisions of the legislation constituting the Office of the Police Ombudsman. This 
requires that anything raised as a matter of concern about police conduct, no matter how 
minor, would be immediately signposted to the PONI. A perception has grown that the 
„Police Ombudsman brush-off‟ has come at a cost to internal regulation and skills in PSNI: 
“that has potentially impacted on their ability to deal with some quite straightforward issues 
sometimes quickly and neatly. Now, I think there is a change of mood within the PSNI in 
terms of moving towards dealing with some of those issues in a more timely, more effective 
way. But I think there has been a tendency around that” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
The change of mood is one which was expressed by interviewees with a PSNI background 
during this research. One police interviewee expressed the view that low level misconduct by 
a police officer should be resolved quickly by his immediate superior. It was argued that 
sergeants and inspectors are potentially are being de-skilled from overseeing the culture 
within a police team under their direct supervision because all transgressions no matter how 
minor must be referred onward to PONI. 
To return to the Patten Commission‟s concept of an integrative, iterative or collaborative 
approach to accountability between the three agencies, scant evidence of this was found 
during this study. In particular, there was little or no evidence from fieldwork of participants 
in the external civilian oversight bodies being involved in a collective endeavour:  
“quite honestly I know less about the Policing Board. The profile of the Policing 
Board isn‟t really…isn‟t perhaps what it should be in many respects. We hardly really 
see much of it in this Office” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
The reference to profile of NIPB was a comment on the fact that when NIPB appears in the 
media it has often been in the past as a result of disputes among members. PSNI participants 
also commented on this pattern and lamented the lack of coherence in NIPB. The absence of 
a complementary, integrative approach by external civilian oversight was conspicuous: 
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“It‟s non-existent. The left hand doesn‟t know what the right hand is doing. So I don‟t 
think they effectively collaborate with each other or indeed, even in their own offices. 
It‟s chaos most of the time and very politicised” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
 
7.5  Internalised 
 
Articulating the optimal conditions for development and change, Bronfenbrenner (1976, 
p.214) emphasised the need for “the growth of mutual trust, positive orientation and goal 
consensus” within the mesosystem among actors. This corresponds with the Patten 
Commission‟s vision of “a receptive organizational culture, one that is infused with a spirit of 
accountability” (Weizter, 1995 cited in ICP, 1999, p.7). Greiling (2014) has also argued that 
“A learning culture in the public sector requires a general readiness to encourage questioning 
and constructive criticism. This is only possible if there is a climate of trust” (2014, p.627)  
These findings have particular resonance for transformational accountability (t) which this 
study suggests includes learning dimension within triadic accountability. While this concept 
is exploratory, findings from participants provide some evidence about the extent to which 
conditions for internalising reform have been created and sustained in policing. In this regard, 
several Q statements which reveal insightful results from transformational accountability. 
Legitimacy 
The position of eminent policing scholars Markham & Punch (2007) is reflected in Q.12 that 
“Without accountability policing in any society is bereft of legitimacy” (PONI=7.333 / 
SD.=1.234; PSNI=7.875 / SD.=1.623; NIPB=7.521 / SD.= 1.441). The link made between 
accountability and legitimacy has been among the most important of ideas in research on 
policing oversight, as highlighted elsewhere in this study‟s review of literature.  
Highlighting historical deficiencies in Northern Ireland, some interviewees were quite 
explicit about the linkage between policing accountability and legitimacy. The formal process 
of questioning police conduct by PONI is in itself an exercise in legitimising policing : 
“Coming from this part of the world where the legitimacy of the police force or police 
service at that time was in doubt across some sections of the community and the 
accountability mechanisms at the time weren‟t believed to be effective… Certainly 
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accountability feeds into legitimacy because it calls police to account for their 
actions…A disputed police service certainly had no legitimacy. As that, I suppose the 
nature changes as you go down through the years and the legitimacy of that police 
service is no longer in doubt. They still need held, the police still need held 
accountable for its actions.” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
Although legitimacy as a construct is not the singular or central focus of this research, these 
findings provide an interesting lens through which to consider the relationship between 
accountability and legitimacy. In fact, this Q statement (12) goes further to place 
accountability and legitimacy in a context of a “democratic society”.  Related to this through 
this strand of transformational accountability is the statement : without the external civilian 
oversight bodies it would be difficult if not impossible for policing to have legitimacy (Q.47). 
Many participants in this study viewed legitimacy as episodic or event-driven. For one NIPB 
interviewee, policing operation at the junction of Twaddell Avenue / Ardoyne in Belfast 
came to legitimise policing, when the PSNI upheld a determination by the Parades 
Commission to halt an Orange march. For another NIPB interviewee, the murder of PSNI 
officer Stephen Carroll represented a defining moment for the legitimacy of policing since 
people of all backgrounds united to condemn the attack. 
“For every report we do where it gets a lot of public attention you‟re always going to 
annoy one side and please the other. …You know, the McGurks report I suppose was 
a big one . I was involved in that. But again, it ebbed and flowed. Because we had the 
report and then withdrew it and then reissued it. Then the police apologised, then they 
didn‟t apologise…. But it was a kind of a big one where I think they at least 
eventually agreed to look at it again and accepted our findings, eventually” (PONI 
interviewee, 2016). 
The idea that legitimacy of policing “ebbs and flows” is a theme which emerged strongly in 
this research. As this participant argues, there is some evidence that the exercise of 
accountability may have both positive and negative effects. The community and political 
divisions entrenched within the macrosystem in Northern Ireland serve to accentuate these 
effects. Apart from reports published by the Police Ombudsman, it was felt the events on the 
ground and the approach of the police may precipitate fluctuation in legitimacy:  
“The legitimacy of the police service increases in one section of the community at 
certain times of the year and decreases in others. When you have something like 
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Twaddell or something happening around Ardoyne, the legitimacy of how the police 
service have dealt with that, it certainly drops within that community but the overall 
legitimacy of the police service has, I feel, amongst the members of the public, has 
increased. Events definitely impinge on the legitimacy (of policing).” (PONI 
interviewee, 2016). 
The linkage between the police legitimacy and the democratic values and norms of society 
was recognised and articulated by participants in this study. For this reason, some argued that 
the exposure of police wrongdoing was required in order for it to be “addressed”.  
“The police service is one of the most significant public bodies. It almost holds the 
society that it‟s serving in the palm of its hands, really. In terms of how that society 
exists, and how it can develop in all sorts of ways, from economically to culturally. 
How people grow up, values and everything. For me, it‟s at the heart of it…. having 
the accountability framework in place has allowed those things like legitimacy to 
come to the fore… before they can be addressed” (NIPB interviewee, 2016)  
For some NIPB interviewees, the link between accountability and legitimacy of policing was 
part of the Patten vision for policing reform but there is still more work to be done:  
“That‟s probably the backbone of what Patten was trying to bring about…But the 
cops just haven‟t bought into that…They shouldn‟t have any politics around them.  
And accountability means that if they take decisions they have to defend them and 
explain them. If they make mistakes, they have to explain them and take full 
responsibility… you know it‟s an incredible principle, but that‟s not what we‟ve got.” 
(NIPB interviewee, 2016). 
There were also very mixed views about legitimacy among PSNI participants in this study. 
While there was support for Q.12 and Q.47 which both relate to the association between 
accountability and legitimacy, there was also some concern expressed about the effect of one 
on the other. The publication of PONI‟s report on the Loughinisland massacre (PONI, 2016) 
during the course of this study prompted one PSNI interviewee to describe it as “an attack on 
the legitimacy” of the police. Another said accountability conflicted with legitimacy: 
“Invariably, there‟s a tension between these two concepts. Because whenever you‟re 
being held to account for stuff that you get wrong it challenges then your external 
legitimacy because this narrative is here. But also because of the internal sense of 
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being treated fairly within the organisation. So actually, whenever this has happened, 
say for example Loughinisland… I‟m not sure it gets translated or viewed through a 
lens that‟s overly positive, either externally or internally” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
Given the salience of the views and attitudes of members of a police service in the legitimacy 
of policing (eg. Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012) these are potentially important findings. These 
views and their implications for accountability and external civilian oversight will be 
examined in greater depth in the chapters which following (8 & 9).  
Human Rights & Confidence 
Strong agreement was expressed by participants from all three agencies for Q.43: 
“Monitoring human rights compliance is now an integral and vital component part of the 
external civilian oversight bodies” (PONI=6.466 / SD.=1.302; PSNI=7.041 / SD.=1.334; 
NIPB=7.434; SD.=1.056). Participant with a background in PONI were slightly less 
resounding in their agreement for this than their counterparts in PSNI or NIPB. This may be 
because PONI have less recourse to the Human Rights Act 1998 in handling complaints or 
carrying out investigations. PONI investigations are limited to breaches of the PSNI Code of 
Ethics or where appropriate criminal law. Even participants from other agencies noted that 
NIPB‟s Human Rights expertise has had a transformational effect on policing and the PSNI:  
“This is more in particular in regard to the work that the Policing Board (Human 
Rights advisers) did...the police now are magnificent about talking human rights. 
Sometimes they don‟t always understand nor get it but a good thing is they think 
about it. and they have the concept, ingrained in them, from the start of training right 
through to everything they do…I don‟t know many other police forces in the world 
that have a core grasp of human rights the way that the PSNI does now” (PONI 
interviewee, 2016). 
In 2003 NIPB first appointed Keir Starmer as Human Rights adviser before later becoming 
head of the Crown Prosecution Service. He was later joined by Jane Gordon. When both of 
them left, they were replaced by Alyson Kilpatrick, BL. The importance of this expertise in 
influencing the human rights agenda with policing was favoured by most participants:  
“The monitoring human rights compliance, I think that‟s absolutely basic to, you 
know, what the role of the Board. In terms of human rights, the way the police 
166 
 
interact with the public, also the human rights of the PSNI themselves” (NIPB 
interviewee, 2016). 
The impact of the expertise of the NIPB‟s independent advisor on Human Rights was not 
universally welcomed. One NIPB participant said the HR rights adviser “boldly went where 
no one wanted them to go”. On attending a PSNI station during the term of a previous Chief 
Constable she “was refused entry. That forced the pace of change” (NIPB interviewee, 2016). 
As with legitimacy, there were some mixed feelings among PSNI participants about Q.53: “If 
it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsman and the Policing Board the human rights 
agenda on policing would not be so far advanced”. For instance, several PSNI participants 
argued that the police embraced human rights of their own accord. One PSNI participant 
dismissed the suggestion that police “had to be led by the nose” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
Again, these differences in perspective will be explored later (Chapter 8 & 9). 
Counterpoised with the positive influence of the human rights adviser for NIPB, was Q.15: 
“The Policing Board has been very successful in engendering public confidence in policing” 
(PONI=4.8 / SD.=0.414; PSNI=3.458 / SD.=1.641; NIPB=5 / SD.=1.477).  As these results 
indicate, PONI participants mildy disagreed with Q.15 while NIPB participants were neutral. 
However, it was among PSNI participants that there was most dissatisfaction with NIPB. 
An example of this may be the College Review. Information brought to its attention by the 
PSNI Chief Constable lead to a question of confidence in him by the NIPB. However, as the 
issue was further explored by the NIPB wider problems within the PSNI training college 
began to emerge. These concerned training and culture, both of which were central elements 
of the reform programme heralded by the Patten Report. Moreover, it was NIPB‟s duty in law 
to monitor composition and ethos of the workforce, oversee recruitment into the PSNI and 
ensure training was human-rights compliant. Problems highlighted in previous reports by the 
independent Human Rights advisor to the NIPB appear to have been ignored or overlooked. 
The result was that when “Garnerville-gate” came to a head (August 2016) wider College 
Review commissioned by the PSNI revealed an embarrassing cultural malaise. While the 
PSNI had responsibility for this, so too did the NIPB. The outworking of this had other 
effects as NIPB made this “adopted this as a totemic issue” (PSNI): 
“It was back into this binary position of conflict, the simplification of the issue which 
can then be used as a point of conflict between the Chief and the Board.. Instead of 
creating a forum it became much more of a cauldron around taking this to the brink 
167 
 
around confidence, around trust, around all of those matters.. I think it was an 
example of accountability transforming an issue, which undoubtedly needed 
addressed, into a crisis in which people are force to take sides” (PSNI interviewee, 
2017). 
 
7.6  Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to summarise exploratory research into the putative 
dimension of transformational accountability. As these findings make clear, transformational 
accountability interacts with and is interdependent upon the two other strands of triadic 
accountability. This is consistent with the ecological system of policing accountability which 
this study proposes. Yet, there is a distinctive aspect to transformational accountability which 
is of particular interest in this study. For it is argued that learning and change is a potential 
benefit of accountability but that the evidence to support this claim is undiscovered. Some 
answers to the question about whether accountability and external civilian oversight are 
found in this chapter. 
Firstly, participants in this study believe that external civilian oversight has led to 
improvement in policing. The findings suggest that improvement is most pronounced in the 
extent to which policing is accountable. Evidence that accountability led to improvement in 
policing was less clear. Although this was a conviction held by many participants, it was 
difficult to find specific examples which could be explored to understand how ECO bodies 
had facilitated or directed improvement in policing. Secondly, the vision espoused by the 
Patten Commission of an integrative, collaborative approach to accountability and policing 
reform does not appear to match with the findings from this study. In fact, while there is 
evidence of much activity, there were also questions about how productive this has been. This 
was most clearly epitomised by the two stand-alone computer-based systems operated by the 
PSNI and PONI. Although these systems relate to the same process of recommendations and 
reform or policy and practice in policing, they are not separate and not iterative. Thirdly, the 
argument that change and learning is most effective and sustainable when it has been 
internalised within an organisation is one which this study supports. That is why this study 
explores transformational accountability at the level of the microsystem and mesosystem 
within the ecological system. As previously cited, “a learning culture in the public sector 
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requires a general readiness to encourage questioning and constructive criticism. This is only 
possible if there is a climate of trust” (Greiling, 2014, p.627). The findings in this study offer 
a mixed picture in this regard. While there was support for the salience of accountability in 
relation to legitimacy, confidence and human rights, there were also problematic dynamics 
which came to the fore. These co-existing , co-varying and sometimes contradictory 
dynamics are consistent with the ecological systems framework proposed in this study. 




Chapter 8:  Perspectives of elite actors on accountability. 
  
8.1  Introduction. 
 
In preceding chapters, postulated dimensions of situational (s), relational (r) and 
transformational (t) accountability were explored according to participants‟ viewpoints 
grouped according to agency affiliation. For that purpose, an assumption has been made until 
now that participants‟ responses by agency affiliation would yield an understanding of the 
operability and efficacy of policing accountability. Results tend to suggest a pattern of 
difference between participants‟ responses based on agency affiliation. This chapter puts that 
assumption to the test through statistical analysis of responses by participants to the Q sort of 
statements to explore patterns of variance within this sample.  
 
As outlined earlier, the ontological position of this research is that the subjective responses of 
participants constitute an invaluable source of data, without a priori assignment or 
appointment to a presumed group. Whether or not any (statistically) significant patterns exist 
between the responses of individual participants may constitute an important factor within the 
ecological system of policing accountability. In turn, this may influence the efficacy of 
external civilian oversight. To that end, this chapter explores subjective responses of 
participants at the level of the individual. From an ecological systems perspective, this is at 
the level of a micro-system. Using PQ method (v.2.35) statistical software to investigate 
preferences at this level of analysis, this chapter will test two hypotheses :  
 
H1 – that there is more than one distinct perspective on external civilian oversight of policing 
in Northern Ireland; and  
H2 – that agency affiliation (NIPB; PONI; PSNI) of individual participants in this study is 
closely associated with the perspective participants hold. 
 
Results are presented with support for both hypotheses and presents analysis of two different 





8.2  Factor analysis 
 
To investigate participants‟ responses at this microsystem level PQ software (v.2.35) written 
for Q method (Schmolk, 2014) was employed. The procedure for data input and statistical 
analysis followed protocols outlined (Van Exel & de Graaf, 2005; Webler et al, 2009; 
Schmolk, 2015). The PQ method facilitated exploratory factor analysis of participants‟ 
responses at this microsystem level. The final outcome of this statistical analysis is a two-
factor solution with 61 out of 62 participants loading on one of these two factors. In this 
study, 43 participants loaded on Factor 1 (F1) while 18 participants loaded on Factor 2 (F2). 
Each of these factors are investigated in detail and the responses of one participant who did 
not load on either factor will also be explored. Those Q statements which form common 
ground between F1 and F2 are highlighted and levels of significance indicated. Equally, there 
are Q statements which distinguish or differentiate F1 from F2 and these will also be 
explored in detail. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion about the implications of 
the findings for the operability and efficacy of external civilian oversight. 
The distinct advantage of Q method derives from the rigour with which it enables comparison 
of the subjective preferences expressed by individual participants in response to the 
concourse of statements selected. As O‟Connor (2013) has underlined, analysis of the Q sort 
of responses by individual participants is effectively an inverted factor analysis (2013, 
p.1078). A shared perspective between participants is inferred from comparative analysis of 
the preferences each has expressed in response to Q statements. In this inverted factor 
analysis, it is individual participants who constitute the variables. Having already completed 
each sample during individual interviews noting the position of Q statements and recording 
reasons given by the participant for their preferences, the numerical data was coded for input 
to the PQ software.  
As previously outlined, there was a 9-point scale of response from Very Strongly Agree (Q 
sort value = +4) to Neutral (Q sort value =) to Very Strongly Disagree (Q sort value = -4). 
Having conducted numerical coding manually, the data was then input to the PQ software  in 
accordance with the protocol outlined (Schmolk, 2014; van Exel & de Graf, 2005; Weber, 
Danielson & Tuler, 2009)  and in line other Q method studies (O‟Connor, 2013;  Kraak et. 
al., 2014; Ratcliffe et. al., 2014; McKevitt & Davies, 2015). 
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The software automatically truncates each statement to 60 characters, as seen in the full 
statistical output from which these findings are derived (Appendix 12). Therefore, each of the 
59 Q statements was input and cross-checked manually with the laminate cards used in the Q 
sort. To help make results in this chapter easier to interpret, key findings have been 
reformatted to incorporate the original complete Q statements. Preferences expressed through 
the Q sort for all of the 62 participants were manually validated before numerical coding was 
input into the PQ software. After numerical data was input manually for all participants, PQ 
method standardises the distribution across the statements by weighting the average of each 
participant‟s score (P=62) for each of the Q statements (Q=59) in this sample. The resulting 
correlation matrix produced a normalised factor score or Z –score enabling comparison of 
responses on statements. Continuing to follow the procedure for Q method, seven centroid 
factors were extracted and rotated generating a seven factor solution which was then subject 
to manual analysis. In subsequent iterations, 6, 5, 4, 3 and 2 factors were manually selected 
and subject to varimax rotation to generate factor solutions. In each case, exploratory factor 
analysis was undertaken by selecting factor rotation and statistical output generated was then 
subject to analysis.  None of these factor solution explained more than 67% of the variance 
within the sample (7 factor solution. See Appendix 12). Most Q method studies will generate 
a solution of between 2 and 5 factors (Webler et al, 2009).  In the current study, the final 
rotation of a 2 factor solution explained 50% of the variance in this sample with 61 out of 62 
participants defining loadings on one of the two factors. As other have previously underlined 
(eg: Webler et al., 2009), factor analysis in Q research is not mathematical reductionism 
which serves up the explanation to the researcher: 
“Social perspectives are coherent patterns of opinion about a topic.  They rarely match any 
individual‟s view completely.  But some individuals‟ views will be closer to the social 
perspective than others‟.  People whose individual views most closely match a social 
perspective are said to “define the perspective.” (Webler et.al, 2009, p.11-12). 
Guided by the statistical output, the theoretical and conceptual framework outlined, literature 
reviewed and the researcher‟s own judgement or intuition, it is concluded that the two factor 
solution may distinguish two social perspectives within this sample. The next section will 
provide an overview of the two factor solution and more detail about what these distinct 




8.3  Two factor solution 
 
Emerging from this analysis is two factor solution suggesting distinct and different 
viewpoints within this sample (consistent with H1). The result also reveals a pattern of 
association between agency affiliation and factor loading (consistent with H1). Participants 
with a background in either the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland or the 
Northern Ireland Policing Board tended to load on Factor 1. On the other hand, participants 
with a background in the PSNI tended to load on Factor 2 (see Table 14).  
Indeed, several participants load onto a different factor than those with whom they share 
agency affiliation (see Table 14). There is evidence of this in 8 participants with a 
background in the PSNI (18; 19; 20; 21; 25; 30; 32; 30) loading on Factor 1. There is also 
some evidence of a cross-over in perspective from those with a background in external 
civilian oversight to loading on Factor 2. This was much more limited with two participants 
with a background in the Northern Ireland Policing Board (47 & 52) loaded on Factor 2. 
Furthermore, both of these participants had factor loadings which were quite evenly spread 
across  both  Factors 1 & 2.  
Within the current sample two-thirds of those with a background in the PSNI (16 
participants) loaded more highly on Factor 2, and the extent to which this perspective was 
shared by those with a background in either the NIPB or PONI was very limited. Factor 1 is 
postulated to represent a social perspective shared by the majority of those within this 
sample. These findings have important implications for the current research.  
In a complex system like policing accountability, improvement and learning is most likely 
when individual actors share common beliefs, values and attitudes. Therefore, the dominance 
of a perspective (Factor 1) shared by most participants in this sample is likely to be conducive 
to policing reform and improvement. However, if agency affiliation is a marker of contrasting 
perspectives on external civilian oversight of policing in Northern Ireland, these differences 
may stymie change.  
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Table 14. Factor matrix for 2 factor solution (with agency affiliation. X=defining sort). 
Q sort Factor 1 Factor 2 Agency affiliation / F1 or F2 
1 0.6305 X 0.1931 PONI – F1 
2 0.6274 X 0.1593 PONI – F1 
3 0.5556 X 0.2191 PONI – F1 
4 0.1463 0.2380 PONI – neither 
5 0.6642 X 0.1766 PONI – F1 
6 0.7701 X 0.2831 PONI – F1 
7 0.7422 X 0.1227 PONI – F1 
8 0.6809 X 0.2984 PONI – F1 
9 0.5940 X 0.3472 PONI – F1 
10 0.6146 X 0.3769 PONI – F1 
11 0.6348 X 0.3216 PONI – F1 
12 0.7334 X 0.2112 PONI – F1 
13 0.6060 X 0.4861 PONI – F1 
14 0.5391 X 0.2857 PONI –F1 
15 0.6676 X 0.2560 PONI – F1 
16 -0.1037 0.7848 X PSNI – F2 
17 -0.0354 0.6728 X PSNI – F2 
18 0.6030 X 0.5591 PSNI – F1 
19 0.4860 X 0.3049 PSNI –F1 
20 0.6828 X 0.2923 PSNI –F1 
21 0.4809 X 0.3660 PSNI – F1 
22 0.4123 0.4743 X PSNI – F2 
23 0.2045 0.6385 X PSNI – F2 
24 0.3936 0.6456 X PSNI – F2 
25 0.6865 X 0.4542 PSNI – F1 
26 0.2772 0.5477 X PSNI – F2 
27 0.5255 0.6133 X PSNI –F2 
28 0.2540 0.6633 X PSNI –F2 
29 0.4810 0.5232 X PSNI –F2 
30 0.6518 X 0.1180 PSNI – F1 
 
Agency affiliation: PONI=Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland; PSNI=Police Service of Northern 
Ireland; NIPB=Northern Ireland Policing Board 
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Table 14. (continued) 
Q sort Factor 1 Factor 2 Agency affiliation / F1 or F2 
31 -0.0908 0.6775 X PSNI – F1 
32 0.5633 X 0.5167 PSNI –F1 
33 0.7240 X 0.3054 PSNI – F1 
34 0.1158 0.5503 X PSNI –F2 
35 0.4554 0.6098 X PSNI – F2 
36 0.3684 0.6744 X PSNI – F2 
37 0.1165 0.6835 X PSNI – F2 
38 0.3842 0.4115 X PSNI – F2 
39 0.4909 0.5644 X PSNI – F2 
40 0.6635 X 0.2677 NIPB – F1 
41 0.7844 X 0.2318 NIPB – F1 
42 0.7216 X 0.2943 NIPB – F1 
43 0.6859 X 0.1606 NIPB – F1 
44 0.8075 X 0.0970 NIPB – F1 
45 0.6469 X 0.1482 NIPB – F1 
46 0.6605 X 0.3717 NIPB – F1 
47 0.4219 0.5285 X NIPB – F2 
48 0.4577 X 0.4217 NIPB – F1 
49 0.6195 X -0.1019 NIPB – F1 
50 0.6659 X 0.2692 NIPB – F1 
51 0.8098 X 0.2198 NIPB – F1 
52 0.3877 0.3916 X NIPB – F2 
53 0.7240 X 0.3763 NIPB – F1 
54 0.4647 X 0.3358 NIPB – F1 
55 0.6387 X 0.3767 NIPB – F1 
56 0.6340 X 0.2224 NIPB – F1 
57 0.5320 X 0.3903 NIPB – F1 
58 0.7387 X -0.0592 NIPB – F1 
59 0.5079 X 0.2699 NIPB – F1 
60 0.6945 X 0.2872 NIPB – F1 
61 0.7546 X 0.2759 NIPB – F1 




From an ecological systems perspective, shared beliefs, values and attitudes are a 
precondition for effective learning and reform (Bronfenbrenner, 1992). At the same time, the 
findings from this factor analysis of Q sort responses reveals evidence of a cleavage in 
perspectives between those in the police and those involved in policing oversight. This 
further builds on patterns evident in the preceding chapters on situational, relation and 
transformational accountability. Arguably, the Q sort factor analysis undertaken and 
summarised in this chapter provides robustness and levels of statistical significance which 
also present a challenge. If shared beliefs, values and attitudes on the operability and efficacy 
of external civilian oversight are theorised to be a precondition for learning and consequent 
reform, then evidence of competing or polarised perspectives between the police and those in 
policing oversight ought to be a cause for concern. To the extent that Factor 1 and Factor 2 
represent social perspectives which are inimical to one another, such beliefs, values and 
attitudes may in themselves hinder learning. Moreover, if perspectives on the operability and 
efficacy of external civilian oversight are diametrically opposed to one another, arguably 
further reform and improvement in policing is in jeopardy. 
To explore these issues further, greater understanding is required of the defining, 
distinguishing and common features of the social perspectives represented by Factor 1 and 
Factor 2. Since these factors are thought to be viewpoints within this sample, Factor 1 is 
renamed as Perspective A (F1) and Factor 2 is renamed as Perspective B (F2) for the rest of 
this chapter. The features of these distinct perspectives will be considered next and related to 
the dimensions of accountability which have been conceptualised as situational (s), relational 
(r) and transformational (t). 
 
8.4  Perspective A (Factor 1) 
 
Comprising of 43 participants, Perspective A (F1) accounts for 33% of variance in the sample 
as a whole (Table 14 & Appendix 12). Drawing upon the analytical techniques employed in 
other Q studies (eg: Kraak et. al., 2014; McKevitt & Davies, 2015; Carlin, 2017) this section 
explores the variables (P) and statements (Q) which may define Perspective A.  To aid 
interpretation of these results, a positive z-score represents agreement while disagreement 
with a statement is reflected by a negative z-score. Although, the PQ method software 
automatically truncates the statement, additional detail is included in Table 8.2 to highlight 
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which conceptualised dimension of accountability (s; r; t) each statement is assumed to 
correspond with. These findings help to reveal differences and consensus between 
perspectives within this study. Areas of consensus will be explored at the end of this chapter.  
 
Characterising statements for Perspective A. 
There is no stipulation in Q method about how many distinguishing statements should be  
selected for further discussion to help define a shared social perspective. In their study of  
accountability in food policy,  Kraak et al. (2014) chose 16 from 48 statements in their Q set. 
Usually, the main determinant of statement choice should be the strength of agreement or  
disagreement expressed for the statement as expressed by those participants who have  
defining loadings on it. Those statements are identified from the z-scores (Schmolk, 2015)  
and are viewed as „characterising statements‟ for that perspective (Carlin, 2017). In similar  
proportion to the sample of statements from the Q sort employed by Kraak et al. (2014) for  
examining the ten statements with which those holding Perspective A most strongly agree  
and most strongly disagree were reviewed. The ten statements with which participants in  
Perspective A most strongly agreed are listed below, in rank order of highest score first: 
47. Without the external oversight bodies it would be difficult if not impossible for 
policing to have legitimacy (transformational +) 
 
12. Without accountability policing in any democratic society is bereft of legitimacy 
(transformational +). 
 
53. If it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsman and the Policing Board the 
human rights agenda in policing would not be so far advanced (transformational +) 
 
28. Without external oversight it would not be possible to have accountable policing 
(transformational + ) 
 
33. A new beginning to policing accountability has been the key to a new beginning 
to policing (transformational +) 
 
6. The most effective model of policing oversight is one which is under civilian 
control (situational +) 
 
43. Monitoring human rights compliance is now an integral and vital component part 




8. Without effective civilian oversight there can be no public confidence in policing 
(transformational +) 
 
20. After 15 years of external oversight there is now irrefutable evidence that it has 
driven policing reform (transformational +) 
 
16. There are still some areas where the external oversight bodies struggle to gain full 
co-operation from police officers and staff (relational -) 
 
Within these statements is a noticeable pattern, with Perspective A strongly agreeing with the 
transformational value of external civilian oversight. Furthermore, most of these 
characterising statements have a positive interpretation. Only one statement (16) has a 
negative implication, this for the dimension of relational accountability.   
Below, ten statements with which Perspective A most strongly disagreed are listed in rank 
order starting with highest disagreement  first : 
52. There was nothing wrong with the arrangements for policing accountability which 
we had in the past before the Patten report (situational +) 
26. There is no evidence that external oversight has had any impact on policing 
reform or improvements in the PSNI (transformational + ) 
25. A separate Policing Board and Office of the Police Ombudsman may have been 
justified at the start of the policing reform process but now resource constraints mean 
2 separate oversight bodies is a luxury. (situational +) 
2. The PSNI has always dealt speedily and fairly with all requests for disclosure of 
information from the external oversight bodies (relational - ) 
4. There is no need for the Policing Board to have scrutiny over or accountability for 
matters in the sphere of national security or covert policing. (situational - ) 
57. The PSNI has always demonstrated complete transparency to the external 
oversight bodies (relational - ) 
21. More of what is presently done by external oversight could be transferred to 
internal police accountability mechanisms. (situational +) 
36. External civilian oversight bodies should limit their remit to those issues of 
concern presented by members of the public (situational +) 
42. External oversight bodies should have scrutiny over only those aspects of policing 
which concern everyday crime and community safety. (situational +) 
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35. The institutions for policing oversight which have evolved are like a monster 
which has to be fed. (relational +) 
Seven of the ten characterising statements with which Perspective A most strongly disagrees, 
are positive for the dimensions of accountability to which they have been assigned. Most of 
these statements pertain to situational accountability where 6 of the 7 statements are positive. 
One statement relating to situational accountability (4) and two statements construed as 
relational accountability (2 & 57) have negative results. 
 
Summary of Perspective A  
Perspective A places very high positive value on the legitimising effect of policing oversight 
and a strong emphasis on the influence of oversight on human rights-based policing and 
public confidence. At the same time, full co-operation from police officers and staff with 
external civilian oversight is still viewed as a struggle. Trouble gaining disclosure of 
information and transparency by the PSNI to the policing oversight bodies are areas of 
concern. Taken together, the dynamic interaction between police and policing oversight are 
conflicted and this has negative connotations for relational accountability. This perspective 
sees policing oversight as being proactive and expansive, inclusive of issues beyond 
individual complaints or issues of civic policing. That includes areas of national security and 
covert policing, which are presently the preserve of separate overseers appointed by the 
British government under reserved or excepted policing powers. Policing oversight under 
„civilian control‟ is paramount and this oversight has been central to the reform of policing. 
This is a significant dynamic in policing reform with accountability pivotal to delivering the 
new beginning to policing. Indeed, it is a feature of the new policing dispensation not 
provided in the past. 
Those holding Perspective A might be described as: promoters; enablers; constructors; 






8.5  Perspective B (Factor 2) 
 
Comprising of 18 participants, Perspective B (F2) accounts for 17% of the variance in this 
sample. For ease of interpretation, this overview of Perspective B follows the same pattern as 
the preceding analysis. The statements (Q) and variables (P) which help to define Perspective 
B are summarised before this chapter goes onto compare both perspectives. 
Loadings on all 59 statements are reported (Appendix 12) and from the related statistical 
output statements and variables which best define Perspective B are derived. Once more, a 
positive z-score represents agreement while disagreement with a statement is reflected by a 
negative z-score. Where an item assumes importance in this analysis of results, the complete 
Q statement is presented in the following sections. 
Characterising statements for Perspective B 
As explained in the previous section, the characterising statements for Perspective B are 
taken to be those with the highest positive and negative z-score. To maintain symmetry with 
the preceding analysis, the ten Q statements with which Perspective B most strongly agree or 
most strongly disagree were reviewed to learn more about the characterising statements of 
Perspective B. Firstly, Q statements are ranked in order of strongest agreement: 
12. Without accountability policing in any democratic society is bereft of legitimacy 
(transformational +) 
33. A new beginning to policing accountability has been the key to a new beginning 
to policing. (transformational +) 
28. Without external oversight it would not be possible to have accountable policing. 
(transformational +) 
8. Without effective external civilian oversight there can be no public confidence in 
policing. (transformational +) 
27. Party politics has too great an influence on the Northern Ireland Policing Board. 
(relational -) 
47. Without the external oversight bodies it would be difficult if not impossible for 
policing to have legitimacy. (transformational +) 
43. Monitoring human rights compliance is now an integral and vital component part 
of the external civilian oversight bodies. (transformational +) 
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50. It is unfair of external oversight bodies to judge past policing practices and 
procedures by current policing practices and procedures. (relational -) 
10. PSNI is justified in its concern that information disclosed to the external civilian 
oversight bodies may not be treated with the necessary sensitivity / confidentiality 
(situational -). 
14. As a result of external oversight, accountability is now ingrained within the 
culture of policing in the north of Ireland. (transformational +) 
 
These findings show strong agreement in Perspective B for the transformational value of 
policing accountability and oversight. Seven of the ten statements have a positive connotation 
for transformational accountability. Of the three remaining characterising statements in this 
sub-section, two of these (Q27 & Q50) have negative implications for relational 
accountability and the other (Q10) appears to reflect a deficit in the situational dimension of 
accountability to which it is assigned.  
On the other hand, six out of the ten statements (below) with which Perspective B most 
strongly disagreed had a negative implication for the dimension of accountability to which 
they were construed. Three of these characterising statements had negative connotations for 
situational accountability (Q17; Q7; Q13). The three remaining statements in this sub-section 
had adverse implications for relational accountability (Q2 & Q57) and transformational 
accountability (Q15). 
52.  There was nothing wrong with the arrangements for policing accountability 
which we had in the past before the 1999 Patten report. (situational +) 
26. There is no evidence that external oversight has had any impact on policing 
reform or improvements in the PSNI. (transformational +) 
36. External civilian oversight bodies should limit their remit to those issues of 
concern presented by members of the public. (situational +) 
17. All those aspects of policing which in the past gave cause for concern are now 
subject to effective accountability through the Police Ombudsman and / or the 
Policing Board. (situational -) 
15. The Policing Board has been very successful in engendering public confidence in 
policing. (transformational -) 
7. The Police Ombudsman‟s access to all aspects of policing, including national 
security & covert policing is completely unfettered. (situational -) 
181 
 
30. The Northern Ireland Policing Board‟s powers and responsibilities need to be 
increased to make it effective. (situational +) 
2. The PSNI has dealt fairly and speedily with all requests for disclosure of 
information from the external oversight bodies.(relational -) 
13. Since the inception of the Policing Board and the Police Ombudsman, there has 
been effective collaboration between both in achieving accountability. (situational -) 
57. The PSNI has always demonstrated complete transparency to the external 
oversight bodies. (relational -) 
 
Summary of Perspective B.  
Perspective B finds fault with accountability arrangements before the Patten Report and 
views accountability as key to a new beginning. This accountability has been ingrained in 
policing and gives legitimacy while external civilian oversight has also aided legitimacy, 
confidence and human rights. Overall, this perspective holds that external civilian oversight 
should not be limited to only those issues raised by members of the public and that there is 
evidence of this oversight aiding reform.  
The NIPB has enough powers to discharge its duties but according to Perspective B it has not 
been effective at engendering public confidence and has been too affected by party politics. 
Several statements shared by Perspective B reveal a problem with disclosure to the external 
civilian oversight bodies by the PSNI. From this perspective, the PSNI is justified in its 
concerns about information disclosure and the PONI does not have unfettered access to 
information relating to National Security and covert policing. The NIPB and PONI are not 
viewed as collaborating effectively although all areas of policing in the past which gave cause 
for concern are not yet under their oversight. At the same time, Perspective B believes 
accountability for past policing by present standards is unfair. 
One of the issues which appears especially salient in Perspective B is control of information 
and its disclosure. There are two characterising statements which reflect this theme (7 & 10).  
One of the defining variables for Perspective B explained these Q sort preferences. 
Commenting on why PONI do not have unfettered access to information on all aspects of 
policing, including National Security and covert policing, this interviewee said:   
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“Not all of it is unfettered but I can understand why. Which relates very closely to 
number 10 in that PSNI is justified in its concern that information disclosed to 
external civilian oversight bodies may not be treated with the necessary sensitivity 
and confidentiality. We don‟t vet the staff who are working within external oversight 
bodies. So we don‟t really necessarily have, once it leaves our organisation, we don‟t 
have control over it and there‟s an element of trust that it will be dealt with. There 
would have been things that would have caused, some stories that have got out that 
maybe would have damaged that trust about the confidentiality of the information 
that‟s provided.” – Perspective B (PSNI) 
 
8.6  Comparing Perspectives: Consensus Statements 
 
Both Perspective A & B strongly believe that policing accountability before Patten Report 
was seriously faulted (4). The new beginning to policing envisaged by Patten which placed 
civilian oversight at the centre of the new accountability arrangements have impacted upon 
reform and improvement in policing (26). Further change under devolution of policing and 
justice has enhanced the reform process (5). ECO needs to go beyond everyday crime and 
community safety (42) and be more than reactive to issues of concern to the public (36). Both 
perspectives strongly agree that human rights monitoring is an essential part of external 
civilian oversight (43). As a result of oversight, a culture of accountability is now strongly 
ingrained in policing in Northern Ireland (14) and to a lesser degree both perspectives view 
the PSNI as the most accountable police service in the world (46). Neither perspective views 
use of external civilian oversight as an attempt to deliberately damage policing (3) and were 
equally non-committal, or perhaps ambivalent about the role of external civilian oversight 
bodies amidst the police decision-making process (55). However, where both perspectives 
converged on areas of concern, these related to matters of transparency (57), disclosure of 
information (2) and the independence of external civilian oversight bodies (48). Police are 
seen by both perspectives to be undercutting or underperforming relational accountability in 
these key areas. While the reasons for holding these perspectives no doubt vary between 
individuals, this is an especially challenging finding for the effectiveness of external civilian 
oversight. Moreover, this appears to reflect the „embodied contradictions‟ within policing 
which Chan (1997) has previously underlined where police action or attitudes would hinder 









Differences between Perspectives A & B. 
The descending array of factor scores  (z-scores) for each statement help to clarify those 
issues within the Q sort on which Perspectives A & B most clearly diverge. Like consensus 
statements, this statistical procedure is performed automatically as part of the output from PQ 
method after completing exploratory factor analysis. However, the descending array of factor 
scores had to be generated manually from the output and the full table is in appendices 
(Appendix 13). From this the 10 Q statements on which difference is most pronounced at 
either end of the scale are summarised (Tables 16 & 17). 
Table 16. Differences ( >0 ) in factor scores between Perspective A (F1) & B (F2) 
Item  Statement A (F1)  B (F2) Diff. 
53 If it was not for the work of the Police 
Ombudsman and the Policing Board the human 
rights agenda would not be so far advanced.   
1.717     -0.470        2.187 
30 The NIPB‟s powers and responsibilities need to 
be increased to make it effective   
0.244     -1.408        1.652 
15 The Policing Board has been very successful in 
engendering public confidence in policing.   
0.002 -1.467 1.469 
20 After 15 years of external oversight there is now 
irrefutable evidence it has driven policing 
reform 
1.322 -0.062 1.383 
56 Everything that is in the public interest  - not the 
police interest – should be disclosed to the 
external oversight bodies. 
1.108 -0.154 1.261 
17 All those aspects of policing which in the past 
gave cause of concern are not subject to 
effective accountability through PONI +/or 
NIPB 
0.245 -1.502 1.257 
44 The Department of Justice has too much 
influence over the affairs of the external 
oversight bodies.  
0.350 -0.712 1.062 
34 Democratically accountable policing is only 
possible because elected representatives are 
involved in the Policing Board. 
0.546 -0.470 1.015 
37 Policing accountability in Northern Ireland is the 
„Rolls Royce model‟ of external oversight. 
0.550 -0.428 0.978 
49 External civilian oversight bodies have already 
played a positive role in dealing with the legacy 
of past policing. 






Table 17. Differences (<0 ) in factor scores between Perspective A (F1) & B (F2). 
Item  Statement A (F1)  B (F2) Diff. 
10 PSNI is justified in its concern that information 
disclosed to the external civilian oversight 
bodies may not be treated with the necessary 
sensitivity  / confidentiality. 
-0.269   1.074       -1.343 
35 The institutions for policing oversight which 
have evolved are like a monster which has to be 
fed. 
  -1.065   0.209 -1.275 
39 As a result of external oversight we now have 
leaders in policing chasing numbers and targets 
which are completely counterproductive.  
-0.650 0.551 -1.201 
31 The emphasis on policing oversight sometimes 
has the effect of inhibiting internal regulation 
within the PSNI. 
-0.346 0.713 -1.059 
27 Party politics has too great an influence on the 
Northern Ireland Policing Board 
0.457 1.434 -0.977 
59 External oversight of policing in the north of 
Ireland is too complex and cumbersome. 
-0.825 0.096 -0.921 
19 All public agencies have to adapt to current 
funding constraints and external oversight of 
policing should be treated in exactly the same 
way. 
0.149 0.982 -0.834 
58 There are clear and necessary limits to what the 
PSNI should disclose to the external civilian 
oversight bodies. 
-0.464 0.358 -0.822 
4 There is no need for the Policing Board to have 
scrutiny over areas of covert policing and 
national security. 
-1.347 -0536 -0.811 
22 The external oversight bodies are not ready for 
the creation of the Historical Investigations Unit. 
-0.164 0.642 -0.806 
 
The differences between Perspective A and B, possible explanations for these differences and 
what significance, if any, they may have for accountability and external civilian oversight of 
policing reform in Northern Ireland will be discussed in following chapter (9). However, it is 
noteworthy that something so fundamental to policing reform as Human Rights (Q.53) 
appears to be an issue which distinguishes these two Perspectives (Table 16). Furthermore, a 
recurrent theme (Table 16 & 17) is the extent to which the practices and procedures for 
information-sharing between policing and policing oversight bodies are viewed positively by 
participants. Differences in perceptions about the past or legacy of the conflict, the 
effectiveness of the ECO bodies and the role of the DoJ also distinguish the Perspectives.  
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8.7  Conclusion. 
 
The potential significance of these results should be underscored. Central to the proposition 
in this study is the finding from an extensive review of literature that shared values, attitudes 
and beliefs are a condition for change and development, learning and reform. That 
proposition is inherent in the conceptualisation of an ecological systems perspective. 
However, these findings reveal a cleavage within values, attitudes and beliefs of elite actors 
(n=62) in this sample. This divergence in perspective was statistically significant, and a 
pattern is evident to some extent of agency affiliation being closely aligned to the perspective 
held by a participant (Table 14). That may be an important finding in determining how 
accountability and external civilian oversight affects policing reform in Northern Ireland. 
However, it is also noted that the inference of an association between agency affiliation and 
perspective held by participants is not predictive of the sample as a whole. Notably, several Q 
sorts appear to deviate or cross-over from the dominant Perspective held by others with the 
same agency affiliation. Significantly, this cross-over includes eight participants with a 
background in the PSNI who share Perspective A. It also includes two participants with a 
background in the NIPB who share Perspective B, although they actually load quite evenly 
on both perspectives. Nonetheless, the analysis indicates that they share sufficient in common 
in their individual Q sorts to be aligned to Perspective B. However, with the relatively small 
numbers in this sample the identification of any other features of these two participants may 
compromise the study‟s ability to secure anonymity of those involved. Possible titles or 
names for Perspective B and Perspective A will be considered in the next Chapter (9) after 









Chapter Nine: Arresting Policing Reform? 
  
9.1  Introduction 
 
Preceding chapters on results have considered findings separately in relation to: i) the three 
proposed strands of triadic accountability, and ii) the extent to which participants hold shared 
values, attitudes and beliefs with the triadic strands of accountability and external civilian 
oversight. However, central to this thesis is the argument that in order to understand the effect 
of accountability and external civilian oversight on policing reform, these component parts 
must be considered together. Indeed, the whole concept advanced in this study is one of an 
ecological system of policing accountability made up of the dynamic and conjunctural 
interactions of the different facets of which it is comprised. This thesis argues that policing 
reform can best be optimised and actualised when a) the three levels of triadic accountability 
are correctly aligned to achieve this and b) the values, attitudes and beliefs of those keys 
actors engaged in this coalesce with one another. Therefore, having considered the findings 
separately and sequentially, this discussion chapter provides an integrative analysis of the 
results of this study.  In the development of this analysis, further data from this study is 
discussed and triangulated with other findings from documentary and observational research 
within this study.  In doing so, the interpretation of these findings is related, where possible, 
to wider scholarship on accountability and policing reform.  
As the conceptualisation of an ecological system of policing accountability outlined (Chapter 
4), this study has been oriented towards an interdisciplinary research framework. Yet, as also 
discussed at the outset of this study (Chapters 1 & 2), the academic investigation of external 
civilian oversight of policing reform in Northern Ireland is limited. This leaves the study with 
some initial findings for which a definitive explanation is beyond the reach of existing 
research. Where this occurs, this chapter will offer a qualified interpretation of the findings 
grounded in what research is available and the preliminary analysis of the researcher. 
Arguably, this discussion may prompt theoretical questions for future research.  
Therefore, this discussion will present an analysis in three parts. Firstly, an ecological 
systems perspective on external civilian oversight of i) NIPB and ii) PONI. An integrative 
examination of triadic accountability (s,r,t) in relation to each of these agencies highlights 
factors which potentially attenuate the efficacy of these “Patten institutions” (Shearing, 2010, 
p.29). Secondly, the salience of shared values, attitudes and beliefs among participants across 
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all agencies (PSNI, PONI, & NIPB) is further discussed. As stated earlier in this study when 
considering ecological systems theory learning and reform, change and development occurs 
most effectively when people share values, attitudes and beliefs about the joint endeavour in 
which they are engaged (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p. 214). Therefore, the results summarised in 
Chapter 8 are re-examined in relation to i) areas of consensus and ii) areas of divergence 
between participants. This illuminates the extent to which values, attitudes and beliefs of 
those elite actors in this study are shared. In turn, that permits this discussion to explore why 
any apparent patterns might exist, and to postulate the implications of this for the effective 
operation of external civilian oversight. 
Finally, by integrating the qualitative and qualitative evidence gathered during this study and 
triangulated in this discussion, this chapter concludes that there are significant deficiencies in 
the ecological system of policing accountability in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, the 
discussion concludes that while there is evidence of some shared values, attitudes and beliefs 
among elite actors about policing accountability, there are notable differences. The alignment 
of these differences to agency affiliations, raise a challenge for policing reform. Some ideas 
are shared about why these differences may exist and how they may affect the operation of 
accountability and external civilian oversight. It is concluded that some of the effects may 
contrast with or be different to what was foreseen or intended by the Patten Commission. 
This phenomenon is theorised in a different way, in an effort to further contribute to the 
growing scholarship within the academy, as that of agathakakological accountability. 
 
9.2  An ecological systems perspective of External Civilian Oversight (ECO) 
 
The capacity and effect of ECO to exercise accountability and advance the agenda for 
policing reform is indivisible from the ecological system within which it operates. 
Furthermore, this study argues that triadic accountability is a conceptualisation which can 
help illustrate the distinct strands of the ecological system. As outlined earlier, (Chapter 4), 
the proposed framework of triadic accountability is a conceptual development upon other 
scholarship which has explored public accountability (Bovens et al, 2014; Dubnik, 2014b) 
and external civilian oversight (Finn, 2002; Bayley, 2008;  Prenzler, 2011; and Millar, 2002). 
The three strands of this conceptual framework (situational (s); relational (r); & 
transformational (t)) are not weighted differently. The assumption of triadic accountability is 
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that each of these component strands interacts dynamically and interdependently. Having 
considered each strand separately, the logical extension of assumptions underpinning triadic 
accountability is that these strands can, and should, be considered contiguously within a 
given ecological system. In order to do this, additional data gathered from semi-structured Q 
method interviews will be triangulated with documentary and observational data collected 
during this study. In this way, triadic accountability will be discussed through external 
civilian oversight by the NIPB and PONI. 
 
9.3  Triadic accountability and NIPB 
 
An ecological systems approach to policing oversight was applied to operation of the 
Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB). During the course of this study, the NIPB was 
suspended for almost a year. At the time of completing the study, the NIPB remains un-
constituted. Rather than present problems to this study, the changes in NIPB present 
inconsistencies and contradictions which an ecological systems perspective is especially well 
placed to help examine. The interacting and independent nature of triadic accountability is 
illustrated quite dramatically through developments which have impacted upon the NIPB in 
the course of the last twelve months of this study. It is important to note that some of the 
developments outlined are outside the control of the NIPB. That also underlines the salience 
of an ecological systems perspective. From analysis of the NIPB, indications arise of 
shortcomings or weaknesses in the exercise and operation of external civilian oversight. This 
analysis suggests that shortcomings in external civilian oversight may at times be attributable 
to those involved in policing oversight, rather than the police. Referring back to wider 
policing scholarship, this analysis also helps to highlight a further important finding: that 
“civilianness” (Savage, 2013a) of oversight does not guarantee effectiveness.  
 
9.3.1  Difficulties & challenges: Situational „s‟ 
 
By virtue of the Police (NI) Act 2000 which established the Northern Ireland Policing Board 
(NIPB), it must be reconstituted after every Northern Ireland Assembly election. In February 
2017, the NIPB held its last full meeting before the Northern Ireland Assembly election in 
March 2017, precipitated by the resignation of the former deputy First Minister Martin 
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McGuinness and collapse of the power-sharing Executive. During the private session, NIPB 
officials made a submission to NIPB members that they should delegate NIPB‟s statutory 
authority (NIPB, 2017, Record no. 315398). This submission recommended delegating 
authority for prescribed functions to the Chief Executive and serving Chair and Vice-Chair. 
The term of office of the Chair, Vice-Chair and serving independent members of NIPB was 
also extended (Stewart, 2017, November 17).With the permission of the Department of 
Justice (DoJ), this also enabled the independent members originally appointed by DoJ to 
continue to receive a stipend and expenses, and in the case of the Chair and Vice-Chair, their 
respective salaries. Excluded from the submission made to NIPB members was the delegated 
authority to either a) further extend the contract of the independent Human Rights adviser; or 
b) run a competition for a new adviser at the end of the fixed term contract due to expire on 
12
th
 September 2017. The role of officials and of the Human Rights adviser will be further 
explored later in this discussion. For now, these events illustrate that the NIPB is not entirely 
in charge of its own destiny within the ecological system of policing accountability. 
 
In response to a question from SDLP MLA Dolores Kelly, the Permanent Secretary of DoJ 
wrote:  “The 2000 Act expressly confers the function of inviting nominations to the political 
membership of the Board on the Minister of Justice, not the Department, so the Board cannot 
be properly reconstituted until the Minister is again in place. In the absence of its political 
members, we have legal advice to the effect that the Board cannot exercise any of its 
functions” (Perry, 2017, October 23). This creates a void in policing accountability in 
Northern Ireland. In more than 16 years since its inception, there has never before been any 
significant length of time when the NIPB failed in its duty to discharge statutory duties under 
the Police (NI) Acts 2000 & 2003, until now. In October 2002, when the Assembly was 
previously suspended, the Secretary of State formally reappointed members under the 
provisions of the Police (NI) Act 2000. That did not happen in 2017. When a former member 
of NIPB and Sinn Féin MLA Gerry Kelly was interviewed by media (UTV, 2017, October 9) 
about the absence of effective external civilian oversight he said: “It is a not-thought-out-
consequence… of the situation that we‟re in”. This “not-thought-out consequence” or as 
Merton (1936) might argue an “unintended consequence” is to some extent a symptom of the 
inexorably contested paradigm of politics in the north of Ireland. Since elections in March 
2017, political talks to restore the power-sharing Assembly have failed. Yet, the architecture 
of accountability which the Patten Commission envisaged was never expected to be a hostage 
to political parties. Together with legislation emerging from protracted negotiations on 
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policing reform, the accountability architecture at the heart of the new beginning to policing 
was to have been durable. That has now proven to be vulnerable to changes in the ecological 
macro-system. The suspended animation in which the NIPB has existed for most of 2017 
underlines the salience of situational accountability (s) as a strand of external civilian 
oversight, as outlined earlier (chapter 5). However, it would be incomplete to construe this 
episode singularly through the lens of situational accountability. Although the socio-political 
circumstance and legal framework (macro-system) within which the NIPB operated was 
impacted upon by other dynamics, how the NIPB responded was in its own control. 
Elsewhere in this study, research has been reviewed which underpins the significance of the 
“living procedures” for effective accountability, especially external civilian oversight 
(Bayley, 2006; Savage, 2013a, 2013b). This particularly implicates relational accountability 
(r) (see chapter 6) which includes interaction between and within the agencies at the centre of 
this research. Therefore, NIPB‟s response to political events and suspension of the Assembly 
in January 2017 provides insight into the living procedures of relational accountability. 
 
9.3.2  Difficulties and challenges: Relational „r‟ 
 
There have been many elections in Northern Ireland over recent years.  Since the devolution 
of powers on policing and justice in 2010, there have been three Northern Ireland Assembly 
elections in May 2011, May 2016 and March 2017. As mentioned, the NIPB has continued to 
function on a statutory basis throughout that time, until the beginning of 2017. Consequently, 
minutes of NIPB exchanges are available to review. On 7 April 2011, the NIPB held its last 
monthly meeting before the Assembly election that year. The NIPB minutes reflect 
discussion on the reconstitution of the NIPB and serving members agreed that: “delegated 
authority be granted to the Chief Executive to deal with any urgent items of business in the 
period from the end of the current Board‟s term of office until the election of the Chairperson 
and Vice-Chairperson.” (NIPB, 2011, Record no: 160310, p.8). Following the election, the 
NIPB was reconstituted under the provisions of the Police (NI) Act 2000. When Assembly 
elections were scheduled again for May 2016, the NIPB held its last monthly meeting on 7
th
 
April 2016 (record no: 292841). NIPB members discussed whether Committee meetings 
would be required later that month or deal with items of committee business by email. Then, 
the interim Chief Executive “advised members that a Board Induction Event would be 
arranged for 26
th
 May 2016.” (p.4-5). No proposal was tabled for NIPB members to delegate 
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authority of the NIPB to the Interim Chief Executive, although there is no rationale for this 
decision in NIPB minutes. 
  
However, in February 2017 (NIPB, 2017, Record no: 315398, p.15) NIPB minutes refer to 
the “Northern Ireland Assembly elections – implications for the Board and arrangements for 
Board and committee meetings”.  This was the last monthly meeting of NIPB before the 
Assembly elections in March and minutes record that: “The Chief Executive presented a 
paper which updated Members on the impact of the dissolution of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly and an election on the constitution of the Policing Board”. In response to the Chief 
Executive‟s papers it was agreed that “Officials draw up a programme of work for 
Independent Board members during the election period” (NIPB, 2017, Record no: 315398, 
p.15). The paper from the Chief Executive is not appended to minutes or available on the 
website. A further meeting of NIPB was held on 27
th
 February 2017, but no detail is publicly 
available about the proposals officials prioritised. Analysis of available documentation 
highlights that NIPB officials adopted a different procedure before Assembly election 2017, 
than 2016 or 2011. The rationale for this difference in approach is unexplained and unknown. 
 
Correspondence to the SDLP from the Chief Executive (Stewart, 2017, November 17) quotes 
from the paper which was presented to NIPB members in February 2017 (NIPB, 2017, 
Record no. 315398). This proposed that the NIPB “approve an extension of the tenure of the 
Chair and Vice-Chair until the first meeting of a new Board”. Furthermore, it proposed that 
authority be delegated to the Chief Executive, Chair and Vice-Chair of the of NIPB for,  inter 
alia,  financial scenario planning;  PSNI funding and approval of PSNI high value 
compensation requests; approval of PSNI secondments; appointments to a Police and 
Community Safety Partnership (PCSP); and authorities over acquisition and disposal of 
property, rental leases and assisted removals. Yet, correspondence from the DoJ Permanent 
Secretary (Perry, 2017, October 23) to Mrs. Kelly makes clear that the NIPB “cannot exercise 
any of its functions”. In those circumstances the decision to extend the salaried tenure of the 
Chair and Vice-Chair and extend remuneration for 9 independent members may raise 
governance questions.  
 
Furthermore, the proposal from NIPB officials in February 2017 for delegated authority 
contrasts with the approach taken before Assembly elections in 2011 and 2016 and included 
additional authorities to those delegated in 2011. There is no documentary evidence available 
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during this study to explain the difference in approach. Importantly, the NIPB members did 
not appear to have the statutory authority to make any decision to delegate authority to the 
Chair, Vice-Chair and chief executive. On 20 January 2017, an Order In Council by the 
Secretary of State James Brokenshire came into force which stated “The Assembly is to be 
dissolved on 26
th
 January 2017” (S.I. 2017 No.32). When the Assembly is dissolved the 
NIPB is also dissolved, as happened before elections in 2011 and 2016. Therefore, the 
dissolution of the Assembly on 26
th
 January by the Secretary of State meant that the NIPB 
was already de-constituted. Given this fact, when NIPB met twice during February 2017, it 
appears to have had no statutory basis to take decisions to delegate authority, as 
recommended by officials. Indeed, it has previously been noted that there is no provision 
anywhere in the primary legislation constituting the NIPB for delegating authority (NIAC, 
2002). As these living procedures by which external civilian oversight operates are examined, 
the significance of relational accountability becomes all the more apparent. As this study 
comes to a close, the ramifications of this for NIPB and for policing accountability in the 
north of Ireland are still not fully known. Yet the situational and relation strands of this study 
are clearly seen to interact through this sequence of events in NIPB. What remains to be 
discussed is how these intersect through this example with transformational accountability. 
 
9.3.3  Difficulties and challenges: Transformational „t‟ 
 
The transformation of policing in Northern Ireland was the raison d‟etre for the programme 
of reform heralded by the Patten Report (1999). For this reason, statements in this study 
concerning human rights have been taken to give expression to transformational 
accountability (chapter 7). A key condition and objective for the “new beginning to policing” 
has been to inculcate a culture of human rights in policing. The integral nature of human 
rights to policing reform was enshrined in the Police (NI) Act 2000. Under section 3 (3), this 
places a statutory duty on the NIPB to monitor the performance of the PSNI in complying 
with the Human Rights Act 1998 (s.3(3)(b)(ii)) and to assess the effectiveness of the PSNI 
Code of Ethics (s.3(3)(d)(iv)). The Police (NI) Act also requires that the PSNI Code of Ethics 
stipulates standards of conduct and practice for police officers arising from their obligations 
under the Human Rights Act 1998. Finally, there is a duty on NIPB under section 57 (Police 
(NI) Act, 2000) to issue an annual report on policing in Northern Ireland, and that this shall 
include an assessment of compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998 in the performance of 
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the PSNI (s.57(2)(a)ii)). NIPB also has duties under the statutory Codes of Practice for stop 
and search powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 (paragraph 13.4) and the Justice and 
Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 (paragraph 5.14). Given the onerous nature of these 
obligations, NIPB has relied upon independent human rights experts since 2003 to provide 
advice and support in discharging its legal duties. From that time, the duties on NIPB have 
extended to monitoring the exercise of functions of the UK-wide National Crime Agency 
(NCA). Although the NIPB has no oversight role in relation to the British Security Service 
(MI5) the expanded role afforded this agency in the north of Ireland under Annex E of the St 
Andrews Agreement 2007 included explicit reference to the role of Human Rights Advisors 
to NIPB. It is also envisaged under the Stormont House Agreement that the oversight role of 
the NIPB is extended to encompass a new Historical Investigations Unit (HIU).  Apart from 
their expert training in human rights law and practice, these experts have been subject to 
Developed Vetting (DV). This has permitted access to premises and information which are 
out-of-bounds for the NIPB itself. Between 2003 and 2008, the NIPB contracted for services 
by Direct Award Contract (DAC) of two independent human rights experts to provide this 
support (NIPB, 2008). Importantly, during most of this five year period, the Assembly was 
suspended until May 2007. Since December 2008, NIPB has relied upon the expert assistance 
of a single independent Human Rights adviser also appointed by DAC. With that contract due 
to expire in February 2012, NIPB extended it for several months to discharge its statutory 
duties whilst advertising a new tender for services. That new contract for services was 
awarded in September 2012 for five years and expired on 12
th
 September 2017. Therefore, 
for the first time in fourteen years the NIPB had no independent Human Rights advisor. This 
reduced the capacity of the NIPB to monitor PSNI compliance with the Human Rights Act 
1998, and to compile an annual Human Rights and thematic reports on Human Rights. 
Whether this impacts on the present legal obligations of NIPB is uncertain, but it does appear 
at variance with what the Patten Commission envisaged for a Policing Board with expert 
capacity in human rights and a dynamic role in human rights promotion (ICP, 1999). 
 
Controversy surrounds how this has come about but there are clearly implications for 
transformational accountability. While the role of the Human Rights advisor was challenged 
and criticised by some members of NIPB itself during that time, the contract was still 
retained. Yet, arguably from 2015 onwards an attempt was made by NIPB officials to alter 
the established and influential role of the Human Rights advisor. For example, a decision was 
taken to re-profile the contract with the independent Human Rights adviser as „discretionary 
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spend‟ within the budgets (NIPB, 2015, FoI.44/2015). Duties undertaken by the Human 
Rights adviser were to be changed and reassigned (NIPB, 2015, FoI.44/2015). The committee 
structure within NIPB was also redesigned to move Human Rights under the control of the 
interim NIPB Chief Executive as opposed to the Performance Committee where it previously 
sat (NIPB, 2016, Record no. 30050, p.10).   
Following the collapse of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in 2017, there were 
difficulties with the reconstitution of the NIPB given the absence of local Ministers to 
approve this. Subsequently, the Human Rights Advisor position was not renewed at the end 
of its contracted period (from 2012-2017 as a fixed term contract). By contrast, during a 
previous political hiatus in Northern Ireland when the Assembly and Executive were 
suspended between 2002-2007, the NIPB was reappointed by the Secretary of State  and it 
contracted two Human Rights Advisors. When discussing the non- renewal of the contract in 
2017, the NIPB chair Anne Connolly said : “Well, I find it somewhat strange that some of the 
people who are saying that obviously don‟t understand public accountability, because as I‟ve 
just said to you in my previous comments we are not fully constituted as a Board. So 
therefore we do not have the mandate to recur new expenses, to either initiate contracts or 
appointments or to renew them. That is outwith. We can‟t do that” (UTV, 2017, October 9).  
This sequence of events appears to illustrate a distinct change in view about the perceived 
authorities and competencies of the NIPB between two separate periods of political hiatus. 
On a point of technicality, it is correct to say that the NIPB cannot now reverse the 
termination of contract for the Human Rights advisor. However, this was because the NIPB 
itself opted not to use its authority to retain its Human Rights advisor, or appoint a new 
advisor. The submission in February 2017 omitted that proposal from the „delegated 
authorities‟ recommended to NIPB members. This decision was reinforced by the Permanent 
Secretary of DoJ who said: “…there is no specific requirement to appoint a Human Rights 
advisor” (Perry, 2017, October 23). These views are, however, difficult to reconcile with the 
formal references to the role of the advisor outlined in policies, documents and the St. 
Andrews Agreement (2006).  This approach also appears to be at variance with what the 
Patten Commission envisaged whereby the NIPB would champion human-rights based 
policing and have the professional, legal expertise and internal capacity to discharge this role.  
This sequence of events and the absence of effective human rights oversight of policing by 
the NIPB may well compound concerns expressed by some interviewees during this study: 
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“The Policing Board, I don‟t think, the Policing Board is 100% effective in anything 
that it is doing. In fact, I think it‟s well under 100% in effectiveness, in how diligently 
its pursuing human rights compliance within the PSNI. I‟m not sure if it‟s an issue of 
it can‟t or won‟t, but it‟s somewhere. I think it starts with the will to monitor human 
rights compliance and it ranges right from that through to the cooperation from the 
PSNI. So it‟s a continuum of the will to do it and the cooperation in doing it” (NIPB 
interviewee, 2016). 
 
9.3.4  Conclusion 
 
So onerous were the legal obligations to monitor human rights compliance by the PSNI, so 
complex were those duties, and so seriously were they taken, that NIPB had once employed 
two Human Rights advisor at considerably greater expense. One of these advisors had been 
Sir Keir Starmer, QC, who later became the head of the Crown Prosecution Service and a 
Member of Parliament. Since that time, the changes in the ecology of policing in the north of 
Ireland have added to the complex responsibilities of the Human Rights adviser to NIPB. 
Duties have developed with policy changes under the St Andrews Agreement 2007, (Annex 
E); Stop and Search powers; the National Crime Agency and proposals under the Stormont 
House Agreement (2014) for a Historical Investigations Unit (HIU). Yet even as human 
rights policing assumes greater importance, interacting factors across all strands of the 
ecological system have combined to produce a result where the NIPB dispensed with a 
crucial source of expertise. Given the value attached by the Patten Commission to a human 
rights-based approach to policing, the decision by NIPB to cease with the role of Human 
Rights advisor after 14 years is a notable development. It is one which points to many of the 
contradictions and co-varying dynamics at work within the ecological system of policing 
accountability. The role of the sponsor Department (DoJ) in the affairs of a non-departmental 





9.4  Triadic accountability and PONI 
 
Earlier in this study, the socio-historical context from which policing reform emerged under 
the aegis of the Patten Commission was outlined in detail. From the time of the Collins-Craig 
agreement of the 1920s to investigate allegations of police wrongdoing; through to 1980s & 
1990s when critical incidents such as the Stalker inquiry and threats to human rights lawyers 
occurred under the watch of the ICPC; policing in Northern Ireland was not adequately 
accountable. Almost two decades on, PONI is now well established as an independent 
statutory authority with powers and resources to receive complaints or referrals and 
investigate allegations of wrongdoing.  Earlier, this study revealed through the words of an 
interviewee about what happened when the doors of PONI were opened in November 2000. 
Since that time, there has been an average of 3,000 complaints each year. With more than 17 
years of public service, PONI have handled more than 50,000 complaints against the police. 
The variety of these complaints stretch from allegations by members of the public of 
incivility by a police officer to investigations linked to multiple murders involving state 
agents. One such investigation was Operation Ballast which was initiated by the first Police 
Ombudsman, Nuala O Loan, shortly after PONI opened (PONI, 2007, April 16). In 
December 2017, this culminated in the conviction of loyalist Gary Haggarty, a self-confessed 
police agent who has become an Assisting Offender in the investigation of several murders 
unsolved by police (Morris, 2018, January 30). Another investigation by PONI into multiple 
murders is Operation Whiteside. This came on referral from the PSNI Chief Constable 
following evidence which emerged before the Criminal Convictions Review Commission 
CCRC about the role of another State agent. That person is widely referred to as agent 
„Stakeknife‟ and has been implicated in multiple murders by the IRA. A separate, parallel 
police inquiry is underway led by a senior British police officer John Boutcher, as outlined 
elsewhere (Chapter 4). These examples illustrate the complexity and scale of PONI‟s work.  
Respecting the statutory obligations under which PONI operates, this study is limited to 
investigations which have been completed. One PONI investigation completed during this 
study and raised by many interviewees is the report about the Loughinisland massacre in June 
1994 (PONI, 2016, June 9). Contemporaneous events pertaining to this PONI investigation 
were recorded during fieldwork and offer a prism through which to view triadic 
accountability. To be clear however: what follows is not a desk review of the investigation or 
198 
 
report. This study is primarily interested in the dynamics in the ecological system of policing 
accountability within which the Loughinisland investigation was conducted and from which 
the PONI report emerged, and not the report itself. 
 
9.4.1  Difficulties and challenges: Situational „s‟ 
 
In 2010, under devolution of policing and justice to the local Assembly, responsibility for 
approving an annual budget for PONI switched from the NIO to the Department of Justice 
(DoJ). Given warnings by the National Audit Office (2015) about how decisions about 
budgets by sponsor Departments can impinge on the independence of oversight, this issue is 
relevant to briefly review. It has been, and remains, an issue of dispute. In 2012,  Judicial 
Review proceedings (Martin J. v Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. [2012] NIQB 89) 
evidence was heard that each year between 2006 and 2010, PONI had publicly raised 
concerns about inadequate funding from the NIO to discharge its mandatory statutory 
functions, particular on Historic Investigations (pre-1998) [NIQB 89 / 2012; para.12]. Under 
the transfer to DoJ, funding problems continued for PONI. Between February 2010 and 
January 2012, business cases for additional resources to progress investigations were 
repeatedly rejected by DoJ [ NIQB 89 / 2012; para. 16 – 18]. PONI Director of Historic 
Investigations testified that: “...the DoJ accepts that the Ombudsman‟s Office is woefully 
underfunded for the volume of work presented to it by historic cases” [NIQB 89 / 2012; 
para.23]. Upholding the applicant‟s complaint, Justice Treacy ruled that PONI was in breach 
of its statutory duty: “I have concluded… that by reason of chronic underfunding at the 
material time the respondent was disabled from discharging its statutory duty to investigate 
within a reasonable time” [2012] NIQB 89. Similar proceedings last year (Bell v DoJ & 
PONI [2017] NIQB 38) revealed that during years which followed (2012 -2017), DoJ had 
substantially defunded PONI. Justice Maguire ruled in March 2017 that DoJ had effectively 
disabled PONI from discharging its statutory duties under the Police (NI) Act 1998. This was 
overturned on appeal by DoJ on grounds that it was lawfully permitted to alter funding to 
non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs) according to departmental (DoJ) needs. Another 
aspect of situational accountability deserving of note during these years was the statutory 
quinnenial review of PONI powers. Since PONI was established, this statutory review has 
been undertaken on three occasions. On the first two occasions this was submitted by PONI 
to the NIO. In 2012, PONI submitted this review to the DoJ. Recommendations have been 
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made each time for amending PONI‟s remit and responsibilities and amending statutory 
provisions to improve the efficacy of PONI. None of the reviews have been enacted. 
 
A further important shift in situational accountability during this time was a change in the 
Police Ombudsman and in the process by which the Police Ombudsman was appointed. In 
2007, the NIO appointed a former senior Canadian police officer Al Hutchinson to replace 
Nuala O‟Loan as Police Ombudsman. During Hutchinson‟s tenure, evidence would later be 
uncovered of a “lowering of the independence” of PONI (CJINI, 2011). In that time, the 
Office was marred by increasing public controversy, the resignation of the PONI Chief 
Executive, and a series of reports in 2011 (CJINI, 2011; CAJ, 2011; McCusker, 2011). 
Eventually, this led to Hutchinson‟s removal as Police Ombudsman. By this time, devolution 
of policing and justice powers to the Assembly had been enacted. This empowered the First 
and deputy First Minister to jointly appoint a new Police Ombudsman, an appointment 
process in which the NIO or DoJ played no active part. These changes in the ecological 
system of policing accountability also appeared to coincide with changes with regard to the 
PONI investigation into the Loughinisland massacre in 1994.  A chronology of the sequence 
of events in relation to the Loughinisland case can be found at Appendix 14. 
 
In June 2011, then Police Ombudsman Al Hutchinson published a report about the PONI 
investigation into a complaint lodged five years previously by the families of those killed in a 
loyalist gun attack on 9
th
 June 1994 in the Heights Bar, Loughinisland. The families were so 
dismayed and disappointed at the contents of the PONI report that they succeeded in lodging 
Judicial Review proceedings to have it quashed. By this time, Al Hutchinson has been 
replaced by the first Police Ombudsman to be appointed under devolution of policing and 
justice, Dr. Michael Maguire. Dr. Maguire directed a review of his predecessor‟s report and 
in December 2012 agreed to the report being quashed. This cleared the way for a new 
investigation which commenced in 2013 and concluded with a report on 9
th
 June 2016 
(researcher fieldnotes, Belfast High Court, February – December 2017).  One participant in 
this study attributed the change of PONI in approach to a change in leadership of PONI: 
“For me, police oversight and the civilian aspect of it, I think accountability and 
confidence in accountability mechanisms work when people believe that they are 
truly independent and truly accountable. And I think we‟ve had an experience where 
leadership in accountability in Northern Ireland with somebody from a policing 
background didn‟t engender as much confidence. So I think, whether it‟s for the 
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reality of the situation certainly or for the perception of it, for me that there‟s evidence 
to support civilian oversight is a better a model” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
Yet there were other changes in the ecological system of policing accountability which also 
impinged on progress in the new PONI investigation into the Loughinisland massacre. Most 
of the information which PONI required was held by the PSNI. Considering these 
interactions provides some insight into the relational strand of accountability 
 
9.4.2  Difficulties and challenges:  Relational „r‟  
 
In June 2014, the Police Ombudsman took the PSNI Chief Constable to court for withholding 
over 100 pieces of information on more than 60 murders related to ongoing PONI 
investigations, including Loughinisland. Explaining his decision to take the PSNI to court, 
the Police Ombudsman later told a BBC documentary: “I decided I couldn‟t have 
investigation by negotiation” (BBC Secret Terror Deals, 2015, May 28). The Judicial Review 
proceedings by PONI against the PSNI were unprecedented since either authority was 
formed. Pleadings on 13
th
 June 2014 on behalf of the PSNI Chief Constable at the time 
complained to the court about an “exponential growth in requests for sensitive information, 
which was quite radical in the past two years (under Dr Maguire). When the volume was 
identified by police, they had concerns about the nature of it and how it is to be handled” 
(Murphy, 2016, April 12). The court was told that the volume of requests for sensitive 
information by PONI to the PSNI was as follows: 4 requests in 2011; 21 requests in 2012; 69 
requests in 2013; and 38 requests in the first quarter of 2014, before application for Judicial 
Review (Murphy, 2016, April 12). Of additional interest to this research is that the 
appointment of the new Police Ombudsman in June 2012 does indeed correspond with an 
increase in activity by PONI. In September 2014, the new PSNI Chief Constable informed 
the NIPB that he had agreed to provide PONI with all sensitive information requested without 
the need for further court proceedings (NIPB, 2014). This dispute only appears to have been 
resolved after a change in leadership in the PSNI, not a change in the legal issues it raised. 
This reveals the salience of individual attributes and skills in relational accountability. 
 
However, not all actors in the ecological system were so open-minded towards PONI‟s 
investigation(s). As the Loughinisland report by PONI was being completed, the Secretary of 
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State Theresa Villiers made a key note address on legacy inquiries:  “Today we face a 
pernicious counter narrative...to suggest that misconduct by the police and our Armed Forces 
was somehow rife or endemic is…in the view of this Government…a deliberate distortion 
and a narrative of the Troubles that is not justified by the facts…. It wasn‟t the RUC or the 
Army who planted bombs at La Mon, Enniskillen or the Shankills, or pulled triggers at 
Loughinisland or Greysteel” (BBC, 2016, February 11). 
 
This keynote speech was made publicly at a venue in Belfast city centre a short distance from 
the offices of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland where the investigation into work 
Loughinisland massacre was near completion. This political commentary barely disguised 
hostility towards the PONI investigation which was mirrored by the Police Federation at its 
conference in May 2017. Addressing the conference, to which the Police Ombudsman Dr 
Maguire was an invited guest, the chairperson of the Police Federation claimed: “there is very 
little officer confidence in relation to the operation of the Ombudsman‟s office. The 
credibility of the office is also seriously questioned. It is often viewed as nothing more than a 
pawn in a political game, one where it revels in publicising minor indiscretions…In addition, 
the role of the PPS in recommending (police) officers for prosecution as a result of PONI 
reports is also questionable”. Calling for reform, the Police Federation chairperson said : 
“…the Government must redefine the role of the Office to ensure that the men and women I 
represent are not the victims of a witchhunt...” (PFNI, 2017, May 31). 
This theme of a “witchhunt” by PONI is one which appears to be a sentiment quite widely 
held, even among some elite actors involved in accountability and external civilian oversight:  
“There was a sense at that time for sure and I think there still is, that there was a bit of 
a witch-hunt against senior officers in C2…xxxxxxx particularly and there were a 
number of us put through these processes in a period about 12 to 18 months ago, and 
it did result in us being very defensive around it” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
A perception of unfairness appears to be widespread within the PSNI. One interviewee with 
the background in policing oversight claimed it was shared even by trainee police officers:  
“There‟s an absolute perception out there…They‟ll all nod along as you‟re answering 
and I‟ll tell them that if you think it‟s a malicious complaint you can report them to 
the police…. But they do, a lot of the police, do feel strongly that the complaints 
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against them are lies and don‟t give much credence to a lot of them. I don‟t think that 
will ever change to be honest” (PONI interviewee, 2016). 
This study does not seek to reconcile or harmonise the perceptions of interviewees or other 
influential actors. These findings are shared to delineate dynamics at work within the 
ecological system of policing accountability. It was within this environment that the PONI 
Loughinisland report was finally published in June 2016. The final part of this analysis is to 
consider what this example reveals about transformational accountability. 
 
9.4.3  Difficulties and challenges: transformational „t‟ 
 
The fact that policing in the past had not been accountable has already been mentioned in this 
study. Therefore, the justification for the PONI investigation into the Loughinisland massacre 
does not need to be rehearsed or revisited here. Instead, the interest of this study is to 
consider what this process might reveal about transformational accountability.   
Of note here is the initial consensus which greeted the publication of the PONI report. The 
complainants who had been bereaved in the Loughinisland massacre were the first to 
welcome the report (BBC, 2016, June 9). That same day, the PSNI Chief Constable told a 
meeting of the NIPB “that the PSNI fully accepted the findings of the PONI report and would 
be offering a full public apology to the families” (NIPB, 2016, June 9, p.11). This was later 
reaffirmed by then British Prime Minister David Cameron who wrote: “The Government 
accepts the Police Ombudsman‟s Report and the Chief Constable‟s response and we take any 
allegations of police misconduct very seriously. Where there is evidence of wrongdoing it 
must be pursued  - everyone is subject to the rule of law” (Cameron, 2016, July 12). This 
appeared to be a comprehensive endorsement of the PONI Loughinisland report. However, 
within a few days of the PONI report being publicly available, that seemed to change. 
The PSNI Chief Constable‟s next monthly report to NIPB stated: “It should be noted that no 
recommendations were made for the PSNI in the Loughinisland report and no actions remain 
outstanding. This has been acknowledged by the Police Ombudsman” (PSNI, 2016, July 7). 
This reflects the contents of the PONI report and it is notable that no recommendations were 
made. It is unclear why no actions remain outstanding following disclosures in the Alex 
Gibney documentary film “No Stone Unturned” (2017) about lines of enquiry which had not 
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been pursued by the police in the original investigation. In the past, PONI recommendations 
to the PSNI about disciplinary proceedings against police officers have not always been 
accepted (BBC, 2015, December 18). Whilst a decision by the PSNI to downgrade sanctions 
recommended by PONI has often occasioned public criticism, the role of the NIPB‟s Police 
Appeals Tribunal (PAT) often goes unnoticed. Under existing regulations, a police officer 
subject to disciplinary sanctions may appeal to the PAT which is administered and chaired by 
an independent NIPB member. From 2009 to 2015 there were 21 appeals to the Police 
Appeals Tribunal. An analysis by the PSNI of its own disciplinary procedures revealed: “57% 
of these 21 appeals to the PAT have resulted in the sanction imposed at misconduct hearing 
being overturned. Within this figure there appears to be significant variation between panel 
chairs, with one chair overturning 88% of sanctions” (PSNI, 2015, p.15). It seems 
paradoxical that one external civilian oversight body should overturn the sanction of another. 
In relation to the Loughinisland report (PONI, 2016, June 9), the police officers with whom 
PONI spoke during their investigation were retired. The report notes that some of these 
retired officers refused to cooperate and this is a broader dynamic in the ecological system. 
The quinnenial reviews by PONI to the NIO and DoJ recommend that there should be an 
amendment to statute to place the onus on retired police officers to cooperate with PONI. 
Like the other recommendations in those reviews, this has never been enacted. Furthermore, 
retired police officers have formed an association whose position is to actively discourage 
cooperation with PONI. Instead, retired police officers instigated legal proceedings against 
the PONI Loughinisland report to have it quashed and to fetter the power of PONI to issue 
such reports under s.62, Police (NI) Act 1998). A preliminary judgement by Justice 
McCluskey (Hawthorn, R. and White, R. v PONI. [2018] NIQB 5) found that PONI had acted 
unlawfully. However, further legal submissions by counsel for PONI and for the families of 
the Loughinisland dead  were made that Justice McCloskey should recuse himself on grounds 
of “unconscious bias”. On 26 January 2018, the preliminary judgment in the case was set 
aside and Justice McCloskey agreed that the case should be heard for a second time before a 
different judge (McCloskey, J. 2018, January 26; BBC, 2018, January 26).  After key 
milestones in the Loughinisland investigation, the PONI report (2016) and the subsequent 
legal challenge by retired police officers, it is still unclear whether accountability has been 
attained. Certainly, neither those involved in the Loughinisland massacre nor those involved 
in police wrongdoing which was uncovered have yet been subject to criminal prosecution.   
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In fact, there have been very few prosecutions ever brought as a result of PONI 
investigations. In primary data obtained for this study (PPS, 2017, FoI 1524/17-18), the 
Public Prosecution Service (PPS) disclosed that between 2010 and 22
nd
 November 2017 there 
were 1,703 files were submitted by PONI for a decision to prosecute relating to 3,272 
suspects. During the same, period of time decisions were made in relation to 3,299 suspects 
identified and directions given for indictable prosecution (28 suspects) and summary 
prosecution (30 suspects). Of these, 8 suspects were convicted for at least one offence before 
the Crown Court while 8 suspects were convicted for at least one offence before the 
Magistrates Court. Therefore, convictions were secured against 1 in 4 of those suspects 
prosecuted (16/58). However, of 3,299 suspects about whom the PPS made decisions during 
the last seven years, less than 2% (58 suspects) faced prosecution. This means the rate of 
successful conviction was less than 0.5%. This raises questions about the low rate of decision 
to prosecute and conviction secured based on PONI files to the PPS. It also appears to raise 
contradictions for the claim that PONI and the PPS are involved in a collective “witchhunt” 
against PSNI. The limits of this study preclude exploration of these issues at the present time. 
 
9.4.4  Conclusion 
 
How the complaint by the families of those bereaved in the Loughinisland massacre was 
handled from the outset and the response of others to PONI‟s report is revealing. It tends to 
support this study‟s contention that accountability and external civilian oversight in Northern 
Ireland is best construed as an ecological system. Within this, the contradictions inherent in 
society in Northern Ireland as it staggers out of conflict still pervade policing. Individual 
attributes and organisational agendas and interests interact with the statutory processes. It is 
important to note that the British government cites these processes, specifically PONI‟s 
investigative capacity, as part of a package of measures to provide assurances to the Council 
of Ministers of compliance with Article 2 of ECHR. Yet, these are the same investigative 
processes under the aegis of the PONI which the former Secretary of State politically 
impugned and which retired police officers legally contest. What remains is akin to a meta-
conflict, where the representations of past conflict are now the subject of continuing 
contestation. That was never envisaged by the Patten Commission. Returning to the scope for 
learning and reform, or development and change, it is hard to see evidence of that having 
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emerged from the example of Loughinisland. At the same time, some participants in this 
study, especially in the police, did admit to being conflicted about the report: 
“Well, I suppose the immediate reaction to it is just embarrassment, and feel ashamed 
and you feel, like, you feel connected to it because it is my organisation now. And I 
struggle with it on a number of different levels when stuff like that comes out. I 
suppose organisationally what it felt like was just another big body blow and the sort 
of opinion I hear articulated is the idea of being held accountable by today‟s standards 
for yesterday‟s practice, whenever people would argue there‟s a disconnect, they 
would say it‟s about practice, I wouldn‟t. I would say it‟s about right and wrong, that 
doesn‟t really change….. it‟s got marginally better but it isn‟t where it needs to be in 
terms of accountability” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
There is an insight here to the internal moral debate which PONI‟s report evoked among 
police. Debate about what was right and wrong, and against what standards it is just and fair 
to measure past policing, might be considered as potentially a catalyst for transformational 
learning and change. Yet that is not something which was shared or officially expressed by 
the police after the PONI report. If the effect of this example of accountability and external 
civilian oversight was a reflective approach by the police, it was hidden from public view.  
It was outside the parameters of this study to interview the families. However, based on 
attendance at various court hearings and observations, this study posits another perspective 
on the Loughinisland report. Perhaps this process served to provide a form of “restorying” 
where the experience of victims is heard and acknowledged publicly by those who caused 
them harm (Zehr, 2014).  Restorying implies a restorative experience but it also bears 
similarity to the understanding that in accountability, developing a narrative is important 
(Dubnik, 2014b). It has been argued in other research that “narrative accountability” is a 
process distinguished by the agency which is overseen giving an account of itself to its 
oversight body (Mansbridge, 2009, p.31). This process implies a one-way interaction 
(Mansbridge, 2009, p.32). Yet, that does not quite accord with the process through which the 
Loughinisland report was produced. This study observes that the features of the PONI 
approach to the Loughinisland report might be better described as corrective and restorative: 
corrective in relation to the previous account offered for the tragedy visited upon 
Loughinisland and restorative for the families bereaved. This process may have been 
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transformational for those victimised. However, it is difficult to discern what the effect may 
be for policing reform when the report itself is contested and the process is legally disputed. 
 
9.5  “Us and Them” 
 
For this discussion, it is important to reiterate that two distinct social perspectives about 
accountability and external civilian oversight have been found within the current study. In 
Chapter 8, these results were summarised and as reported, these include findings which are 
statistically significant. Now, these findings will be interpreted to explore their significance 
for ecological systems theory looking for evidence of shared values, attitudes and beliefs.  
 
Almost two decades after the new beginning to policing ECO bodies face a real challenge. 
Brockie (1994) said police felt besieged by oversight from politicians, media, NGOs and 
bureaucracy: “All this as they daily ricochet from the boring to the volatile, from the trivial to 
the life-threatening… the Police I met did feel separate from, rather than part of, the broader 
community. It had driven many of them to a siege mentality – the „us and them‟ 
syndrome…” (cited by Chan, 1997, p.170).  In the ecological systems model theorised by 
Bronfenbrenner (1979; 1992; 2009) shared values, attitudes and beliefs are a condition for 
development, change and learning. Shared values, attitudes and beliefs shape “the growth of 
mutual trust, positive orientation, goal consensus between settings and evolving balance of 
power” (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p. 214).  
 
The importance of shared values, attitudes and beliefs has been reviewed earlier in this study, 
and is reflected cross a diverse corpus of scholarship (Chapter 4). In Procedural Justice (PJ) 
literature, individuals have been found to regulate their own behaviour in accordance with the 
values, norms and social rules they share with others (Tyler, 2006, p.309). Sociological 
Institutionalism (SI) has also explored the values, attitudes and social rules shared through 
patterns of behaviour within institutions (eg: Hall & Taylor, 1996). Scholarship on legitimacy 
in criminal justice has underlined the importance of the attitudes and beliefs shared by those 
who hold power (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012, p.141-147). According to these findings, shared 
values are among the “core values that create and sustain legitimacy” (Bottoms & Tankebe, 
2012 ,p.143).  Research on the psychology of accountability (Tetlock, 1992) extends the 
importance of values, norms and beliefs to expectations of key actors. These factors interact 
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with decision-making situations as “a function of both the micro and macro context” (1992, 
p.38) in the exercise of accountability. For individuals to identify with others perceived as 
sharing values, beliefs and norms reinforces group identity among individuals (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1976). In turn, a stronger sense of group membership influences cognitive processes 
and elevate heuristic judgements and bias towards those in out-groups (Tajfel, 1978; Turner 
& Tajfel, 1979; Abraham & Hogg, 19882). In addition, this impinges on motivation to act in 
defence of the group with which an individual identifies (Blader & Tyler, 2009). This 
dynamic resembles what policing scholars have described as “defensive solidarity” (Bayley, 
1990, p.179).   In this third part of this discussion, these issues will be explored.  
 
9.5.1  Pattenisers & Hotspurs  
 
From the computer-based statistical analysis of the Q sort, there are significant distinctions 
between the two social perspectives in this study (see Chapter 8). Now, these will be 
discussed in more detail to consider areas of consensus and divergence. When these results 
were produced, the labels Perspective A and Perspective B were assigned. While this 
emphasised the socially-bound nature of the perspectives reflected in participants‟ responses, 
it conveyed very little about the distinct features of both. It is common for labels to be 
assigned to such results of Q studies to reflect some aspect of the subject under study (eg: 
O‟Connor, 2013; Ratcliffe et al. 2014). Therefore, Perspectives A & B are renamed. Having 
reviewed these findings in more detail, those within Perspective A are referred to as 
„Pattenisers‟ and those within Perspective B are referred to as „Hotspurs‟. Of interest in this 
discussion is what common or distinguishing features exist between both.  
The label for Perspective A as Pattenisers (n=43) reflects the fact that the reform programme 
from which external civilian oversight emerged was the Patten Report (1999). One of those 
who authored the report Professor Clifford Shearing, himself a policing scholar of 
international standing, referred to the NIPB and PONI as the Patten institutions (2010). 
Furthermore, the analysis of results reveal that the agency affiliation of participants in 
Pattenisers was closely aligned to past or current membership of external civilian oversight 
(ECO) in the north of Ireland. Of the 38 participants with a background in ECO interviewed 
during this study, 35 of these participants were Pattenisers. Three of those with a background 
in ECO could not be assigned to this social perspective. Two participants crossed over to the 
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alternative perspective (Hotspurs) and one participant did not load on either perspective. In 
itself, these differences are of note and invite further examination. However, this will be 
addressed in the subsequent discussion about limitations of the study and potential for future 
research. Also noteworthy is that 8 of the participants whose responses aligned to the 
Pattenisers had a background in the PSNI. It is also interesting that of these 8 participants, 5 
were formerly affiliated to the PSNI in some way. This may reveal something about the 
contested nature of the ecological system within which policing accountability operates and 
how the perspective of (former) affiliates to the PSNI changes once outside of this. 
The label for Perspective B as Hotspurs (n=18) reflects the fact that 16 of the 18 participants 
who shared this perspective had some affiliation to the PSNI. This means that two-thirds of 
those with a background in the PSNI who were interviewed for this study shared the 
perspective of Hotspurs. This name derives from the vehicles driven by the police. Before the 
Patten reform programme commenced, the RUC travelled in distinctive grey landrovers. 
These vehicles were sheathed in heavy armour plating to protect police against attack during 
the conflict. When the PSNI was formed, a transformation of the police estate began and this 
included the landrovers. As the peace process progressed and the landrovers aged, the PSNI 
ordered a new fleet of vehicles. These were landrovers with a civilian chasis called „Tangi‟. 
However, because the police were still at risk of attack, the heavy armour plating from the old 
RUC landrovers was used to encase the new vehicle. The surface of the hybrid landrovers 
was given the livery and branding of the PSNI. The vehicles from which this armour plating 
was taken were called Hotspurs. For the purpose of this study, Hotspurs is the name given to 
perspective B because it conveys the hybrid nature of policing here. It suggests that police 
still feel detached from the public and still feel at risk. It also reflects the unfinished work of 
reform. As with the previous perspective of Pattenisers, there is some cross-over. Two 
participants with a background in the ECO bodies, specifically NIPB, shared the perspective 
of Hotspurs. At the same time, the extent to which these two participants cross-over is 
moderated by the fact that their responses loaded quite evenly on both perspectives. Still, 
there was sufficient commonality with other Hotspurs to indicate a significant result (Chapter 
8 & Appendix 12). This will be discussed again under „limitations‟ and „future research‟. 




9.5.2  Areas of consensus  
 
Evidence of shared values, attitudes and beliefs among participants is a promising sign for 
external civilian oversight, as previously explained. The potential for development and 
learning, change and reform is greatest among individuals and groups of people with a shared 
mission. To that extent, this study offers some hope that there is some common cause among 
participants. These areas emerge from the previous statistical analysis (Chapter 8 &Appendix 
12) and are described as “Consensus statements” (Chapter 8; Table 15).  In this study, 17 of 
the 59 statements in the Q sort formed the basis for a consensus between Pattenisers and 
Hotspurs. These will be discussed by reference back to the paradigm of triadic accountability 




There are four Q items (52, 36, 42 & 5) among consensus statements which reflect aspects of 
situational accountability, with responses which are positive. Of these, the item which elicits 
the strongest response from both Pattenisers and Hotspurs is: “There was nothing wrong with 
the arrangements for policing accountability which we had in the past before the 1999 Patten 
Report” (Q.52).  Earlier in this study (Chapter 2), the void in accountability over policing in 
Northern Ireland was discussed. Also noted was that the Patten Report devoted 38 of its 175 
recommendations to accountability and stated: “A new beginning to democratic 
accountability is a key to a new beginning to policing”.  
 
Two of the other items concerning situational accountability which Pattenisers and Hotspurs  
have in common relate to the remit of external civilian oversight. These were: “external 
civilian oversight should limit their remit to those issues of concern presented by members of 
the public” (Q.36); and “external civilian oversight should have scrutiny over only those 
aspects of policing which concern everyday crime and community safety” (Q.42). This 
shared perspective reflects a desire to ensure that external civilian oversight is dynamic and 
responsive. There is clearly an ambition by participants in both perspectives to have external 
civilian oversight involved in matters of strategic significance for the development of 
policing. There is an implication in this that ECO bodies should look beyond only what 
members of the public raise. Indeed, some participants highlighted the fact that the NIPB in 
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particular would become fixated at times on constituency based matters, raised by MLAs on 
NIPB. Another participant articulated how PSNI had been inundated forty eight hours before 
a meeting of NIPB with written questions about Orange marches. Again, this was because of 
the personal interest in this of a political member of NIPB. Looking beyond “everyday crime 
and community safety” also implies that participants from both perspectives recognise much 
policing is carried out beyond the public gaze. This leans into areas of covert policing and 
National Security but these will be discussed later as there are conflicting views on this. 
Finally, both Pattenisers and Hotspurs view the devolution of policing and justice powers as 
having led to tangible improvements in policing accountability (Q.5). While this is also 
positive for situational accountability, the results indicate that agreement on this item is more 
moderate for both. This may reflect the fact that despite being recommended in the Patten 
Report, devolution of policing and justice did not happen until 2010.  Coming late in the 
programme, participant may feel that the interaction between ECO and the devolved 
institutions is not fully bedded down. In particular, there are outstanding issues in delineating 
the remit of the NIPB by contrast to the Assembly Justice Committee. Moreover, the role of 
the sponsor Department (DoJ) has not been entirely virtuous and beneficent as will be 
discussed again. Nevertheless, it is positive that devolution of policing and justice is welcome 
by both perspectives, but since January 2017 the local Assembly has been in suspension. 
 
Relational consensus 
Common ground was also shared by both perspectives on some aspects of relational 
accountability. There are five items which are consensus statements but four of these had 
negative implications for this strand of accountability (2, 57, 48 & 16). The fifth statement is 
positive for relation accountability although only just. This item (3) is among those within 
this study which is reversed in order to control for response bias among participants.  
The item Q.3 states that “Sometimes it seems as though the external civilian oversight bodies 
are used by those who deliberately want to damage policing”. Whilst Pattenisers disagree 
with this item, Hotspurs are more neutral. This reflects a slightly ambivalent position by 
Hotspurs on the motives and intent of those who come forward to the ECO bodies, or perhaps 
are involved in them. This is sentiment is not so strongly expressed as a cognate item: “There 
are still some areas where the external civilian oversight bodies struggle to gain full co-
operation from police officers and staff” (Q.16). Both perspectives agreed this.  
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The other three items (57, 2 & 48) in this strand on which provide for a consensus for both 
Pattenisers and Hotspurs are negative for relational accountability. These concern PSNI 
challenging the independence of the ECO bodies and the vexed issue of PSNI disclosure of 
information to ECO bodies. Given the integral nature of independence and access to 
information for the effectiveness of ECO bodies, these are troubling findings. How external 
civilian oversight can be effective if independence and disclosure of information is at risk 
from the PSNI is difficult to envisage. On the other hand, it may be positive that this is 
recognised and accepted by participants from both perspectives. 
 
Transformational consensus 
More encouragingly is that the area where there is greatest consensus between Pattenisers 
and Hotspurs is in transformational accountability. There are 8 items out of the 17 items in 
Consensus Statements (Chapter 8; Table 8.5) which correspond with transformational 
accountability (t). Of these, 7 items have positive implications (26, 28, 8, 43, 14, 9 & 46) and 
the sentiment on the final item (Q.55) is neutral, which is also interesting in some respects. 
This item states:  “When decisions on policing have to be made, the external oversight bodies 
should not interfere with the police decision making process” (Q.55). To some extent, this 
may reflect debate about the degree of discretion which is vested in the police. The Patten 
Report itself advocated that police should have operational responsibility instead of the 
nebulous „operational independence‟. However, there is no clear delineation between these 
concepts. Those parts of policing where ECO bodies should help police make decisions are 
undefined. There is no greater clarity from the fact that one of the other items about which 
both perspectives moderately agree is that the Policing Board can be consulted by the police 
but ultimately all decisions are for the PSNI (Q.9). 
 
The other items on which there is consensus between Pattenisers and Hotspurs are all 
affirmative for transformational accountability. Both perspectives share the view that without 
ECO there can be no confidence in policing (Q.8); that accountable policing depends on ECO 
(Q.28) which has ingrained accountability in PSNI culture (Q.14) making PSNI the most 
accountable police service in the world (Q.46). Furthermore, both perspectives believe that 
monitoring human rights compliance is now an integral and vital component part of ECO 
bodies (43) and that there is evidence that ECO has impacted on PSNI reform and 
improvement (26). These appear to be promising findings. 
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9.5.3  Areas of divergence  
 
Continuing in the exploration of Pattenisers and Hotspurs, areas where both perspectives 
diverge will now be explored in more detail. Previously, results from statistical output from 
participants‟ Q sorts revealed differences between both Perspectives (Chapter 8; Tables .16 & 
17.). In Q studies, these are represented in the „Descending Array of Differences‟ (Appendix 
13). Since all items in the Q set are listed in the descending array, interpreting these results is 
usually achieved by selecting items at either end of the scale of difference. No prescription is 
made in Q studies for how many items are required for this purpose. In the current study, 10 
items from either end of the scale of difference in response between perspectives were 
selected (Chapter 8;  Tables 16 & 17). Altogether, this provides approximately one third of 
the items from the overall Q set (q=59) and is comparable in number to Consensus 
statements. However, for the purpose of this discussion, the items are grouped again and 
discussed from the perspective of triadic accountability (s-r-t). 
 
Situational divergence 
Of the 20 items extracted from analysis, 9 of these correspond with the strand of situational 
accountability (Q: 4, 17, 19, 22, 30, 31, 37, 44 & 49). These items encompass several 
different issues and will be explored more thematically later in this discussion by integration 
with findings from existing scholarship. For now, the main areas of divergence on situational 
accountability between Pattenisers and Hotspurs are summarised. 
One of the aspects of situational accountability which most strongly distinguishes both 
perspectives is the suggestion that external oversight inhibits internal regulation within the 
PSNI (Q.31). Mindful of the evidence already highlighted that agency affiliation strongly 
aligns to perspective, it is unsurprising that Pattenisers disagreed with this whilst Hotspurs 
agreed. The PSNI has its own Discipline Branch and Anti-Corruption Unit. Significant effort 
is invested by these two sub-sections to internal investigations within the PSNI. Unlike 
external civilian oversight, this effort is unseen. Discipline Branch is located at PSNI 
Lisnasharragh, a station which houses many internal aspects of PSNI‟s organisation including 
Human Resources and the rooms in which tribunals are heard. Up to the present time, these 
tribunal rooms are closed to the public unless a member of the public is a witness against a 
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police officer in a disciplinary hearing. Access to this hearing room was permitted during 
fieldwork but only those involved in cases may be in the room during hearings. Although this 
has also been the norm in Britain, proposals under the Taylor Review (2005) envisage greater 
transparency of internal regulation by the police, including public access. However, there is a 
broader debate about the balance between internal regulation and external oversight. There is 
ample evidence, reviewed earlier (Chapter 4) of the need for accountability to be internalised. 
Some, like Bayley (1990) argued that internal regulation in policing is diminished or 
inhibited by external oversight. In this study, that is a position on which perspectives diverge. 
Provisions of the Police (NI) Act 1998 require that all complaints or instances of misconduct 
are referred by PSNI to PONI. This is directly related to the inadequate accountability for 
policing in the past, a point which featured as an Area of Consensus between both 
perspectives. However, the legislative requirement on the PSNI to refer to PONI has led to 
what one Patteniser described as “The Police Ombudsman‟s brush-off” where the PSNI 
“wash their hands” of complaints. One of the arguments offered by Hotspurs for a 
moderation of this requirement is that it deskills police officers, especially at the level of 
sergeant and inspector. Oddly enough, the best example in support of this view was offered 
by someone with a background in NIPB. The example evidenced how an error in a police 
house search in Derry was resolved by the PSNI officers involved returning to the occupants 
of the house and apologising for their mistake. Apart from the speed of this resolution, the 
exchange between the occupant and the police officer had a restorative effect. According to 
the NIPB participant, this exchange “went round the Bogside (in Derry city) like wildfire”. 
This was one of the most lucid examples of effective accountability offered by participants 
during this study. This occurred outside the existing local resolution scheme is available to 
PONI and PSNI under current provisions which this study found was used sparingly.  
Some of the other issues in this domain on which Pattenisers and Hotspurs significantly 
diverged were safeguarding ECO bodies from funding cuts (Q.19) and the NIPB‟s powers 
(Q.30). The role of political members in NIPB (Q.31 & Q.34) also divided opinion with 
Hotspurs taking a less agreeable position on these issues.  The claim that “policing 
accountability is the „Rolls Royce model‟ of external oversight” (Q.37) also differentiated 
these two perspectives. While Pattenisers agreed, Hotspurs took a more sceptical view of this 
claim with one remarking: “Maybe it is, but a Rolls Royce is a very expensive car to run”. 
Both perspectives agreed that NIPB‟s should scrutinise matters of national security and 





Among the items which differentiate Pattenisers from Hotspurs are 8 items viewed in this 
study as expressions of relational accountability (Q:10, 27, 35, 39, 49, 56, 58 & 59). Of these 
items, it is notable that three (10, 56 & 58) pertain to information sharing. This is especially 
significant. Not only do these results indicate a problem with disclosure by PSNI to ECO 
bodies, they also reveal a significant divergence in beliefs held by Pattenisers and Hotspurs 
about disclosure.  One example of this is item (Q.56) which states: “Everything that is in the 
public interest – not the police interest – should be disclosed to the external oversight 
bodies”. Pattenisers firmly agreed with this item while Hotspurs moderately disagreed. This 
assumes special significance because it is a derived from the Patten Report (1999, p.36) under 
recommendations are made to improve police transparency : “Police codes of practice should 
be publicly available; this does not mean, for example, that all details of police operational 
techniques should be released – they clearly should not – but the principles, and legal and 
ethical guidelines governing all aspects of police work should be, including such covert 
aspects as surveillance and the handling of informants (cf the ACPO Codes of Practice on 
these matters referred to in Chapter 4). The presumption should be that everything should be 
available for public scrutiny unless it is in the public interest – not the police interest – to 
hold it back (italicised in ICP, 1999). It follows that there should be readily available and 
clearly drafted notes on matters which the public are likely to be interested to see. It was our 
experience during the period of our review that briefing notes and statistics on a range of 
issues of interest to us – and therefore probably to others – were not readily 
available….Transparency is not a discrete issue but part and parcel of a more accountable, 
more community-based and more rights-based approach to policing.” (1999, p.36) 
During fieldwork it was found that some indicators of transparency outlined in the Patten 
Report, such as PSNI Service Procedures and Policies, were not readily accessible to the 
public through either the PSNI or the NIPB website. In fact, there appears to be a pattern 
where PSNI Service Procedures are available for a period of time before being removed and 
replaced with others. This is despite recommendations by the independent Human Rights 
Advisor to NIPB that PSNI should make all Service Procedures publicly available. More 
importantly, this theme of transparency and disclosure arose earlier in this discussion in 
respect of Areas of Consensus between Pattenisers and Hotspurs. The items on which both 
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perspectives agreed in that case (Q: 2, 48 & 57) had negative implications for relational 
accountability. At the same time, both perspectives had significant common ground in their 
critique of those items. On the other hand, these areas of divergence add a layer of 
complexity. The perspective of Pattenisers remains critical of the quality of disclosure while 
Hotspurs appear to be more internally conflicted or incongruous about this. Possible reasons 
why these differences may exist, and why Hotspurs may be conflicted are offered in the third 
part of this discussion.  Other issues from relational accountability on which both 




The strand of transformational accountability appears to evoke least difference between the 
two perspectives. Only 3 items (Q: 53, 15 & 20) out of the 20 items which manifest greatest 
areas of divergence correspond with transformational accountability. Yet, even these offer 
some interesting and potentially contradictory findings for this study. Of note is the extent to 
which these items reveal the strength of divergence between Pattenisers and Hotspur with 
these 3 items in the top 4 items which most strongly differentiate both perspectives. 
For instance, item Q.53 states: “If it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsman and the 
Policing Board the human rights agenda would not be so far advanced” (Q.53). Pattenisers 
strongly agreed with this but Hotspurs disagreed. More than any other, this item (Q.53) 
differentiated between the perspectives. In a moment, this will be further discussed. On item 
15, Hotspurs strongly disagreed while Pattenisers were neutral. This item stated that the 
“Policing Board has been very successful in engendering public confidence in policing” 
(Q.15). Apart from the interesting difference in response, this finding has  implications for 
the NIPB which has a statutory duty to engender public confidence. NIPB repeatedly refers to 
the Omnibus survey which is gathered by DoJ. Elsewhere in this study, questions were posed 
about how accurate these surveys may be in reflecting  public confidence in the police and in 
policing. It was also noted that the construct employed by DoJ as a measure of confidence in 
policing is in fact not a measure of confidence in the police, but a composite of seven 
measures encompassing the NIPB, PONI and PSNI within “policing”. Lastly, in this section, 
participants had been asked to rate the item : “After 15 years of external oversight there is 
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now irrefutable evidence it has driven policing reform” (Q.20). Again, Hotspurs moderately 
disagreed with this while Pattenisers were strongly in agreement with that item.  
All of these appear to contradict the affirmative areas of consensus shared by both 
perspectives on transformational accountability, as discussed earlier. The 3 items in this 
section seem to contradict the Hotspurs sharing a view with the Pattenisers that ECO bodies 
foster confidence, promote human rights and help PSNI reform and improvement. In the case 
of item Q.15, it more likely reflects a jaundiced view by Hotspurs of the contribution of 
NIPB to public confidence. In relation to the other two items, these may merely be indicative 
of the kind of embodied contradictions highlighted by Christine Chan in her seminal research 
on police culture (1997). It seems Hotspurs do not so much contest the potential for 
transformational accountability through ECO. Instead, Hotspurs seem to resent the 
implication that it is ECO bodies which lead the process, not the PSNI. That interpretation 
seems to accord with results that both perspectives are closely aligned to agency affiliation of 
participants in the study. Hotspurs demure from giving credit to the ECO bodies for ensuring 
that the human rights agenda is “so far advanced”(Q.53) or for having “driven policing 
reform” (Q.20). The corollary to this is Hotspurs think that the PSNI deserve more credit for 
these changes or would have achieved them anyway whereas Pattenisers credit ECO bodies.  
 Summary 
In addition to the statistical significance of the differences between Pattenisers and Hotspurs, 
they also diverge in their perspectives on some important aspects of accountability and 
external civilian oversight. To what extent this may affect the efficacy of the ECO bodies is 
not measured in this study. The final part of this discussion will attempt to explore why these 
differences in values, attitudes and beliefs may exist and what effect this may have. 
 
9.6  Polarised perspectives and perverse effects. 
 
To find that values, attitudes and beliefs differ towards accountability and external civilian 
oversight among those involved in carrying it out is interesting in itself. What makes this 
more important for policing reform in Northern Ireland is that these perspectives mostly 
divide according to affiliation to either the police or policing oversight. At the outset of the 
Patten Commission‟s programme of reform perhaps this would have been expected. As 
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discussed at the beginning of this thesis (Chapter 2), the context for reform was a huge 
accountability void. Values, attitudes and beliefs of those involved in policing might have 
been expected to reflect the norms of that time. Yet, almost two decades after the formation 
of the new architecture of accountability, existing differences in perspective held between 
Pattenisers and Hotspurs remain an important aspect of the ecological system.   
Drawing upon wider literature and where necessary further data from this study to aid 
analysis, this final section of the discussion explores why these differences may exist between 
Pattenisers and Hotspurs. Two possible explanations are suggested: a new concept of 
“challenge fatigue” which this study postulates; and “defensive solidarity” (Bayley, 1990). 
Consideration is also given here to what implications such divergence between Pattenisers 
and Hotspurs may have for policing reform. In this, the importance of values, attitudes and 
beliefs for development and learning is underscored once more. So too is the dynamic nature 
of an ecological system of policing accountability. Consequently, the divergence between 
Pattenisers and Hotspurs helps to modulates the effect of accountability upon policing and 
policing reform. As such, unintended outcomes can occur. One of these is a duality of impact 
arising from the interplay between the ecological system and the views of elite actors. That 
duality of impact is postulated by this study to be “agathakakological” accountability.  
  
9.6.1  Challenge fatigue. 
 
External civilian oversight means that change by the PSNI, or failure or refusal to change, is 
routinely exposed in public. By its very nature, there is a challenge function to external 
civilian oversight. Yet, what adds potency to this challenge is the repetitive exposure. It is 
conceivable that the very process of external civilian oversight itself has some adverse effect. 
Recent research from the field of occupational psychology (Wray Kinman & Shelvin, 2015) 
tends to support this proposition. Looking at work-related well-being in UK higher education, 
researchers found evidence of what they describe as “change fatigue”. As Professor Kinman 
(2017) states: “There is a general sense of apathy or passive resignation towards 
organisational change. It is a growing problem … Change fatigue can be highly stressful and 
reduce job satisfaction and motivation, stifle creativity and organisational citizenship 
behaviours, and encourage absenteeism and turnover. People need a period of stability, 
otherwise they may actively resist beneficial change” (Kinman, 2018, p42).  
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Findings of this kind might well have resonance with policing reform in Northern Ireland. 
The raison d‟etre of the process of policing reform heralded by Patten has been change. 
Seventeen years later, it is very clear that this reform process has had success. Yet there 
remain recommendations from the Patten Commission which are still outstanding. There are 
also some aspects of reform, such as change in workforce composition, which are far from 
complete. Latest data on workforce composition reveal that Catholics and women continue to 
be significantly underrepresented (Irish Times, 2018, January 12) and this is most acute at the 
highest ranks of the police.  Considering the challenges and difficulties within the ecological 
system of policing accountability, there is a risk that the reform agenda loses momentum. 
Exploring literature on organisational fatigue more deeply offers further possible explanation. 
Research has increasingly highlighted the incidence of “compassion fatigue” among nurses 
(Hooper et al, 2010; Abendroth & Flannery, 2006). The concept has been extended to social 
workers (Adams & Figley, 2008; Boscarino & Figley, 2004); and others involved in caring 
for traumatised populations such as those involved in mental health services (Figley, 2002; 
Sprang, Clark & Whitt-Whoosley, 2007). Compassion fatigue is defined as “the natural 
consequent behaviours and emotions resulting from knowing about a traumatising event 
experienced or suffered by a person” (Figley, 1995, p.7). Knowing the traumatic impact of an 
incident upon a person in detail and giving empathic support the person‟s recovery is 
predictive of compassion fatigue in the carer or helper (Figley, 1995). There is more limited 
research on the prevalence of compassion fatigue in policing. Burns, Morley, Bradshaw and 
Domene (2008) examined the incidence compassion fatigue among police officers in an 
Internet Child Exploitation (ICE) team in Canada. Other research has looked at the 
occurrence of compassion fatigue among adult probation officers across in parts of the United 
States of America (Lewis, Lewis & Garby, 2012). Compassion fatigue was found to be 
highest among those who had served longest and engendered mistrust, dissociative episodes, 
desensitisation to trauma of others and impaired information processing or moral judgement 
(Lewis et al. 2008, p.80). Given the traumatic impact of the conflict in the north of Ireland 
and the salience of legacy-related issues in the realm of policing reform and oversight, it is at 
least arguable that something akin to compassion fatigue may impinge on ECO.  Knowledge 
of the local context, including the conflict, may better equip an individual involved in 
policing and policing accountability to understand the need for reform. Yet, repeatedly 
placing individuals who have had exposure to the conflict in the position where they are 
faced with other people‟s experience of the conflict or trauma risks challenge fatigue. That 
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risk would be consistent with scholarship in other fields which has been summarised. This 
risk must be heightened by the fact that some of those interviewed in this study have been 
involved in the criminal justice system for all of their careers. Several interviewees have been 
in post in the ECO bodies from the start. As other research indicates, length of service 
increases susceptibility to fatigue (Lewis et al. 2008). This study did not measure or set out to 
measure the concept of challenge fatigue but it has emerged during this study as something 
which invites further investigation in the future. Recounting the detail of personal 
experiences of exposure to conflict may impinge on the confidentiality of participants. 
However, it is apparent that some of those involved in senior positions within policing or 
policing accountability have personally witnessed or directly experienced injury or 
bereavement as a result of the conflict. Indeed, during this study interviewees from all three 
agencies have frequently referred to the past. This is because the nexus between past and 
present policing is the litany of legacy cases. Even those who might wish to face forward 
within the new policing arrangements with continuing policing reform may be pulled back by 
the failure of police accountability in the past and the resulting legacy.  
Consequently, this study suggests that the on-going contest between “the old conditions… 
and a new order of things” (Machiavelli, 1513, p.9) is not simply a matter of reform meeting 
resistance through “change fatigue” (Kinman, 2018). Nor is it only a function of repeated 
exposure to vicarious traumatisation leading to onset of “compassion fatigue” (Figley, 1995). 
Instead, this study suggests that the ecological system of policing accountability in Northern 
Ireland meets the conditions highlighted by other research for occurrence and co-existence of 
both change fatigue and compassion fatigue. This presents an especially complex challenge 
for those who would wish to further advance policing reform. In an attempt to represent the 
distinctive attributes at work within the ecological system of policing accountability in 
Northern Ireland, this study proposes the concept of “challenge fatigue”. Challenge fatigue 
may be a composite or hybrid of change fatigue and compassion fatigue. It is argued that this 
“challenge fatigue” may help explain differences observed between Pattenisers and 
Hotspurs.  
As a post-hoc interpretation of findings which have emerged from this study, this dynamic of 
“challenge fatigue” clearly requires further investigation. Nonetheless, the possibility that 
there is an adverse emotional or affective response to accountability which may influence the 
response of a group or organisation to reform is worthy of attention. As outlined earlier in 
this thesis (Chapter 4), social psychologists have been alert to this phenomenon through 
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research on accountability under experimental conditions (eg. Tetlock, 1992). More recently, 
research on attitudes towards Transitional Justice measures has found that negative emotions, 
especially anger and fear, influence attitudes towards support for TJ (Barcelo, 2018). 
Interestingly, this finding of a negativity bias corresponds with policing research by Skogan 
(2008) which found negative police-public interactions were 14 times more impactful than 
positive interaction on attitudes by public towards the police. Building on this it might be 
argued that the difference in perspective between Pattenisers and Hotspurs is influenced by 
negative interactions between policing oversight and policing. It is possible that this also 
contributes to a sense of “challenge fatigue” amongst key actors engaged in accountability 
and external civilian oversight of policing reform, as this study suggests. 
Finally, the research on an affective dimension underpinning reactions to TJ may yet hold 
another clue as to why Pattenisers and Hotspurs diverge in values, attitudes, beliefs. For it 
has been found that “emotional engagement with the past significantly influences support for 
TJ. The discrete emotions of anger and fear have a larger effect on the desire for 
justice…those individuals who report holding a feeling of indifference toward the regime are 
not neutral…they tend to support a lack of justice mechanisms” (Barcelo, 2018, p.488). 
Although this research by Barcelo (2018) does not include existing policing scholarship, this 
study identifies a possible overlap. Previous policing scholarship has identified “defensive 
solidarity” (Bayley, 1990) as a dynamic in response to external accountability.  
 
9.6.2  Defensive solidarity. 
 
Explaining the response to external criticism, a Police Commissioner in New South Wales 
compared the police to being like a turtle: “If it is bashed about, the turtle simply sucks its 
head, arms and legs into its shell… it does not matter how hard or ferociously you bang on 
top, it remains tucked away from public glare” (Lauer, 1994, p.65 cited by Chan, 1997). This 
phenomenon is one which Bayley (1990) has already observed in international comparative 
research on accountability and oversight of policing. More than an adverse reaction to 
external criticism, it is argued that internal regulation may also be inhibited by external 
accountability : “Read by the police as an indictment, external regulation impinges on police 
pride and self-esteem and confirms their impression that the public does not respect them… 
Defensiveness, riding on embitterment, destroys self-regulation.” (Bayley, 1990, p.178). The 
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effect of external accountability may be “defensive solidarity” within the police (Bayley, 
1990, p.179). It is argued here that this may help to explain differences between Pattenisers 
and Hotspurs. 
Earlier in this study, the socio-historical context for policing reform and a new architecture of 
accountability was outlined in some detail (Chapter 2). Amidst the findings to emerge from 
that was evidence that in the passage of legislation to enact policing reform, the British 
Government significantly diverged from recommendations made by the Patten Commission. 
In particular, it was noted that the former Secretary of State Peter Mandelson inserted the 
RUC into the “title deeds” of the new policing service (HC deb 06 June 2000, vol. 351 
cc177-263, p.184). This intervention was all the more significant since those serving as 
members of the RUC transferred into roles in the new PSNI without any process of lustration. 
Naturally enough, those who transferred from the RUC to the PSNI retained pride in their 
former service under the “old conditions”. Yet, the Patten Commission had been very clear 
that for many in society, “the name of the police is symbolic of a relationship between the 
police, unionism and the British state. The argument about symbols is not an argument about 
policing, but an argument about the constitution” (1999, p.99). The decision by the former 
Secretary of State to disregard this and amend the “title deeds” of the new police service 
reflects a form of embodied contradiction (Chan, 1997, p.54). Importantly, this embodied 
contradiction has come to be embedded and expressed in the culture of policing. 
 
When the HMIC visited PSNI headquarters to carry out an inspection a photograph was 
posted on social media (@HMICcunningham , 04 April 2017). Beside the HMIC and senior 
PSNI officers was a lectern displaying a plaque with an eagle and tourniquet. This emblem is 
also the background image to certificates issued to all PSNI officers for firearms training. The 
eagle and tourniquet emblem is the badge of the RUC branch comprised of Special Branch 
and armed officers which participated in joint ambushes with the British Army during the 
conflict.  During 2017, the PSNI Superintendents Association Northern Ireland (SANI) had 
an internal debate about a change of symbols. SANI has a large membership within the PSNI 
and its symbol is the Harp and Crown crest of the old RUC SANI. During this study, a 
proposal to change the symbol of the SANI was rejected by members (by three votes). 
Elsewhere, the PSNI sports facility at Newforge is still home to the RUC athletic association. 
A proposal to change the name of the association to the PSNI was voted down by members.  
The credit union for police officers is called the “Harp and Crown”, reflecting the RUC cap 
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badge. With its sponsorship of the PSNI Cricket team this cap badge is prominently displayed 
on the team kit and for any teams the Credit Union sponsors. The soccer team logo displays 
the RUC badge and the PSNI crest, along with the founding year of the club as 1956, 45 
years before the PSNI was established. Within the PSNI, there is evidence of debate about 
this. The College Review undertaken in 2016 after Garnerville-gate (see Appendix 1) 
recommended that the military-style parading of probationary officers should be reduced. It 
stopped short of dispensing with the parade ground march for PSNI probationers on their 
graduation day, partly because some senior PSNI officers opposed a change. At PSNI Knock 
Headquarters, the RUC George Cross foundation has an office on site in secure premises. The 
RUCGC foundation is fully funded by the Department of Justice and two of its Board 
members were until recently, members of the NIPB. Moreover, the welcome by the PSNI to 
former members of the RUC extends to social occasions. An annual senior officers‟ dinner 
held in Newforge brings together the PSNI senior executive team (SET) with former chief 
officers in the RUC. At one such dinner, a senior PSNI officer addressed the gathering to 
salute the presence as a “hero” of Raymond White, former head of RUC Special Branch. Mr 
White was chair of the Northern Ireland Retired Police Officers Association (NIRPOA). He 
is an applicant in judicial review proceedings challenging the PONI Loughinisland report, 
discussed earlier, and has taken similar legal action previously. With the exception of the 
RUC GC, none of these examples are linked to the remembrance of those RUC officers  
murdered during the conflict, as mentioned at the outset of this study (Chapter 1). That is 
something on which the Patten Report acknowledged the need for sensitivity (1999, p.98). It 
is not the existence of the RUCGC Foundation which is of note but its co-location at PSNI 
HQ and the role of two of its members on the NIPB. The recurrent theme is an apparent 
allegiance to or fidelity with a past policing regime which is observable and is arguably an 
influential dynamic within the ecological system of policing accountability. 
 
Recent research suggests that an “emotional engagement with the past significantly 
influences support for TJ...” (Barcelo, 2018, p.488).  This may be important in explaining 
divergent values, attitudes and beliefs between Pattenisers and Hotspurs. All of those who 
serve at the highest ranks of the PSNI have previously been officers in the RUC. Other 
officers at middle and senior management who have joined the police service since the PSNI 
was formed have had superiors and mentors who served in the RUC. Strong relations remain 
between present police officers and those who are retired. The prevalence of symbols and 
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emblems related to the RUC noted within the physical environment of the PSNI appear to 
signify and perhaps even reinforce an emotional engagement with the past. That these remain 
so long after policing reform began and are the focus of agitation to retain is also notable. 
Taken together, this does suggest an emotional engagement with the former policing regime 
although testing this was outside the limits of this study. Moreover, other research (Barcelo, 
2018) indicates that an emotional engagement with the past policing regime may impact upon 
attitudes towards accountability in the present. Furthermore, as discussed earlier the absence 
of accountability in the past has heightened the prominence of legacy cases in the present. 
This was captured most succinctly by one interviewee who said: “…it‟s back to the kind of 
concept the Chief (Constable) talks about all the time in terms of the past really being our 
critical incident of today” (PSNI interviewee, 2016).  
Taken separately, these observations each hold potential significance for the explaining the 
findings from this study: embodied contradictions (Chan, 1997)  inserted into the “title 
deeds” of the PSNI; an emotional engagement (Barcelo, 2018) with the past policing regime; 
and the perception of the past as a critical incident for police actors today. Taken together, 
this may engender a “defensive solidarity” (Bayley, 1990) towards accountability. This 
contention finds support in a direct way amidst through the interviews with participants: 
“If anybody thinks there weren‟t wrong things done they weren‟t living in the same 
country as me. But that‟s in the public interest (to disclose). It‟s also in the police 
interest (to disclose). The public would have more confidence in modern day policing 
if there wasn‟t this feeling that they‟re trying to not reveal a murky past. And there‟s 
this sort of legacy of loyalty to officers that served in the past but most of them 
probably don‟t serve to any extent now. I think that‟s an area where they could do 
better. I think they are unnecessarily defensive at times” (NIPB interviewee, 2016). 
Here the interviewee is reflecting on the reasons why difficulties in securing disclosure of 
information from the police continue to be experienced by external civilian oversight bodies. 
However, as the literature and evidence already reviewed reveals, this dynamic may, in part,  
also help to explain the differences in perspective between Hotspurs and Pattenisers.  Having 
attempted to reason why these differences exist, this study argues that accountability and 
external civilian oversight has a distinctive duality in its impact upon policing reform. This 
study suggests that this duality of effect might best be considered as a form of 
„agathakakological‟ accountability.   
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9.6.3  Agathakakological accountability 
 
To explain further, this study has argued that the divergence in perspectives outlined and 
idiosyncratic features of the ecological system of policing accountability in Northern Ireland 
lead to a duality in the impact or effect of external civilian oversight. In simple terms, this 
study contends that the effect of accountability on confidence, legitimacy and trust can be 
both good and bad. Drawing on a word, first coined by 18
th
 century poet Robert Southey 
„agathakakological‟, this thesis presents the concept of „agathakakological accountability‟ as 
an explanation. 
Agathakakological derives from the Greek words agath (meaning good) kako (meaning bad) 
and logos (meaning word). This study argues that accountability and external civilian 
oversight has an agathakakological effect upon policing reform. Accountability can both help 
and hinder as this study shows. In part, this duality of effect relates to the earlier discussion 
about the possible reasons why Pattenisers and Hotspurs diverge in their perspectives. 
Significant differences in values, attitudes and beliefs among elite actors involved in the 
exercise of external civilian oversight can lead to differential impacts on policing reform. 
This dynamic is underscored by the idiosyncratic features of the ecological system of 
policing accountability within Northern Ireland, including co-existing and co-varying forces. 
This contention is supported by other policing scholarship. Both Bayley (1990) and Chan 
(1997) have highlighted the programmes of reform may have unintended or perverse effects. 
One of the circumstances in which unintended consequences may result from reform is where 
reformers give insufficient heed to the wider environment: “change agents may have 
miscalculated the effects of their action or may have been unaware of the other forces that 
were simultaneously acting” (Schein, 1985 cited by Chan, 1997, p.237).   
That is what this study contends. A desire for the peace process to succeed, the overwhelming 
public support for the Good Friday Agreement, and the recognition that policing reform was 
fundamental to both, may have led to a miscalculation of the dynamics at work within the 
ecological system. Indeed, the pace of policing reform over the early years may have raised 
public expectations that the new „Patten Institutions‟ would make past wrongdoing 
accountable. That appears to be reflected by one interviewee quoted earlier speaking about 
the expectation of those in PONI when it opened its doors for the first time: 
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“I suppose we expected a steady flow of people all day. But we soon realised that it 
would be more than that. A queue of people began forming at our front door and I 
think at one stage it formed across the front of the building and onto a side street. I 
also noticed that quite a few of them had bags with them, which turned out to contain 
folders of paperwork which they had amassed about their issues. I remember at one 
stage we had to send out for supplies of tissues as some of the people we were talking 
to had become emotional and tearful” (PONI interviewee, 2016) 
Alongside this, whether as a result or in parallel, is a misalignment of values, attitudes and 
beliefs about accountability and external civilian oversight among and between key actors. 
That misalignment reflects itself in the divergent perspectives of Pattenisers and Hotspurs. 
Yet, it may also have deeper roots in the sense of abandonment or betrayal which appears to 
be part of policing culture in Northern Ireland. As far back as the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 
1986, senior police officers have complained that the “RUC had become a political puppet” 
(Hermon, 1997, p.191). This sentiment of betrayal was reflected in outspoken criticism of 
policing reform by unionist politicians reflected earlier in this thesis (see chapter 2).  Whether 
or not that is a factor, evidence in this study suggests that what is good for accountability and 
policing oversight may also be bad for policing, according to some of those involved in the 
process. In fact, some of those involved expressed a view which captured the complexity of 
this effect. Referring to PONI‟s Loughinisland Report (2016), one participant from a PSNI 
background said there was a feeling of collective responsibility within the PSNI for the 
shortcomings exposed by the report even though these referred to the conduct of the RUC. 
The report (PONI, 2016) provided learning but was also impactful personally and 
organisationally: 
“This is probably my felt experience internally in PSNI which is very real even 
though it‟s got nothing to do with me. So for example when things like Loughinisland 
are reported on, that has an impact on my experience of policing as a police officer in 
that day for me, never mind what other people think about me. Because you can‟t help 
but feel it‟s, well, it‟s not a halfway house policing. Either you‟re in or you‟re out. 
And when you‟re in, you can‟t help but feel a sense of responsibility for stuff like that 
even though you didn‟t have anything to do with it….” (PSNI interviewee, 2016) 
This expresses the sense of being “emotionally engaged” (Barcelo, 2018) in the way someone 
with a background in the PSNI can have a “felt experience” about the conduct of the RUC, 
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which was the subject of criticism in the PONI Loughinisland report (2016). Also, to “feel a 
sense of responsibility” implies a collective responsibility shared by those directly involved 
and the wider police family. This is revealing insight into the linkages which transcend levels 
within the ecological system and how these relations or perceptions may affect the impact of 
external civilian oversight. Responding to the same PONI report, another PSNI interviewee 
suggested that perceptions and emotions of others shape the perspectives of the police:  
“….a lot of members of the wider police family who just feel that basically they‟ve 
been left behind in the peace process, in a way and reengage some of that debate if 
there was a willingness to do that. But I don‟t actually think there is. The report 
basically moved to a position where it‟s saying in the wider meta-narrative terms, 
supporting one narrative over another. And therefore reinforces that black and white 
position of they (RUC) were a malign force designed to do only one thing. And then a 
lot of politicians can then say: well we told you so…  the overwhelming sense was, 
the perception was that the effect that was desired was this visceral public outpouring 
of anger and vindication. It wasn‟t actually a great sense that this was a report that led 
to reform or improvements” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
The identification with the “wider police family” is an insight consistent with the findings 
discussed earlier in relation to a solidarity forged between PSNI officers and former RUC 
officers. The sentiment expressed of “being left behind in the peace process” is one which has 
a resonance with the feeling of betrayal highlighted in relation to policing reform, or being 
used as “a political puppet” as claimed by Hermon (1997). However, what is expressed most 
strongly is a view that accountability and policing oversight is for a purpose other than 
reform or improvements. On this basis, the PONI Loughinisland report is a product of a 
process where the process itself is being assigned an ulterior motive or hidden objective: 
“supporting one narrative over another..” to reinforce the position that the RUC “were a 
malign force designed to do only one thing”. To call into question the actual process of 
accountability and external civilian oversight tends to illustrate this agathakakological effect. 
It reveals a lack of trust between those engaged in the process itself.  This is inimical to the 
“the growth of mutual trust, positive orientation, goal consensus…” which Bronfenbrenner, 
(1976, p.214)   has argued is a precondition for learning, development and change. Of course, 
it might be argued that there were peculiarities about the PONI Loughinisland report which 
led to this negative attribution about the process from which it emerged. However, there is 
evidence within this study that the same belief of unfairness applied to other PONI reports:  
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“If you look at Operation Ballast, Nuala O‟Loan‟s report, that was broadly similar. 
There were not, I don‟t believe there were any prosecutions came out of that report 
either… So again, she has reached conclusions, which she is entitled to as the 
Ombudsman based on the information available, despite the fact that it didn‟t meet the 
threshold for prosecution. So it is a very different approach to the police service who 
can‟t do that. So I think officers sometimes feel aggrieved that it‟s not even the case 
now that you‟re either guilty or innocent in the eyes of the law. You can be innocent 
in the eyes of the law and still be found to be guilty in the court of public opinion 
because the Ombudsman can simply publish their findings and make conclusions on 
the back of that” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
Some PSNI participants were reticent to publicly articulate a negative reaction to the PONI 
report because of concern they could be accused of challenging the Office or its 
independence. For the purpose of this study, it is an important finding to note that such strong 
critical perceptions prevail. Most strikingly is the articulation by one PSNI participant that the 
Loughinisland report was “damaging to confidence among police officers in the service”:  
“What I did see was that it absolutely affected serving officers …the links that were 
made between incidents were not evidentially based. So it does feel like a judgement, 
an opinion, a judgement that has been put together, that is being put out publicly. That 
isn‟t being caveated around presenting evidence, that suggests that‟s what it is. And it 
feels like it is an attack on police legitimacy” (PSNI interviewee, 2016). 
That those elite actors involved in policing should believe that policing accountability may 
delegitimise policing is an example of the agathakakological effect this study postulates. This 
is despite the acceptance by the report by the PSNI Chief Constable (PSNI, 2016, June 9) and 
by the British Prime Minister at that time (Cameron, 2016, July 12).  The reaction of elite 
actors in policing also contrasts with families bereaved in the Loughinisland massacre whose 
complaint to PONI prompted the investigation and ultimately led to the report those families 
welcomed. In the context of wider scholarship this study reveals some of the challenges for 
policing reform. It may well be that these arguable contradictions are specific to the 
ecological system of policing accountability in Northern Ireland, as this study has suggested. 
The Patten Report itself is evidence of the contested legitimacy of policing in Northern 
Ireland.  This study has outlined the socio-historical context for that in detail and equally 
underlined the importance accorded to policing reform in the wider Peace Process. 
228 
 
Accountability and oversight of policing was central to the Patten Commission‟s plan for the 
creating a new policing dispensation which engendered legitimacy, confidence and trust and 
which would be human rights-based and representative of society (ICP, 1999). To a large 
extent that plan has been a success. However, this study suggests contradictions embodied 
inherently within the ecological system of policing accountability, and the political failure to 
address the legacy of the conflict, have hindered the Patten Commission‟s reforms. Some 
scholars have argued that legitimacy of policing and criminal justice is dialogic (Bottoms & 
Tankebe, 2012). Perhaps that is evident in other contexts. However, the context in Northern 
Ireland is one in which society is emerging from a sustained, low intensity, political conflict 
in which there was no effective accountability of the police (Moore and O‟Rawe, 2000). It 
was a conflict in which thousands were killed, many more were injured and the institutions  
of State, including the police, were engaged in physical confrontation, including armed 
action, against the civilian population as well as those involved in paramilitary or proscribed 
organisations. In this specific context, the effect of accountability and external civilian 
oversight may have a duality for policing, both delegitimising and legitimising in the same 
process. Dynamics in the ecological system of triadic accountability (situational; relational & 
transformational) and perspectives, and perhaps also the experiences, of elite actors 
contribute to this duality of effect. It might be wished otherwise and presumably this effect 
was an unintended consequence of reform (Bayley,1990; Chan, 1997). Yet the fact remains 
that this duality of effect as a result of accountability and external civilian oversight reflects 
findings emerging from this study. Moreover, given that legal proceedings about the PONI 
Loughinisland report continue (McCloskey J. 2018, January 26) as this study ends the 
agathakakological effect of this accountability for families already bereaved endures.  
 
9.7  Conclusion 
 
This discussion has outlined an analysis of findings in three sections. Firstly, while still 
exploratory and embryonic, the development of „triadic accountability‟ in this thesis offers a 
useful conceptual framework. Examining time-bound episodes (NIPB) or particular cases 
(PONI) through situational, relational and transformational accountability helps reveal those 
factors which may enable or inhibit the efficacy of external civilian oversight. While this 
modest framework invites further refinement and validation by post-doctoral study and by 
other scholars, the introduction and development of triadic accountability as a multi-level 
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paradigm for investigating these processes from an ecological systems perspective in 
important.  
Secondly, the position assumed by this study from the outset has been that the values, 
attitudes and beliefs of elite actors involved in accountability and external civilian oversight 
interact with possible reform. The study contended that distinct perspectives would be 
evident among and between elite actors in this sample. The findings in this study support that 
contention. Furthermore, the two distinct perspectives, Pattenisers and Hotspurs, have been 
delineated to a large extent along lines of agency affiliation of participants. Areas of 
consensus were found between both perspectives and a minority of interviewees with a 
background in the police shared the perspective of Pattenisers. This appears to be a 
promising basis for further reform. Nonetheless, it is notable that Hotspurs reflects a 
perspective held almost exclusively by interviewees from a police background. Also, there 
are significant areas of divergence between Hotspurs and Pattenisers, which have been 
reviewed and analysed in this chapter. This study suggests this polarisation in perspectives 
between those at senior levels of policing and of policing oversight potentially fetters 
policing reform.  
Finally, this discussion has suggested “challenge fatigue” and / or “defensive solidarity” as 
reasons why these differences in perspective may exist. The concept of “challenge fatigue” 
draws upon existing scholarship about organisational change and the repetitive exposure to 
trauma or grievance which has been found to be part of policing oversight in Northern 
Ireland. Nevertheless, this concept of challenge fatigue is one suggested as an interpretation 
of the findings in this study and the concept itself invites more robust empirical validation. 
There is more evidence for the salience of “defensive solidarity” (Bayley, 1990) in explaining 
the differences in perspective. Evidence of an emotional engagement (Barcelo, 2018) with the 
past policing regime appears to be an especially pertinent finding for helping to explain some 
of the findings in this study which have emerged from a police perspective. However, the 
analysis and interpretation is, perhaps by necessity, post-hoc. As a result, any attribution 
made of defensive solidarity for explaining the differences found between Pattenisers and 
Hotspurs must recognise this limitation. Consequently, it is beyond the scope of this study to 
conclusively explain why differences in perspective may exist. Despite this, it is argued that 
the values, attitudes and beliefs of elite actors interact with accountability and external 
civilian oversight in a way which has an agathakakological effect. In other words, 
accountability and external civilian oversight can be both good and bad for policing reform.   
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Whether this agathakakological accountability is avoidable or amenable to modification is 
beyond the parameters of this particular study but one which could be considered in the 
future. It may be that the idiosyncratic features of the ecological system of policing 
accountability in Northern Ireland make this effect inevitable. Again, that has not been tested 
in this study nor has the possibility that this duality of impact may be ameliorable. In any 
event, the argument central to this study is that in order for accountability and external 
civilian oversight of policing reform to optimise learning and change, then shared values, 
attitudes and beliefs are needed among elite actors. The evidence in this study suggests that 
there is in fact a polarisation of perspectives. This study argues such polarisation inhibits 
potential to maximise the learning from accountability. Instead, accountability and external 





Chapter 10: Restarting „the new beginning‟ of policing. 
 
10.1  Introduction 
 
When the offices of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI) opened for the first 
time in November 2000, the public were waiting for the new beginning to policing 
accountability. As mentioned earlier, the public response was more than PONI anticipated: 
“We had done a media launch of the Office on a Friday, with a plan to open for 
business the following Monday morning. The launch got a lot of media coverage. We 
were in very early on the Monday morning to put the finishing touches to opening the 
Office for the first time to the public. I suppose we expected a steady flow of people 
all day. But we soon realised that it would be more than that. A queue of people began 
forming at our front door and I think at one stage it formed across the front of the 
building and onto a side street. I also noticed that quite a few of them had bags with 
them, which turned out to contain folders of paperwork which they had amassed about 
their issues. I remember at one stage we had to send out for supplies of tissues as 
some of the people we were talking to had become emotional and tearful” (PONI 
interviewee, 2016). 
This story epitomised the challenge facing external civilian oversight in Northern Ireland. 
Past failings in policing and policing oversight, including the legacy of the conflict had, and 
still has, imposed heavily upon the new architecture of accountability from its inception. 
Despite this, the architecture of the Patten institutions and the PSNI has been sustained. That 
might be considered an achievement in itself, especially given the continuing  political 
instability in Northern Ireland. More than a year ago, the power-sharing Executive and local 
Assembly was dissolved by the former Secretary of State on 26
th
 January 2017 (S.I. 2017 
No.32). Since then, successive attempts to restore the local institutions which emerged from 
the Good Friday Agreement (1998) have failed. The latest phase of multi-party talks have 
commenced as this study concludes. With no power-sharing Executive to make decisions, the 
budget for government departments and related agencies, including the agencies in this study,  
have already been set by the former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Resource 
allocation across Departments is being taken forward by the Senior Civil Service without 
input from local Ministers or scrutiny by local Assembly members. Elsewhere, negotiations 
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to finalise Britain‟s exit from the European Union continue and are likely to lead to further 
upheaval within the macro-political environment. The current political breakdown in 
Northern Ireland and prospect of future constitutional and legislative change under Brexit 
threaten to compound the challenges already facing policing and policing oversight.   
As vividly illustrated at the outset of this chapter, the greatest challenge which policing and 
policing oversight currently face is the legacy of the conflict.  Elsewhere in this study, the 
legacy of the conflict was described by one PSNI  interviewee as “the critical incident of 
today”. That “critical incident” is not something for which the Patten institutions were 
designed. It is not something for which participants interviewed in this study were prepared. 
Indeed, neither the Good Friday Agreement (GFA, 1998) nor the Patten Commission (1999) 
proposed a way of dealing with the past. Instead, it was only in recent years that mechanisms 
were agreed under the Stormont House Agreement (SHA, 2014). Yet, with the on-going 
political breakdown in Northern Ireland, there is still no agreement to implement the SHA 
(2014) proposals. In societal terms, it is as if the queue of people standing outside PONI‟s 
offices almost 18 years ago is still waiting.  Given the challenges described, the changes 
ahead , and the findings which have emerged, this study concludes that it is time to refresh 
and recalibrate the Patten Commission‟s proposals for accountability and policing reform. 
 
10.2  Summarising the main findings 
 
At the outset of this study, a series of research questions were posed for this study.  The 
primary research question was: in what way does accountability and external civilian 
oversight impact on policing and policing reform in Northern Ireland?   
 
This study argues that the best way to demonstrate the potential impacts, or otherwise, is 
through the conceptualisation of accountability and external civilian oversight of policing 
reform in Northern Ireland as an ecological system, adapted from Bronfenbrenner‟s EST 
(1979; 1992; 1999; 2009).  In doing so, the study has sought to bridge the apparent 
dichotomy between constructs of institutional and relational accountability which other 
scholars have highlighted (Bovens et al. 2014; Savage, 2013a; Dubnik, 2014b). This 
conceptualisation of an ecological system of policing accountability offers a better possibility 
of identifying and explaining the effect of co-varying and co-existing factors, which may be 
mutually contradictory; and may impede or enhance the efficacy of external civilian 
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oversight. An ecological systems perspective offers to provide a more complete and accurate 
insight into policing and policing accountability and its impacts than binary representations of 
external/internal, or civilian/non-civilian may do. From this perspective, contradictions and 
idiosyncratic variables are accepted as potential sources of rich data within the ecological 
system rather than ontological problems to be ironed out (Zeineddine & Pratto, 2017). The 
findings from this research offer evidence to support this new conceptualisation which the 
study has defined as triadic accountability. It is argued that this has three interactive and 
interdependent dimensions of accountability: situational (s); relational (r); and 
transformational (t). The thesis argues that this is the way that accountability and external 
civilian oversight has impacted on policing and policing reform in Northern Ireland. 
 
The secondary research questions which were posed at the outset of this study were:  
i) what are the values, attitudes and beliefs held by those elite actors involved in external 
civilian oversight about accountability and its impact on policing? 
ii) how do these attitudes differentiate elite actors involved in external civilian oversight?   
iii) and, what are the factors which enable or inhibit the efficacy of external civilian 
oversight? 
 
The answer to questions i) and ii) mirrors results for the results of the two hypothesis for this 
study. Therefore, the response to these are presented together later in this section. The answer 
to question iii) is related back to the new conceptualisation of an ecological system of 
policing accountability, which this study has proposed. Although triadic accountability is a 
new conceptualisation, exploratory research into the three putative dimensions of situational 
(s), relational (r) and transformational (t) offer some key findings in answer to question iii) 
For each dimension, three main features were identified earlier and summarised again here: 
 
Situational accountability „s‟ 
 
Findings derived from participants‟ responses for this dimension highlighted three significant 
factors or features which are relevant to the situational accountability. Firstly, the socio-
historical context and legislative framework within which accountability and external civilian 
oversight operates is idiosyncratic. As this chapter has already reaffirmed, this idiosyncratic 
context and environment requires a bespoke approach to accountability and external civilian 
oversight.  Secondly, the pre-eminent feature of effective accountability and external civilian 
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oversight is independence. Independence includes not only the autonomy of the institutions 
but also the exercise of powers of oversight, and the outlook and attitude of those who lead 
arrangements for policing oversight. Thirdly, the evidence in this study suggests that an 
overarching and effective approach to oversight of intelligence must be part of policing 
accountability. Without this, conflicting agency interests outside the realm of policing 
oversight may impinge upon and risk undermining external civilian oversight.  
 
Relational accountability „r‟ 
 
Three main features of the putative dimension of relational accountability were suggested by 
participants‟ responses in this study. First and foremost, was information sharing. 
Information-sharing, also described as disclosure, is the lifeblood of accountability. Without 
unfettered information-sharing, policing and policing oversight is a site of perpetual 
contestation, as some of the findings from this study confirm, Secondly, the leadership and 
the character and style of engagement in accountability and external civilian oversight may 
be enhanced or undermined by individual differences. Some of the main turning points in 
external civilian oversight of policing in Northern Ireland during the course of this study have 
occurred because of a change in the individuals involved. Thirdly, the inter-agency handling 
by policing and policing oversight of critical incidents may have a disproportionate influence 
upon relational accountability. This may have intra-agency, inter-agency and wider societal 
implications. Therefore, the third and final feature which findings suggest may be vital in 
enabling or impairing relational accountability is the approach to critical incidents. 
 
Transformational accountability „t‟ 
 
The final dimension of triadic accountability has been proposed as transformational (t). As 
the literature reviewed elsewhere in this study reveals, the assumption of policy-makers and 
researchers is that accountability enables learning and reform. Participants‟ responses in this 
study provided some evidence to support this. As such the first feature of transformational 
accountability is improvement. Secondly, the evidence available to this study suggested that 
where learning and reform or improvement has occurred, it has often been incremental and 
iterative, through exchange and collaboration between the agencies involved. There is clearly 
much room for improvement in this. As suggested earlier, one starting place would be to 
ensure that the computer-based tracking systems on policy reform are iterative. Therefore, 
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this study proposes a second feature of transformational accountability is that it is iterative. 
Finally, an abundance of literature reviewed in this study suggests that the conditions for 
reform are optimised when the internal conditions are conducive to learning and change. The 
kernel of this is that change and reform is adopted and internalised by those involved. 
Without shared values, attitudes and beliefs, proposals for reform especially from external 
oversight bodies are likely to meet with some degree of internal resistance. Forging shared 
values, attitudes and beliefs between those engaged in policing and policing oversight could 
not be more fundamental to enabling transformational accountability. Therefore, the third 
feature of transformation accountability which this study suggests is : internalised  
 
Taken together these findings answer question iii). From an ecological systems perspective, 
these findings are summarised as: „s‟ (idiosyncratic; independence; intelligence); „r‟ 
(information-sharing; individuals; incidents); and „t‟(improvement; iterative; internalised). 
Therefore, this study proposes these to be the nine „I‟s of triadic accountability. 
 
This study also tests two hypotheses concerning participant‟s perspectives on accountability 
and external civilian oversight for policing reform (Chapter 8). These hypotheses are: 
 
H1 - that at least two distinct social perspectives are held by participants in this study; 
H2 - that these social perspectives may be differentiated according to agency affiliation. 
 
This study found empirical evidence which would tend to support both H1 and H2. In 
exploring the similarities and differences in the values, attitudes and beliefs of participants 
this study provides an answer to research questions i) and ii). Two distinct perspectives were 
found in the sample for this study named as Pattenisers and Hotspurs. These align closely 
although not exclusively with differences in agency affiliation. Thirty-five participants with a 
background in either PONI or NIPB and eight participants with a background in the PSNI 
and comprised the perspective named as Pattenisers. Sixteen participants with a background 
in the PSNI and two participants with a background in NIPB comprised the perspective 
named as Hotspurs. Both perspectives shared some common beliefs about the value of 
accountability and policing reform in Northern Ireland. However, Pattenisers and Hotspurs 




This study has suggested that the idiosyncratic features of accountability and external civilian 
oversight have created embodied contradictions (Chan, 1997) which create the conditions 
where these differences in perspective have emerged. The study has argued the effect of 
either: a) defensive solidarity (Bayley, 1990); or b) the postulated influence of „challenge 
fatigue‟ foster these differences in perspective. As a result, the effect of accountability and 
external civilian oversight on policing reform is both positive and negative for elite actors and 
for policing reform. This study posits this phenomenon as agathakakological accountability.  
 
10.3  Limitations of research 
 
Every effort has been expended to ensure this research has been completed without 
compromise to personal integrity or academic rigour. However, there are significant 
limitations to the study which must equally be acknowledged. 
The decision to adopt an interdisciplinary framework, albeit grounded in the discipline of 
social and political psychology, was especially challenging. Theoretical and conceptual 
debates and differences within disciplines did not easily yield to comparative analysis, nor 
did they give up intra-disciplinary disputes. The apparent virtue of an interdisciplinary 
approach does not sit comfortably with these theoretical and conceptual dilemmas. Therefore, 
the broad perspective brought to reviewing public accountability and policing reform leaves 
many questions and contradictions unrreconciled, as yet.  
Sampling for this study was by necessity purposive. That is not only compatible with but also 
supported by previous Q methods studies (eg: O‟Connor, 2013; Ratcliffe et al. 2014). 
However, purposive sampling carries with a selection bias. The fact that discussions between 
the researcher and agencies led to recruitment of participants may have helped to guard 
against further selection bias. Within the confines of a study of this kind, an earnest 
endeavour was made to secure a broad cross-section of elite actors, past and present, from 
within policing and within policing oversight. Nevertheless, the non-randomised nature of the 
sample does tend to caveat findings from the standpoint of generalizability. 
The context-sensitive nature of the findings in this study does tend to inhibit the 
generalizability of these findings. Of course, that is consistent with the conceptual framework 
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employed but whether or not this study could be replicated may reflect on the validity of the 
findings from this study. 
Being unable to examine the audit trail of exchanges between agencies limited the degree to 
which definitive conclusions could be derived from documents. As sensitive research which 
at times covered matters alive and ongoing for the agencies, it would have been insightful to 
have real-time access to meetings and exchanges. In the end, access of this kind would have 
gone beyond the boundaries of ethical approval and have transgressed agency protocols. Yet 
there is a limit to reliance upon the views and observations of others, albeit participants in the 
study. Self-presentation or hindsight bias is a risk in such instances where the participant may 
wish to reference him or herself in a way which justifies his or her own role in an episode. 
The Q statements were not subject to pilot-testing. An opportunity for the statements to be 
trialled with a group of police officers not part of the sample was lost when the group 
cancelled. With a field trip to London to gather data the following month, the session could 
not be rearranged beforehand. Such a trial may have helped improve clarity and reliability of 
the Q set chosen.  
While the two factor model derived from the Q sort results in Pattenisers and Hotspurs, there 
are limitations to this. Of the 62 participants, responses of 61 participants load on one 
perspective or the other to a level of statistical significance. However, this accounts for 
around 50% of variance in responses. Although this is sufficient, it means that a large amount 
of variance within the response of this sample is not explained by the model. This may reflect 
the nuance of individual differences which statistical solutions sometimes struggle to capture. 
Most participants loaded to some extent on both factors and this was especially the case in the 
2 Hotspurs who had a background in ECO. This also illustrates the difficulty arising from 
maintaining anonymity of participants. To explore and attempt to explain the single 
participant who did not load on either factor would be to divulge information which may 
transgress research Ethics.  Similar difficulties beset interpretation of the cross-over of 
participants from ECO bodies to Hotspurs and 8 participants from PSNI to Pattenisers.  
Finally, the interpretation of findings is always fraught with potential for subjectivity. Effort 
has been made to triangulate findings from the Q sort responses with participants‟ interviews. 
However, there is a risk of confirmation bias with interpretation of results. Attempts have 
been made to mitigate this risk by reference to wider scholarship and comparable studies. 
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Yet, the iterative nature of this process and the post-hoc consideration of concepts such as 
„challenge fatigue‟ invite further validation through research. 
 
10.4  Future Research  
 
For the purpose of understanding how accountability operates and how it may affect 
performance and learning, policing presents great research possibilities. Exploring the 
development of conceptual mapping, reframing expectations or fostering shared values and 
beliefs are all avenues for future research. Whilst this research postulates that realigning the 
ecology and the attitudes of key actors would optimise the learning and change from 
accountability, that needs to be tested. This study argues that by fostering shared values, 
attitudes and beliefs about accountability and external civilian oversight among all those 
involved; and recalibrating the dimensions of triadic accountability, the potential for learning 
and improvement will be optimised. In those circumstances, it would be revealing to track 
through single case study research the handling of a file or investigation from beginning to 
end. That would have required a different form of ethical approval than granted to this study. 
In particular, to explore the views and experiences of those who are victims or complainants 
compared with officials and with police officers may be revealing. Research of this kind 
invites consideration of theoretical research on procedural justice or fairness. It may also 
permit concepts such as challenge fatigue, malicious compliance and defensive solidarity to 
be validated or redefined. In fact, it may be possible to undertake experimental research 
which would permit the development of measures in these respects, as research has already 
done with concepts like compassion fatigue. 
Perhaps the most promising area for future research would be to explore the application of 
triadic accountability to other performance contexts. For this study, it would be inviting to 
offer a visual, animated model of the ecological system of policing accountability. In this 
way, the graphic representation of triadic accountability might look more like a „swiss roll‟ or 
kaleidoscope. With changes over time, the relative significance of different dynamics in the 
eco-system would be expected to alter and move, rather like a solar system. In this way, the 
temporal dimension or chronosystem for policing accountability might be more accurately 
represented. More importantly, those aspects of the system around which other factors or 
239 
 
variables orbit, or the dynamics which act like a centre of gravity for the eco-system might 
become more easily identified. This in turn may facilitate further change and reform. 
There are also questions emerging from wider developments within the ecological system of 
policing which invite further research. With technological change, policing involves drones, 
body-worn video and cyber-security all of which have come on-stream since the Patten 
Commission reported almost two decades ago. In the USA, police deployed a robot to use 
lethal force against a sniper. In such an episode, it is unclear whether accountability for use of 
force is attributable to the robot or the officer controlling it. External civilian oversight is not 
yet aligned to the pace and development of such technological changes.  
 
10.5  Another new beginning. 
 
This chapter opened with a vignette about the expectations and limits of accountability as a 
concept. This may be especially important after conflict: “Clearly in such contexts, shared 
values may be in short supply and… skilful negotiation by power-holders might be required 
if the legitimacy of the official law is to be fostered” (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012, p.144). 
As negotiations on policing reform in Northern Ireland moved swiftly from one stage to the 
next, the establishment of institutions appears to have taken precedence. Less attention 
appears to have been paid to the prevailing contradictions within the wider socio-legal and 
political ecological system. Even less attention appears to have been given to the negotiation 
and enculturation of shared values, beliefs and attitudes towards accountability. This is 
reflected in the divergent perspectives uncovered through this study. External civilian 
oversight is only one instrument for policing reform. It is most effective “when these 
processes work together and reinforce one another” (Millar, 2002, p.22). This study found 
that to optimise ECO, the situational, relational and transformational strands of accountability 
need realigned. In addition, greater convergence in the shared values, beliefs and attitudes of 
key actors in ECO is required to achieve reform through accountability.  The corollary to this 
is a new process to reform the policing reforms to take account of what has occurred in the 
intervening time. Such an endeavour may be serendipitous if progress is made politically to 
dealing with the past and the legacy of the conflict outside the external civilian oversight 
bodies. Those conditions may present an opportunity to realign the dimensions of triadic 
accountability (s, r & t) and cultivate stronger shared values, attitudes and beliefs among elite 
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actors in policing. At that juncture, reviewing and refreshing the proposals which the Patten 
Commission first offered for a new beginning to policing could help revitalise momentum for 
policing reform. From an ecological systems standpoint, the timing of this is important. As 
evident almost twenty years ago when the “new beginning to policing” was heralded, the “old 
conditions” and “a new order of things” remain in contest. The difference now is that the 
“new order” ushered in the aftermath of the Patten Commission is no longer new.  
If Machiavelli‟s prescient analysis is correct, then reforming the reforms will not be easy.  








Appendix 1 : 2014-2017 : Critical Incidents or Milestones in Policing Accountability 
This summary is intended to help elaborate on the ecological system within which policing 
accountability operated in Northern Ireland during this study. The summary prioritises 
incidents or episodes involving PSNI, NIPB and /or PONI. This is especially germane to 
fieldwork and the interpretation of findings. It helps to contextualise the findings which 
emerge from this study. Therefore, academic research, investigative reports by media and 
public events relating to policing accountability which have occurred during this period are 
not included here. Changes in senior leadership in any of the three specified agencies during 
this time period is noted. Also included are reports or responses to deaths or critical incidents. 
2014 (during this time there were 27 reports by PONI – called itself in several times 
including case of video footage of woman in road in Derry 19/03/2014) 
 
 PSNI referred Abuse of Process judgement in the John Downey court case to PONI  
(27/02/2014) 
 
 PONI reported in relation to the death of Andrew Lorimer (February 2012) after a 
referral by the PSNI Chief Constable. PONI found that a police officer failed to 
provide police patrols with all relevant information but that this failing did not 
contribute to the death of Mr Lorimer (27/02/2014) 
 
 PONI reported that Mr David McGowan died in police custody (30/05/2014) in 
Lisburn PSNI station. An investigation into the circumstances began by PONI.  
 
 NIPB announced appointment under s.35 of the Police (NI) Act 2000 of George 
Hamilton as the new PSNI Chief Constable (29/05/2014). The appointment was 
approved by the Minister of Justice with the date of commencement of the new Chief 
Constable from 30/06/2014. 
 
 PONI initiated Judicial Review proceedings against the PSNI for refusing to provide 
100 pieces of information relating to PONI investigations into circumstances 
surrounding more than 60 deaths. (03/06/2014) 
 
 PONI published a statutory report (under s.62, Police (NI) Act 1998) into the death of 
Paul Somerville (January 2012) in police custody after a referral from the PSNI. 
PONI reported that Mr Somerville had fallen from the PSNI van and sustained head 
injuries from which he later died. PONI made recommendations for improvements to 
cell vans which the PSNI implemented. Disciplinary action against two police officers 




 Northern Ireland Community Safety College (NICSC) programme board tells the 
Assembly Justice Committee that it plans to proceed with a new joint training college 
for PSNI and emergency services at Desertcreat (June 2014). 
 
 PONI published a statutory report (under s.62, Police (NI) Act 1998) into a complaint 
that RUC had colluded with loyalists in the attempted murder of Gerry Adams (14
th
 
March 1994). PONI found no evidence to support the complaint. (19/06/2014) 
 
 PONI published a statutory report (under s.62, Police (NI) Act 1998) into the 
circumstances surrounding the loyalist murder of RUC sergeant Joseph Campbell 
(25/02/1977). PONI concluded several RUC officers at the most senior levels, 
including Special Branch, failed to act upon intelligence which would have prevented 
the killing of Mr Campbell and withheld information and evidence from follow-up 
investigations into his killing. (27/06/2014). 
 
 NIPB Performance Committee was informed by the PSNI Chief Constable that he had 
agreed to disclose up to 100 pieces of sensitive information of relevant to ongoing 
investigations by PONI into more than 60 murders. Judicial Review proceedings by 
PONI against the PSNI ceased (02/09/2014). 
 
 PONI published a statutory report (under s.62, Police (NI) Act 1998) into the 
disappearance and subsequent death of Mr Jonathan Magee (29/01/2011). PONI made 
recommendations on police policy and procedures, similar to those made in an earlier 
report (February 2012). PONI also recommended misconduct proceedings against 8 
police officers which PSNI accepted (01/09/2014). 
 
 PONI issued a public appeal for information following the death of two members of 
the public in road traffic collision with a police car  (30/09/2014). 
 
 NIPB announced appointment under s.35 of the Police (NI) Act 2000 of Drew Harris 
as the new PSNI Deputy Chief Constable. The appointment was approved by the 
Minister of Justice (15/09//2014). 
 
 PONI published a statutory report (under s.62, Police (NI) Act 1998) into the referral 
by the PSNI of the John Downey trial judgment. PONI reported flaws in the PSNI 
approach to Operation Rapid. (20/10/2014). 
 
 PONI published a statutory report (under s.62, Police (NI) Act 1998 into a referral by 
the PSNI relating to circumstances surrounding the Omagh Bomb (August 1998). 
PONI investigated the relationship between RUC Special Branch and the British 
Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ). PONI confirmed that RUC 
Special Branch did not share some information with police investigating the Omagh 
Bomb but believed that was within the law at that time (Interception of 
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Communications Act 1985). PONI reported that “I do not have the authority to 
investigate matters concerning organisations other than the RUC/PSNI” (2014, p.15) . 
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 now governs the use of such 
intelligence but constraints are “arguably now even more restrictive although there are 
different views on this” (2014, p.15). PONI also state GCHQ is empowered by the 
Intelligence Services Act 1994 to constrain use of any intercept material shared with 
police (30/10/2014). 
 
 PSNI state that, as the lead partner in the project team for the NICSC at Desertcreat 
that it would be prudent not to proceed with the project amidst concerns about the 
current financial environment. (03/11/2014) 
 
 PSNI brief NIPB monthly meeting on proposals to establish a new Legacy 
Investigations Branch (LIB) to discharge its investigative responsibilities for legacy 
cases, after the dissolution of the Historical Enquiries Team (HET) (04/12/2014). 
 
 PONI published a statutory report (under s.62, Police (NI) Act 1998 into the murder 
of Arthur Rafferty (August 1974). PONI found many failures in the RUC 
investigation which led to the destruction or loss of important evidence. PONI also 
found no evidence that police had information beforehand to prevent the attack or 
colluded with the killers to protect them (04/12/2014). 
 
 NIPB welcomed a report published by CJINI on operation of PCSPs (04/12/2014). 
 






 The DPP required the PSNI to carry an investigation into the actions of MI5 and 
referred the actions of police officers to PONI for investigation.  The investigations 
concern the actions of former RUC and MI5 personnel in relation to withholding, 
concealing and destroying surveillance evidence. The DPP said : “I have carefully 
considered the matters disclosed by the CCRC (Criminal Case Review Commission) 
in relation to the events at Ballynery North Road on 24
th
 November 1982 and the 
investigations carried out by Mr John Stalker and Mr Colin Sampson. In addition, I 
have considered the ruling of the Court of Appeal which quashed the conviction of 
Mr. Martin McCauley. …The actions of police and security service personnel in 
relation to the concealment and destruction of potential evidence requires further 





 DoJ appointed Barney McGahan as an interim Chief Executive to the NIPB following 
the retirement of Mr. Sam Pollock after 3 years in post (January 2015). 
 
 NIPB Performance Committee met and expressed concern about PSNI‟s continued 
delays in completing disclosures for several outstanding inquests. The Committee 
chair said : “There has been significant public commentary around delays  in the PSNI 
disclosure of materials for inquest cases, particularly in relation to the Sean Brown 
case and the Stalker  / Sampson cases. Following a hearing in the Coroner‟s court 
today, in relation to the murder of Sean Brown, Committee members are becoming 
increasingly concerned regarding the lack of progress made by the PSNI in this 
process” (15/01/2015). 
 
 NIPB independent member Mrs Joan O Hagan brought libel action against two fellow 
independent members of the NIPB Stuart McDonnell and Brian Rea. The legal action 
before the High Court concerned “wrongful and unfounded allegations” against Mrs 
O Hagan which had occasioned psychiatric upset. Mr Justice Stephens was told that it 
was hoped that the terms of an agreement could be signed in the near future 
(30/01/2015). 
 
 NIPB Performance committee questioned the PSNI Deputy Chief Constable in 
connection with delays in disclosure to coronial inquests. The Committee Chair said 
members remained seriously concerned around the damage this issues causes to 
confidence in policing and the Coronial process. (19/02/2015) 
 
 NIPB published a report by its independent Human Rights advisor monitoring the 
PSNI performance under the Human Rights Act 1998. The report records the PSNI‟s 
implementation of 210 recommendations made by NIPB since the first annual Human 
Rights report and makes 9 new recommendations (20/02/2015). 
 
 NIPB agreed to ask the Minister of Justice to commission HMIC / CJINI to undertake 
a review of the PSNI‟s roles in disclosures to the Coroner‟s court (05/03/2015) 
 
 The British Secretary of State introduced an Order in Council permitting the National 
Crime Agency (NCA) to become operational in the north of Ireland (03/03/2015) 
 
 PONI powers extended by agreement with British Home Office to investigate 
complaints and concerns about the conduct of Immigration and Customs officials. The 
powers are confined to „serious‟ matters and do not include treatment of immigrants 
by a third party contractor (16/03/2015). 
 
 DoJ and the Department of Health agree to recommendation from the NICSC 




 NIPB Performance Committee is briefed by the PSNI on the findings of a pilot 
scheme of Body Worn Video and plans to roll-out the technology (23/03/2015) 
 
 NIPB met with Director General of the British National Crime Agency (NCA) to 
discuss arrangements for NIPB‟s oversight of NCA and MoU for this (01/05/2015). 
 
 PONI powers extended to investigate all complaints against NCA officers operating 
in Northern Ireland. NIPB also announce its role in oversight of the NCA 
(20/05/2015). 
 
 NIPB published an update report on its 2012 thematic review of PSNI interaction with 
people who identify as LGB and / or Transgender. NIPB had made 18 
recommendations to the PSNI which were accepted (22/06/2015) 
 
 NIPB confirmed the appointment of nine independent members by the Minister of 
Justice for a term of either 3 or 4 years commencing from 1
st
 July 2015. Four of the 
nine independent members had served previously on NIPB with the longest serving 
since 2009. For a minimum of four days per month, each independent member 
receives £15k p/a. (30/06/2015) 
 
 NIPB interim Chief Executive exchanges correspondence with DoJ permanent 
secretary about changes to the role and remit of the NIPB‟s independent expert 
Human Rights adviser (June 2015), later disclosed under FoI. 
 
 NIPB received a report from HMIC following up on its inspection of the PSNI‟s 
Historical Enquiries Team (HET). The initial report was published in 2013 and the 
NIPB had set up a working group to track implementation of the findings. In July 
2014, the follow-up report was commissioned by the Minister of Justice following a 
request by the NIPB. NIPB said : “substantial progress has been made with 10 of the 
20 initial recommendations fully implemented, however Board members are 
concerned that there are a number of outstanding areas. These concerned : 
independence of staff / officers involved in historical enquiries; management of 
intelligence; and openness and accountability. (24/06/2015) 
 
 NIPB held a meeting at which it expressed concern at the decision by the Minister for 
Justice to refuse a request by NIPB to commission HMIC to carry out a review of the 
PSNI‟s role in supporting legacy inquests (30/07/2015) 
 
 PONI reported that the death of a woman in a road traffic collision (December 2011) 
was not caused by PSNI. PONI recommended disciplinary action against two police 





 NIPB chair and vice chair met the new US consul general (25/08/2015). 
 
 PSNI recruitment events at several venues are subject of security alerts (09/10/2015) 
 
 NIPB‟s Performance Committee met with PSNI and with the chair of the Police 
Federation (PFNI) about a police workforce survey by PFNI (15/10/2015) 
 
 PONI forwarded an interim report to the PPS regarding police conduct in 
circumstances surrounding 24 murders attributed to the IRA‟s „Internal Security 
Team‟ and the activities of a British agent codenamed „Stakeknife‟. PONI‟s report 
identified potential culpability of not only police officers but members of other British 
Intelligence agencies and members of the public. The PPS referred these onto the 
PSNI for investigation (21/10/2015).  
 
 NICSC programme board submit plans for Desertcreat to be set aside for a new 
training facility for the Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service (NIFRS). PSNI 
involvement in the new training college is withdrawn and it is proposed to allocate 
around £20m for upgrading existing facilities at PSNI Garnerville (27/10/2015). 
 
 NIPB announce that the process to recruit a new Chief Executive will be restarted 
after the first process collapsed contentiously (Belfast Telegraph, 07/11/2015). 
 
 PONI reported into events surrounding the murder of Mr Kevin McDaid (May 2009). 
PONI found no evidence that the PSNI failed to act to prevent the attack on Mr 
McDaid or had permitted sectarian violence (12/11/2015). 
 
 NIPB met with the UN Special Rapporteur Pablo de Greiff to assist his investigation 
into „truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence‟ (12/11/2015). 
 
 PONI published a statutory report (under s.62, Police (NI) Act 1998  into events 
surrounding a bomb attack on PSNI Constable Peadar Heffron (08/01/2010). PONI 
reported that insufficient evidence had been found that the PSNI had prior information 
which might have prevented the attack. PONI also recommended disciplinary action 
against four officers in PSNI C3 intelligence for failings in the follow-up 
investigation. PONI summarised a dispute within senior levels of the PSNI about the 
recommended disciplinary action against the two officers (Detective 
Superintendents). The result was the level of sanction was reduced by the PSNI 
against these officers and discipline the other two officers remained outstanding 
(18/12/2015). 
 
 NIPB held a meeting with PSNI to question the Chief Constable and Deputy Chief 
Constable about the PONI report about the bomb attack on Peadar Heffron. NIPB said 
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: “..this report highlighted a failure which affected the momentum of the investigation 
and has proven to be publicly and professionally embarrassing for the service. This 
was acknowledged and accepted by the Chief Constable. The Chief Constable has 
been asked by the Board to consider if there are any further measures which now need 
to be taken on the back of the PONI report and the Board has also asked its Human 
Rights advisor to conduct a review of arrangements.” (22/12/2015). 
 
 PPS confirmed that no-one would be prosecuted in connection with an investigation 
into the awarding of PSNI vehicle contracts. Offences under investigation included 
allegations of bribery and misconduct in public office involving a total of nine people, 




 British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Theresa Villiers made a special 
keynote address at Ulster University challenging PONI‟s role in legacy investigations 
including Loughinisland. Ms Villiers‟ Office had asked that retired police officers, 
police staff associations and relatives of former RUC officers who had been killed 
during the conflict be special guests at the event. Ms Villiers claimed investigations 
into legacy cases, including those by PONI, were part of a “pernicious counter-
narrative” which was unfairly critical of the role played by State agencies in the 
conflict. (January 2016) 
 
 PSNI Chief Constable rejected allegations that the RUC had prior knowledge of the 
Shankill Bomb in 1993 which killed 9 people (BBCNI, 27/01/2016). PSNI refuted the 
claims again at the public accountability session of the NIPB monthly meeting 
(05/02/2016). PONI had already announced investigation into a complaint following 
newspaper claims a police informer had passed on information prior to the bomb onto 
the RUC. (Irish News, 26/01/2016) 
 
 PONI published a statutory report (under s.62, Police (NI) Act 1998 into the 
disappearance and death of Mr Gerard Hampson (November 2007). PONI‟s report 
was completed in October 2012 but not published at the time as one of PONI‟s 
recommendations was that the PSNI commission a „full structured review into the 
circumstances of Mr. Hampson‟s death. PONI‟s report also recommended 
disciplinary action against eight officers. PSNI accepted the recommendation in 
relation two officers and downgraded the sanction recommended by PONI in relation 
to the other six officers (26/01/2016). 
 
 Master Bell issued a judgement dismissing application for an Order on PSNI to make 
discovery in Loughgall killings but criticised the PSNI “estimate that the discovery is 
likely to take „many months‟ is unfortunately vague…the lack of more detail as to the 




 NIPB held its first public meeting with the Director of NCA director to receive her 
report on the operation and performance of NCA in the north of Ireland (03/03/2016).  
 
 NIPB and PSNI go to Washington, USA for a scheduled programme of events and 
engagements ahead of St Patricks |Day (14/03/2016). 
 
 NIPB published the Policing Plan for 2016/17 and a report entitled Strategic 
Outcomes for Policing in Northern Ireland 2016/2020. NIPB also published the 
annual report by its independent Human Rights adviser (07/04/2016).  
 
 NIPB appointed a new Chief Executive (16/05/2016). 
 
 PONI published a statutory report (under s.62, Police (NI) Act into the loyalist murder 
of six men in the Heights Bar, Loughinisland (18/06/1994). PONI found serious 
failings by the police which, when viewed collectively, revealed that “collusion was a 
significant feature of the Loughinisland murders”. During the tenure of the previous 
Police Ombudsman, PONI had published a report in 2011 into the same incident 
which this was subject to legal challenge by the relatives of those murdered. When the 
new Police Ombudsman was appointed he agreed to the 2011 report being quashed 
and commissioned a new investigation into the Loughinisland massacre (09/06/2016). 
In immediate response to the PONI report, the PSNI Chief Constable apologised for 
the police shortcomings and for collusion (BBCNI, 09/06/2016). Several days later, 
the PSNI challenged PONI to produce arrests and bring police officers before the 
courts to substantiate collusion claims (BBCNI Spotlight, 13/06/16). 
 
 PSNI announce Operation Kenova led by Bedfordshire Chief Constable Jon Boutcher, 
as an investigation into the alleged activities of an alleged British agent codenamed 
„Stakeknife‟. The Britsh agent is alleged to have worked with the Brttish Armys 
intelligence Force Research Unit (FRU and to have been connected with the 
commission of serious crimes including murder. The PSNI Chief Constable George 
Hamilton made the announcement a day after the PONI report into the Loughinisland 
murders to avoid a clash. He said: “Chief Constable Boutcher will have the delegated 
authority of me as the Chief Constable of the PSNI.” Operation Kenova is based in 
London and staffed with officers with no connection to the police in the north of 
Ireland, the British Army or MI5. Any evidence under-covered by Operation Kenova 
of misconduct by police will be referred to PONI via the PSNI DCC (10/06/2016) 
 
 NIPB chair, vice chair and officials join PSNI for breakfast ahead of the policing 
operation surrounding the annual Orange Order marches (12/07/2016). 
 
 PSNI Chief Constable informs NIPB of allegations that a number of police recruits 
may have been cheating in an entry exam. NIPB convened a special meeting with 
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PSNI about its investigation into the incident (16/06/2016). The associated 
controversy (Garnerville-gate) triggered a wider review agreed by PSNI with NIPB of 
police training at Garnerville (August, 2016). 
 
 PONI reported on the death of a woman after police contact (February 2014) 
following a referral from the PSNI Chief Constable. PONI recommended disciplinary 
action, accepted by the PSNI against two officers for failing to alert colleagues that 
the woman had sustained a head injury (23/06/2016). 
 
 NIPB welcomes publication of two new HMIC reports about the PSNI (04/08/2016) 
 
 NIPB hosted a conference about the 2015 annual report by the independent Human 
Rights adviser (07/09/2016). 
 
 PONI reported on a finding of misconduct by a police officer who had acted contrary 
to advice from the PPS when he gave a man accused of assault an immediate caution 
(June 2015). The PPS asked PONI to carry out an independent investigation into the 
conduct of the police officer. No recommendation for disciplinary action was made by 
PONI because PSNI Discipline Branch had already sanctioned the officer 
(22/09/2016). 
 
 PONI reported on the discharge of a firearm by a police officer (May 2015) in which 
the officer wounded herself. PONI found no evidence of misconduct but made 
recommendations in relation to PSNI firearms training, including the holstering of 
weapons. PSNI accepted the recommendations (06/10/2016). 
 
 PONI published a statutory report (under s.62, Police (NI) Act into the death of John 
Hemsworth (January 1998) after an alleged assault by police officers (July 1997). 
Following an inquest finding in 2011 that it was highly probable one or more RUC 
officers inflicted the injuries on Mr Hemsworth which led to his death, the PSNI 
referred the matter to PONI for investigation. PONI noted that whilst some of the 
police officers on duty at the time of the incident had since retired, others remain 
within the PSNI. PONI expressed concern that “throughout the course of three 
investigations and an inquest no officer who was present has been able to recall the 
incident” (24/11/2016). 
 
 NIPB co-hosted a conference with the PSNI and Queens University Belfast about 
future challenges for policing in the north of Ireland (02/11/2016). 
 
 NIPB held a special meeting (10/11/16) to consider final plans to implement 
recommendations arising from the College review of Garnerville and the 
arrangements for the student officer training programme. Subsequently, NIPB 
250 
 
announced approval for the PSNI student officer intakes to recommence 
(01/12/2016). 
 
 NIPB welcome the appointment of former PSNI ACC Will Kerr by the NCA. After 
commencing employment Tribunal proceedings against NIPB following his non-
selection by the NIPB to the post of PSNI DCC, Mr Kerr was awarded undisclosed 
compensation. NIPB later agreed Mr Kerr‟s secondment to NCA. (06/12/2016) 
 
2017 
 NIPB delegated its statutory functions and responsibilities to the chair, vice-chair and 
Chief Executive. DoJ extended the term of office of NIPB‟s chair, vice chair & 
independent members and their remuneration (February 2017). 
 
 PSNI officer convicted and sentenced to 12 month conditional discharge for 
perverting course of justice in a RTC following an investigation by PONI 
(24/03/2017). 
 
 Northern Ireland Retired Police Officers Association (NIRPOA) (R.White, former 
Head of RUC Special Branch & R.Hawthorne) are granted leave to judicially review 
against the publication the Loughinisland report by PONI. 
 
 Maguire J. ruled (23/03/2017 : Bell v PONI & DoJ [NIQB 38]) that the Department of 
Justice was acting unlawfully by failing to provide PONI with sufficient resources to 
discharge its duties : “The present case is one of systemic and persistent underfunding 
which is disabling the Police Ombudsman, not in one but in a range of case, and not 
in one lone period but over a period of years now..”  
 
 PONI reported on conspiracy to pervert the course of justice by a police officer in 
relation to a road traffic collision after a referral from the PSNI. PSNI reviewed a case 
file in March 2012 which had already been before the courts before referring the 
matter to PONI for investigation. PONI forwarded a file to the PPS resulting in the 
officer being prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to a 12 month conditional discharge 
(24/03/2017). 
 
 PSNI and MI5 imposed a unilateral moratorium on the disclosure of all information to 
PONI and a former PONI investigator is arrested in England about alleged leaks 
(April 2017) 
 
 Police Federation conference hears strident public criticism of PONI who attended the 




 PSNI Superintendents vote to retain the original emblem of the RUC for the 
Superintendents Association of Northern Ireland (SANI) (May / June 2017) 
 
 NIPB host the first in a series of seminars about policing issues (05/06/2017). 
 
 NIPB published a thematic review of Race Hate Crime and policing. The report which 
was authored by the NIPB‟s independent Human Rights adviser made 14 
recommendations about improvement in PSNI response (28/06/2017). 
 
 PONI opened an investigation into a news report (Irish News, 25/07/2017) and 
complaint of wrongdoing by PSNI officers in trying to recruit an informer. 
(26/07/2017) 
 
 PONI reported finding misconduct by a police officer towards a solicitor during an 
interview (September 2016). PONI recommended a misconduct hearing and 
disciplinary action against the police officer. PSNI declined the recommendation and 
referring it as a matter of performance to the local police authorities to take 
appropriate action. (20/07/2017) (this is the second case during this study of a 
complaint by a solicitor upheld against police officer) 
 
 Treacy J.  ruled in the case of Barnard V PSNI (July 2017) which found that 
investigation by the PSNI LIB of collusion cases associated with the Glenanne Gang 
and more broadly legacy cases was not Article 2 compliant because police officers 
engaged in the LIB could not be fully independent of the police. 
 
 Stephens J. ruled in the case of Flynn V PSNI (July 2017) that the PSNI was required 
to make disclosure of a list of documents or face a judgement on the statement of 
claim and costs incurred. The judgment stated that a loyalist informant was not 
brought to justice despite his criminal activities being known  to the PSNI. There was 
no doubt that the documents had been provided by the PSNI to PONI for the 
Operation Ballast investigation but there was some question about whether or not 
either PSNI or PONI had a list of these documents :  “Years have passed without 
compliance…there is no evidence of any attempt by the defendant (PSNI) to comply 
with its initial obligation under the rules to serve a list of documents or to comply 
with all the order made by the Master over many years” 
 
 PSNI agreed with PONI to lift its moratorium on disclosure of sensitive information 
(26/7/17) 
 
 PONI published a report into the killing of Harry Holland in 2008 which is critical of 




 PONI published a report (31/08/2017) into the death of missing person Geng Feng Shi 
in 2015. The report is extremely critical of the PSNI and recommends disciplinary 
action against 14 officers. PONI also criticised the PSNI‟s failure to adopt and 
implement recommendations arising from previous Missing Person („mispers‟) 
reports : “Some of the failings identified in 2010 were still happening in 2015” (when 
Geng Feng went missing). (31/08/ 2017) 
 
 PONI published a section 62 report into the killing of two people by Sean Hegarty 
following a referral by the PSNI CC. PONI criticised the PSNI role in the supervision 
and release of Hegarty who was known by the PSNI to be a serious violent offender. 
Many but not all recommendations by PONI for disciplinary action against police 
officers are accepted by PSNI. NIPB issued a public statement expressing shock and 
disappointment (12/09/2017). 
 
 PSNI brief NIPB that Managed Services (including call handling, guard duties etc) 
which had been the subject of failed legal proceedings civilian, has now been 
integrated into PSNI civilian staff. PSNI also request NIPB to pay legal costs 
(September 2017) arising from UK Supreme Court ruling in DB V PSNI (February 
2017). 
 
 NIPB‟s expert Human Rights adviser is forced to leave her position (September 2017) 
and the duties discharged by the Human Rights adviser cease to carried out.  
 
 PONI reported finding no evidence to support claims the PSNI had prior information 
or had facilitated a break-in and burglary of Castlereagh police station (17/03/2002). 
PONI undertook the investigation in response to a referral from the PSNI concerning 
allegations of that the break-in had been arranged to protect the identity of a police 
informant (28/09/2017). Although not part of the PONI report, the Castlereagh break-
in was followed by a policy review of intelligence gathering by Sir John Chilcott 
whose confidential report recommended that primacy on national security intelligence 
gathering should be transferred to MI5. By 2007 St Andrews Agreement Act this was 
complete. 
 
 DoJ publish annual report on public perceptions of policing. NIPB greeted the results 
as indicating that 90% of respondents had confidence in the PSNI (27/10/2017). 
 
 PSNI recommence recruitment of police officers (October 2017) following NIPB 
monitoring of the implementation of findings arising from review of police training 
 
 PONI announce investigation into allegations of bribery and misconduct in public 




 DPP directed no prosecution against 13 individuals alleged by assisting offender  and 
police informer Gary Haggarty. The decision includes two former police officers 
identified by Haggarty as his Special Branch handlers who activities had been 
investigated and reported by PONI (Operation Ballast;  Operation Stafford) in 
connection with 15 serious criminal offences including eight murders and two 
attempted murders (11/10/2017) 
 
 Justice Stephens quashed the judgement by a District Court in September 2014 to 
throw out charges against three individuals, including a former police officer arising 
from the murder of Robert Hamill in 1997. The case of Robert Hamill was one of 6 
specified inquiries agreed in the Weston Park agreement 2001. Mr Hamill‟s family 
have always insisted police (RUC) were complicit in his death by failing to intervene 
and covering up. Three individuals had been facing charges of perverting the course 
of justice charged in connection with the investigation into Mr Hamill‟s murder. 
However, a District Judge dismissed the case on grounds that the main prosecution 
witness was unreliable. Justice Stephens remitted the case with a direction to hold a 
fresh preliminary inquiry (8/12/17). 
 
 In Judicial Review proceedings by Hawthorne R. & White R. v PONI,  a preliminary 
ruling by Justice McCloskey found PONI had acted “unlawfully” in relation to the 
Loughinsland report (21/12/17). The case was adjourned until January 2018 to discuss 
a remedy and further submissions were invited from parties to the proceedings. ON 
19
th
 January, Counsel for PONI and for the families of the Loughinisland dead argued 
that Justice McCloskey should recuse himself because of a perception of 
“unconscious bias”. The response of Justice McCloskey was to set aside his 
preliminary ruling and step aside from proceedings in order that they could be 
reconvened before another judge (28
th





Appendix 2. Contextual semi-structured interview schedule with elite actors. 
 
 
Setting the context and sharing lessons (October 2015) 
The rationale for this conversation is two-fold.  Firstly, it’s about briefly setting a context for 
the story of policing reform in the north of Ireland. I’d like to begin with your own experience, 
observations and recollections of the policing reform process and broader Peace Process at 
that time. I’d like to explore how you saw policing reform and wider negotiations evolve to the 
stage we have reached today.  Secondly, it’s around the development of a consensus which 
promotes the idea that the Northern Ireland experience provides valuable lessons for other 
trouble spots. I’d like to reflect on that a little with you. What these valuable lessons or model 
might be need to be unpicked and so I want to talk to people who have had experience of 
engaging with other countries and agencies/actors in this context. Sometimes these 
initiatives take place in host countries, sometimes we have delegations of 
actors/stakeholders come on fact finding missions to NI to learn from the experiences here.  
Questions on setting the context for policing reform & Peace Process:  
1) how would you describe the context in which the policing reform agenda emerged in 
the north of Ireland ? 
2) what do you think were the key dynamics for reform in policing at that time? what did 
you see as the early sticking points in negotiations and reform? 
3) where did you see policing reform feature in broader peace process / negotiations ? 
4) did negotiations on policing reform evolve as you had expected ? 
 
Questions on the NI Model  
1) where have you been abroad to talk about the Peace Process in north of Ireland?  
OR who has travelled here to talk with you about the Peace Process? 
- who would have accompanied you ? how did it come about ? Official  / unofficial ? 
organised by? What sort of briefing were you given beforehand ?   
 
2) what sort of things did they want to know ? 
 
 3) what did you feel you could say about the Peace Process overall?   
- about policing reform in particular ? about lessons learned overall?  
-  
4) what value do you place on these kinds of lesson sharing experiences ? 
- how much coherence do you see in these lesson sharing experiences ? 
- how were relations between the different interests / groups from our society ? 
- what was the follow up afterwards, if any, with those whom you met with ? 
 
 5) given the current context in local politics  / local policing, how comfortable do you feel 
about the use of the Peace Process in the north of Ireland as a model for other societies 
emerging from conflict? - are there any particular lessons in our own society regarding 





Appendix 3. General biographic questionnaire for participants 




Please tick one box 
 
Age 25-29        30-34          35-39                 40-44            45-49            50-54          55-59 60+ 
 
 
Gender  Male  Female   
 




Current employment _________________________________________________ 
 
Years service  ________________ 
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Years service ________________ 
  
Education: 








Please tick each box which relates to  
 










Appendix 4. Project information sheet and Consent form for participants. 
 
    
Information Sheet 
Independent Study Undertaken by Ulster University  
 
1. Study Title:  The impact of external civilian oversight on policing reform. 
 
2. Invitation 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to 
take part, it is important that you understand what the research is for and what you will be 
asked to do. Please read the following information and do not hesitate to ask any questions 
about anything that might not be clear to you. Make sure that you are happy before you 
decide what to do. Thank you for taking the time to consider this invitation. 
 
3. What is the purpose of the study? 
This research study seeks to examine and explain the impact of external civilian oversight on 
policing reform in the north of Ireland. The study will explore the views and experiences of 
those engaged in the process of policing accountability. Using approved qualitative and 
quantitative research methods, the study will analyse external civilian oversight of policing 
through the views and experiences of key stakeholders in policing, principally within the 
Northern Ireland Policing Board, Office of the Police Ombudsman and the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland. It will seek to identify examples of good practice and areas where it may be 
possible to enhance the framework for policing accountability. The findings of the study will 
inform stakeholders, government and policy makers and others interested in policing reform. 
 
4. Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen as potential interviewee for this research study because of your 
knowledge / experience of the process of policing accountability within the PSNI. In total, up 
to 42 interviews will be undertaken as part of this study. 
 
5. Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will be 
given this information sheet to keep. You will also be asked to sign a consent form giving 
your permission to be interviewed. If you choose to take part, you can change your mind at 
any time and withdraw from the study without giving a reason. 
 
6. What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will be asked to agree to participate in an interview of around one-hour long with the 
researcher, in order to answer questions on your expectations, views and experiences of 
policing accountability.  
 
You will be provided with a consent form and asked to complete it, which will outline the use 
of the research information which will be collected during the course of the interview and 
how this information will be stored and safeguarded. The interview / focus group will be 





7. What do I have to do? 
You are asked to respond to questions asked in the interview as honestly and 
comprehensively as possible. 
 
8. Are there any alternative interventions?  No 
 
9. What about side effects? 
There are no direct health risks to you. It is of course possible that you may become upset 
by discussing issues related to policing reform or policing accountability. Disclosure of any 
information is purely voluntary and not expected. You can expect to be fully briefed and to 
request detailed information about how your responses will be employed in this study. 
 
10. Risks and/or disadvantages 
The purpose of the interviews / focus groups will be to learn your views about the process of 
policing accountability and experiences of engaging in it. However, we recognise that talking 
about this may cause distress. We will provide you with accurate information about the study 
so that you can make an informed decision about whether you would like to participate. 
There will be a number of opportunities for you to withdraw from the study: when you are 
initially contacted to arrange the research interview, before it starts; midway point during the 
interview, at the end and at any time after the interview up to the point of publication. A list of 
appropriate counselling services will be available to you and details of what each service can 
offer will be shared with you. All counselling services referred to will be free of charge. In 
addition, there will be an opportunity for you to be accompanied to the interview by a support 
person e.g. family member, friend or other person of your choice. There will be 
arrangements made for access to a counsellor if required. The researchers will be available 
before, during and after the interview. If you become distressed during this study, the 
interview / focus group will be stopped and will not continue unless you feel able to do so. 
You will be reminded that you can withdraw from the study and all records of your 
participation will be destroyed. You will receive a follow up call to check how you are feeling.  
 
11. Are there positive benefits in taking part? 
The research offers you a platform to voice your views and experiences (positive or 
negative) of external civilian oversight of policing. This may result in change or enhancement 
of the processes of policing accountability and may help to inform government and 
policymakers and other societies thinking about undertaking a similar process.  
 
12. What if new information becomes available? 
You will be kept fully informed about any new relevant information as it becomes available 
by the Principle Investigator. Alternatively direct information can be obtained from the 
researchers at the address given at the end of the information sheet. 
 
13. What will happen to the results of the study when it ends?  
The main purpose of this study is research for an academic doctoral thesis at the University 
of Ulster. The results will be reserved primarily for that purpose and may also be used for: 
 Short research briefing papers which may be written and distributed widely. 
 Publication in Academic journals, media releases, social media engagement; and 
articles for newspapers and voluntary sector magazines, and websites. 
 More broadly, the study will raise awareness and generate public debate on how 
external civilian oversight in policing accountability and its impact on policing reform.  
 
 
14. What if something goes wrong? 
It is very unlikely that anything will go wrong, all possible risks have been identified by the 
researchers and measures put in place to address them. The University has procedures in 
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place for reporting, investigating, recording and handing adverse events. If you have any 
complaints they will be taken seriously by the University and should be made to the 
appropriate authority within the University. 
 
15. Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Prior consent will be sought to record the interviews. The digital recordings will be kept in a 
lockable file in a lockable office in the University in line with the University’s Data Protection 
Policy. Transcripts of the interviews will be undertaken by staff members that are familiar 
with handling confidential information and they will not be any identifiable information about 
you. Data and consent forms will be stored separately to ensure confidentiality is not 
breached. No material will be made public without all identifying information being removed. 
In line with Ulster policy data will be destroyed after a period of 10 years by means of 
deleting transcripts and recordings. As far as legally possible all efforts will be made to 
ensure confidentiality. But there may be a situation where the police can compel the 
researchers to provide transcripts or recordings of interviews.  
 
16. What will happen to the results of the study? 
As discussed in point 13 above, the results will be distributed widely and will impact on in a 
number of ways (as described). 
 
17. Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research is organised within the Institute for Research in Social Science at the 
University of Ulster. At present no-one is funding the research. In the future, it is possible 
that funding applications will be submitted to the relevant academic and related funding 
bodies. 
 
18. Who has reviewed this study? 
The objectives, methodology and ethical considerations of this study have been reviewed by 
an Ethics Committee focussing on social science research within the University of Ulster. If 
you have any queries in relation to this ethical approval, you can contact the Ulster’s 
Research Governance Department for further details. 
   
Contact details: Principal Investigator 
Professor Cathy Gormley-Heenan, School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy, 
University of Ulster, Shore Road, Newtownabbey, BT37 0QB. Tel. 02890 366132. 
Email: c.gormley@ulster.ac.uk 
 
Dr. Jonny Byrne, School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy, University of Ulster, 
Shore Road, Newtownabbey, BT37 0QB. Tel. 02890 366159 
Email: j.byrne1@ulster.ac.uk 
 
Professor Brandon Hamber, INCORE, University of Ulster, Magee 
 
Ciarán J. Kearney, PhD candidate, School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy, 
University of Ulster, Shore Road, Newtownabbey, BT37 0QB. 





Title of the Project:  The Impact of External Civilian Oversight on Policing Reform 
Name of Chief Investigator:  Professor Cathy Gormley Heenan 
         Please Initial 
 
 I confirm that I have been given and have read and  [          ] 
understood the information sheet about this study.   
 
 I have been invited to ask questions about this study  [          ] 
which have been dealt with satisfactorily.     
 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I   
am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason  [                    ] 
and without my rights being affected in any way. 
 
 I understand that the researcher will hold all information  [                    ] 
and data collected securely and in confidence. 
 
 I freely give permission for the researcher to hold relevant  [                    ] 
personal data. 
 
 I understand that as far as legally possible all efforts will  [                    ] 
be made to ensure confidentiality.       
 
 I agree to the use of a tape-recorder during the interview. [                    ] 
 
 I understand that the researchers are obliged to report  
any information revealed in interviews about abuse, or  [                   ] 
other illegal behaviour, to the appropriate authorities.   
 
 I understand that there will be a research report published 
and publications in the future and that all efforts will be  [                    ] 
made to ensure that I cannot be identified. 
 
 I agree to take part in the above study.   [                    ] 
 
--------------------------------------------  --------------------------------------   ----------------------- 
Name of Participant    Signature   Date 
giving consent  
 
--------------------------------------------  --------------------------------------   ----------------------- 
Name of Researcher   Signature   Date 
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Appendix 5. Q set of statements (q=59). 
Q statements on „s‟ situational accountability 
8. There is no need for the Policing Board to have scrutiny over or accountability for 
matters in the sphere of national security or covert policing.  
9. The devolution of powers on policing and justice has led to tangible improvements in 
policing accountability 
10. The most effective model of policing oversight is one which is under civilian control 
11. The Police Ombudsman‟s access to all aspects of policing, including national security 
and covert policing is completely unfettered 
20. All those aspects of policing which the in the past gave cause for concern are now 
subject to effective accountability through the Police Ombudsman and / or the 
Policing Board. 
21. The existence of the arrangements for external civilian oversight ought to be 
sufficient to build public confidence in policing. 
22. All public agencies have to adapt to current funding constraints and external 
oversight of policing should be treated in exactly the same way. 
23. More of what is presently done by external oversight could be transferred to internal 
police accountability mechanisms. (reverse scored). 
24. The external oversight bodies are not ready for the creation of the Historical 
Investigations Unit. (reverse scored). 
26. External oversight bodies are not yet effectively aligned to recent changes in the 
delivery of policing. (reverse scored). 
27. A separate Policing Board and Office of the Police Ombudsman may have been 
justified at the start of the policing reform process but now resource constraints mean 
2 separate oversight bodies is a luxury. (reverse scored). 
34. The Northern Ireland Policing Board‟s powers and responsibilities need to be 
increased to make it effective. (reverse scored). 
35. The emphasis on external oversight sometimes has the effect of inhibiting internal 
regulation within the PSNI.(reverse scored) 
36. The office of the Police Ombudsman has all of the power and responsibilities is needs 
to fulfil its mandate. 
37. A new beginning to policing accountability has been the key to a new beginning to 
policing 
35. Democratically accountable policing is only possible because elected representatives 
are involved in the Policing Board. 
38. External civilian oversight bodies should limit their remit to those issues of concern 
presented by members of the public.(reverse scored) 
39. Policing accountability in Northern Ireland is the „Rolls Royce model‟ of external 
oversight. 
43. Ultimately, the PSNI is accountable to the courts and that takes precedence over the 
external oversight bodies.(reverse scored). 
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44. External oversight bodies should have scrutiny over only those aspects of policing 
which concern everyday crime and community safety. (reverse scored). 
46. The Department of Justice has too much influence over the affairs of the external 
oversight bodies. (reverse scored). 
47. What has evolved through negotiation and legislation for policing accountability in 
Northern Ireland is faithful to the Patten Report in 1999. 
53. There was nothing wrong with the arrangements for policing accountability which 
we had in the past before the 1999 Patten report.(reverse scored).  
Q statements on „r‟ (relational accountability) 
4. The process of interaction between the PSNI and the external civilian oversight bodies 
is too adversarial. (reverse scored) 
5. The PSNI has dealt fairly and speedily with all requests for disclosure of information 
from the external oversight bodies. 
6. Sometimes it seems as though the external civilian oversight bodies are used by those 
who deliberately want to damage policing.(reverse scored) 
13. Since the inception of the Policing Board and the Police Ombudsman, there has been 
effective collaboration between both in achieving accountability. 
17. There are still some areas where the external oversight bodies struggle to gain full co-
operation from police and officers and staff. (reverse scored) 
28. Party politics has too great an influence on the Northern Ireland Policing Board. 
(reverse scored) 
30. Sometimes the activities in which external oversight engage are like a morality drama 
or a piece of theatre.(reverse scored) 
36. The institutions for policing oversight which have evolved are not like a monster 
which has to be fed. (reverse scored) 
40. It‟s as though the PSNI is being pulled up by its roots every time the policing 
oversight bodies grab an issue of concern.(reverse scored) 
41. As a result of external oversight we now have leaders in policing chasing numbers and 
targets which are completely counterproductive. (reverse scored). 
41. Over the years the Office of the Police Ombudsman has shown consistency in 
handling of complaints against the police. 
52. The independence of the external oversight bodies has never been challenged or 
undermined by the PSNI. 
53. External oversight bodies have already played a positive role in dealing with the 
legacy of the past policing. 
54. It is unfair of external oversight bodies to judge past policing practices and procedures 
by current policing practices and procedures.(reverse scored) 
55. It seems as though there is little understanding and sympathy on the part of external 
oversight bodies of how policing works in the local context. (reverse scored) 
55. The external oversight bodies do not engender confidence among the officers and staff 
of the PSNI.(reverse scored). 
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60. Everything that is in the public interest  - not the police interest – should be disclosed 
to the external oversight bodies. 
61. The PSNI has always demonstrated complete transparency to the external oversight 
bodies. 
62. There are clear and necessary limits to what the PSNI should disclose to the external 
civilian oversight bodies. 
63. External oversight of policing in the north of Ireland is too complex and cumbersome 
(reverse scored). 
Q statements on „t‟  (transformational accountability) 
8.   Without effective external civilian oversight there can be no public confidence in policing 
10. It is helpful that the Policing Board is consulted but ultimately all decisions on policing 
are for the PSNI. 
14. It is useful that the Office of the Police Ombudsman can make suggestions for policy and 
practice reform but ultimately all decisions on policing are for the PSNI. 
15. Without accountability policing in any democratic society is bereft of legitimacy. 
16. Since the inception of the Policing Board and the Police Ombudsman, there has been 
effective collaboration in achieving accountability. 
16. As a result of external oversight, accountability is now ingrained within the culture of 
policing in the north of Ireland. 
17. The Policing Board has been very successful in engendering public confidence in 
policing. 
21. After 15 years of external oversight there is now irrefutable evidence that it has driven 
policing reform. 
23. The office of the Police Ombudsman has been very successful in engendering   public  
confidence in policing. 
26. There is no evidence that external oversight has had any impact on policing reform or 
improvements in the PSNI. 
28. Without external oversight it would not be possible to have accountable policing 
43. Monitoring human rights compliance is now an integral and vital component part of the 
external civilian oversight bodies. 
46. The PSNI is the most accountable police service in the world 
47. Without the external oversight bodies it would be difficult if not impossible for policing 
to have legitimacy. 
53. If it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsman and the Policing Board the human 
rights agenda on policing would not be so far advanced. 
54. The external oversight bodies do not engender confidence among the officers and the 
staff of the PSNI. 
55. When decisions on policing have to be made, the external oversight bodies should not 












Appendix 7 – Post Q sort semi-structured interview schedule 
 
 
Study Title:  The impact of external civilian oversight on policing reform. 
 
What would policing in the north of Ireland look like today if we did not have external 
civilian oversight ? 
 
What aspects of the exercise of external civilian oversight have you found most 
challenging  - personally  / professionally ?  
 
If you were to start again, what would you like to have seen done differently in 
policing accountability?  
 
In the here and now, how does external civilian oversight influence or impact upon 
policing reform ?  
 
What are the obstacles  / barriers, if any, to effective policing accountability ? What 
are the examples of best practice in policing accountability ?  
 
Looking ahead, what would you see as being the key to enhancing policing 
accountability ?  
 
What if anything can those interested in policing reform learn from the process of 









































Appendix 9. Situational accountability „s‟ mean scores by agency. 
 PONI RESPONSE ON SITUATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 PSNI RESPONSE ON SITUATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 




Appendix 10. Relational Accountability „r‟ mean scores by agency affiliation. 
PONI RESPONSES ON ‘R’ – RELATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
PSNI RESPONSES ON ‘R’ RELATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 




Appendix 11. Transformational accountability „t‟ mean scores by agency. 
PONI RESPONSE ON ‘T’ – TRANSFORMATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
PSNI RESPONSE ON T – TRANSFORMATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 




Appendix 12. Statistical output for two factor solution 
 
PQMethod2.35               External Civilian Oversight of policing in the north of Ireland                       
PAGE    1 
Path and Project Name: C:\PQMethod\projects/ECOstudy                                                             May 23 
17 
 
Correlation Matrix Between Sorts   
 
SORTS          1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  
27  28  29  30 
  
  1 PO1      100  57  42  29  48  62  58  48  52  48  63  45  51  47  67   9  22  49  18  33  34  37  36  33  51  
30  32  36  32  38 
  2 PO2       57 100  60  28  55  57  53  55  55  38  58  42  55  33  59  12  18  48  39  42  32  34  33  37  49  
25  27  22  42  54 
  3 PO3       42  60 100  20  62  51  42  58  38  36  34  42  48  19  54  17  15  51  47  46  39  27  26  38  42  
35  32  38  34  58 
  4 PO4       29  28  20 100  25  28  15  22  46  13  20   0  25  12  34  27   9  26  19   0  23  10   9  16  17  
16   8   1   5  10 
  5 PO5       48  55  62  25 100  56  58  49  55  46  42  55  52  40  63  16  18  61  58  48  42  32  27  32  50  
26  42  21  23  53 
  6 PO6       62  57  51  28  56 100  68  58  70  48  64  63  70  65  56  15  15  64  37  47  48  43  35  45  60  
33  56  30  46  50 
  7 PO7       58  53  42  15  58  68 100  43  47  52  51  66  52  49  65   2  13  59  36  42  45  47  20  36  50  
19  47  20  43  50 
  8 PO8       48  55  58  22  49  58  43 100  45  57  54  57  55  39  51  15  13  55  50  52  36  42  28  53  59  
48  55  38  44  55 
  9 PO9       52  55  38  46  55  70  47  45 100  41  49  48  67  47  55  32  23  58  38  31  38  33  40  42  53  
30  46  32  47  35 
 10 PO10      48  38  36  13  46  48  52  57  41 100  48  50  59  30  52  17  37  52  35  52  48  36  44  64  
47  38  59  37  37  44 
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 11 PO11      63  58  34  20  42  64  51  54  49  48 100  35  51  49  52  25  25  56  33  47  32  48  30  43  
57  32  53  40  46  48 
 12 PO12      45  42  42   0  55  63  66  57  48  50  35 100  51  53  54  14   8  59  46  59  52  46  26  36  67  
42  55  32  57  50 
 13 PO13      51  55  48  25  52  70  52  55  67  59  51  51 100  57  57  33  34  69  46  43  45  34  42  57  
51  43  52  37  51  40 
 14 PO14      47  33  19  12  40  65  49  39  47  30  49  53  57 100  39  11  18  60  25  42  30  35  25  38  
45  29  37  23  34  18 
 15 PO15      67  59  54  34  63  56  65  51  55  52  52  54  57  39 100  19  26  61  52  39  55  33  38  45  
57  25  47  39  47  57 
 16 PS1        9  12  17  27  16  15   2  15  32  17  25  14  33  11  19 100  53  31  27  10  28  23  35  36  30  
37  37  49  39   9 
 17 PS2       22  18  15   9  18  15  13  13  23  37  25   8  34  18  26  53 100  36  29  12  23  18  35  37  25  
28  45  31  28  17 
 18 PS3       49  48  51  26  61  64  59  55  58  52  56  59  69  60  61  31  36 100  43  66  45  63  43  56  66  
45  67  48  58  44 
 19 PS4       18  39  47  19  58  37  36  50  38  35  33  46  46  25  52  27  29  43 100  51  43  25  16  35  45  
45  50  17  32  54 
 20 PS5       33  42  46   0  48  47  42  52  31  52  47  59  43  42  39  10  12  66  51 100  43  63  27  47  66  
47  58  38  40  52 
 21 PS6       34  32  39  23  42  48  45  36  38  48  32  52  45  30  55  28  23  45  43  43 100  35  18  50  45  
40  55  33  47  56 
 22 PS7       37  34  27  10  32  43  47  42  33  36  48  46  34  35  33  23  18  63  25  63  35 100  42  49  60  
38  56  41  42  32 
 23 PS8       36  33  26   9  27  35  20  28  40  44  30  26  42  25  38  35  35  43  16  27  18  42 100  58  40  
34  43  61  40  18 
 24 PS9       33  37  38  16  32  45  36  53  42  64  43  36  57  38  45  36  37  56  35  47  50  49  58 100  41  
50  63  58  55  29 
 25 PS10      51  49  42  17  50  60  50  59  53  47  57  67  51  45  57  30  25  66  45  66  45  60  40  41 
100  40  68  48  66  58 
 26 PS11      30  25  35  16  26  33  19  48  30  38  32  42  43  29  25  37  28  45  45  47  40  38  34  50  40 
100  51  30  32  24 
 27 PS12      32  27  32   8  42  56  47  55  46  59  53  55  52  37  47  37  45  67  50  58  55  56  43  63  68  
51 100  46  60  54 
276 
 
 28 PS13      36  22  38   1  21  30  20  38  32  37  40  32  37  23  39  49  31  48  17  38  33  41  61  58  48  
30  46 100  62  21 
 29 PS14      32  42  34   5  23  46  43  44  47  37  46  57  51  34  47  39  28  58  32  40  47  42  40  55  66  
32  60  62 100  42 
 30 PS15      38  54  58  10  53  50  50  55  35  44  48  50  40  18  57   9  17  44  54  52  56  32  18  29  58  
24  54  21  42 100 
 31 PS16      -5  13  12  25  13  16   3  17  23  22  12   9  30  17  16  51  46  37  27  21  33  20  33  41  25  
49  38  24  27   2 
 32 PS17      38  50  43  15  43  57  56  58  42  52  55  51  68  47  42  33  23  62  47  57  40  59  46  65  63  
54  62  54  64  32 
 33 PS18      44  48  49  20  60  65  59  61  55  57  47  68  55  30  67  14  31  59  68  60  55  48  33  43  70  
42  71  33  47  72 
 34 PS19      21  13  13   8  18  24  23  22  20  27  33  10  28  28   7  38  29  40  13  14  20  31  28  40  30  
32  42  42  38  14 
 35 PS20      42  30  40  20  44  57  44  45  38  50  48  43  57  40  47  45  42  68  31  46  53  56  42  50  55  
22  65  56  54  38 
 36 PS21      44  37  31  36  28  51  30  45  50  50  48  34  57  43  37  46  41  60  21  34  23  38  49  51  58  
39  49  54  50  18 
 37 PS22      17   1   9   1  13  22  20  28  22  33  27  25  33  25  14  43  48  42  31  33  27  37  52  48  38  
31  48  55  47  17 
 38 PS23      25  27  38  30  44  43  25  30  49  23  21  30  40  27  48  21  22  48  37  47  43  37  43  34  50  
30  50  40  33  42 
 39 PS24      44  37  29  12  32  52  42  48  42  54  57  52  54  48  39  48  33  50  31  45  39  42  40  55  58  
27  56  60  60  32 
 40 PB1       39  36  37   9  50  52  42  61  43  44  51  63  44  39  47  11   5  60  57  67  46  50  22  35  72  
38  62  32  53  55 
 41 PB2       62  50  31  18  48  58  60  60  58  62  61  62  58  51  53  13  11  56  30  57  43  43  32  53  64  
35  51  35  55  43 
 42 PB3       53  45  33   4  36  62  57  45  54  51  65  54  57  47  45  19  12  54  21  52  33  45  38  45  66  
24  52  53  70  37 
 43 PB4       44  42  38  17  36  46  37  59  45  51  50  37  42  34  29   1  -3  41  34  55  27  33  22  41  53  
45  39  27  40  28 
 44 PB5       47  45  46  10  55  54  57  60  50  58  51  59  49  30  57   3  13  45  58  57  42  31  28  44  59  
27  60  25  47  67  
277 
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Correlation Matrix Between Sorts   
 
SORTS          1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  
27  28  29  30 
  
 45 PB6       29  35  38   9  34  45  37  58  29  52  48  37  38  31  36  -1  13  41  33  55  28  28  18  29  63  
31  49  18  38  44 
 46 PB7       53  35  36  12  40  58  43  57  45  63  49  53  58  40  54  17  29  51  49  59  46  35  50  50  60  
48  47  48  41  44 
 47 PB8       34  35  48  19  35  46  36  46  28  32  39  43  40  36  31  39  27  51  33  51  39  45  37  40  66  
50  62  36  46  49 
 48 PB9       30  44  27  37  43  53  41  37  35  40  49  34  55  40  33  34  32  49  37  44  27  43  32  25  56  
15  42  19  28  32 
 49 PB10      28  30  17  -3  17  43  44  28  32  47  37  34  31  28  31 -13 -10  25   3  30  28   6   5  35  30  -
7  31  21  48  26 
 50 PB11      43  34  26  -3  27  64  54  55  43  49  45  65  50  52  40   3   6  41  35  40  37  30  44  49  57  
39  59  45  55  32 
 51 PB12      51  52  40  17  59  67  68  59  54  60  49  68  57  43  55  10  25  60  52  67  49  41  31  38  
64  30  60  27  48  62 
 52 PB13      13  18  43  10  44  35  23  34  35  43  12  43  39  27  33  18  32  42  50  52  52  26  30  44  
48  47  49  31  30  34 
 53 PB14      55  46  33  26  51  63  55  48  58  58  59  59  65  55  52  20  27  67  32  61  36  47  42  42  
70  32  57  40  56  41 
 54 PB15      28  38  36  12  43  52  46  51  39  53  34  44  44  25  33  22  22  37  31  35  32  41  35  49  
43  24  51  21  37  33 
 55 PB16      35  35  36   1  33  68  55  52  50  48  46  65  64  55  37  24   8  53  28  48  45  41  32  61  58  
38  57  50  62  29 
278 
 
 56 PB17      40  43  36  22  44  53  48  45  45  45  51  40  53  43  32  11  -4  50  29  58  28  41  23  38  49  
37  31  28  28  27 
 57 PB18      40  36  44  20  27  51  32  52  33  53  48  37  56  40  48  28  21  45  37  51  32  27  33  51  
44  52  48  37  32  22 
 58 PB19      32  35  48   0  56  53  37  42  35  39  38  52  38  40  39 -15  -6  39  41  60  48  27   8  28  43  
18  36  24  32  47 
 59 PB20      47  26  25   5  26  47  33  33  36  27  42  48  42  50  36  15  -7  53   1  43  23  30  27  31  56  
15  32  53  47  16 
 60 PB21      53  35  45  18  43  65  57  56  53  56  59  54  53  52  53  27  13  63  27  53  40  35  24  39  
58  25  56  51  48  45 
 61 PB22      54  50  44  15  60  66  63  51  47  63  64  52  55  55  65  12  20  67  45  64  33  43  38  49  
62  33  52  35  39  42 
 62 PB23      38  42  45  28  63  60  49  48  59  57  43  47  66  49  53  20  22  62  62  53  41  37  35  49  
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Correlation Matrix Between Sorts   
 
SORTS         31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  
56  57  58  59  60 
  
  1 PO1       -5  38  44  21  42  44  17  25  44  39  62  53  44  47  29  53  34  30  28  43  51  13  55  28  35  
40  40  32  47  53 
  2 PO2       13  50  48  13  30  37   1  27  37  36  50  45  42  45  35  35  35  44  30  34  52  18  46  38  35  
43  36  35  26  35 
  3 PO3       12  43  49  13  40  31   9  38  29  37  31  33  38  46  38  36  48  27  17  26  40  43  33  36  36  
36  44  48  25  45 
  4 PO4       25  15  20   8  20  36   1  30  12   9  18   4  17  10   9  12  19  37  -3  -3  17  10  26  12   1  22  
20   0   5  18 
  5 PO5       13  43  60  18  44  28  13  44  32  50  48  36  36  55  34  40  35  43  17  27  59  44  51  43  33  
44  27  56  26  43 
  6 PO6       16  57  65  24  57  51  22  43  52  52  58  62  46  54  45  58  46  53  43  64  67  35  63  52  68  
53  51  53  47  65 
  7 PO7        3  56  59  23  44  30  20  25  42  42  60  57  37  57  37  43  36  41  44  54  68  23  55  46  55  
48  32  37  33  57 
  8 PO8       17  58  61  22  45  45  28  30  48  61  60  45  59  60  58  57  46  37  28  55  59  34  48  51  52  
45  52  42  33  56 
  9 PO9       23  42  55  20  38  50  22  49  42  43  58  54  45  50  29  45  28  35  32  43  54  35  58  39  50  
45  33  35  36  53 
 10 PO10      22  52  57  27  50  50  33  23  54  44  62  51  51  58  52  63  32  40  47  49  60  43  58  53  
48  45  53  39  27  56 
 11 PO11      12  55  47  33  48  48  27  21  57  51  61  65  50  51  48  49  39  49  37  45  49  12  59  34  
46  51  48  38  42  59 
280 
 
 12 PO12       9  51  68  10  43  34  25  30  52  63  62  54  37  59  37  53  43  34  34  65  68  43  59  44  65  
40  37  52  48  54 
 13 PO13      30  68  55  28  57  57  33  40  54  44  58  57  42  49  38  58  40  55  31  50  57  39  65  44  
64  53  56  38  42  53 
 14 PO14      17  47  30  28  40  43  25  27  48  39  51  47  34  30  31  40  36  40  28  52  43  27  55  25  
55  43  40  40  50  52 
 15 PO15      16  42  67   7  47  37  14  48  39  47  53  45  29  57  36  54  31  33  31  40  55  33  52  33  37  
32  48  39  36  53 
 16 PS1       51  33  14  38  45  46  43  21  48  11  13  19   1   3  -1  17  39  34 -13   3  10  18  20  22  24  
11  28 -15  15  27 
 17 PS2       46  23  31  29  42  41  48  22  33   5  11  12  -3  13  13  29  27  32 -10   6  25  32  27  22   8  -4  
21  -6  -7  13 
 18 PS3       37  62  59  40  68  60  42  48  50  60  56  54  41  45  41  51  51  49  25  41  60  42  67  37  53  
50  45  39  53  63 
 19 PS4       27  47  68  13  31  21  31  37  31  57  30  21  34  58  33  49  33  37   3  35  52  50  32  31  28  
29  37  41   1  27 
 20 PS5       21  57  60  14  46  34  33  47  45  67  57  52  55  57  55  59  51  44  30  40  67  52  61  35  48  
58  51  60  43  53 
 21 PS6       33  40  55  20  53  23  27  43  39  46  43  33  27  42  28  46  39  27  28  37  49  52  36  32  45  
28  32  48  23  40 
 22 PS7       20  59  48  31  56  38  37  37  42  50  43  45  33  31  28  35  45  43   6  30  41  26  47  41  41  
41  27  27  30  35 
 23 PS8       33  46  33  28  42  49  52  43  40  22  32  38  22  28  18  50  37  32   5  44  31  30  42  35  32  
23  33   8  27  24 
 24 PS9       41  65  43  40  50  51  48  34  55  35  53  45  41  44  29  50  40  25  35  49  38  44  42  49  61  
38  51  28  31  39 
 25 PS10      25  63  70  30  55  58  38  50  58  72  64  66  53  59  63  60  66  56  30  57  64  48  70  43  58  
49  44  43  56  58 
 26 PS11      49  54  42  32  22  39  31  30  27  38  35  24  45  27  31  48  50  15  -7  39  30  47  32  24  38  
37  52  18  15  25 
 27 PS12      38  62  71  42  65  49  48  50  56  62  51  52  39  60  49  47  62  42  31  59  60  49  57  51  57  
31  48  36  32  56 
 28 PS13      24  54  33  42  56  54  55  40  60  32  35  53  27  25  18  48  36  19  21  45  27  31  40  21  50  
28  37  24  53  51 
281 
 
 29 PS14      27  64  47  38  54  50  47  33  60  53  55  70  40  47  38  41  46  28  48  55  48  30  56  37  62  
28  32  32  47  48 
 30 PS15       2  32  72  14  38  18  17  42  32  55  43  37  28  67  44  44  49  32  26  32  62  34  41  33  29  
27  22  47  16  45 
 31 PS16     100  30  18   8  25  33  40  30  13  13   5   4   6   2  13  12  31  25 -18   4  12  37  11  17  12  
13  31 -14   7  12 
 32 PS17      30 100  52  44  55  51  40  33  58  49  54  63  55  46  43  52  55  53  26  60  55  40  63  47  
67  55  58  39  37  48 
 33 PS18      18  52 100  14  45  33  35  58  36  65  53  44  43  69  43  60  50  44  25  54  74  50  56  43  
51  41  44  57  23  48 
 34 PS19       8  44  14 100  44  51  34  12  51  21  25  36  30   5  16  19  40  19  11  28  14  18  32  31  37  
31  11   7  31  31 
 35 PS20      25  55  45  44 100  61  45  41  69  52  48  58  38  37  37  49  47  54  23  40  53  33  60  39  
45  36  40  38  50  57 
 36 PS21      33  51  33  51  61 100  40  33  72  38  52  53  48  27  40  53  52  57  20  49  37  32  58  40  
52  45  52  20  62  46 
 37 PS22      40  40  35  34  45  40 100  36  42  35  31  28  22  28  20  44  36  32   5  30  37  27  40  20  40  
29  21   5  20  19 
 38 PS23      30  33  58  12  41  33  36 100  25  42  32  24  22  35  27  45  35  38  10  27  42  35  44  28  
26  34  36  30  29  39 
 39 PS24      13  58  36  51  69  72  42  25 100  52  55  66  41  40  42  52  46  49  43  56  47  32  56  54  
60  50  44  34  59  53 
 40 PB1       13  49  65  21  52  38  35  42  52 100  57  48  55  48  49  48  44  38  29  47  52  35  50  39  
39  43  32  48  40  45 
 41 PB2        5  54  53  25  48  52  31  32  55  57 100  72  74  68  50  63  40  40  48  63  69  21  70  44  62  
62  46  49  56  65 
 42 PB3        4  63  44  36  58  53  28  24  66  48  72 100  68  61  57  58  39  41  58  64  62  27  75  38  67  
57  48  51  62  68 
 43 PB4        6  55  43  30  38  48  22  22  41  55  74  68 100  57  63  55  44  32  39  55  53  27  60  27  49  
65  57  52  43  48 
 44 PB5        2  46  69   5  37  27  28  35  40  48  68  61  57 100  63  62  43  40  45  60  77  39  63  39  49  
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Correlation Matrix Between Sorts   
 
SORTS         31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  
56  57  58  59  60 
  
 45 PB6       13  43  43  16  37  40  20  27  42  49  50  57  63  63 100  53  42  47  44  45  58  39  62  35  
38  49  54  39  31  49 
 46 PB7       12  52  60  19  49  53  44  45  52  48  63  58  55  62  53 100  36  43  34  67  67  50  68  38  
56  52  57  47  41  51 
 47 PB8       31  55  50  40  47  52  36  35  46  44  40  39  44  43  42  36 100  54  13  46  48  42  47  36  
45  39  46  29  35  43 
 48 PB9       25  53  44  19  54  57  32  38  49  38  40  41  32  40  47  43  54 100  14  31  55  27  62  43  
34  46  48  29  30  40 
 49 PB10     -18  26  25  11  23  20   5  10  43  29  48  58  39  45  44  34  13  14 100  50  41  17  40  34  
58  38  30  45  35  48 
 50 PB11       4  60  54  28  40  49  30  27  56  47  63  64  55  60  45  67  46  31  50 100  57  39  53  44  
73  37  48  45  48  53 
 51 PB12      12  55  74  14  53  37  37  42  47  52  69  62  53  77  58  67  48  55  41  57 100  48  74  55  
56  52  43  57  33  63 
 52 PB13      37  40  50  18  33  32  27  35  32  35  21  27  27  39  39  50  42  27  17  39  48 100  33  34  
42  22  34  55  16  30 
 53 PB14      11  63  56  32  60  58  40  44  56  50  70  75  60  63  62  68  47  62  40  53  74  33 100  35  
60  61  57  43  54  63 
 54 PB15      17  47  43  31  39  40  20  28  54  39  44  38  27  39  35  38  36  43  34  44  55  34  35 100  
50  30  27  25  10  39 
 55 PB16      12  67  51  37  45  52  40  26  60  39  62  67  49  49  38  56  45  34  58  73  56  42  60  50 
100  55  50  49  54  55 
283 
 
 56 PB17      13  55  41  31  36  45  29  34  50  43  62  57  65  42  49  52  39  46  38  37  52  22  61  30  
55 100  52  42  57  43 
 57 PB18      31  58  44  11  40  52  21  36  44  32  46  48  57  49  54  57  46  48  30  48  43  34  57  27  
50  52 100  35  43  55 
 58 PB19     -14  39  57   7  38  20   5  30  34  48  49  51  52  60  39  47  29  29  45  45  57  55  43  25  49  
42  35 100  39  43 
 59 PB20       7  37  23  31  50  62  20  29  59  40  56  62  43  35  31  41  35  30  35  48  33  16  54  10  54  
57  43  39 100  59 
 60 PB21      12  48  48  31  57  46  19  39  53  45  65  68  48  60  49  51  43  40  48  53  63  30  63  39  
55  43  55  43  59 100 
 61 PB22      14  54  60  18  48  50  32  47  50  62  64  55  53  54  54  66  40  52  51  50  63  36  68  45  
56  62  61  47  43  61 
 62 PB23      29  59  69  23  45  45  36  52  36  53  53  47  56  53  32  52  41  49  26  47  55  47  57  29  
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Correlation Matrix Between Sorts   
 
SORTS         61  62 
  
  1 PO1       54  38 
  2 PO2       50  42 
  3 PO3       44  45 
  4 PO4       15  28 
  5 PO5       60  63 
  6 PO6       66  60 
  7 PO7       63  49 
  8 PO8       51  48 
  9 PO9       47  59 
 10 PO10      63  57 
 11 PO11      64  43 
 12 PO12      52  47 
 13 PO13      55  66 
 14 PO14      55  49 
 15 PO15      65  53 
 16 PS1       12  20 
 17 PS2       20  22 
 18 PS3       67  62 
 19 PS4       45  62 
285 
 
 20 PS5       64  53 
 21 PS6       33  41 
 22 PS7       43  37 
 23 PS8       38  35 
 24 PS9       49  49 
 25 PS10      62  50 
 26 PS11      33  40 
 27 PS12      52  52 
 28 PS13      35  33 
 29 PS14      39  37 
 30 PS15      42  42 
 31 PS16      14  29 
 32 PS17      54  59 
 33 PS18      60  69 
 34 PS19      18  23 
 35 PS20      48  45 
 36 PS21      50  45 
 37 PS22      32  36 
 38 PS23      47  52 
 39 PS24      50  36 
 40 PB1       62  53 
 41 PB2       64  53 
 42 PB3       55  47 
 43 PB4       53  56 
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Correlation Matrix Between Sorts   
 
SORTS         61  62 
  
 45 PB6       54  32 
 46 PB7       66  52 
 47 PB8       40  41 
 48 PB9       52  49 
 49 PB10      51  26 
 50 PB11      50  47 
 51 PB12      63  55 
 52 PB13      36  47 
 53 PB14      68  57 
 54 PB15      45  29 
 55 PB16      56  48 
 56 PB17      62  55 
 57 PB18      61  58 
 58 PB19      47  54 
 59 PB20      43  29 
 60 PB21      61  51 
 61 PB22     100  64 
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Unrotated Factor Matrix  
                Factors 
                   1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8 
 SORTS 
  1 PO1           0.6360   -0.1738   -0.1131    0.3971   -0.1492   -0.0569   -0.0017    0.0689 
  2 PO2           0.6154   -0.2006    0.1410    0.3767   -0.0823   -0.0494    0.1094    0.3177 
  3 PO3           0.5867   -0.1118    0.3287    0.1058   -0.0234   -0.0156   -0.1094    0.3854 
  4 PO4           0.2508    0.1230    0.2273    0.6265    0.1721   -0.0316    0.0089    0.0419 
  5 PO5           0.6558   -0.2057    0.3875    0.2282   -0.0843    0.0769   -0.0956    0.0181 
  6 PO6           0.8022   -0.1723   -0.0242    0.2212   -0.0788   -0.0550   -0.1151    0.0063 
  7 PO7           0.6929   -0.2930    0.0036    0.1482   -0.2793   -0.0191    0.0438    0.0165 
  8 PO8           0.7350   -0.1117    0.1027   -0.0495    0.0980   -0.0671    0.1227    0.3092 
  9 PO9           0.6791   -0.0186    0.0598    0.3682   -0.0874   -0.1499   -0.1844   -0.0443 
 10 PO10          0.7209   -0.0099    0.0078   -0.0759    0.0131   -0.3573    0.2542   -0.0876 
 11 PO11          0.7085   -0.0674   -0.1723    0.2283   -0.0171    0.0885    0.2179    0.1201 
 12 PO12          0.7328   -0.2134    0.0547   -0.1936   -0.2037    0.0784   -0.1962    0.0155 
 13 PO13          0.7720    0.0870    0.0188    0.2310    0.0246   -0.2141   -0.1013   -0.0200 
 14 PO14          0.6084   -0.0466   -0.2062    0.1774    0.0590    0.0451   -0.2868   -0.1218 
 15 PO15          0.7011   -0.1404    0.2510    0.2776   -0.2695   -0.1241   -0.1025   -0.0412 
 16 PS1           0.3318    0.7187    0.0300    0.1566   -0.0965    0.0305    0.0497    0.0901 
 17 PS2           0.3297    0.5876    0.2176    0.0834   -0.1690   -0.1629    0.3049   -0.2288 
 18 PS3           0.8085    0.1502    0.0577    0.1324   -0.0461    0.2008   -0.1593   -0.0332 
 19 PS4           0.5737   -0.0020    0.5679   -0.1333    0.0802   -0.0239    0.0173    0.0433 
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 20 PS5           0.7333   -0.1178    0.1268   -0.2879    0.2277    0.2811   -0.0411   -0.0558 
 21 PS6           0.6021    0.0523    0.2863   -0.1497   -0.2314   -0.0717   -0.1734    0.0428 
 22 PS7           0.6019    0.1806   -0.0058   -0.0732   -0.0530    0.3959    0.0228    0.0885 
 23 PS8           0.5141    0.4304   -0.0617    0.0321   -0.0757   -0.1858   -0.0409   -0.1308 
 24 PS9           0.6777    0.3354   -0.0472   -0.1395   -0.0304   -0.3582   -0.0626    0.1518 
 25 PS10          0.8230    0.0170    0.0056   -0.0937   -0.0216    0.3129    0.0610   -0.0227 
 26 PS11          0.5270    0.3147    0.2115   -0.1909    0.3743   -0.1289   -0.1395    0.3340 
 27 PS12          0.7720    0.2376    0.1118   -0.2821   -0.1328    0.0516    0.1181   -0.0287 
 28 PS13          0.5692    0.4249   -0.2671   -0.1347   -0.1983   -0.0000   -0.2235    0.0261 
 29 PS14          0.6862    0.1852   -0.2074   -0.1936   -0.3173    0.0295   -0.0367    0.1126 
 30 PS15          0.6140   -0.2486    0.4029   -0.0989   -0.2848    0.1632    0.1877    0.1274 
 31 PS16          0.2854    0.6212    0.2867    0.0258    0.2238   -0.0984   -0.0939   -0.0250 
 32 PS17          0.7763    0.1737   -0.0893   -0.0781    0.1214   -0.0088   -0.0097    0.2136 
 33 PS18          0.7752   -0.1288    0.4095   -0.1260   -0.1107    0.0277    0.0028   -0.0968 
 34 PS19          0.3920    0.4033   -0.3104   -0.0203   -0.0858    0.1275    0.0799    0.2901 
 35 PS20          0.7108    0.2720   -0.1025    0.0528   -0.1965    0.2153    0.0561   -0.1061 
 36 PS21          0.6718    0.3731   -0.2934    0.2206    0.1476    0.0107    0.0580    0.0025 
 37 PS22          0.4638    0.5154   -0.0464   -0.2438   -0.0276    0.0341    0.0545   -0.3111 
 38 PS23          0.5447    0.1425    0.3086    0.0640    0.0132    0.1504   -0.2513   -0.3086 
 39 PS24          0.7165    0.2147   -0.3602   -0.0203   -0.1443    0.0371    0.1291    0.0523 
 40 PB1           0.7039   -0.1284    0.1184   -0.1963    0.0038    0.3414   -0.0158    0.0430 
 41 PB2           0.7868   -0.2233   -0.2302    0.0376    0.0301   -0.0537    0.0506   -0.0176 
 42 PB3           0.7672   -0.1368   -0.4333   -0.0358   -0.0596    0.0214    0.0556   -0.0082 
 43 PB4           0.6656   -0.2308   -0.2058   -0.0844    0.4462   -0.0192    0.0781    0.1695 
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Unrotated Factor Matrix (continued) 
                Factors 
                   1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8 
 SORTS 
 45 PB6           0.6260   -0.2204   -0.0441   -0.1662    0.3096    0.0381    0.3906   -0.0474 
 46 PB7           0.7570   -0.0388   -0.0122   -0.1261    0.1354   -0.2099    0.0278   -0.2457 
 47 PB8           0.6390    0.2212    0.0734   -0.1033    0.1221    0.2701    0.1101    0.2175 
 48 PB9           0.6122    0.1118    0.0557    0.2742    0.1938    0.2367    0.3221   -0.2313 
 49 PB10          0.4616   -0.4124   -0.3936   -0.1417   -0.1696   -0.2875    0.0728   -0.0677 
 50 PB11          0.7067   -0.1283   -0.2674   -0.2666   -0.0403   -0.2374   -0.0853    0.0136 
 51 PB12          0.8019   -0.2470    0.1352   -0.0661   -0.0602   -0.0012    0.1877   -0.2119 
 52 PB13          0.5370    0.1238    0.3547   -0.3438    0.1073   -0.1496   -0.1896   -0.0691 
 53 PB14          0.8130   -0.0688   -0.1772    0.1150    0.1103    0.0946    0.1052   -0.2702 
 54 PB15          0.5722    0.0354    0.0377   -0.0479   -0.1849   -0.1799    0.3201    0.1591 
 55 PB16          0.7411   -0.0229   -0.3138   -0.1996   -0.0544   -0.1857   -0.2009    0.0724 
 56 PB17          0.6547   -0.1509   -0.2013    0.1216    0.4022    0.1066   -0.0647    0.0314 
 57 PB18          0.6583    0.0455   -0.0502    0.0435    0.4512   -0.2304   -0.0099   -0.0075 
 58 PB19          0.5927   -0.4448    0.0913   -0.2268    0.0329    0.0399   -0.2428   -0.0301 
 59 PB20          0.5736   -0.0433   -0.5175    0.0804    0.0382    0.2524   -0.3466   -0.0518 
 60 PB21          0.7405   -0.1284   -0.1896    0.0882   -0.0850    0.0243   -0.0380   -0.0529 
 61 PB22          0.7853   -0.1701   -0.0135    0.1041    0.1214   -0.0286    0.0284   -0.1931 




 Eigenvalues     26.9476    4.0647    3.2212    2.3239    1.8966    1.6493    1.5229    1.4242 
 % expl.Var.          43         7         5         4         3         3         2         2 
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Cumulative Communalities Matrix  
                Factors 1 Thru .... 
                   1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8 
 SORTS 
  1 PO1           0.4046    0.4348    0.4476    0.6052    0.6275    0.6307    0.6307    0.6355 
  2 PO2           0.3787    0.4190    0.4388    0.5808    0.5875    0.5900    0.6019    0.7028 
  3 PO3           0.3442    0.3567    0.4647    0.4759    0.4765    0.4767    0.4887    0.6372 
  4 PO4           0.0629    0.0780    0.1297    0.5221    0.5518    0.5528    0.5528    0.5546 
  5 PO5           0.4301    0.4724    0.6225    0.6745    0.6817    0.6876    0.6967    0.6970 
  6 PO6           0.6435    0.6732    0.6738    0.7227    0.7289    0.7320    0.7452    0.7453 
  7 PO7           0.4802    0.5660    0.5660    0.5880    0.6660    0.6663    0.6683    0.6685 
  8 PO8           0.5402    0.5526    0.5632    0.5656    0.5752    0.5797    0.5948    0.6904 
  9 PO9           0.4612    0.4616    0.4652    0.6008    0.6084    0.6309    0.6649    0.6668 
 10 PO10          0.5197    0.5198    0.5198    0.5256    0.5258    0.6534    0.7180    0.7257 
 11 PO11          0.5019    0.5065    0.5362    0.5883    0.5886    0.5964    0.6439    0.6583 
 12 PO12          0.5370    0.5826    0.5856    0.6231    0.6645    0.6707    0.7092    0.7094 
 13 PO13          0.5960    0.6035    0.6039    0.6572    0.6578    0.7037    0.7139    0.7143 
 14 PO14          0.3701    0.3723    0.4148    0.4463    0.4498    0.4518    0.5341    0.5489 
 15 PO15          0.4916    0.5113    0.5743    0.6514    0.7240    0.7394    0.7499    0.7516 
 16 PS1           0.1101    0.6266    0.6275    0.6520    0.6613    0.6623    0.6647    0.6728 
 17 PS2           0.1087    0.4539    0.5013    0.5083    0.5368    0.5633    0.6563    0.7087 
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 18 PS3           0.6536    0.6762    0.6795    0.6971    0.6992    0.7395    0.7649    0.7660 
 19 PS4           0.3292    0.3292    0.6517    0.6695    0.6759    0.6765    0.6768    0.6786 
 20 PS5           0.5378    0.5517    0.5677    0.6506    0.7025    0.7815    0.7832    0.7863 
 21 PS6           0.3625    0.3653    0.4472    0.4696    0.5232    0.5283    0.5583    0.5602 
 22 PS7           0.3623    0.3949    0.3950    0.4003    0.4032    0.5599    0.5604    0.5682 
 23 PS8           0.2642    0.4495    0.4533    0.4543    0.4601    0.4946    0.4963    0.5134 
 24 PS9           0.4593    0.5718    0.5740    0.5935    0.5944    0.7227    0.7266    0.7496 
 25 PS10          0.6772    0.6775    0.6776    0.6863    0.6868    0.7847    0.7885    0.7890 
 26 PS11          0.2777    0.3768    0.4215    0.4579    0.5980    0.6147    0.6341    0.7457 
 27 PS12          0.5959    0.6524    0.6649    0.7444    0.7621    0.7647    0.7787    0.7795 
 28 PS13          0.3240    0.5045    0.5759    0.5940    0.6333    0.6333    0.6833    0.6840 
 29 PS14          0.4708    0.5051    0.5481    0.5856    0.6863    0.6872    0.6885    0.7012 
 30 PS15          0.3770    0.4388    0.6011    0.6109    0.6920    0.7186    0.7538    0.7701 
 31 PS16          0.0814    0.4673    0.5495    0.5502    0.6003    0.6100    0.6188    0.6194 
 32 PS17          0.6027    0.6328    0.6408    0.6469    0.6616    0.6617    0.6618    0.7074 
 33 PS18          0.6009    0.6175    0.7851    0.8010    0.8132    0.8140    0.8140    0.8234 
 34 PS19          0.1537    0.3163    0.4126    0.4130    0.4204    0.4367    0.4430    0.5272 
 35 PS20          0.5052    0.5792    0.5897    0.5925    0.6311    0.6774    0.6806    0.6918 
 36 PS21          0.4514    0.5906    0.6767    0.7253    0.7471    0.7472    0.7506    0.7506 
 37 PS22          0.2151    0.4808    0.4829    0.5424    0.5431    0.5443    0.5473    0.6440 
 38 PS23          0.2967    0.3170    0.4123    0.4164    0.4165    0.4392    0.5023    0.5976 
 39 PS24          0.5134    0.5595    0.6892    0.6897    0.7105    0.7119    0.7285    0.7313 
 40 PB1           0.4954    0.5119    0.5260    0.5645    0.5645    0.6811    0.6813    0.6832 
 41 PB2           0.6191    0.6690    0.7220    0.7234    0.7243    0.7272    0.7297    0.7301 
 42 PB3           0.5886    0.6073    0.7951    0.7963    0.7999    0.8003    0.8034    0.8035 
 43 PB4           0.4430    0.4963    0.5386    0.5458    0.7449    0.7452    0.7513    0.7801 
 44 PB5           0.5393    0.6615    0.6807    0.7078    0.7090    0.7227    0.7576    0.7682 
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Cumulative Communalities Matrix (continued) 
                Factors 1 Thru .... 
                   1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8 
 SORTS 
 45 PB6           0.3919    0.4405    0.4424    0.4701    0.5659    0.5674    0.7200    0.7222 
 46 PB7           0.5730    0.5745    0.5746    0.5905    0.6089    0.6529    0.6537    0.7141 
 47 PB8           0.4083    0.4573    0.4627    0.4733    0.4883    0.5612    0.5733    0.6206 
 48 PB9           0.3748    0.3873    0.3904    0.4656    0.5032    0.5592    0.6629    0.7164 
 49 PB10          0.2130    0.3831    0.5380    0.5581    0.5868    0.6695    0.6748    0.6794 
 50 PB11          0.4995    0.5159    0.5875    0.6586    0.6602    0.7165    0.7238    0.7240 
 51 PB12          0.6431    0.7041    0.7224    0.7267    0.7304    0.7304    0.7656    0.8105 
 52 PB13          0.2883    0.3037    0.4295    0.5476    0.5592    0.5815    0.6175    0.6223 
 53 PB14          0.6610    0.6657    0.6971    0.7104    0.7225    0.7315    0.7425    0.8156 
 54 PB15          0.3274    0.3287    0.3301    0.3324    0.3666    0.3990    0.5014    0.5267 
 55 PB16          0.5492    0.5498    0.6482    0.6880    0.6910    0.7255    0.7659    0.7711 
 56 PB17          0.4287    0.4514    0.4919    0.5067    0.6685    0.6799    0.6841    0.6850 
 57 PB18          0.4333    0.4354    0.4379    0.4398    0.6434    0.6965    0.6966    0.6967 
 58 PB19          0.3513    0.5492    0.5575    0.6089    0.6100    0.6116    0.6706    0.6715 
 59 PB20          0.3290    0.3308    0.5986    0.6051    0.6066    0.6703    0.7904    0.7931 
 60 PB21          0.5484    0.5649    0.6008    0.6086    0.6158    0.6164    0.6179    0.6207 
 61 PB22          0.6166    0.6456    0.6458    0.6566    0.6713    0.6721    0.6729    0.7102 
 62 PB23          0.5326    0.5333    0.5846    0.5934    0.6402    0.6493    0.6946    0.7130 
 
cum% expl.Var.        43        50        55        59        62        65        67        69 
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Factor Matrix with an X Indicating a Defining Sort 
                Loadings 
 
 QSORT             1         2 
  
  1 PO1          0.6305X   0.1931  
  2 PO2          0.6274X   0.1593  
  3 PO3          0.5556X   0.2191  
  4 PO4          0.1463    0.2380  
  5 PO5          0.6642X   0.1766  
  6 PO6          0.7701X   0.2831  
  7 PO7          0.7422X   0.1227  
  8 PO8          0.6809X   0.2984  
  9 PO9          0.5840X   0.3472  
 10 PO10         0.6146X   0.3769  
 11 PO11         0.6348X   0.3216  
 12 PO12         0.7334X   0.2112  
 13 PO13         0.6060X   0.4861  
 14 PO14         0.5391X   0.2857  
 15 PO15         0.6676X   0.2560  
 16 PS1         -0.1037    0.7848X 
 17 PS2         -0.0354    0.6728X 
 18 PS3          0.6030X   0.5591  
 19 PS4          0.4860X   0.3049  
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 20 PS5          0.6828X   0.2923  
 21 PS6          0.4809X   0.3660  
 22 PS7          0.4123    0.4743X 
 23 PS8          0.2045    0.6385X 
 24 PS9          0.3936    0.6456X 
 25 PS10         0.6865X   0.4542  
 26 PS11         0.2772    0.5477X 
 27 PS12         0.5255    0.6133X 
 28 PS13         0.2540    0.6633X 
 29 PS14         0.4810    0.5232X 
 30 PS15         0.6518X   0.1180  
 31 PS16        -0.0908    0.6775X 
 32 PS17         0.5633X   0.5617  
 33 PS18         0.7240X   0.3054  
 34 PS19         0.1158    0.5503X 
 35 PS20         0.4554    0.6098X 
 36 PS21         0.3684    0.6744X 
 37 PS22         0.1165    0.6835X 
 38 PS23         0.3842    0.4115X 
 39 PS24         0.4909    0.5644X 
 40 PB1          0.6635X   0.2677  
 41 PB2          0.7844X   0.2318  
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Factor Matrix with an X Indicating a Defining Sort (continued) 
                Loadings 
 QSORT             1         2  
 43 PB4          0.6859X   0.1606  
 44 PB5          0.8075X   0.0970  
 45 PB6          0.6469X   0.1482  
 46 PB7          0.6605X   0.3717  
 47 PB8          0.4219    0.5285X 
 48 PB9          0.4577X   0.4217  
 49 PB10         0.6105X  -0.1019  
 50 PB11         0.6659X   0.2692  
 51 PB12         0.8098X   0.2198  
 52 PB13         0.3877    0.3916X 
 53 PB14         0.7240X   0.3763  
 54 PB15         0.4647X   0.3358  
 55 PB16         0.6387X   0.3767  
 56 PB17         0.6340X   0.2224  
 57 PB18         0.5320X   0.3903  
 58 PB19         0.7387X  -0.0592  
 59 PB20         0.5079X   0.2699  
 60 PB21         0.6945X   0.2872  
 61 PB22         0.7546X   0.2759  
 62 PB23         0.6304X   0.3686  
 
 % expl.Var.         33        17 
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Free Distribution Data Results 
 QSORT            MEAN     ST.DEV.  
  1 PO1           0.000     2.117 
  2 PO2           0.000     2.117 
  3 PO3           0.000     2.117 
  4 PO4           0.000     2.117 
  5 PO5           0.000     2.117 
  6 PO6           0.000     2.117 
  7 PO7           0.000     2.117 
  8 PO8           0.000     2.117 
  9 PO9           0.000     2.117 
 10 PO10          0.000     2.117 
 11 PO11          0.000     2.117 
 12 PO12          0.000     2.117 
 13 PO13          0.000     2.117 
 14 PO14          0.000     2.117 
 15 PO15          0.000     2.117 
 16 PS1           0.000     2.117 
 17 PS2           0.000     2.117 
 18 PS3           0.000     2.117 
 19 PS4           0.000     2.117 
 20 PS5           0.000     2.117 
 21 PS6           0.000     2.117 
 22 PS7           0.000     2.117 
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 23 PS8           0.000     2.117 
 24 PS9           0.000     2.117 
 25 PS10          0.000     2.117 
 26 PS11          0.000     2.117 
 27 PS12          0.000     2.117 
 28 PS13          0.000     2.117 
 29 PS14          0.000     2.117 
 30 PS15          0.000     2.117 
 31 PS16          0.000     2.117 
 32 PS17          0.000     2.117 
 33 PS18          0.000     2.117 
 34 PS19          0.000     2.117 
 35 PS20          0.000     2.117 
 36 PS21          0.000     2.117 
 37 PS22          0.000     2.117 
 38 PS23          0.000     2.117 
 39 PS24          0.000     2.117 
 40 PB1           0.000     2.117 
 41 PB2           0.000     2.117 
 42 PB3           0.000     2.117 
 43 PB4           0.000     2.117 
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Free Distribution Data Results 
 QSORT            MEAN     ST.DEV. 
 45 PB6           0.000     2.117 
 46 PB7           0.000     2.117 
 47 PB8           0.000     2.117 
 48 PB9           0.000     2.117 
 49 PB10          0.000     2.117 
 50 PB11          0.000     2.117 
 51 PB12          0.000     2.117 
 52 PB13          0.000     2.117 
 53 PB14          0.000     2.117 
 54 PB15          0.000     2.117 
 55 PB16          0.000     2.117 
 56 PB17          0.000     2.117 
 57 PB18          0.000     2.117 
 58 PB19          0.000     2.117 
 59 PB20          0.000     2.117 
 60 PB21          0.000     2.117 
 61 PB22          0.000     2.117 




PQMethod2.35               External Civilian Oversight of policing in the north of Ireland                       
PAGE   15 
Path and Project Name: C:\PQMethod\projects/ECOstudy                                                             May 23 
17 
Factor Scores with Corresponding Ranks 
                                                                                  Factors 
No.  Statement                                                  No.          1            2  
  1  1. The process of interaction between the PSNI and the     1      -0.63  42    0.14  27 
  2  2. The PSNI has dealt fairly and speedily with all req     2      -1.36  56   -1.20  52 
  3  3. Sometimes it seems as though the external civilian      3      -0.45  39   -0.26  35 
  4  4. There is no need for the Policing Board to have scr     4      -1.35  55   -0.54  41 
  5  5. The devolution of powers on policing and justice ha     5       0.85  13    0.89  13 
  6  6. The most effective model of policing oversight is o     6       1.45   6    0.80  14 
  7  7. The Police Ombudsman’s access to all aspects of pol     7      -0.70  44   -1.43  54 
  8  8. Without effective external civilian oversight there     8       1.33   8    1.49   4 
  9  9. It is helpful that the Policing Board is consulted      9      -0.34  37   -0.47  40 
 10  10. PSNI is justified in its concern that information     10      -0.27  36    1.07   9 
 11  11. It is useful that the Office of the Police Ombudsm    11      -0.16  31    0.47  21 
 12  12. Without accountability policing in any democratic     12       1.75   2    2.14   1 
 13  13. Since the inception of the Policing Board and the     13       0.05  26   -1.15  51 
 14  14. As a result of external oversight, accountability     14       1.15  11    1.00  10 
 15  15. The Policing Board has been very successful in eng    15       0.00  28   -1.47  55 
 16  16. There are still some areas where the external over    16       1.17  10    0.98  12 
 17  17. All those aspects of policing which the in the pas    17      -0.24  33   -1.50  56 
 18  18. The existence of the arrangements for external civ    18      -0.25  34   -0.96  49 
 19  19. All public agencies have to adapt to current fundi    19       0.15  24    0.98  11 
 20  20. After 15 years of external oversight there is now     20       1.32   9   -0.06  29 
 21  21. More of what is presently done by external oversig    21      -1.28  53   -0.89  46 
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 22  22. The external oversight bodies are not ready for th    22      -0.16  32    0.64  17 
 23  23. The office of the Police Ombudsman has been very s    23       0.83  14   -0.11  32 
 24  24. External oversight bodies are not yet effectively     24      -0.10  30    0.65  16 
 25  25. A separate Policing Board and Office of the Police    25      -1.51  57   -0.72  44 
 26  26.  There is no evidence that external oversight has     26      -1.76  58   -1.69  58 
 27  27. Party politics has too great an influence on the N    27       0.46  21    1.43   5 
 28  28.  Without external oversight it would not be possib    28       1.71   4    1.86   3 
 29  29. Sometimes the activities in which external oversig    29       0.05  27    0.52  20 
 30  30. The Northern Ireland Policing Board’s powers and r    30       0.24  23   -1.41  53 
 31  31. The emphasis on external oversight sometimes has t    31      -0.35  38    0.71  15 
 32  32. The office of the Police Ombudsman has all of the     32      -0.04  29    0.60  18 
 33  33. A new beginning to policing accountability has bee    33       1.63   5    2.01   2 
 34  34. Democratically accountable policing is only possib    34       0.55  19   -0.47  38 
 35  35. The institutions for policing oversight which have    35      -1.07  50    0.21  26 
 36  36. External civilian oversight bodies should limit th    36      -1.23  52   -1.58  57 
 37  37. Policing accountability in Northern Ireland is the    37       0.55  18   -0.43  37 
 38  38. It’s as though the PSNI is being pulled up by its     38      -0.98  48   -0.54  42 
 39  39.  As a result of external oversight we now have lea    39      -0.65  43    0.55  19 
 40  40. Over the years the Office of the Police Ombudsman     40      -0.27  35   -0.91  48 
 41  41. Ultimately, the PSNI is accountable to the courts     41      -0.84  47   -0.32  36 
 42  42. External oversight bodies should have scrutiny ove    42      -1.16  51   -0.91  47 
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 44  44. The Department of Justice has too much influence o     44     0.35  22  -0.71  43 
 45  45. What has evolved through negotiation and legislati     45     0.66  16  -0.08  31 
 46  46.  The PSNI is the most accountable police service i     46      0.61  17   0.46  22 
 47  47.  Without the external oversight bodies it would be     47      1.77   1   1.41   6 
 48  48. The independence of the external oversight bodies      48     -0.99  49  -0.81  45 
 49  49. External oversight bodies have already played a po     49      0.72  15  -0.23  34 
 50  50. It is unfair of external oversight bodies to judge     50      0.50  20   1.19   8 
 51  51. It seems as though there is little understanding a     51     -0.77  45  -0.08  30 
 52  52. There was nothing wrong with the arrangements for      52     -2.20  59  -1.90  59 
 53  53.  If it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsma     53      1.72   3  -0.47  39 
 54  54. The external oversight bodies do not engender conf     54     -0.46  40   0.28  24 
 55  55.  When decisions on policing have to be made, the e     55      0.07  25   0.26  25 
 56  56. Everything that is in the public interest  - not t      56      1.11  12  -0.15  33 
 57  57. The PSNI has always demonstrated complete transpar     57     -1.34  54  -1.07  50 
 58  58. There are clear and necessary limits to what the P     58     -0.46  41   0.36  23 
 59  59. External oversight of policing in the north of Ire     59     -0.82  46   0.10  28 
 
     Correlations Between Factor Scores 
               1       2 
    1     1.0000  0.6555 
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Factor Scores -- For Factor    1 
 No.  Statement                                                        No.     Z-SCORES 
  47  47.  Without the external oversight bodies it would be diffi   47        1.773 
  12  12.  Without accountability policing in any democratic societ  12        1.750 
  53  53.  If it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsman and   53        1.717 
  28  28.  Without external oversight it would not be possible to   28        1.711 
  33  33.  A new beginning to policing accountability has been the   33        1.634 
   6  6.  The most effective model of policing oversight is one whi   6        1.451 
  43  43.  Monitoring human rights compliance is now an integral a  43        1.417 
   8  8.  Without effective external civilian oversight there can b   8        1.333 
  20  20.  After 15 years of external oversight there is now irrefu  20        1.322 
  16  16.  There are still some areas where the external oversight   16        1.169 
  14  14.  As a result of external oversight, accountability is now  14        1.147 
  56  56.  Everything that is in the public interest  - not the pol  56        1.108 
   5  5.  The devolution of powers on policing and justice has led    5        0.854 
  23  23.  The office of the Police Ombudsman has been very success  23        0.828 
  49  49.  External oversight bodies have already played a positive  49        0.716 
  45  45.  What has evolved through negotiation and legislation for  45        0.660 
  46  46.  The PSNI is the most accountable police service in the   46        0.613 
  37  37.  Policing accountability in Northern Ireland is the ‘Roll  37        0.550 
  34  34.  Democratically accountable policing is only possible bec  34        0.546 
  50  50.  It is unfair of external oversight bodies to judge past   50        0.498 
  27  27.  Party politics has too great an influence on the Norther  27        0.457 
  44  44.  The Department of Justice has too much influence over th  44        0.350 
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  30  30.  The Northern Ireland Policing Board’s powers and respons  30        0.244 
  19  19.  All public agencies have to adapt to current funding con  19        0.149 
  55  55.  When decisions on policing have to be made, the externa  55        0.066 
  13  13.  Since the inception of the Policing Board and the Police  13        0.055 
  29  29.  Sometimes the activities in which external oversight eng  29        0.050 
  15  15.  The Policing Board has been very successful in engenderi  15        0.002 
  32  32.  The office of the Police Ombudsman has all of the power   32       -0.039 
  24  24.  External oversight bodies are not yet effectively aligne  24       -0.098 
  11  11.  It is useful that the Office of the Police Ombudsman can  11       -0.161 
  22  22.  The external oversight bodies are not ready for the crea  22       -0.164 
  17  17.  All those aspects of policing which the in the past gave  17       -0.245 
  18  18.  The existence of the arrangements for external civilian   18       -0.248 
  40  40.  Over the years the Office of the Police Ombudsman has sh  40       -0.265 
  10  10.  PSNI is justified in its concern that information disclo  10       -0.269 
   9  9.  It is helpful that the Policing Board is consulted but ul   9       -0.339 
  31  31.  The emphasis on external oversight sometimes has the eff  31       -0.346 
   3  3.  Sometimes it seems as though the external civilian oversi   3       -0.453 
  54  54.  The external oversight bodies do not engender confidence  54       -0.458 
  58  58.  There are clear and necessary limits to what the PSNI sh  58       -0.464 
   1  1.  The process of interaction between the PSNI and the exter   1       -0.626 
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   7  7. The Police Ombudsman’s access to all aspects of policing,    7       -0.698 
  51  51. It seems as though there is little understanding and sym   51       -0.775 
  59  59. External oversight of policing in the north of Ireland i    59       -0.825 
  41  41. Ultimately, the PSNI is accountable to the courts and th   41       -0.845 
  38  38. It’s as though the PSNI is being pulled up by its roots     38       -0.978 
  48  48. The independence of the external oversight bodies has ne   48       -0.986 
  35  35. The institutions for policing oversight which have evolv    35       -1.065 
  42  42. External oversight bodies should have scrutiny over only   42       -1.156 
  36  36. External civilian oversight bodies should limit their re    36       -1.229 
  21  21. More of what is presently done by external oversight cou   21       -1.279 
  57  57. The PSNI has always demonstrated complete transparency t   57       -1.338 
   4  4. There is no need for the Policing Board to have scrutiny     4       -1.347 
   2  2. The PSNI has dealt fairly and speedily with all requests     2       -1.359 
  25  25. A separate Policing Board and Office of the Police Ombud   25       -1.508 
  26  26. There is no evidence that external oversight has had an   26       -1.761 
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 No.  Statement                                                        No.     Z-SCORES 
  12  12. Without accountability policing in any democratic societ   12        2.145 
  33  33. A new beginning to policing accountability has been the    33        2.005 
  28  28. Without external oversight it would not be possible to     28        1.856 
   8  8. Without effective external civilian oversight there can b    8        1.494 
  27  27. Party politics has too great an influence on the Norther    27        1.434 
  47  47. Without the external oversight bodies it would be diffi    47        1.407 
  43  43. Monitoring human rights compliance is now an integral a   43        1.297 
  50  50. It is unfair of external oversight bodies to judge past     50        1.193 
  10  10. PSNI is justified in its concern that information disclo    10        1.074 
  14  14. As a result of external oversight, accountability is now    14        0.999 
  19  19. All public agencies have to adapt to current funding con   19        0.982 
  16  16. There are still some areas where the external oversight    16        0.977 
   5  5. The devolution of powers on policing and justice has led     5        0.890 
   6  6. The most effective model of policing oversight is one whi   6        0.797 
  31  31. The emphasis on external oversight sometimes has the eff   31        0.713 
  24  24. External oversight bodies are not yet effectively aligne    24        0.651 
  22  22. The external oversight bodies are not ready for the crea   22        0.642 
  32  32. The office of the Police Ombudsman has all of the power    32        0.598 
  39  39. As a result of external oversight we now have leaders i    39        0.551 
  29  29. Sometimes the activities in which external oversight eng   29        0.519 
  11  11. It is useful that the Office of the Police Ombudsman can   11        0.468 
  46  46. The PSNI is the most accountable police service in the     46        0.456 
  58  58. There are clear and necessary limits to what the PSNI sh   58        0.358 
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  54  54. The external oversight bodies do not engender confidence   54        0.280 
  55  55. When decisions on policing have to be made, the externa   55        0.262 
  35  35. The institutions for policing oversight which have evolv    35        0.209 
   1  1.The process of interaction between the PSNI and the exter    1        0.141 
  59  59. External oversight of policing in the north of Ireland i    59        0.096 
  20  20. After 15 years of external oversight there is now irrefu    20       -0.062 
  51  51. It seems as though there is little understanding and sym   51       -0.076 
  45  45. What has evolved through negotiation and legislation for   45       -0.077 
  23  23. The office of the Police Ombudsman has been very success   23       -0.105 
  56  56. Everything that is in the public interest  - not the pol    56       -0.154 
  49  49. External oversight bodies have already played a positive   49       -0.227 
   3  3. Sometimes it seems as though the external civilian oversi    3       -0.260 
  41  41. Ultimately, the PSNI is accountable to the courts and th   41       -0.322 
  37  37. Policing accountability in Northern Ireland is the ‘Roll    37       -0.428 
  34  34. Democratically accountable policing is only possible bec   34       -0.470 
  53  53. If it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsman and    53       -0.470 
   9  9. It is helpful that the Policing Board is consulted but ul     9       -0.472 
   4  4. There is no need for the Policing Board to have scrutiny     4       -0.536 
  38  38. It’s as though the PSNI is being pulled up by its roots     38       -0.539 
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  25  25. A separate Policing Board and Office of the Police Ombud   25       -0.724 
  48  48. The independence of the external oversight bodies has ne   48       -0.808 
  21  21. More of what is presently done by external oversight cou   21       -0.892 
  42  42. External oversight bodies should have scrutiny over only   42       -0.905 
  40  40. Over the years the Office of the Police Ombudsman has sh   40       -0.907 
  18  18. The existence of the arrangements for external civilian     18       -0.956 
  57  57. The PSNI has always demonstrated complete transparency t   57       -1.070 
  13  13. Since the inception of the Policing Board and the Police   13       -1.147 
   2  2. The PSNI has dealt fairly and speedily with all requests     2       -1.200 
  30  30. The Northern Ireland Policing Board’s powers and respons   30       -1.408 
   7  7. The Police Ombudsman’s access to all aspects of policing,   7       -1.434 
  15  15. The Policing Board has been very successful in engenderi   15       -1.467 
  17  17. All those aspects of policing which the in the past gave    17       -1.502 
  36  36. External civilian oversight bodies should limit their re    36       -1.575 
  26  26. There is no evidence that external oversight has had an    26       -1.690 
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 53  53.  If it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsman and   53        1.717    -0.470       2.187 
30  30. The Northern Ireland Policing Board’s powers and respons  30        0.244    -1.408       1.652 
15  15. The Policing Board has been very successful in engenderi  15        0.002    -1.467       1.469 
20  20. After 15 years of external oversight there is now irrefu  20        1.322    -0.062       1.383 
56  56. Everything that is in the public interest  - not the pol  56        1.108    -0.154       1.261 
17  17. All those aspects of policing which the in the past gave  17       -0.245    -1.502       1.257 
13  13. Since the inception of the Policing Board and the Police  13        0.055    -1.147       1.202 
44  44. The Department of Justice has too much influence over th  44        0.350    -0.712       1.062 
34  34. Democratically accountable policing is only possible bec  34        0.546    -0.470       1.015 
37  37. Policing accountability in Northern Ireland is the ‘Roll  37        0.550    -0.428       0.978 
49  49. External oversight bodies have already played a positive  49        0.716    -0.227       0.944 
23  23. The office of the Police Ombudsman has been very success  23        0.828    -0.105       0.933 
 7  7. The Police Ombudsman’s access to all aspects of policing,  7       -0.698    -1.434       0.737 
45  45. What has evolved through negotiation and legislation for  45        0.660    -0.077       0.737 
18  18. The existence of the arrangements for external civilian   18       -0.248    -0.956       0.708 
 6  6. The most effective model of policing oversight is one whi  6        1.451     0.797       0.654 
40  40. Over the years the Office of the Police Ombudsman has sh  40       -0.265    -0.907       0.642 
47  47.  Without the external oversight bodies it would be diffi   47        1.773     1.407       0.366 
36  36. External civilian oversight bodies should limit their re  36       -1.229    -1.575       0.346 
16  16. There are still some areas where the external oversight   16        1.169     0.977       0.193 
46  46. The PSNI is the most accountable police service in the    46        0.613     0.456       0.158 
14  14. As a result of external oversight, accountability is now  14        1.147     0.999       0.149 
 9  9. It is helpful that the Policing Board is consulted but ul  9       -0.339    -0.472       0.133 
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43  43. Monitoring human rights compliance is now an integral a   43        1.417     1.297       0.120 
 5  5. The devolution of powers on policing and justice has led   5        0.854     0.890      -0.036 
26  26. There is no evidence that external oversight has had an   26       -1.761    -1.690      -0.071 
28  28. Without external oversight it would not be possible to    28        1.711     1.856      -0.145 
 2  2. The PSNI has dealt fairly and speedily with all requests   2       -1.359    -1.200      -0.159 
 8  8. Without effective external civilian oversight there can b  8        1.333     1.494      -0.161 
48  48. The independence of the external oversight bodies has ne  48       -0.986    -0.808      -0.178 
 3  3. Sometimes it seems as though the external civilian oversi  3       -0.453    -0.260      -0.193 
55  55. When decisions on policing have to be made, the externa   55        0.066     0.262      -0.196 
42  42. External oversight bodies should have scrutiny over only  42       -1.156    -0.905      -0.251 
57  57. The PSNI has always demonstrated complete transparency t  57       -1.338    -1.070      -0.268 
52  52. There was nothing wrong with the arrangements for polici  52       -2.197    -1.896      -0.301 
33  33. A new beginning to policing accountability has been the   33        1.634     2.005      -0.371 
21  21. More of what is presently done by external oversight cou  21       -1.279    -0.892      -0.387 
12  12. Without accountability policing in any democratic societ  12        1.750     2.145      -0.394 
38  38. It’s as though the PSNI is being pulled up by its roots   38       -0.978    -0.539      -0.439 
29  29. Sometimes the activities in which external oversight eng  29        0.050     0.519      -0.469 
41  41. Ultimately, the PSNI is accountable to the courts and th  41       -0.845    -0.322      -0.523 
11  11. It is useful that the Office of the Police Ombudsman can  11       -0.161     0.468      -0.628 




PQMethod2.35               External Civilian Oversight of policing in the north of Ireland                       
PAGE   22 
Path and Project Name: C:\PQMethod\projects/ECOstudy                                                             May 23 
Descending Array of Differences Between Factors   1 and   2 
No.  Statement                                                       No.     Type   1  Type   2  Difference 
50  50. It is unfair of external oversight bodies to judge past    50        0.498     1.193      -0.695 
51  51. It seems as though there is little understanding and sym  51       -0.775    -0.076      -0.698 
54  54. The external oversight bodies do not engender confidence  54       -0.458     0.280      -0.738 
24  24. External oversight bodies are not yet effectively aligne  24       -0.098     0.651      -0.749 
  1  1. The process of interaction between the PSNI and the exter  1       -0.626     0.141      -0.767 
25  25. A separate Policing Board and Office of the Police Ombud  25       -1.508    -0.724      -0.784 
22  22. The external oversight bodies are not ready for the crea  22       -0.164     0.642      -0.806 
 4  4. There is no need for the Policing Board to have scrutiny   4       -1.347    -0.536      -0.811 
58  58. There are clear and necessary limits to what the PSNI sh  58       -0.464     0.358      -0.822 
19  19. All public agencies have to adapt to current funding con  19        0.149     0.982      -0.834 
59  59. External oversight of policing in the north of Ireland i  59       -0.825     0.096      -0.921 
27  27. Party politics has too great an influence on the Norther  27        0.457     1.434      -0.977 
31  31. The emphasis on external oversight sometimes has the eff  31       -0.346     0.713      -1.059 
39  39. As a result of external oversight we now have leaders i   39       -0.650     0.551      -1.201 
35  35. The institutions for policing oversight which have evolv  35       -1.065     0.209      -1.275 
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No.  Statement                                                  No.          1          2  
  1  1. The process of interaction between the PSNI and the     1     -0.87  41   0.70  57 
  2  2. The PSNI has dealt fairly and speedily with all req     2     -1.02  40  -1.05  40 
  3  3. Sometimes it seems as though the external civilian      3     -0.53  45   0.13  51 
  4  4. There is no need for the Policing Board to have scr     4     -1.42  36  -0.01  50 
  5  5. The devolution of powers on policing and justice ha     5      0.67  57   0.75  57 
  6  6. The most effective model of policing oversight is o     6      1.65  66   0.17  52 
  7  7. The Police Ombudsman’s access to all aspects of pol     7     -0.19  48  -1.44  36 
  8  8. Without effective external civilian oversight there    8      1.13  61   0.87  59 
  9  9. It is helpful that the Policing Board is consulted      9     -0.25  47  -0.39  46 
 10  10. PSNI is justified in its concern that information     10     -0.94  41   1.66  67 
 11  11. It is useful that the Office of the Police Ombudsm    11     -0.54  45   0.87  59 
 12  12. Without accountability policing in any democratic     12      1.14  61   1.72  67 
 13  13. Since the inception of the Policing Board and the     13      0.56  56  -1.39  36 
 14  14. As a result of external oversight, accountability     14      0.83  58   1.01  60 
 15  15. The Policing Board has been very successful in eng    15      0.68  57  -1.84  32 
 16  16. There are still some areas where the external over    16      1.02  60   0.49  55 
 17  17. All those aspects of policing which the in the pas    17      0.41  54  -1.73  33 
 18  18. The existence of the arrangements for external civ    18      0.14  51  -1.02  40 
 19  19. All public agencies have to adapt to current fundi    19     -0.33  47   1.37  64 
 20  20. After 15 years of external oversight there is now     20      1.73  67  -0.75  42 
 21  21. More of what is presently done by external oversig    21     -1.17  38  -0.46  45 
 22  22. The external oversight bodies are not ready for th    22     -0.45  46   0.68  57 
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 23  23. The office of the Police Ombudsman has been very s    23      0.78  58  -0.14  49 
 24  24. External oversight bodies are not yet effectively     24     -0.35  46   0.73  57 
 25  25. A separate Policing Board and Office of the Police    25     -1.46  35  -0.43  46 
 26  26.  There is no evidence that external oversight has     26     -1.43  36  -1.29  37 
 27  27. Party politics has too great an influence on the N    27     -0.24  48   1.76  68 
 28  28.  Without external oversight it would not be possib    28      1.26  63   1.44  64 
 29  29. Sometimes the activities in which external oversig    29     -0.15  48   0.64  56 
 30  30. The Northern Ireland Policing Board’s powers and r    30      0.82  58  -1.65  33 
 31  31. The emphasis on external oversight sometimes has t    31     -0.82  42   1.16  62 
 32  32. The office of the Police Ombudsman has all of the     32     -0.32  47   0.76  58 
 33  33. A new beginning to policing accountability has bee    33      1.08  61   1.63  66 
 34  34. Democratically accountable policing is only possib    34      1.08  61  -1.21  38 
 35  35. The institutions for policing oversight which have    35     -1.39  36   0.59  56 
 36  36. External civilian oversight bodies should limit th    36     -0.74  43  -1.44  36 
 37  37. Policing accountability in Northern Ireland is the    37      0.89  59  -0.81  42 
 38  38. It’s as though the PSNI is being pulled up by its     38     -0.91  41  -0.23  48 
 39  39.  As a result of external oversight we now have lea    39     -0.95  41   0.84  58 
 40  40. Over the years the Office of the Police Ombudsman     40      0.08  51  -0.87  41 
 41  41. Ultimately, the PSNI is accountable to the courts     41     -0.83  42  -0.19  48 
 42  42. External oversight bodies should have scrutiny ove    42     -0.91  41  -0.78  42 
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Exact Factor Scores (á la SPSS) in Z-Score and T-Score units 
                                                                              Factors 
No.  Statement                                                  No.          1          2 
  
 44  44. The Department of Justice has too much influence o    44      0.87  59  -1.29  37 
 45  45. What has evolved through negotiation and legislati    45      0.79  58  -0.23  48 
 46  46.  The PSNI is the most accountable police service i    46      0.50  55   0.35  53 
 47  47.  Without the external oversight bodies it would be    47      1.63  66   0.85  58 
 48  48. The independence of the external oversight bodies     48     -0.67  43  -0.78  42 
 49  49. External oversight bodies have already played a po    49      0.86  59  -0.51  45 
 50  50. It is unfair of external oversight bodies to judge    50      0.18  52   1.11  61 
 51  51. It seems as though there is little understanding a    51     -0.99  40   0.32  53 
 52  52. There was nothing wrong with the arrangements for     52     -1.88  31  -1.28  37 
 53  53.  If it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsma   53      2.31  73  -1.18  38 
 54  54. The external oversight bodies do not engender conf    54     -0.64  44   0.59  56 
 55  55.  When decisions on policing have to be made, the e    55     -0.22  48   0.36  54 
 56  56. Everything that is in the public interest  - not t     56      1.53  65  -0.58  44 
 57  57. The PSNI has always demonstrated complete transpar    57     -1.23  38  -0.66  43 
 58  58. There are clear and necessary limits to what the P    58     -0.77  42   0.66  57 
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Factor Q-Sort Values for Each Statement 
                                                                                Factor Arrays 
  No.  Statement                                                       No.        1      2 
  1  1. The process of interaction between the PSNI and the exter   1       -1      0 
  2  2. The PSNI has dealt fairly and speedily with all requests    2       -3     -3 
  3  3. Sometimes it seems as though the external civilian oversi   3       -1      0 
  4  4. There is no need for the Policing Board to have scrutiny    4       -3     -1 
  5  5. The devolution of powers on policing and justice has led    5        2      2 
  6  6. The most effective model of policing oversight is one whi   6        3      2 
  7  7. The Police Ombudsman’s access to all aspects of policing,   7       -1     -3 
  8  8. Without effective external civilian oversight there can b   8        3      3 
  9  9. It is helpful that the Policing Board is consulted but ul   9       -1     -1 
 10  10. PSNI is justified in its concern that information disclo  10       -1      2 
 11  11. It is useful that the Office of the Police Ombudsman can  11        0      1 
 12  12. Without accountability policing in any democratic societ  12        4      4 
 13  13. Since the inception of the Policing Board and the Police  13        0     -2 
 14  14. As a result of external oversight, accountability is now  14        2      2 
 15  15. The Policing Board has been very successful in engenderi  15        0     -3 
 16  16. There are still some areas where the external oversight   16        2      2 
 17  17. All those aspects of policing which the in the past gave  17        0     -3 
 18  18. The existence of the arrangements for external civilian   18        0     -2 
 19  19. All public agencies have to adapt to current funding con  19        1      2 
 20  20. After 15 years of external oversight there is now irrefu  20        2      0 
 21  21. More of what is presently done by external oversight cou  21       -3     -2 
 22  22. The external oversight bodies are not ready for the crea  22        0      1 
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 23  23. The office of the Police Ombudsman has been very success  23        2      0 
 24  24. External oversight bodies are not yet effectively aligne  24        0      1 
 25  25. A separate Policing Board and Office of the Police Ombud  25       -4     -1 
 26  26.  There is no evidence that external oversight has had an  26       -4     -4 
 27  27. Party politics has too great an influence on the Norther  27        1      3 
 28  28.  Without external oversight it would not be possible to   28        3      4 
 29  29. Sometimes the activities in which external oversight eng  29        0      1 
 30  30. The Northern Ireland Policing Board’s powers and respons  30        1     -3 
 31  31. The emphasis on external oversight sometimes has the eff  31       -1      2 
 32  32. The office of the Police Ombudsman has all of the power   32        0      1 
 33  33. A new beginning to policing accountability has been the   33        3      4 
 34  34. Democratically accountable policing is only possible bec  34        1     -1 
 35  35. The institutions for policing oversight which have evolv  35       -2      0 
 36  36. External civilian oversight bodies should limit their re  36       -3     -4 
 37  37. Policing accountability in Northern Ireland is the ‘Roll  37        1     -1 
 38  38. It’s as though the PSNI is being pulled up by its roots   38       -2     -1 
 39  39.  As a result of external oversight we now have leaders i  39       -1      1 
 40  40. Over the years the Office of the Police Ombudsman has sh  40        0     -2 
 41  41. Ultimately, the PSNI is accountable to the courts and th  41       -2     -1 
 42  42. External oversight bodies should have scrutiny over only  42       -2     -2 
 43  43.  Monitoring human rights compliance is now an integral a  43        3      3 
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                                                                             Factor Arrays 
No.  Statement                                                       No.        1      2 
 45  45. What has evolved through negotiation and legislation for  45        1      0 
 46  46.  The PSNI is the most accountable police service in the   46        1      1 
 47  47.  Without the external oversight bodies it would be diffi  47        4      3 
 48  48. The independence of the external oversight bodies has ne  48       -2     -2 
 49  49. External oversight bodies have already played a positive  49        2      0 
 50  50. It is unfair of external oversight bodies to judge past   50        1      3 
 51  51. It seems as though there is little understanding and sym  51       -2      0 
 52  52. There was nothing wrong with the arrangements for polici  52       -4     -4 
 53  53.  If it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsman and   53        4     -1 
 54  54. The external oversight bodies do not engender confidence  54       -1      1 
 55  55.  When decisions on policing have to be made, the externa  55        0      0 
 56  56. Everything that is in the public interest  - not the pol  56        2      0 
 57  57. The PSNI has always demonstrated complete transparency t  57       -3     -2 
 58  58. There are clear and necessary limits to what the PSNI sh  58       -1      1 
 59  59. External oversight of policing in the north of Ireland i  59       -2      0 
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Factor Q-Sort Values for Statements sorted by Consensus vs. Disagreement (Variance across Factor 
Z-Scores) 
                                                                                Factor Arrays 
No.  Statement                                                       No.      1      2 
  5 The devolution of powers on policing and justice has led      5        2      2 
 26  There is no evidence that external oversight has had an   26       -4     -4 
 43  Monitoring human rights compliance is now an integral a   43        3      3 
  9  It is helpful that the Policing Board is consulted but ul     9       -1     -1 
 28  Without external oversight it would not be possible to   28        3      4 
 14  As a result of external oversight, accountability is now 14        2      2 
 46  The PSNI is the most accountable police service in the    46        1      1 
  2  The PSNI has dealt fairly and speedily with all requests      2       -3     -3 
  8  Without effective external civilian oversight there can b     8        3      3 
 48  The independence of the external oversight bodies has ne    48       -2     -2 
  3  Sometimes it seems as though the external civilian oversi      3       -1      0 
 16  There are still some areas where the external oversight     16        2      2 
 55  When decisions on policing have to be made, the externa    55        0      0 
 42  External oversight bodies should have scrutiny over only    42       -2     -2 
 57  The PSNI has always demonstrated complete transparency t   57       -3     -2 
 52  There was nothing wrong with the arrangements for polici    52       -4     -4 
 36  External civilian oversight bodies should limit their re    36       -3     -4 
 47  Without the external oversight bodies it would be diffi    47        4      3 
 33  A new beginning to policing accountability has been the     33        3      4 
 21  More of what is presently done by external oversight cou    21       -3     -2 
 12  Without accountability policing in any democratic societ    12        4      4 
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 38  It’s as though the PSNI is being pulled up by its roots     38       -2     -1 
 29  Sometimes the activities in which external oversight eng    29        0      1 
 41  Ultimately, the PSNI is accountable to the courts and th    41       -2     -1 
 11  It is useful that the Office of the Police Ombudsman can    11        0      1 
 32  The office of the Police Ombudsman has all of the power     32        0      1 
 40  Over the years the Office of the Police Ombudsman has sh    40        0     -2 
  6  The most effective model of policing oversight is one whi      6        3      2 
 50  It is unfair of external oversight bodies to judge past     50        1      3 
 51  It seems as though there is little understanding and sym    51       -2      0 
 18  The existence of the arrangements for external civilian     18        0     -2 
 45  What has evolved through negotiation and legislation for    45        1      0 
  7  The Police Ombudsman’s access to all aspects of policing,      7       -1     -3 
 54  External oversight bodies are not yet effectively aligne    24        0      1 
  1  The process of interaction between the PSNI and the exter      1       -1      0 
 25  A separate Policing Board and Office of the Police Ombud    25       -4     -1 
 22  The external oversight bodies are not ready for the crea    22        0      1 
  4  There is no need for the Policing Board to have scrutiny      4       -3     -1 
 58  There are clear and necessary limits to what the PSNI sh    58       -1      1 
 19  All public agencies have to adapt to current funding con    19        1      2 
 59  External oversight of policing in the north of Ireland i    59       -2      0 
 23  The office of the Police Ombudsman has been very success    23        2      0 
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                                                                                 Factor Arrays 
No.  Statement                                                        No.       1      2 
 27  Party politics has too great an influence on the Norther    27        1      3 
 37  Policing accountability in Northern Ireland is the ‘Roll    37        1     -1 
 34  Democratically accountable policing is only possible bec    34        1     -1 
 31  The emphasis on external oversight sometimes has the eff    31       -1      2 
 44  The Department of Justice has too much influence over th    44        1     -1 
 39  As a result of external oversight we now have leaders i    39       -1      1 
 13  Since the inception of the Policing Board and the Police    13        0     -2 
 17  All those aspects of policing which the in the past gave    17        0     -3 
 56  Everything that is in the public interest  - not the pol    56        2      0 
 35  The institutions for policing oversight which have evolv    35       -2      0 
 10  PSNI is justified in its concern that information disclo    10       -1      2 
 20  After 15 years of external oversight there is now irrefu    20        2      0 
 15  The Policing Board has been very successful in engenderi    15        0     -3 
 30  The Northern Ireland Policing Board’s powers and respons    30        1     -3 
 53  If it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsman and     53        4     -1 
Factor Characteristics 
                                       Factors 
                                         1        2 
No. of Defining Variables             43       18 
Average Rel. Coef.                   0.800    0.800 
Composite Reliability                0.994    0.986 




Standard Errors for Differences in Factor Z-Scores 
(Diagonal Entries Are S.E. Within Factors) 
               Factors         1        2 
                  1         0.108    0.140 
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Distinguishing Statements for Factor  1 
 (P < .05 ;  Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01) 
Both the Factor Q-Sort Value (Q-SV) and the Z-Score (Z-SCR) are Shown. 
                                                                             Factors 
                                                                                  1             2 
 No. Statement                                                     No.    Q-SV Z-SCR  Q-SV Z-SCR   
  47 Without the external oversight bodies it would be diffi   47      4  1.77*    3  1.41  
  12 Without accountability policing in any democratic societ  12      4  1.75*    4  2.14  
  53 If it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsman and    53      4  1.72*   -1 -0.47  
  33 A new beginning to policing accountability has been the   33      3  1.63*    4  2.01  
   6 The most effective model of policing oversight is one whi    6       3  1.45*    2  0.80  
  20 After 15 years of external oversight there is now irrefu  20       2  1.32*    0 -0.06  
  56 Everything that is in the public interest  - not the pol  56      2  1.11*    0 -0.15  
  23 The office of the Police Ombudsman has been very success  23       2  0.83*    0 -0.11  
  49 External oversight bodies have already played a positive  49       2  0.72*    0 -0.23  
  45 What has evolved through negotiation and legislation for  45       1  0.66*    0 -0.08  
  37 Policing accountability in Northern Ireland is the ‘Roll  37       1  0.55*   -1 -0.43  
  34 Democratically accountable policing is only possible bec  34       1  0.55*   -1 -0.47  
  50 It is unfair of external oversight bodies to judge past   50       1  0.50*    3  1.19  
  27 Party politics has too great an influence on the Norther  27       1  0.46*    3  1.43  
  44 The Department of Justice has too much influence over th  44       1  0.35*   -1 -0.71  
  30 The Northern Ireland Policing Board’s powers and respons  30       1  0.24*   -3 -1.41  
  19 All public agencies have to adapt to current funding con  19       1  0.15*    2  0.98  
  13 Since the inception of the Policing Board and the Police  13       0  0.05*   -2 -1.15  
  29 Sometimes the activities in which external oversight eng  29       0  0.05*    1  0.52  
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  15 The Policing Board has been very successful in engenderi  15       0  0.00*   -3 -1.47  
  32 The office of the Police Ombudsman has all of the power   32       0 -0.04*    1  0.60  
  24 External oversight bodies are not yet effectively aligne  24       0 -0.10*    1  0.65  
  11 It is useful that the Office of the Police Ombudsman can  11       0 -0.16*    1  0.47  
  22 The external oversight bodies are not ready for the crea  22       0 -0.16*    1  0.64  
  17 All those aspects of policing which the in the past gave  17       0 -0.24*   -3 -1.50  
  18 The existence of the arrangements for external civilian   18       0 -0.25*   -2 -0.96  
  40 Over the years the Office of the Police Ombudsman has sh  40       0 -0.27*   -2 -0.91  
  10 PSNI is justified in its concern that information disclo  10      -1 -0.27*    2  1.07  
  31 The emphasis on external oversight sometimes has the eff  31      -1 -0.35*    2  0.71  
  54 The external oversight bodies do not engender confidence  54      -1 -0.46*    1  0.28  
  58 There are clear and necessary limits to what the PSNI sh  58      -1 -0.46*    1  0.36  
   1 The process of interaction between the PSNI and the exter    1      -1 -0.63*    0  0.14  
  39 As a result of external oversight we now have leaders i  39      -1 -0.65*    1  0.55  
   7 The Police Ombudsman’s access to all aspects of policing,    7      -1 -0.70*   -3 -1.43  
  51 It seems as though there is little understanding and sym  51      -2 -0.77*    0 -0.08  
  59 External oversight of policing in the north of Ireland i    59      -2 -0.82*    0  0.10  
  41 Ultimately, the PSNI is accountable to the courts and th  41     -2 -0.84*   -1 -0.32  
  38 It’s as though the PSNI is being pulled up by its roots   38      -2 -0.98*   -1 -0.54  
  35 The institutions for policing oversight which have evolv  35      -2 -1.07*    0  0.21  
  36 External civilian oversight bodies should limit their re  36      -3 -1.23    -4 -1.58  
  21 More of what is presently done by external oversight cou  21      -3 -1.28*   -2 -0.89  
   4 There is no need for the Policing Board to have scrutiny     4      -3 -1.35*   -1 -0.54  
  25 A separate Policing Board and Office of the Police Ombud  25      -4 -1.51*   -1 -0.72  
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Consensus Statements  --  Those That Do Not Distinguish Between ANY Pair of Factors. 
All Listed Statements are Non-Significant at P>.01, and Those Flagged With an * are also Non-
Significant at P>.05. 
                                                                                           Factors 
                                                                                   1            2 
 No.  Statement                                                       No.  Q-SV Z-SCR  Q-SV Z-SCR   
   2* 2.  The PSNI has dealt fairly and speedily with all requests   2     -3 -1.36    -3 -1.20   
   3* 3.  Sometimes it seems as though the external civilian oversi  3     -1 -0.45     0 -0.26   
   5* 5.  The devolution of powers on policing and justice has led   5      2  0.85     2  0.89   
   8* 8.  Without effective external civilian oversight there can b  8      3  1.33     3  1.49   
   9* 9.  It is helpful that the Policing Board is consulted but ul  9     -1 -0.34    -1 -0.47   
  14* 14. As a result of external oversight, accountability is now 14      2  1.15     2  1.00   
  16* 16. There are still some areas where the external oversight  16      2  1.17     2  0.98   
  26* 26.  There is no evidence that external oversight has had an 26     -4 -1.76    -4 -1.69   
  28* 28.  Without external oversight it would not be possible to  28      3  1.71     4  1.86   
  36  36.  External civilian oversight bodies should limit their re 36     -3 -1.23    -4 -1.58   
  42* 42. External oversight bodies should have scrutiny over only 42     -2 -1.16    -2 -0.91   
  43* 43.  Monitoring human rights compliance is now an integral a 43      3  1.42     3  1.30   
  46* 46.  The PSNI is the most accountable police service in the  46      1  0.61     1  0.46   
  48* 48. The independence of the external oversight bodies has ne 48     -2 -0.99    -2 -0.81   
  52  52.  There was nothing wrong with the arrangements for polici 52     -4 -2.20    -4 -1.90   
  55* 55.  When decisions on policing have to be made, the externa 55      0  0.07     0  0.26   
  57* 57. The PSNI has always demonstrated complete transparency t 57     -3 -1.34    -2 -1.07   
 
QANALYZE was completet at 11:26:17 
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Appendix 13. Descending factor arrays. Differences in perspective A (F1) v B (F2) 
                                                                             Factors 
                                                                                      1             2 
No. Statement                                                     Q-SV Z-SCR     Q-SV Z-SCR   
47 Without the external oversight bodies it would be diffi    4   1.77*      3       1.41  
12 Without accountability policing in any democratic societ  4   1.75*     4       2.14  
53 If it was not for the work of the Police Ombudsman and    4   1.72*    -1     -0.47  
33 A new beginning to policing accountability has been the   3   1.63*     4       2.01  
 6 The most effective model of policing oversight is one whi    3   1.45*     2       0.80  
20 After 15 years of external oversight there is now irrefu   2   1.32*     0      -0.06  
56 Everything that is in the public interest  - not the pol   2   1.11*      0      -0.15  
23 The office of the Police Ombudsman has been very success  2   0.83*      0      -0.11  
49 External oversight bodies have already played a positive  2   0.72*     0      -0.23  
45 What has evolved through negotiation and legislation for  1            0.66*       0      -0.08  
37 Policing accountability in Northern Ireland is the „Roll   1   0.55*    -1      -0.43  
34 Democratically accountable policing is only possible bec  1   0.55*    -1      -0.47  
50 It is unfair of external oversight bodies to judge past    1   0.50*      3        1.19  
27 Party politics has too great an influence on the Norther   1   0.46*      3        1.43  
44 The Department of Justice has too much influence over th  1   0.35*    -1      -0.71  
30 The Northern Ireland Policing Board‟s powers and respons  1   0.24*    -3      -1.41  
19 All public agencies have to adapt to current funding con  1   0.15*      2        0.98  
13 Since the inception of the Policing Board and the Police   0   0.05*     -2      -1.15  
29 Sometimes the activities in which external oversight eng  0   0.05*      1        0.52  
15 The Policing Board has been very successful in engenderi  0   0.00*    - 3       -1.47  
32 The office of the Police Ombudsman has all of the power   0  -0.04*     1       0.60  
24 External oversight bodies are not yet effectively aligne   0  -0.10*     1       0.65  
11 It is useful that the Office of the Police Ombudsman can  0  -0.16*     1       0.47  
22 The external oversight bodies are not ready for the crea  0  -0.16*     1       0.64  
17 All those aspects of policing which the in the past gave   0  -0.24*    -3      -1.50  
18 The existence of the arrangements for external civilian    0  -0.25*    -2      -0.96  
40 Over the years the Office of the Police Ombudsman has sh  0  -0.27*    -2      -0.91  
10 PSNI is justified in its concern that information disclo   -1  -0.27*     2       1.07  
31 The emphasis on external oversight sometimes has the eff  -1  -0.35*     2       0.71  
54 The external oversight bodies do not engender confidence  -1  -0.46*     1       0.28  
58 There are clear and necessary limits to what the PSNI sh  -1  -0.46*     1       0.36  
 1 The process of interaction between the PSNI and the exter    -1  -0.63*     0       0.14  
39 As a result of external oversight we now have leaders i   -1  -0.65*     1       0.55  
 7 The Police Ombudsman‟s access to all aspects of policing,     1  -0.70*    -3      -1.43  
51 It seems as though there is little understanding and sym  -2  -0.77*     0      -0.08  
59 External oversight of policing in the north of Ireland i     -2  -0.82*     0       0.10  
41 Ultimately, the PSNI is accountable to the courts and th  -2  -0.84*    -1      -0.32  
38 It‟s as though the PSNI is being pulled up by its roots    -2  -0.98*    -1 -     0.54  
35 The institutions for policing oversight which have evolv   -2  -1.07*     0       0.21  
36 External civilian oversight bodies should limit their re   -3  -1.23      -4       -1.58  
21 More of what is presently done by external oversight cou  -3  -1.28*    -2      -0.89  
 4 There is no need for the Policing Board to have scrutiny     -3  -1.35*    -1      -0.54  
25 A separate Policing Board and Office of the Police Ombud  -4  -1.51*    -1      -0.72  
52 There was nothing wrong with the arrangements for polici  -4  -2.20      -4       -1.90 
 
Appendix 13. -  Differences in Perspective : Distinguishing Statements for Factor  1 
(P < .05 ;  asterisk (*) indicates statistical significance at P < .01) 





Appendix 14.  Chronology of the Loughinisland Massacre, 9 June, 1994. 
June 1994 A UVF loyalist gang attack the Heights Bar, Loughinisland, County 
Down murdering 6 people and injuring 5 others. 
March 2006 Relatives of those killed and injured in Loughinisland lodge a 
complaint with Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Nuala 
O‟Loan. Preliminary work is commissioned on the investigation. 
November 2007 The British Secretary of State & NIO appoint Al Hutchinson to take 
over as Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland from Nuala O‟Loan 
Sept-Nov 2009 A draft report is compiled on the investigation and shared with the  
PSNI. A file is submitted to the PPS. 
November 2010 PPS direct no prosecution. 
June 2011 PONI Al Hutchinson published the first report into Loughinisland. 
September 2011 Families lodge Judicial Review papers in court against PONI. 
November 2011 Amidst growing public controversy Al Hutchinson resigns his post. 
July 2012 The First and deputy First Ministers appoint a new Police 
Ombudsman, Dr Michael Maguire. He directs a review of the report. 
December 2012 Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Dr. Maguire agrees to the 
application by the families to have the first report quashed. 
June 2013 Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Dr. Maguire commissions a 
new investigation into the Loughinisland massacre and RUC conduct. 
June 2016 Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland Dr. Maguire publishes his 
report into the Loughinisland massacre and RUC conduct. 
February 2017 Retired police officers lodge Judicial Review papers in court against 
PONI 
December 2017 Judicial Review by retired police officers against PONI is heard before 
Justice McCloskey. Preliminary judgment states PONI acted 
unlawfully and upholds all grounds of the retired officers application. 
January 2018 Submissions are made that Justice McCloskey must recuse himself and 
that the preliminary judgement must be set aside because of disclosures 
that may give rise to a public perception of “unconscious bias”. Justice 
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